Summary: Background: Multiple petitions were filed by several journalists against the Federation of Pakistan due to numerous FIRs registered against them across various regions of Pakistan. The petitioners, who were journalists critical of government, claimed that the FIRs were filed to suppress freedom of expression. The main grievances included the registration of FIRs under the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) sections such as 131, 153, and 505, among others, for their opinions and reports shared on social media and television platforms. The petitioners requested the consolidation of all FIRs under one jurisdiction to prevent harassment and sought transitory bail. -----Issues: 1- Whether multiple FIRs related to the same incident or cause of action can be consolidated and tried under one jurisdiction. ----2- Whether the registration of FIRs in different jurisdictions amounts to political harassment and an abuse of the criminal justice system. ----3- Whether the actions of journalists expressing opinions on social media or television can be considered crimes under the PPC and Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act (PECA). ----4- Whether the authorities must provide complete records of all FIRs filed against the petitioners. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court held that multiple FIRs for the same cause of action, even if registered in different provinces, violate the legal principle established in the Sughran Bibi case. After the registration of the first FIR, any subsequent FIRs are to be treated as 161 CrPC statements or supplementary to the initial case. The court ruled that registering multiple FIRs against individuals expressing opinions through media platforms, especially journalists, constitutes harassment and an abuse of the criminal justice system. The FIRs were politically motivated and intended to punish the petitioners for their critical views. The court clarified that not all cases of expressing opinions on media platforms should be considered crimes under the PPC or PECA. For an act to qualify under PECA, specific mens rea and actus reus requirements must be met, and mere criticism does not fall under these categories. The authorities were directed to provide the petitioners with all the information and records related to FIRs filed against them. Furthermore, the court emphasized that the constitutional protections of due process and the right to a fair trial must be upheld in these cases. The petitions were disposed of, and the court provided protection orders to the petitioners, preventing further arrests related to the contested FIRs. -----Citations/Precedents: Sughran Bibi v. The State (PLD 2018 SC 595) Muhammad Bashir v. The State (PLD 2007 SC 539) Ch. Abdul Razzaq v. Federation of Pakistan and others (PLD 1998 Lahore 394) Independent Media Corporation (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Government of Balochistan (PLD 2019 Balochistan 27) Asad Qaiser v. Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (Writ Petition No.5281-P/2023) Muhammad Azam Khan Swati v. Inspector General of Police, Balochistan (PLD 2023 Balochistan 85) Sandalbar Enterprises Ltd. v. Central Board of Revenue (PLD 1997 SC 334) Sui Southern Gas Limited v. Federation of Pakistan (2018 SCMR 802) Protection of Journalists and Media Professionals Act, 2021 (Enacted 01.12.2021)

Summary: Post Arrest Bail by Azam Khan Swati in FIR No. 185/2022 dated 26.11.2022 U/s 20 PECA 2016 r/w 131, 500, 501, 505, & 109 PPC P.S. FIA Cyber Crime Reporting Centre, Islamabad ---- Background: In Criminal Miscellaneous No. 1644-B/2022, Muhammad Azam Khan Swati sought bail after arrest in FIR No. 185/2022 dated 26.11.2022. The FIR was registered under Sections 20 of PECA, 2016, read with Sections 131, 500, 501, 505, and 109 of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) at the Police Station Federal Investigation Agency, Cyber-Crime Reporting Centre, Islamabad. The case was based on a complaint alleging that objectionable tweets were made from Swati's Twitter account, inciting mutiny and derogatory remarks about serving Army Personnel. -----Issues: 1) Whether the petitioner was entitled to bail despite the charges under Sections 20 of PECA, 2016, and various sections of the PPC. 2) Whether the procedural requirements for investigation were followed by the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA). 3) Whether the petitioner's repeated offence disqualified him from bail. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: Entitlement to Bail: The court noted that none of the offences charged against the petitioner fell within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 Cr.P.C., as the maximum punishment under Section 131 PPC was up to 10 years. According to the established principle, for the purpose of bail, the lesser sentence should be considered, thus entitling the petitioner to bail as a rule, with refusal being an exception (Tariq Bashir v. The State, PLD 1995 SC 34). ----Procedural Requirements: The court observed that the FIA did not follow the Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) No. 5/2020, which required a notice under Section 160 Cr.P.C. and a verification process before arrest. The procedural lapse rendered the case one of further inquiry, thus justifying the grant of bail. ----Repeated Offence: Although the petitioner had a previous FIR (No. 109/2022 dated 13.10.2022), the court found that this alone did not fall within the exceptions established in the Tariq Bashir case. The respondents could seek cancellation of bail if the petitioner repeated the offence, but this was not sufficient to deny bail at this stage. ----Outcome: The petition for bail was allowed. The petitioner was granted bail subject to furnishing bail bonds of Rs. 200,000/- with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court. The court noted that if the petitioner repeated the offence, the law would take its course, and the respondents could apply for the recall of the bail order. ----Citations/Precedents: Tariq Bashir v. The State (PLD 1995 SC 34) Kh. Soleman Rafiq v. The State (PLD 2020 SC 456) Asif Ali Zardari v. The State (PLD 2001 SC 568) Ms. Benazir Bhutto v. The President of Pakistan (1992 SCMR 140) M. H. Khondkar v. The State (PLD 1966 Supreme Court 140) Islamic Republic of Pakistan v. Abdul Wali Khan (PLD 1976 Supreme Court 57)

