Summary: Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----Ss. 173 & 561-A---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 322, 320, 279 & 427---Quashing of order---Inherent jurisdiction of High Court---Scope---Applicant/complainant sought quashing of order passed by the Judicial Magistrate who accepted the final report under S.173, Cr.P.C in a road accident case after dropping S. 322 P.P.C, which was a non-bailable offence and was mentioned in the FIR filed by the applicant/complainant while accepted the remaining sections of the FIR---Held: although the FIR was lodged under S.322 P.P.C, including certain other Sections of the P.P.C, the Magistrate dropped the said Section from the final report under S.173 of the Cr.P.C.---In the present case, the Judicial Magistrate based on the material collected by the Investigating Officer, the pontification of the prosecutor, and the final challan submitted by the Investigating Officer took note that while the accused had a valid learner's license to operate the motor vehicle, the deceased persons did not have a driver's license to operate the motorcycle---Therefore, it could not be said in the instant case that the concerned Judicial Magistrate did not apply his mind while passing the impugned order---Matter at hand was a traffic accident case leading to death involving a collision between a motor vehicle operated by an operator having a valid learner's license and a motorcycle being operated by a biker without a valid license/permit---Judicial Magistrate accepted the challan after hearing all the parties and applying his mind, thus there was neither any irregularity nor illegality nor error in law in the impugned order passed by the Judicial Magistrate---Application was dismissed, accordingly. Khalid Hussain and 6 others v. Asif Iqbal and 2 others 2021 PCr.LJ 242 ref. Khadim Hussain v. The State and 12 others PLD 2025 Sindh 12 and 2021 PCr.LJ 242 rel. Majid Ali for Applicant. Nemo for the Respondent No.1/Complainant. Nemo for Respondent No. 2. Date of hearing: 8th September, 2025.

