Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ---Art. 15, 199, and Rule 22 of the Passports Rules, 2021 Right to freedom of movement—Placement of citizen’s name on Passport Control List (PCL)—Legality—Due process—Requirement of Federal Government’s approval The Petitioner challenged the placement of his name on the Passport Control List (PCL) under Article 199 of the Constitution, contending that the restriction was arbitrary, unlawful, and a violation of his fundamental rights. The Petitioner was accused in FIR No. 96/23 under various sections of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, and the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. However, his pre-arrest bail petition was withdrawn after the investigating officer found him not guilty. Despite this, his name remained on the PCL based on the recommendation of the Home Department, Punjab, without any prior notice or opportunity for a hearing. Rule 22 of the Passports Rules, 2021, requires approval from the Federal Government for placing an individual on the PCL, which was absent in the present case. The court held that such a restriction, in the absence of lawful authority and procedural fairness, violated Article 15 of the Constitution, which guarantees the right to free movement subject to reasonable restrictions imposed by law. Therefore, the placement of the Petitioner’s name on the PCL was declared illegal, unconstitutional, and of no legal effect. Cited Cases: Dr. Joseph Wilson v. Federation of Pakistan 2017 PCrLJ 1569 Dr. Shireen M. Mazari v. Federation of Pakistan 2024 MLD 1020 Rasikh Ellahi v. Federation of Pakistan 2024 YLR 2616 Messrs Mustafa Impex, Karachi v. Government of Pakistan PLD 2016 SC 808 Farah Mazhar v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2022 Lahore 119 ----- Disposition: Writ petition allowed—Respondents directed to remove Petitioner’s name from PCL, as its inclusion was found to be unjustified, illegal, and violative of constitutional rights.

Summary: Background: Multiple petitions were filed by several journalists against the Federation of Pakistan due to numerous FIRs registered against them across various regions of Pakistan. The petitioners, who were journalists critical of government, claimed that the FIRs were filed to suppress freedom of expression. The main grievances included the registration of FIRs under the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) sections such as 131, 153, and 505, among others, for their opinions and reports shared on social media and television platforms. The petitioners requested the consolidation of all FIRs under one jurisdiction to prevent harassment and sought transitory bail. -----Issues: 1- Whether multiple FIRs related to the same incident or cause of action can be consolidated and tried under one jurisdiction. ----2- Whether the registration of FIRs in different jurisdictions amounts to political harassment and an abuse of the criminal justice system. ----3- Whether the actions of journalists expressing opinions on social media or television can be considered crimes under the PPC and Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act (PECA). ----4- Whether the authorities must provide complete records of all FIRs filed against the petitioners. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court held that multiple FIRs for the same cause of action, even if registered in different provinces, violate the legal principle established in the Sughran Bibi case. After the registration of the first FIR, any subsequent FIRs are to be treated as 161 CrPC statements or supplementary to the initial case. The court ruled that registering multiple FIRs against individuals expressing opinions through media platforms, especially journalists, constitutes harassment and an abuse of the criminal justice system. The FIRs were politically motivated and intended to punish the petitioners for their critical views. The court clarified that not all cases of expressing opinions on media platforms should be considered crimes under the PPC or PECA. For an act to qualify under PECA, specific mens rea and actus reus requirements must be met, and mere criticism does not fall under these categories. The authorities were directed to provide the petitioners with all the information and records related to FIRs filed against them. Furthermore, the court emphasized that the constitutional protections of due process and the right to a fair trial must be upheld in these cases. The petitions were disposed of, and the court provided protection orders to the petitioners, preventing further arrests related to the contested FIRs. -----Citations/Precedents: Sughran Bibi v. The State (PLD 2018 SC 595) Muhammad Bashir v. The State (PLD 2007 SC 539) Ch. Abdul Razzaq v. Federation of Pakistan and others (PLD 1998 Lahore 394) Independent Media Corporation (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Government of Balochistan (PLD 2019 Balochistan 27) Asad Qaiser v. Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (Writ Petition No.5281-P/2023) Muhammad Azam Khan Swati v. Inspector General of Police, Balochistan (PLD 2023 Balochistan 85) Sandalbar Enterprises Ltd. v. Central Board of Revenue (PLD 1997 SC 334) Sui Southern Gas Limited v. Federation of Pakistan (2018 SCMR 802) Protection of Journalists and Media Professionals Act, 2021 (Enacted 01.12.2021)

