Summary: Acquittal ---- (a) Pakistan Penal Code (XLV of 1860)----Ss. 302, 324, 353, 396, 435, 427, 148 & 149---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997)----S. 7---Appreciation of evidence---Unnamed accused---Conviction on capital charge---Sustainability---FIR was lodged against unknown assailants and appellants were not nominated by name---Informant attempted to give physical descriptions of only some assailants, but gave no identifying particulars of the remaining alleged offenders including the driver and the LMG operator---Prosecution case rested mainly on ocular account of two witnesses who, despite alleged indiscriminate firing, remained completely unhurt and whose conduct in immediately chasing heavily armed assailants, though they were in plain clothes, unarmed, and had already witnessed one death and multiple serious injuries, was held to be unnatural and contrary to normal human behaviour---Their claimed ability, during a sudden life-threatening attack, to observe and retain minute features such as age, height, complexion and clothing of the assailants was also found inherently improbable---Presence of said witnesses at the place of occurrence was not established through any independent and unimpeachable evidence---Held, that prosecution version suffered from material improbabilities and could not safely sustain conviction on capital charge. (b) Criminal trial---Identification parade---Evidentiary value---Joint identification parade of multiple accused---Effect---Identification parade in the present case was not conducted through injured witnesses, but through two alleged eyewitnesses, and that too jointly in respect of multiple accused---It is a settled rule that each accused is to be put to identification separately and a joint identification parade is unsafe, unreliable and has consistently been disapproved by the Supreme Court---Such defective identification proceedings lost their corroborative value and could not be safely relied upon for maintaining conviction. Cited cases: Gulfam and another v. The State (2017 SCMR 1189); Lal Pasand v. The State (PLD 1981 SC 142); Ziaullah alias Jaji v. The State (2008 SCMR 1210); Bacha Zeb v. The State (2010 SCMR 1189); Shafqat Mehmood and others v. The State (2011 SCMR 537). (c) Criminal trial---Identification parade---Prior disclosure of identity of accused to police---Effect---Appellants had already been arrested in another criminal case and were in judicial custody when, according to the prosecution itself, they allegedly disclosed involvement in the present occurrence and were thereafter formally arrested in this case---Where identity of accused already stands disclosed to police before holding of identification parade, sanctity and evidentiary worth of such parade becomes highly doubtful---Held, that identification evidence so procured had lost legal significance as corroborative evidence. (d) Qanun-e-Shahadat / criminal jurisprudence principles---Disclosure by accused in another case---Acquittal in that case---Effect---Appellants had allegedly been linked with the present occurrence through disclosures made by them in FIR No.73 dated 24.04.2010, but in that very case they had already been acquitted by the Supreme Court vide judgment dated 17.02.2025 in Criminal Appeal No.627 of 2022---In such circumstances, the alleged disclosure lost legal weight and could not validly connect the appellants with the present crime---Prosecution further failed to produce any independent direct or circumstantial evidence reasonably connecting the appellants with commission of the offence. (e) Criminal trial---Benefit of doubt---Scope---Where prosecution evidence is afflicted with material inconsistencies, inherent improbabilities and defects going to the root of the case, benefit of doubt must be extended to accused---Such benefit is not a matter of grace or concession but a matter of right---Even a single circumstance creating reasonable doubt in the mind of a prudent person is sufficient to dislodge prosecution case---Held, that Courts below failed to properly notice serious infirmities in prosecution evidence and thereby fell into error in maintaining conviction and death sentence. Appeal was allowed, convictions and sentences recorded by the Trial Court and maintained by the High Court were set aside, appellants were acquitted of the charge on benefit of doubt, and were directed to be released forthwith if not required in any other case.

Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 452, 427, 109, 148 & 149---Qatl-i-amd, house-trespass after preparation for hurt, assault, or wrongful restraint, causing damage or loss of fifty rupees or more through mischief, abetment, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly---Appreciation of evidence---Delay of 11-hours and 35-minutes in conducting the postmortem examination on the dead body of the deceased---Consequential---Accused was charged that he along with his co-accused persons committed murder of the father of complainant---Although as per contents of the FIR, the occurrence took place on 18.12.2007 at 06:30 p.m. and was alleged to have been seen by witnesses and the matter was reported to the police on the same day at 08:00 p.m., however, postmortem examination on the dead body of deceased was conducted on the next day i.e. 19.12.2007 at 06:05 a.m. i.e., with the delay of about 11 hours and 35 minutes---In the postmortem report of deceased, Medical Officer, who conducted postmortem examination on the dead body, had mentioned probable time between injuries and death as immediate and between death and postmortem as within 12 hours---Thus, there was a delay of 11 hours and 35 minutes in conducting autopsy on the dead body of deceased---Complainant was son of the deceased and eye-witness was paternal nephew of the complainant and both the said witnesses of ocular account were the residents of the same vicinity---In such a situation if the said witnesses were present at the place of occurrence and also witnessed the scene of occurrence then such an inordinate and unexplained delay would never have occurred---So it was a case of delayed postmortem, which casted serious doubt and the inference could be drawn that the intervening period was consumed in fabricating the prosecution story after the preliminary investigation, otherwise there was no justification for sending the police papers on the next day---There was no explanation at all available on record for what happened during the intervening period which delayed the postmortem examination for about 11 hours and 35 minutes---Such noticeable delay in post mortem examination of the dead body was generally suggestive of a real possibility that time had been consumed by the police in procuring and planting eye-witnesses before preparing police papers necessary for the same---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. Irshad Ahmed v. The State 2011 SCMR 1190; Muhammad Rafique alias Feeqa v. The State 2019 SCMR 1068 and Iftikhar alias Kharoo v. The State 2024 SCMR 1449 rel. (b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 452, 427, 109, 148 & 149---Qatl-i-amd, house-trespass after preparation for hurt, assault, or wrongful restraint, causing damage or loss of fifty rupees or more through mischief, abetment, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly---Appreciation of evidence---Motive not proved---Accused was charged that he along with his co-accused persons committed murder of the father of complainant---As per prosecution's own case, on 18.12.2007 at about 04:00 p.m. when the son of complainant was affixing election banners, acquitted co-accused forbade him, upon which an altercation took place between them and thereafter at 06:30 p.m. after about two hours and thirty minutes, the occurrence took place---Altercation took place between the son of the complainant and one of the co-accused but it was very surprising as well as not understandable that instead of murdering said son of complainant, the accused persons committed the qatl-e-amd of father of complainant, aged about 70/75 years, the grandfather of said son of complainant with whom no ill-will or any enmity had been brought on the record by the prosecution, whereas at the time of occurrence, complainant was also at the mercy of the accused persons who did not cause him even a single scratch to him---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. (c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 452, 427, 109, 148 & 149---Qatl-i-amd, house-trespass after preparation for hurt, assault, or wrongful restraint, causing damage or loss of fifty rupees or more through mischief, abetment, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly---Appreciation of evidence---Dishonest improvements made by witnesses in their statements---Accused was charged that he along with his co-accused persons committed murder of the father of complainant---Entire case of the prosecution relied on the ocular account furnished by complainant, who was son of the deceased and an eye-witness, who was paternal nephew of the complainant---On 09.02.2011 examination-in-chief of complainant was recorded but he could not be cross-examined as he was murdered---Other eye-witness appeared in the witness box and admitted in his cross-examination that he stated before the police that at 06:30 p.m. on hearing hue and cry and firing he along with “AR” went inside Daira of deceased and had seen that all the accused were already present inside the Daira---Said witness further admitted that he stated before police that appellant after breaking the door entered into the room and made second fire which hit deceased who was already present inside the Baithak---Said witness further admitted that he had not tried to save himself when he saw assailants---He further alleged that he was not apprehending any danger from accused persons and that at the time of occurrence, the door of room was not broken---Said witness admitted that he did not raise any hue and cry when he saw the assailants---In such circumstances, it appeared that their statements could safely be termed as dishonest improvements---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. (d) Criminal trial--- ----Dishonest improvements made by witness---Scope---When a witness improves his statement to strengthen the prosecution case and the moment it is concluded that improvements were made deliberately and with mala fide intention, the testimony of such witness becomes unreliable. Khalid Mehmood and another v. The State 2021 SCMR 810; Rafaqat Ali v. The State 2022 SCMR 1107; Muhammad Akhtar v. The State 2025 SCMR 45 and Muhammad Nasir Butt and 2 others v. The State and others 2025 SCMR 662 rel. (e) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 452, 427, 109, 148 & 149---Qatl-i-amd, house-trespass after preparation for hurt, assault, or wrongful restraint, causing damage or loss of fifty rupees or more through mischief, abetment, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly---Appreciation of evidence---Presence of witnesses at the relevant time doubtful---Accused was charged that he along with his co-accused persons committed murder of the father of complainant---Investigating Officer, in his cross-examination, admitted that he had shown presence of eye-witness outside the gate in rough site plan---Said witness further admitted that the place