Summary: (Against the orders dated 24.06.2025 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore passed in Criminal Miscellaneous Nos. 2147-B, 2149-B, 2150-B, 2151-B, 2153-B of 2025, 2155-B, 2152-B and 2148-B of 2025). Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 497---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 320, 324, 337-A, 337-F, 337-L , 353, 354, 395, 436, 506-B, 120-B, 121, 121-A, 188 & 201---Qatl-i-amd, attempt to Qatl-i-amd, shajjah, ghayr-jaifah, other hurt, assault or use of criminal force to deter public servant, outraging modesty of woman, dacoity, criminal intimidation, damage to property, criminal conspiracy, waging war, disobedience of order by public servant and causing disappearance of evidence---Bail, grant of---Principle of consistency---Applicability---Plea raised by accused was that co-accused persons had already been released on bail---Validity---Material brought on record regarding alleged criminal conspiracy attributed to accused required further scrutiny and the same would be best adjudged after recording pro and contra evidence during trial---In view of the principle of consistency, other similarly placed accused persons were granted bail by Supreme Court---Bail was allowed. Salman Safdar, Advocate Supreme Court and Jawaid Masood Tahir Bhatti, Advocate-on-Record assisted by Mazhar Ali Haider, Advocate for Petitioner (in all cases). Syed Zulfiqar Abbas Naqvi, Special Prosecutor, Punjab assisted by Mudassar Hussain Malik, Advocate Supreme Court, Dr. Javaid Asif, DSP, Mumtaz Kakar, Inspector, Afzal Sandhu, Inspector, M. Ashraf, Inspector and Alam Langrial, Inspector for the State (in all cases). Ahmed Raza Gillani, Additional Prosecutor General, Punjab on Court's call. Date of hearing: 21st August, 2025. ORDER YAHYA AFRIDI, CJ.--- Through these petitions, Imran Ahmad Khan Niazi (the "petitioner") has sought leave to appeal against the orders dated 24.06.2025 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Crl. Misc. Nos. 2147-B, 2149-B, 2150-B, 2151-B, 2153-B, 2155-B, 2152- B and 2148-B of 2025, whereby post-arrest bail was refused to him in case FIR Nos. 852, 768, 1570, 103, 109, 1271, 108 and 96 registered at different Police Stations Race Course, Shadman, Mughalpura, Sarwar Road and Gulberg of District Lahore on 10.05.2023, 11.05.2023, 12.05.2023 and 13.05.2023 ('FIRs') in respect of offences under sections 302, 324, 395, 436, 452, 440, 427, 353, 354, 391, 186, 290, 291, 153, 152, 148, 149, 147, 109, 505, 506-B, 120, 120-B, 225-B, 337-F(i), 337-L(2), 337-A(i), 337-F(v), 337-A(iii), 336, 449, 153-A, 153-B, 146, 131, 121-A, 121, 188, 201 and 34 P.P.C. read with section 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, section 16 of the Punjab Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, 1960 and section 11-B of Arms Ordinance, 1965. 2. We have heard the learned counsel for both the parties. 3. The main thrust of the prosecution revolves around the allegation that the petitioner hatched a conspiracy for the commission of the offences mentioned in the FIRs. To this end, the learned Special Prosecutor drew the attention of the Court to the ocular statements of three witnesses, as well as electronic media, and argued that these clearly implicate the petitioner and connect him with the commission of the alleged offences. 4. When confronted with the grant of bail rendered by this Court to Mr. Ejaz Ahmad Chaudhary, Mr. Imtiaz Mehmood, and Mr. Hafiz Farhat Abbas, who were linked to the same occurrence and charged similarly to the present petitioner, the learned Special Prosecutor responded that the case of the present petitioner was clearly distinguishable and, therefore, the principle of consistency would not apply in the instant bail matters. 5. Further, when the learned Special Prosecutor was confronted with the definite findings regarding the merits of the case recorded in the impugned order refusing bail to the present petitioner, he explained that it is by now settled that the findings so recorded in a bail granting order are tentative in nature, to be restricted only to the proceedings of bail and are not considered during the trial of an accused. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner, in rebuttal, vehemently opposed the contentions raised by the learned Special Prosecutor. In particular, he emphasized that the principle of consistency had to be applied in favour of the petitioner, as all three accused, namely, Ejaz Ahmad Chaudhary, Imtiaz Mahmood, and Hafiz Farhat Abbas, were charged with alleged criminal conspiracy, and thus the case of the petitioner would surely fall within the domain of parity, which had to be positively considered in favour of the present petitioner. He further explained that the cases of the present petitioner were on a better footing, in particular, than that of Ejaz Ahmad Chaudhary, who had been granted bail by this Court. He pointed out that in the case of Ejaz Ahmad Chaudhry, the investigation had been completed and the trial had commenced, whereas in the case of the present petitioner those stages had not yet been reached, and thus, his entitlement to bail is comparatively stronger. 7. This Court has noted that the definite findings recorded by the learned High Court in the impugned order, which go to the very root of the contested claims of the parties. However, without passing any findings on the legality and veracity of the said findings, our concern at this stage is confined only to the fact that such findings have been recorded at the stage of bail. 8. Let this Court pass any findings on the merits of the case which may prejudice either party at trial, it is sufficient to state that the material brought on record regarding the alleged criminal conspiracy attributed to the petitioner requires scrutiny, and the same would be best adjudged after recording pro and contra evidence during the trial. In addition thereto, the case of the petitioner has to be positively considered in view of the principle of consistency, as others similarly placed have been granted bail by this Court. 9. In view of the above, these petitions are converted into appeals and allowed. The petitioner is granted post-arrest bail in the above mentioned cases, subject to his furnishing bail bond in the sum of Rs.100,000/- with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the Trial Court in each case. MH/I-14/SC Bail allowed.

Summary: Sentence reduction ---- Background: On October 14, 2011, a motorbike rider collided with a pedestrian standing by the roadside, causing severe head injuries to the pedestrian who later succumbed to his injuries. The initial report led to a case being registered under section 337-G, later amended to section 320 Azad Penal Code (APC) following the victim's death. The trial court convicted the motorbike rider, sentencing him to six months' simple imprisonment and a diyat of Rs.20,55,936, payable in installments. The High Court upheld this decision, leading to an appeal to the Supreme Court. ----Issues: 1. Whether the judgments of the trial court and High Court were consistent with legal principles and the factual evidence. 2. Whether the testimonies of the witnesses were reliable despite noted discrepancies. 3. Whether the motorbike rider's actions constituted negligence and reckless driving under section 320 APC. 4. Whether the imposed sentence and diyat were appropriate under the circumstances. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Supreme Court partially accepted the appeal. The conviction was upheld, but the sentence of simple imprisonment was reduced to the period already served. The diyat amount of Rs.20,55,936 remained unchanged, to be paid in specified installments. The Court found that the incident occurred due to the appellant's negligence, supported by the site plan and consistent witness testimonies. Witnesses consistently identified the appellant as the motorbike rider, corroborated by medical evidence. The site plan indicated the appellant’s deviation from the correct path, supporting the prosecution's claim of negligence and reckless driving. Minor discrepancies in witness testimonies did not undermine the overall consistency and reliability of the prosecution’s case. The legal framework under section 320 APC justifies the imposition of both imprisonment and diyat for reckless or negligent driving resulting in death. Outcome: Conviction upheld; simple imprisonment reduced to time served; diyat amount and payment terms affirmed. ----Citations/Precedents: Section 337-G and Section 320 Azad Penal Code (APC) Section 173, Section 242, Section 342, and Section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.PC) General principles regarding witness testimony and minor discrepancies in judicial pronouncements.