Summary: (a) Pakistan Penal Code (XLV of 1860): ----Ss. 124-A, 147, 149, 153, 153-A, 341 – Cognizance of Offenses Against the State – Authority for Complaint – Abuse of Process The petitioners sought to quash FIR No. 92/2023, registered under Sections 124-A, 147, 149, 153, 153-A, and 341 PPC, along with Sections 3 and 4 of the Balochistan Regulation & Control of Loudspeakers and Sound Amplifiers Ordinance, 1965. The allegations involved hate speech and incitement against state institutions during a gathering. Under Section 196 Cr.P.C., no court can take cognizance of offenses against the state (e.g., Sections 124-A, 153-A PPC) unless a formal complaint is filed by the Federal or Provincial Government or an officer empowered by them. Since the FIR was registered by a police sub-inspector without authorization from the competent authority, it lacked legal validity. Reliance was placed on Section 196 Cr.P.C., which serves as a safeguard against misuse of prosecutorial powers in cases involving offenses against the state. (b) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973: ----Arts. 16, 17 & 19 – Fundamental Rights – Freedom of Assembly, Association, and Speech The Constitution guarantees the right to freedom of assembly (Article 16), freedom of association (Article 17), and freedom of speech (Article 19). These rights are subject to reasonable restrictions in the interest of public order, morality, or the integrity and sovereignty of Pakistan. However, such restrictions must be imposed through proper legal mechanisms. In the present case, the FIR and subsequent proceedings were initiated without following due legal process, violating these constitutional safeguards. (c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898): ----S. 196 – Prosecution for Offenses Against the State – Mandatory Procedure Section 196 Cr.P.C. mandates that offenses against the state, including Sections 124-A and 153-A PPC, cannot be prosecuted without explicit authorization from the Federal or Provincial Government or an officer empowered by them. In this case, the FIR was lodged by a police officer without adhering to this legal requirement, rendering the proceedings void ab initio. (d) Abuse of Process of Law – Quashing of FIR: The court emphasized that inherent jurisdiction must be exercised sparingly and only to prevent abuse of the legal process or to secure the ends of justice. The allegations in the FIR were vague, non-specific, and failed to establish any clear role of the petitioners. The court observed that the proceedings appeared to be initiated with mala fide intent to harass and scandalize the petitioners. Reliance was placed on the principle that courts can quash proceedings when they are manifestly groundless or an abuse of legal process. ----Disposition: The petition was allowed. FIR No. 92/2023, dated 4th August 2023, registered at P.S. City Pishin, and all subsequent proceedings were quashed. The court held that the FIR was registered without proper legal authority under Section 196 Cr.P.C., and no specific role was attributed to the petitioners. The court further ruled that the case constituted an abuse of legal process aimed at harassment and reputational damage.

Summary: Who can be complainant in case under section 121, 121-A, 124-A 131 and 153 PPC. Principle laid down -----------Issues: 1)Whether the FIR against Captain (Rtd) Muhammad Safdar was legally valid given the requirements of ---Section 196 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. ----2)Whether the allegations in the FIR constituted an offence under the PPC. ----3)Whether there was evidence of mala fide intent in registering the FIR without forensic verification of the video evidence. ---4)Whether the petitioner’s actions constituted waging war against the state or instigating mutiny. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court held that per Section 196 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, the complainant was not competent to lodge the FIR without the authorization of the Federal or Provincial Government. No such authorization was produced, rendering the FIR legally invalid. The court found no material evidence that the petitioner’s actions met the legal criteria for the alleged offences. Criticism of government policies by a politician does not equate to waging war against the country. The court noted the lack of forensic verification of the video evidence as indicative of mala fide intent, further invalidating the FIR. The allegations did not constitute waging war against the state or instigating mutiny, as no concrete evidence, such as pamphlets, literature, or arms, was presented. Consequently, W.P. No. 2843-P of 2021 was allowed, and the FIR was quashed. Cr.M.(B.B.A.) No. 809-A of 2021 became infructuous and was dismissed. W.P. No. 1297-P of 2021 was disposed of with directions to the respondents to provide case details to the petitioner upon request. ----Citations/Precedents: Section 196 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. Sections 121, 121-A, 124-A, 131, 153, 505, and 511 of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC).