of occurrence was a haveli and occurrence took place inside a room of that haveli and when he visited the place of occurrence, the door of room was closed and he noticed that holes on the door occurred as a result of firing---Said witness further deposed that deceased was inside the room when firing was made and the assailants made firing from outside the door of that room---Said witness further admitted that from inspection of crime scene it appeared that firing hit deceased while passing through the door of the room---Investigating Officer did not find any broken door at the place of occurrence---Scaled site plan showed that the occurrence took place in the room whereas the accused were shown to be present in the veranda and eye-witness allegedly witnessed the occurrence on the other corner of the Dera which was at a distance of ninety feet---Thus, it was not believable that eye-witness who was standing at a distance of ninety feet outside the main gate of the Dera coupled with the fact that it was night time, how he witnessed the occurrence inside the room and even with detailed description of the accused with their specific names and roles---From the statements of both the said witnesses, the presence of both the said witnesses at the place of occurrence on the date and relevant time was doubtful in nature because they did not receive even a scratch during the incident---Said witnesses did not make an abortive attempt to save the deceased from the clutches of appellant and his co- accused---Moreover, both the said witnesses had utterly failed to bring anything on the record establishing their claimed presence with the deceased at the relevant time at the place of occurrence---Eye-witness stated that he lifted the deceased from place of occurrence and put him in a mini jeep---At that time, his clothes became stained with blood and he produced those clothes before the Investigating Officer---Admittedly, neither any blood was collected from the jeep nor blood stained clothes of that witness were taken into possession by the Investigating Officer and no explanation in that behalf had been advanced by the prosecution---Stance of this witness was not only improbable, but also got no support from the record, thus, the prosecution had failed to prove the presence of the eye-witness at the time and place of the occurrence---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. Khalid Mehmood and others v. The State 2011 SCMR 664; Sajjad Hussain v. The State and others 2022 SCMR 1540 and Zafar Ali Abbasi and another v. Zafar Ali Abbasi and others 2024 SCMR 1773 rel. (f) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 452, 427, 109, 148 & 149---Qatl-i-amd, house-trespass after preparation for hurt, assault, or wrongful restraint, causing damage or loss of fifty rupees or more through mischief, abetment, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly---Appreciation of evidence---Night time occurrence---Source of light doubtful---Accused was charged that he along with his co-accused persons committed murder of the father of complainant---Prosecution had introduced the source of light as bulb---Draftsman had shown a bulb at a specific point in scaled site plan but at the same time, the electric bulb was not taken into possession by the Investigating Officer---In such a background, the very identity of the assailants remained fishy---Furthermore, it was also observed that the appellant was found innocent during three successive investigations---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. Haroon Shafique v. The State and others 2018 SCMR 2118 and Sardar Bibi and others v. Munir Ahmed and others 2017 SCMR 344 rel. (g) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 452, 427, 109, 148 & 149---Qatl-i-amd, house-trespass after preparation for hurt, assault, or wrongful restraint, causing damage or loss of fifty rupees or more through mischief, abetment, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly---Appreciation of evidence---Co-accused acquitted on same set of evidence---Accused was charged that he along with his co-accused persons committed murder of the father of complainant---Record showed that on the basis of same set of evidence, ten co-accused persons stood acquitted vide the same judgment---One of the co-accused was charged for abetting his co-accused for commission of murder of deceased and he was acquitted of the charge levelled against him by extending him benefit of doubt---Said ten co-accused were also charged under S.427, P.P.C, for causing damage to the car owned by the complainant and they were acquitted of the charge under S.427, P.P.C as the prosecution badly failed to prove the said charge against them because the prosecution evidence in that regard was full of doubts and contradictions---Furthermore, the prosecution also badly failed to prove the presence of said ten co-accused at the spot at the relevant time and their taking part in the occurrence through confidence inspiring evidence---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. Pervaiz Khan and another v. The State 2022 SCMR 393 and Muhammad Iqbal v. The State and another 2024 SCMR 1133 rel. (h) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 452, 427, 109, 148 & 149---Qatl-i-amd, house-trespass after preparation for hurt, assault, or wrongful restraint, causing damage or loss of fifty rupees or more through mischief, abetment, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly---Appreciation of evidence---Medical evidence---Inconsequential when ocular account doubtful---Accused was charged that he along with his co-accused persons committed murder of the father of complainant---Medical Officer, who conducted autopsy on the dead body of deceased, observed many injuries on his dead body---Said injuries were not in line with the specific roles attributed to the appellant---Medical evidence was only asupporting piece of evidence and relevant only if the ocular account inspired confidence which was not the situation in the case and the murder in issue had remained un-witnessed---Thus, the medical evidence could not point an accusing finger towards the appellant implicated in this case---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. Muhammad Saleem v. Shabbir Ahmad and others 2016 SCMR 1605 rel. (i) Criminal trial--- ----Benefit of doubt---Principle---If there is a single circumstance which created doubt regarding the prosecution case, the same would be sufficient to give benefit of doubt to the accused. Muhammad Akram v. The State 2009 SCMR 230; Abdul Samad v. The State 2025 SCMR 639 and Muhammad Aslam v. The State 2025 SCMR 1240 rel. Burhan Moazzam Malik, Mian Tabassum Ali, Khakan Moazzam Ali and Kamran Rasool Malik along with Appellant on bail. Abdul Rauf Wattoo, Deputy Prosecutor General for the State. Abdul Razzaq Younas, Mehram Ali Bali and Faisal Munir Malik for the Complainant. Date of hearing: 29th September, 2025.