Summary: Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 297, 320 & 427---Causing death by rash and negligent driving and causing damage to property---Appreciation of evidence---Necessary witness---Evidence non-recording of---Four persons lost their lives in an accident between a truck and a trailer---Accused was convicted for driving rash and negligently which resulted into death of four persons---Validity--- Prosecution was duty bound to prove rash and negligent driving by leading independent and cogent evidence---Prosecution failed to record statements of cleaners of trailer and truck--- Evidence of no eye-witness of the occurrence was recorded to prove rash and negligent driving---Trailer and truck were not examined by Motor Vehicle Examiner to ascertain their speed and brakes to fix liability on driver of trailer or truck---Merely saying that accident took place due to rash and negligent driving was not enough to substantiate allegations levelled against accused---High Court set aside conviction and sentence awarded to accused and acquitted him of the charge---Appeal was allowed in circumstances. Yasir Arafat v. The State and another 2012 MLD 611 and Tariq Pervez v. The State 1995 SCMR 1345 rel.

Summary: Background: The appellant was involved in a case registered under FIR No. 330 of 2018 for offenses under sections 320, 279, and 427 of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) at City Police Station Muzaffarabad on 30.7.2018. During the trial, the prosecution sought to introduce an additional recovery memo for a second motorcycle which was not initially exhibited. The Additional District Court of Criminal Jurisdiction, Muzaffarabad allowed this on 3.4.2019. The appellant challenged this order through a revision petition before the Shariat Appellate Bench of the High Court, which was dismissed on 18.4.2019. The appellant then filed a revision petition before the Supreme Court of Azad Jammu & Kashmir. ----Issues: 1- Whether the trial court's allowance for the prosecution to exhibit an additional recovery memo was valid. 2- Whether the re-examination of a witness to introduce the additional recovery memo constitutes filling a lacuna in the prosecution’s case. 3- Whether the re-examination of the witness adversely affected the rights of the accused. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --Allowance for Additional Recovery Memo: The Supreme Court held that the trial court acted within its discretion to allow the prosecution to exhibit the additional recovery memo. The criminal justice system is inquisitorial, aiming to uncover the truth and ensure justice, and thus, any relevant evidence should be brought on record. --Re-examination of Witness: The Court determined that re-examination or recalling a witness to clarify ambiguities is permissible if it serves the ends of justice. In this case, PW.2's statements regarding the recovery of the motorcycles were ambiguous, and re-examination was necessary to resolve this ambiguity. --Rights of the Accused: The Court found that the re-examination did not constitute an unfair advantage to the prosecution or adversely affect the rights of the accused. The trial court's primary duty is to ensure a fair trial and reach a just decision. The procedure adopted did not fill any lacuna but was essential to address the ambiguity in the evidence. ----Citations/Precedents: Watir Ullah and others vs. The State (PLD 1966 Dacca 422): Clarified that re-examination should relate to matters brought out in cross-examination but new matters can be introduced with the Court's permission. Black’s Law Dictionary and Marriam Webster Dictionary: Provided definitions of 'ambiguity', supporting the decision to allow re-examination to resolve unclear statements.