Summary: The applicants were accused of delivering speeches at a public meeting that allegedly incited hatred and animosity between different groups and communities and brought the government into disrepute. The meeting, attended by a large audience, led to the registration of an FIR under sections 124-A and 153-A of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) on 6-11-1986. The applicants were already under preventive detention and were arrested on 9-12-1986 and 10-12-1986. An interim challan was submitted mentioning offences under sections 123-A, 124-A, 153-A, PPC, section 13 of the Prevention of Anti-National Activities Act, 1974, and section 16 of the Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, 1960 (M.P.O.). ----Issues: 1- Whether the First Information Report (FIR) and the investigation were valid under the relevant provisions of law. 2- Whether the applicants were entitled to bail under sections 123-A, 124-A, 153-A, PPC, and section 13 of the Prevention of Anti-National Activities Act, 1974. 3- Whether the provisions of section 196 Cr.P.C. were complied with for taking cognizance of the offences. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The FIR and investigation under sections 124-A and 153-A PPC required a complaint under the order of the Federal Government or Provincial Government as per section 196 Cr.P.C. The report made by a police constable did not meet this requirement. The offences under sections 123-A and 124-A PPC and section 13 of the Prevention of Anti-National Activities Act, 1974, were exclusively triable by a Special Court constituted under the Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act, 1975. A complaint in respect of these offences had been filed before the competent Special Court, rendering the bail application for these offences infructuous. The bail application for offences under section 153-A PPC and section 16 of the M.P.O. was granted, as these offences were not scheduled offences triable by the Special Court. ----Citations/Precedents: Moulana Dost Muhammad v. The State, 1978 PCr.LJ 184 Muhammad Gul and another v. The State, 1985 P Cr.LJ 205 Gul Muhammad etc. v. The State, 1987 P Cr.LJ 737 AIR 1919 Mad. 968 AIR 1936 Pesh 65 PLD 1962 SC 397 PLD 1975 Lah. 126 PLD 1978 Kar. 108 PLD 1959 SC (Pak.) 177 Sardar Gian Singh v. Emperor, AIR 1938 Lahore 82 Muhammad Ehsan Khan v. State, 1968 P Cr.LJ 759 Khizar Hayat v. Commissioner Sargodha Division and others, PLD 1965 Lah. 349 Ch. Khadim Hussain v. The State, PLD 1985 SC (AJ&K) 125

Summary: Bail denied -----(a) Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act, 2016 ---- Ss. 20, 24, 47 --- Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 376(A), 509, 109 & 153 --- Cyber defamation --- Dissemination of false, indecent content on social media against a police official --- Bail declined despite offence not falling under prohibitory clause --- Prima facie material available. Accusation against the petitioner, a YouTuber/V-logger, was that he shared and circulated a video clip via WhatsApp falsely accusing the complainant, a police official, of committing Zina with a lady constable. The video was also shared in various social media groups, causing severe reputational damage and psychological trauma to the complainant and tarnishing the image of the police department. Inquiry conducted by Superintendent of Police confirmed that the allegations were false and that the petitioner and his co-accused were responsible for spreading the defamatory content. Recovery of the petitioner’s phone yielded the video in question, substantiating his involvement. Although offences under Ss. 20 and 24 of PECA, 2016 are bailable and compoundable under S. 47, PECA, and not hit by the prohibitory clause of S. 497, Cr.P.C., courts have held that bail may still be declined in exceptional circumstances where the offence shocks public morality or affects society at large. Petitioner's actions were found to be socially harmful and humiliating, and could lead to psychological breakdown or suicidal ideation in victims. No ground for further inquiry was found. Held, bail is not to be granted as a matter of right where the conduct is heinous, even if the offence is not listed under the prohibitory clause. Petition dismissed. Cited Cases: • Imran Khan v. The State 2020 P.Cr.L.J 1652 • Shameel Ahmad v. The State 2009 SCMR 174 • Sohail Younas v. The State and others 2015 P.Cr.L.J 563 Cited Provisions: • Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act, 2016, Ss. 20, 24, 47 • Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, Ss. 376(A), 509, 109, 153 • Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 497 Disposition: Bail petition dismissed.