Summary: Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----Ss. 173 & 561-A---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 322, 320, 279 & 427---Quashing of order---Inherent jurisdiction of High Court---Scope---Applicant/complainant sought quashing of order passed by the Judicial Magistrate who accepted the final report under S.173, Cr.P.C in a road accident case after dropping S. 322 P.P.C, which was a non-bailable offence and was mentioned in the FIR filed by the applicant/complainant while accepted the remaining sections of the FIR---Held: although the FIR was lodged under S.322 P.P.C, including certain other Sections of the P.P.C, the Magistrate dropped the said Section from the final report under S.173 of the Cr.P.C.---In the present case, the Judicial Magistrate based on the material collected by the Investigating Officer, the pontification of the prosecutor, and the final challan submitted by the Investigating Officer took note that while the accused had a valid learner's license to operate the motor vehicle, the deceased persons did not have a driver's license to operate the motorcycle---Therefore, it could not be said in the instant case that the concerned Judicial Magistrate did not apply his mind while passing the impugned order---Matter at hand was a traffic accident case leading to death involving a collision between a motor vehicle operated by an operator having a valid learner's license and a motorcycle being operated by a biker without a valid license/permit---Judicial Magistrate accepted the challan after hearing all the parties and applying his mind, thus there was neither any irregularity nor illegality nor error in law in the impugned order passed by the Judicial Magistrate---Application was dismissed, accordingly. Khalid Hussain and 6 others v. Asif Iqbal and 2 others 2021 PCr.LJ 242 ref. Khadim Hussain v. The State and 12 others PLD 2025 Sindh 12 and 2021 PCr.LJ 242 rel. Majid Ali for Applicant. Nemo for the Respondent No.1/Complainant. Nemo for Respondent No. 2. Date of hearing: 8th September, 2025.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure----Cancellation of bail---Scope---Principles---Post-arrest bail---Reappraisal of evidence---Test identification parade---Delay---Scope of appellate interference---Respondent No.1 was granted post-arrest bail by the High Court in a murder case registered under Ss. 302/427/109/34, P.P.C., based on the finding that the test identification parade was conducted after a delay of seven months from the occurrence and its evidentiary value would be assessed during trial---Recovery of Kalashnikov was held to be corroborative in nature, not sufficient alone to deny bail---Petitioner sought cancellation of bail on the ground that it was improperly granted---Held, cancellation of bail is permissible where there is: (i) misuse of bail (e.g. intimidation, tampering of evidence, reoffending), or (ii) a perverse or arbitrary bail order passed without proper application of mind or contrary to established principles of bail---Courts do not undertake deeper appreciation of evidence at bail stage and only assess whether “reasonable grounds” exist for believing the accused is guilty---No new facts or perverse reasoning identified in the High Court’s order to justify cancellation---Impugned order neither arbitrary nor in disregard of settled principles of bail---No interference warranted.Disposition: Petition dismissed; leave to appeal declined.Cited Cases:• Zaro v. State 1974 SCMR 11• Sidra Abbas v. State 2020 SCMR 2089• Farid v. Ghulam Hussan 1968 SCMR 924• Khalid Saigol v. State PLD 1962 SC 495Cited Statutes:• Pakistan Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302, 427, 109, 34

Summary: Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----Ss. 249-A, 265-K and 561-A---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 448, 427 & 34---Quashing of proceedings---Scope---Allegation that complainant got the FIR against the accused/applicant with sole aim to deprive the applicant from inheritance and that the accused/applicant was colouring the civil dispute into criminal solely to pressurize the applicant and illegal investigation was carried out against the applicant, which required quashing of the same---Validity---Remedy provided under S.561-A, Cr.P.C., could not be construed as an alternate remedy or substitute for an express remedy provided under Ss. 249-A or 265-K, Cr.P.C., as the case maybe---Therefore, the ordinary remedy provided under the law could not be bypassed or circumvented---Section 249-A,Cr.P.C.,provided the powers of the Magistrate to acquit an accused at any stage of the case if, after hearing the prosecutor and the accused and for reasons to be recorded, it is considered