Summary: Azam Swati has been arrested by FIA. Seeks direction upon the Interior secretary to compile data regarding all FIRs lodged against him regarding the same occurrences. (FIR No. 185/2022 dated 26.11.2022 U/s 20 of PECA 2016 r/w 131,500,501,505,109 PPC P.S. FIA Cyber Crime Reporting Centre, Islamabad) --- Background: In W.P. No. 4441 of 2022, Muhammad Azam Khan Swati petitioned for information on pending cases against him in Sindh and Balochistan related to the same occurrence of social media tweets against the Armed Forces of Pakistan. Swati sought directions for the Federation of Pakistan to provide this information, claiming it as his fundamental right for defense. ----Issues: 1) Whether Swati has a legal right to seek information on pending cases against him in other provinces. 2) Whether the Federal Government is obligated to provide such information. 3) Application of Articles 149 and 10-A of the Constitution in this context. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: ----Legal Right to Information: The court held that there is no legal right for an individual to seek such information under Article 149 or the Rules of Business, 1973. Article 10-A provides the right to a fair trial but does not mandate the provision of information about pending cases. Federal Government's Obligation: The court found no obligation on the Federal Government to obtain information for the petitioner. Article 149 and Rules of Business: The court noted that these provisions empower the Federal Government to issue general directions, not specific to individuals seeking information about pending cases. -----Outcome: The petition was disposed of, with the court advising Swati to seek remedies in the relevant provincial jurisdictions (Sindh and Balochistan). The court suggested the development of a national system to link all police stations to manage information on FIRs, referencing the principles laid down in Sughran Bibi’s case. -----Citations/Precedents: The State of Pakistan v. Mehrajuddin [PLD 1959 SC 147] Fazal-E-Haq v. The State [PLD 1960 SC 295] Nawab Syed Raunaq Ali v. Chief Settlement Commission [PLD 1973 SC 236] Masudul Hassan v. Khadim Hussain [PLD 1963 SC 203] Mst. Sughran Bibi v. The State [PLD 2018 SC 595] Sh. Ihsanul Haq Piracha v. Mr. Wasim Sajjad [PLD 1986 SC 200]

Summary: Background: The petitioner was arrested under offences including sedition, provocation of riots, public mischief, and criminal intimidation. His physical custody was initially extended by the Trial Court but later refused further extension, leading to a criminal revision which was then allowed by the Additional Sessions Judge, granting further physical remand. The petitioner challenged this order under Article 199 of the Constitution. -----Issues: 1- Whether the High Court has jurisdiction to interfere in the investigation and remand orders under Article 199 of the Constitution. 2- Whether the petitioner was subjected to torture during police custody. 3- Whether the FIR could proceed without the sanction of the Federal Government as required under sections 196 and 196-A, Cr.P.C. 4- Whether the physical remand granted by the Additional Sessions Judge was legally valid. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --Jurisdiction under Article 199: The High Court emphasized that it cannot adjudicate a petition under Article 199 like an appeal, and it should only determine whether there was an error of law or jurisdiction. Interference in the investigation can only occur under specific circumstances, such as mala fide intentions or actions beyond the jurisdiction of the investigating agency, which were not proven in this case. --Allegation of Torture: The petitioner claimed torture during police custody. The jail authorities noted bruises on his body upon his admission, but no further action was taken to investigate these injuries. The Court observed that allegations of torture are serious and suggested an inquiry by a retired High Court Judge to investigate the matter thoroughly. --Sanction under Sections 196 and 196-A, Cr.P.C.: The Court held that the provisions of sections 196 and 196-A, Cr.P.C., relate to the Court taking cognizance of the offence, not to the investigation itself. It referenced Supreme Court rulings that investigations could proceed without the sanction, but cognizance by a Court would require it. Therefore, the FIR could continue, and the issue of sanction would be relevant when the Court takes cognizance. --Legality of Physical Remand: The Court found that the Additional Sessions Judge correctly examined police diaries and other materials before granting further physical remand. The decision was not based on conjectures but on the need for further investigation, including the recovery of the cellular phone and conducting a polygraph test. The petition was dismissed, and the order for further physical remand was upheld. The Court suggested an inquiry into the allegations of torture by a retired High Court Judge and expected the Ministry of Interior to ensure this. -----Citations/Precedents: Ghulam Sarwar Zardari v. Piyar Ali alias Piyaro 2010 SCMR 624 Hayatullah Khan and another v. Muhammad Khan and others 2011 SCMR 1354 Muhammad Hanif v. The State 2019 SCMR 2029 Muhammad Nazir v. Fazal Karim and others PLD 2012 Supreme Court 892 General (R) Pervez Musharaf v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2020 Lah. 285 Ali Raza and another v. Federation of Pakistan and another PLD 2017 Isl. 64 Salman Taseer v. Judge, Special Court 1993 SCMR 71