that the charge was groundless or that there was no probability of the accused being convicted of any offence---Likewise, S.265-K, Cr.P.C., also vested in the Court (Sessions Court or High Court) the powers to acquit the accused at any stage of the case, if, after hearing the prosecutor and the accused and for reasons to be recorded, itis considered that there is no probability of the accused being convicted of any offence---However, according to the judicial consensus and unanimity matured on the characteristics of inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under S.561-A, Cr.P.C., it is well-established that the inherent jurisdiction so conferred is curative in nature---In fact, the expression "abuse of process" used under S.561-A, Cr.P.C., connotes an unwarranted or irrational use of legal proceedings or process which also includes the presence of ulterior motives for activating the process for unjustified arrest or groundless criminal prosecution---Essential purposefulness of this doctrine is to foster and safeguard the judicial system, ensuring that it is not misused or blemished---This terminology can be comprehended as an acuity that if a Court has jurisdiction to hear a case, it may terminate the prosecution if an abuse of process is floating on the surface on record, with logical reason and probability of exasperation, persecution and unfairness to the opposite side----Applicant had already availed his remedy under the prescriptions of S.249-A,Cr.P.C., before the Judicial Magistrate and that too had already been dismissed, which fact was also admitted by the counsel for the applicant during the course of arguments, thus, the Criminal Miscellaneous Application was dismissed, in circumstances. Shahnaz Begum v. The Ho’ble Judges of the High Court of Sindh and Balochistan and another PLD 1971 SC 677; Canadian Union of Public Employees v. City of Toronto 2003 SCC 63; R. v. Power [1994] 1 S.C.R. 601, at p. 616; R. v. Conway, [1989] 1 S.C.R 1659, at p. 1667 and R. v. Scott [1990] 3 S.C.R 979, at p. 1007 rel. Tariq Hussain for Applicant. Javed Raza for Respondents Nos. 3 and 4. Ms. Rahat Ehsan, APG.

Summary: Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 497(5)---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 324, 436, 427, 504, 147, 148 & 149---Attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, mischief by fire and explosive substance, mischief causing damage to the amount of fifty rupees, intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of the peace, rioting, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly---Bail, cancellation of---Record reflected that after registration of case the accused moved an application for grant of pre-arrest bail before the Trial Court, which granted ad-interim pre-arrest bail to him and later on his interim pre-arrest bail was confirmed vide order dated 19.07.2024, which was impugned---Admittedly, there was a dispute between the parties, as disclosed in the memo of FIR as well as Trial Court's order---Furthermore, the strong and cogent reasons were required for recalling of bail granting order, if the bail granting order was perverse or disregarded to the principle regulating grant of bail---Applicant/complainant was unable to demonstrate the principles governing the cancellation of bail---As per tentative assessment, the grounds for cancellation of bail as agitated by the complainant could only be thrashed out at the time of recording evidence of the parties---Since the trial was yet to begin thus no fruitful result would come out to recall the pre-arrest bail order as impugned---No cogent grounds had been established by the applicant to warrant the cancellation of bail---Order granting bail was founded upon settled legal provisions, and thus, no interference was justified---Application for cancellation of bail was dismissed in limine, in circumstances. Muhammad Azhar v. Dilawar 2009 SCMR 1202 rel. Abdul Rasheed Abro for Applicant/Complainant. Date of hearing: 13th February, 2025. Order Abdul Hamid Bhurgri, J .--- The applicant / complainant through the captioned Criminal Miscellaneous Application under Section 497(5), Cr.P.C seeks cancellation of bail granted to respondent 1 by the learned Sessions Judge, Badin in Cr. Bail Application No.1007 of 2024 (Re-Maqsood v. The State), arising out of Crime No.356 of 2024 registered at Police Station Badin, under Sections 324, 436, 147, 148, 149, 504, 427, P.P.C vide order dated 19.07.2024. 2. The facts of the case are already stated in the memo. of this application, therefore, there is no need to reproduce the same for the sake of brevity. 3. The learned counsel contended that the grant of bail to the accused/respondent No.1 contravenes established principles of law, as a specific role has been explicitly assigned to the respondent/accused. He further argued that there exists compelling evidence on record, which unequivocally links the respondent to the alleged offense. He urged that the respondent / accused after granting bail by the trial Court is misusing the concession of bail by issuing threats to the applicant / complainant. He further submitted that the respondent / accused was nominated in the promptly lodged FIR with specific role, however, the learned trial Court by ignoring the same and without considering the record has granted bail to the accused. Additionally, he submitted that following the grant of bail, the accused resorted to intimidatory tactics, coercing the complainant into withdrawing from the case. He requested that bail of the accused may be recalled. 4. Having meticulously considered the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the applicant, thoroughly examined the case material, and scrutinized the impugned order issued by the Trial Court, the learned Sessions Judge delivered the following operative findings: "Apparently, applicant/ accused person is nominated in FIR with the role that he made fire which hit to tractor. The main contention of learned defence counsel that no any person sustained any injury; apparently from perusal of FIR, no any person sustained any injury. The other main plea of learned defence counsel that there is civil nature dispute between the applicant's father and one Shakoor; such version was not rebutted by learned complainant's counsel. The other main plea of learned applicant's counsel that as per FIR, only one tire of tractor was shown to have been burnt. As per photographs provided by complainant, one cot was shown to have been burnt. S-far plea of learned complainant's counsel that applicant/ accused is involved in two other cases; admittedly, each case is to be decided on its own facts and circumstances. When as per FIR no any person sustained any injury and no photograph showed the tractor was burnt. Moreover, when during the course of arguments the complainant was asked which tire of tractor either front or rear was damaged, he failed to reply satisfactorily. Moreover there is apparently dispute between the parties over the land, therefore, case of the applicant/ accused needed further inquiry." 5. Record reflects that after registration of case the accused moved an application for grant of pre-arrest bail before the learned trial Court, who granted ad-interim pre-arrest bail to him and later on his interim pre-arrest bail was confirmed vide order dated 19.07.2024, which is impugned. Admittedly, there was a dispute between the parties, as disclosed in the memo of FIR as well as trial Court's order. Furthermore, the strong and cogent reasons are required for recalling of bail granting order. For instance if the bail granting order is perverse or disregard to the settled principle regulating grant of bail. The learned Counsel for the applicant / complainant is unable to demonstrate the above settled principle governing the cancellation of bail. The Honorable Supreme Court in the case of Muhammad Azhar v. Dilawar (2009 SCMR 1202) has observed as under:- "6. It needs no reiteration that considerations for the grant of bail are quite distinct from the consideration for cancellation of bail. Once bail has been granted by a competent Court of law strong and exceptional grounds are required for cancelling the same, as held by this Court on a number of occasions. It is to be seen as to whether order granting bail is patently, illegal, erroneous, factually incorrect and has resulted in miscarriage of justice. Considering the case of the respondent for grant of bail on the above touchstone, we are of the view that learned High Court has rightly reached the conclusion and no exception can be taken to it. The respondent is on bail since 26-1-2009 and he is not shown to have misused the concession of bail. He is entitled to remain on bail " 6. In my tentative assessment, the grounds for cancellation of bail as agitated by learned Counsel for the complainant could only be thrashed out at the time of recording evidence of the parties. Since the trial is yet to begin thus no fruitful result will come out to recall the pre-arrest bail order as impugned. 7. Upon careful deliberation, it is concluded that no cogent grounds have been established by the applicant to warrant the cancellation of bail. The order granting bail, issued by the learned Sessions Court, was founded upon settled legal provisions, and thus, no interference is justified. In such circumstances, the instant application for cancellation of bail is dismissed in limine. JK/A-36/Sindh Application dismissed.