Summary: Who can be complainant in case under section 121, 121-A, 124-A 131 and 153 PPC. Principle laid down -----------Issues: 1)Whether the FIR against Captain (Rtd) Muhammad Safdar was legally valid given the requirements of ---Section 196 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. ----2)Whether the allegations in the FIR constituted an offence under the PPC. ----3)Whether there was evidence of mala fide intent in registering the FIR without forensic verification of the video evidence. ---4)Whether the petitioner’s actions constituted waging war against the state or instigating mutiny. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court held that per Section 196 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, the complainant was not competent to lodge the FIR without the authorization of the Federal or Provincial Government. No such authorization was produced, rendering the FIR legally invalid. The court found no material evidence that the petitioner’s actions met the legal criteria for the alleged offences. Criticism of government policies by a politician does not equate to waging war against the country. The court noted the lack of forensic verification of the video evidence as indicative of mala fide intent, further invalidating the FIR. The allegations did not constitute waging war against the state or instigating mutiny, as no concrete evidence, such as pamphlets, literature, or arms, was presented. Consequently, W.P. No. 2843-P of 2021 was allowed, and the FIR was quashed. Cr.M.(B.B.A.) No. 809-A of 2021 became infructuous and was dismissed. W.P. No. 1297-P of 2021 was disposed of with directions to the respondents to provide case details to the petitioner upon request. ----Citations/Precedents: Section 196 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. Sections 121, 121-A, 124-A, 131, 153, 505, and 511 of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC).

Summary: Bail granted----Background: The petitioner was convicted under several sections of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) and sentenced by the Sessions Judge, Islamabad. The convictions and sentences included: 3 years' rigorous imprisonment (R.I.) for sedition (S. 124-A, PPC) 7 years' R.I. for abetting mutiny (Ss. 131/109, PPC) 2 years' R.I. for statements conducing to public mischief (S. 505(a), PPC) 4 years' R.I. for forgery and using as genuine a forged document (Ss. 468/471, PPC) 1 year's R.I. for defamation (S. 500, PPC) 2 years' R.I. for forgery for the purpose of harming reputation (S. 469, PPC) All sentences were directed to run concurrently, and the petitioner was given the benefit of Section 382-B, Cr.P.C., which accounts for the period of detention during trial. The petitioner appealed the convictions and sentences and sought suspension of the sentences during the pendency of the appeal, which was initially declined by the Lahore High Court and the Supreme Court. The petitioner then filed for a review of the Supreme Court’s decision. -----Issues: 1- Whether the petitioner’s sentences should be suspended during the pendency of the appeal considering the time already served and the remissions applicable. 2- Whether the necessary government sanction for cognizance of the offense under Section 124-A, PPC was obtained. 3- Whether the High Court's refusal to suspend the sentences was justified given the period already served by the petitioner. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --Suspension of Sentences: The Supreme Court held that the petitioner had already undergone the majority of his sentences, and if the remissions granted under the law were credited, he would have served almost the entire sentence under sections 131/109, PPC. The Court noted that not a single hearing had taken place in the appeal for more than three years, and the likelihood of the appeal being heard soon was uncertain. In light of the circumstances and following the precedent set in previous cases, the Court decided to suspend the sentences of the petitioner during the pendency of the appeal. --Government Sanction: The Court took a tentative view that the necessary sanction from the government for taking cognizance of the offense under Section 124-A, PPC might not have been obtained, which would be a matter for the Appellate Court to consider definitively. --High Court’s Refusal: The Supreme Court disagreed with the High Court's refusal to suspend the sentences. The argument that suspending the sentence would defeat the object of filing the appeal was found to be without substance. The provisions of Section 426(3), Cr.P.C., which exclude the period of suspension from the sentence in case of dismissal of the appeal, were highlighted. The Supreme Court accepted the review petition, set aside the Lahore High Court's order, and suspended the petitioner’s sentences during the pendency of the appeal. The petitioner was ordered to be released on bail subject to furnishing bail bonds. -----Citations/Precedents: Salman Taseer v. Judge, Special Court 1993 SCMR 71 Adnan A. Khawaja v. The State Criminal Petition No. 281 of 2001 Khuda Bux v. Emperor AIR 1934 Calcutta 105 Javed Ahmad v. State 1978 SCMR 114