Summary: Bail granted ---- The petitioner, sought pre-arrest bail after the Lahore High Court, Lahore, declined his request. An FIR (No. 309/2023) was lodged against him on January 15, 2023, at Police Station Nishtar Colony, Lahore, under sections 448, 440, 511, 427, 148, 149, PPC. The FIR alleged that on the said date, the petitioner and co-accused, armed with firearms, forcibly entered the housing society of the complainant, fired indiscriminately, injuring a passerby, and damaging property including the gate and building of the office. ----Issues: Whether the petitioner was falsely implicated in the FIR due to mala fide intentions and ulterior motives. Whether the presence of family conflicts and cross-versions of the incident warranted the granting of pre-arrest bail. Whether the lack of police investigation into the alleged injury of a passerby raised further questions about the petitioner’s guilt. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: False Implication and Family Conflicts: The court recognized the ongoing family conflicts over the ownership and management of the Formanites Housing Society, founded by the petitioner’s late father. Given the potential for malafide intentions and false implications arising from these disputes, the court found merit in the petitioner’s claim of being falsely implicated. Cross-Versions and Further Inquiry: The court noted that in cases of cross-versions arising from the same incident, bail is typically granted to allow further inquiry. The petitioner alleged that the complainant party was the aggressor, which required a detailed investigation to ascertain the truth. Precedents cited included Fazal Muhammad (1976 SCMR 391), Shafiq-ur-Rehman (1972 SCMR 682), and Khalid Mahmood (2013 SCMR 1415). Lack of Investigation into Injury: The FIR mentioned an injury to passerby Zeeshan Haider due to the firing, but the police conducted no investigation into this injury. This omission raised further doubts about the prosecution’s case, leading the court to classify the matter as one requiring further inquiry. ----Outcome: The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and allowed it. The impugned order of the Lahore High Court dated November 13, 2023, was set aside. The petitioner was granted pre-arrest bail upon furnishing surety bonds of Rs. 100,000 and a personal recognizance bond of the same amount. The court emphasized that these observations were tentative and that the trial court was free to adjudicate the case independently based on its merits. -----Citations/Precedents: Fazal Muhammad (1976 SCMR 391) Shafiq-ur-Rehman (1972 SCMR 682) Khalid Mahmood (2013 SCMR 1415) ----Notes: The case highlights the importance of a thorough investigation, especially when there are cross-versions and potential false implications due to family disputes. The decision underscores the principle that bail should be granted in cases requiring further inquiry.

Summary: Bail granted --- (a) Criminal Procedure—Pre-arrest Bail—Scope and Principles: ----Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss. 497 & 498; Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 324, 452, 353, 337AF, 430, 186, 427, 147, 148, 149; Section 20 of the Electronic Crimes Act (EHA). The accused-respondents were granted pre-arrest bail, which was subsequently confirmed by the Additional District Court of Criminal Jurisdiction, Rawalakot. The allegations against the accused included physical assault on the complainant, damage to official property, and misconduct within a government office. The High Court held that bail matters must be decided based on tentative assessment of the evidence collected during the investigation. Once bail is granted by a competent court, it cannot be cancelled without strong and exceptional grounds. The court observed that the accused were not required for recovery or further investigation, and their case did not fall under the prohibitory clause of Section 497, Cr.P.C. ----Cited Principles: Bail cannot be cancelled arbitrarily; strong and cogent reasons are required. Tentative assessment at the bail stage does not involve a detailed evaluation of evidence. (b) Criminal Procedure—Credibility of Evidence—Trial Court’s Jurisdiction: ----Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 161. The court emphasized that credibility and scrutiny of witnesses, along with the truthfulness of evidence, are to be adjudicated by the trial court after the conclusion of the trial. At the bail stage, the court is not required to conduct a detailed analysis of the evidence but only to assess its prima facie sufficiency for granting or refusing bail. (c) Bail—Non-Prohibitory Clause—Application of Law: ----Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 497. The case against the accused did not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497, Cr.P.C., and they were not required for further investigation. The court reiterated the established principle that bail is not to be routinely cancelled once granted unless strong grounds for cancellation are demonstrated. (d) Judicial Discretion—Bail Confirmation—Principles Governing: ----General Principles of Criminal Law. The court held that once bail is confirmed by a competent court, the revisional court must exercise restraint in interfering with such an order unless there is clear illegality, irregularity, or perversity. Mere dissatisfaction of the complainant is not sufficient ground for cancellation of bail. ----Disposition: Revision petition dismissed. Bail confirmation order upheld.

Summary: Bail granted ---Background:This case involves two criminal petitions (Nos. 1174 and 1202 of 2023) filed by Faheem Ullah against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar, dated 25.09.2023, which denied post-arrest bail. The petitions arose from separate FIRs (Nos. 691/2022 and 693/2022) registered at Police Station Badber, District Peshawar, under various sections of the Pakistan Penal Code (P.P.C.), including 452, 427, 354, 506, 148, and 149, among others.??Issues:Whether the offenses listed in the FIRs fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.), which would generally restrict the granting of bail.Whether there is potential enmity that might have led to the wrongful implication of Faheem Ullah in the alleged crimes due to familial disputes related to another criminal case.?Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The Supreme Court observed that the offenses mentioned in both FIRs do not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 Cr.P.C., which means that bail cannot be automatically denied based solely on the nature of the offenses. The Court also considered potential motives for the petitioner?s implication arising from family disputes and previous criminal proceedings involving relatives. Notably, the petitioner?s mother is an eyewitness in a related murder case, suggesting possible motives for retaliation or wrongful implication.Both petitions were converted into appeals and allowed. The Supreme Court granted bail to Faheem Ullah in both cases, subject to him furnishing a bail bond of Rs. 200,000 with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the trial court.?Citations/Precedents:Pakistan Penal Code (P.P.C.): Sections 452 (house-trespass), 427 (mischief causing damage), 354 (assault or criminal force to woman with intent to outrage her modesty), 506 (criminal intimidation), 148 (rioting, armed with deadly weapon), and 149 (every member of unlawful assembly guilty of offense committed in prosecution of common object).Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.): Discusses the conditions under which bail may be granted or denied, particularly noting cases that fall under the prohibitory clause where bail is generally more restricted.

Summary: Acquittal granted---(a) Pakistan Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ---- Ss. 353, 224, 186, 225, 427, 147, 148, 149, 337-F(i), 337-H(ii)---Obstruction of public servants, rioting, causing hurt, mischief---Benefit of doubt---Appellants were convicted under multiple sections of the P.P.C. and sentenced to imprisonment and fines on allegations of resisting police, aiding the escape of an accused, and attacking law enforcement officers during an attempted arrest---Prosecution failed to prove beyond doubt that the appellants actively participated in the alleged offenses---Material contradictions were found in the statements of prosecution witnesses, particularly regarding the alleged attack on police officers and the nature of injuries sustained---Absence of specific attribution of injuries or damage to any appellant further weakened the case---Court extended benefit of doubt to the appellants and set aside their convictions---Reliance placed on Shamoon alias Shamma v. The State (1995 SCMR 1377) and Tariq Pervaiz v. The State (1995 SCMR 1345). (b) Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997)--- ---- S. 7---Application of ATA provisions---Scope and intent---Prosecution alleged that the act of attacking police officers created terror in society, thereby falling under the purview of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997---Court held that for an act to constitute terrorism under ATA, there must be clear intent, purpose, and design to create fear or panic in the public or destabilize the state---No evidence was presented to show that the accused had any premeditated intent to spread terror or that their actions had such an effect---Relying on Ghulam Hussain v. The State (PLD 2020 SC 61), Court concluded that fear or insecurity as a mere byproduct of an alleged offense does not bring a case within the ambit of ATA, 1997---Conviction under ATA set aside. (c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ---- S. 103---Recovery and search---Non-compliance with mandatory provisions---Prosecution failed to associate independent witnesses with the recovery of weapons and other material evidence, despite the presence of numerous local residents near the crime scene---Only police officials acted as witnesses in all recovery proceedings, raising concerns about transparency and credibility---Court held that mandatory compliance with S. 103, Cr.P.C., is essential to ensure fairness and prevent false implication---Prosecution's failure to comply with this requirement cast further doubt on its case---Reliance placed on The State v. Bashir (PLD 1997 SC 408) and Yameen Kumhar v. The State (PLD 1990 Karachi 275). (d) Criminal trial--- ---- Material contradictions in prosecution evidence---Effect---Complainant stated that the accused fired upon the police, injuring an officer, while the injured officer himself contradicted this by stating that he was hit by a stone---Medical evidence suggested that the injury could have been caused by falling or an accidental impact rather than a direct attack---Further contradictions were found regarding damage to police vehicles, as some witnesses claimed glass was broken while others did not mention it---Court held that such contradictions created serious doubt about the prosecution’s version of events, warranting acquittal of the accused---Reliance placed on Muhammad Akram v. The State (YLR 2020 Note 94). (e) Benefit of doubt--- ---- Rule of prudence---Scope---Court reaffirmed the principle that if a single circumstance creates reasonable doubt in a prudent mind, the benefit must be given to the accused as a matter of right, not grace---Prosecution must prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, and any failure to do so necessitates acquittal---Where evidence is unreliable, contradictory, or lacking essential elements, conviction cannot be sustained---Reliance placed on Wazir Muhammad v. The State (1992 SCMR 1134) and Muhammad Ilyas v. The State (1997 SCMR 25). ----Disposition: Appeals allowed---Convictions and sentences set aside---Appellants acquitted of all charges under the Pakistan Penal Code and the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997---Appellants ordered to be released unless required in another case. ----Cited Cases: Shamoon alias Shamma v. The State (1995 SCMR 1377) Tariq Pervaiz v. The State (1995 SCMR 1345) Ghulam Hussain v. The State (PLD 2020 SC 61) The State v. Bashir (PLD 1997 SC 408) Yameen Kumhar v. The State (PLD 1990 Karachi 275) Muhammad Akram v. The State (YLR 2020 Note 94) Wazir Muhammad v. The State (1992 SCMR 1134) Muhammad Ilyas v. The State (1997 SCMR 25)