Summary: Bail granted----Background: The petitioner was convicted and sentenced including sedition and abetment to mutiny. The petitioner sought a review of the Supreme Court's judgment, which dismissed his petition for suspension of his conviction and sentence. The review was sought on the grounds that the petitioner had already undergone a significant portion of his sentence and that necessary government sanction for certain charges was not obtained. -----Issues: 1- Whether the Supreme Court erred in dismissing the petition for suspension of conviction and sentence without considering the period already undergone by the petitioner. 2- Whether the necessary sanction for taking cognizance of the offense under Section 124-A of the Penal Code was obtained. 3- Whether the petitioner was entitled to suspension of sentence due to having undergone a substantial portion of the sentence. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Supreme Court found that: The period already undergone by the petitioner was not considered in the previous judgment. The petitioner had completed all sentences except for the one under Sections 131/109 of the Penal Code, and with remissions, he had almost completed the entire sentence. There was a prima facie case that the necessary government sanction under Section 196 of the Criminal Procedure Code for the offense under Section 124-A of the Penal Code was not obtained. Given that the appeal had not been heard for over three years and considering the substantial period already served by the petitioner, the suspension of the sentence was justified in the interest of justice. The Supreme Court reviewed and recalled its earlier judgment, converted the criminal petition into an appeal, and allowed the suspension of the petitioner’s conviction and sentences during the pendency of the appeal before the Lahore High Court. The petitioner was ordered to be released on bail. -----Citations/Precedents: Salman Taseer v. Judge, Special Court 1993 SCMR 71 Adnan A. Khawaja v. The State Criminal Petition No.281 of 2001

Summary: Background: The appellants were charged with offenses under Sections 406, 409, 420, and 427 of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) and were subjected to trial by the Field General Court Martial. They were accused of seducing or attempting to seduce military personnel from their duty or allegiance to the Government of Pakistan. Convictions were challenged in the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, which dismissed their writ petitions. The appellants then appealed to the Supreme Court. -----Issues: 1- Whether civilian personnel subject to the Pakistan Air Force Act or the Pakistan Army Act should be convicted under military laws or under Section 131 of the PPC. 2- Whether the High Court had jurisdiction to entertain writ petitions under Article 199(3) of the Constitution in cases involving General Court Martial proceedings. 3- Whether the enhancement of sentences by the Appellate Authority without providing an opportunity of hearing was valid. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --Conviction under Military Laws: Civilians subject to the Pakistan Air Force Act or the Pakistan Army Act for offenses of seducing military personnel are to be convicted under the respective military laws (Sections 31(d) of the Pakistan Army Act and 37(e) of the Pakistan Air Force Act) and not under Section 131 of the PPC. --Jurisdiction of High Court: The Supreme Court held that the High Court rightly declined to exercise jurisdiction under Article 199(3) of the Constitution as there was no mala fide on the part of the prosecution, and the trial by General Court Martial was within its jurisdiction. --Enhancement of Sentences: The Appellate Authority has the power to enhance sentences under Section 133(b) of the Pakistan Army Act. The enhancement of sentences from life imprisonment to death was valid as the appellants were given an opportunity of hearing through their counsel and jail appeals. -----Citations/Precedents: Shahida Zahir Abbasi v. President of Pakistan: PLD 1996 SC 632 Farooq Ahmed Khan Leghari v. Federation of Pakistan: PLD 1999 SC 57 Gul Akbar v. Deputy Chief of Air Staff: PLD 1968 Pesh. 114 Begum Shamim Afridi v. Province of Punjab: PLD 1974 Lah. 120 State v. Zia-ur-Rehman: PLD 1973 SC 49 Saifuddin Saif v. Federation of Pakistan: PLD 1977 Lah. 1174 Federation of Pakistan v. Ghulam Mustafa Khar: PLD 1989 SC 26 Khuda Bux v. Emperor: AIR 1934 Cal. 105 Javed Ahmad v. State: 1978 SCMR 114 Anwar Aziz v. Federation of Pakistan: PLD 2001 SC 549