Summary: Offence under section 322, P.P.C. is made punishable by the Legislature through Diyat only, and not with some imprisonment, hence this penal provision is to be treated as not attracting the prohibitory clause of section 497, Cr.P.C as it is the salutary principle of law that if a provision can be interpreted in two different manners, then the one which favours an accused is to be adopted.---The petition filed under section 497 Cr.P.C. seeks post-arrest bail for Muhammad Zahid in connection with FIR No. 601 dated 30.11.2020, which involves offenses under sections 322/337-G/427 PPC registered at Police Station Narang District Sheikhupura. The allegations against Zahid stem from a traffic accident involving a collision between a bus he was driving and a Toyota van, resulting in the death of nine individuals and injuries to sixteen others. Upon review of the case and evidence, the court determined that the incident appeared to be a traffic accident rather than a deliberate act. The prosecution's evidence did not convincingly establish that Zahid was solely responsible for the accident. Additionally, it was revealed that another vehicle, a Toyota Van driven by Shahid, struck Zahid's van from the back, leading to further complications and fatalities. The court highlighted the legal provisions related to culpable homicide by rash or negligent driving (section 320 PPC) and unlawful acts causing death (section 321 PPC), emphasizing that the latter is punishable by diyat only, making it a non-bailable offense. However, since section 322 PPC is not punishable by imprisonment and is shown as non-bailable, the court deemed Zahid eligible for post-arrest bail. The judgment referenced various legal precedents supporting the principle of bail over jail, even in cases involving serious offenses, provided certain conditions are met. Notably, Zahid's clean record in prior cases of rash and negligent driving influenced the court's decision to grant him bail. Ultimately, the court granted Zahid post-arrest bail upon his furnishing bail bonds and directed the trial court to expedite proceedings, preferably concluding the trial within six months of receiving the certified copy of the order. The court stressed that its observations were provisional and confined to the disposition of the bail petition.

Summary: Penal Code (XLV of 1860)------Ss. 320, 107 & 114---Provincial Motor Vehicles Ordinance (XIX of 1965), Ss. 3 & 5---Qatl-i-khata by rash or negligent driving--- Abetment--- Scope--- Abettor present when offence is committed---Prohibition on driving without licence---Scope---Accused, while driving a water tanker, hit an unknown lady who received injuries and expired on the spot---Driving licence of accused was found to be fake and bogus---Investigating Officer of the case was required to have included the owner of the vehicle in investigation as co-accused for allowing the vehicle to be driven by a person who was not holding a valid driving licence or whose licence was not genuine---Owner of the vehicle was an abettor in terms of S.107, P.P.C. and his case fell under S.114, P.P.C.---Investigating Officer was directed to take action against owner of the vehicle and the prosecution was directed to expeditiously complete the trial against the owner as co-accused---Appeal was adjourned pending action against the owner of the vehicle. Atta Muhammad v. The State 2005 PCr.LJ 1648 rel.

Summary: Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-------Ss. 320, 337-A (i) (ii) (iii), 337-F, 337-G & 279---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898),S.342---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Arts. 117 & 120---Qatl-i-Khata, Shajjah-i-Khafifa,Shajjah-i-Hashimah, Shajjah-i-Mudihah, Ghayr-Jaifah, rash and negligent driving---Appreciation of evidence---Rash and negligent driving---Onus to prove---Plea of accused---Effect---Accused while driving a vehicle caused accident which resulted into death of threepersons---Trial Court convicted the accused for Qatl-i-Khata and causing injuries by drivingrash and negligently---Trial Court did not discuss statements of prosecution witnesses andconvicted accused on the basis of his reply to a question put to him under S. 342 Cr.P.C.---Prosecution was to prove guilt of accused beyond reasonable doubt---Judgment of TrialCourt was based on statement of accused recorded under S.342 Cr.P.C. and that on physicalexamination of the vehicle of which tie-rod was not found broken---First Information Reportwas registered on 6.1.2016 while vehicle was produced by prosecution witness in Court on3.10.2016, which remained parked with concerned police station---No report of Motormechanic was produced to prove that vehicle was checked after accident---High Courtobserved that when law had provided a thing to be done the same had to be done in thatparticular manner---Trial Court was to first discuss the case in order to come to anindependent conclusion with regard to truthfulness of prosecution witnesses then to examinestatement of accused under S. 342 Cr.P.C.---If the Court had disbelieved prosecutionevidence then it should have accepted the statement of accused as a whole with certainty---None of the ocular witnesses supported prosecution case---Mere driving in high speed didnot constitute the offence where element of negligence was lacking---High Court set asideconviction and sentence awarded to accused by Trial Court and he was acquitted of thecharge---Appeal was allowed in circumstances.

Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-------Ss. 320 & 279---Qatl-i-Khata, rash driving on public way---Appreciation of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Accused was charged for rash and negligent driving the bus which hit aPolice Constable, due to which he sustained head injuries and succumbed to the same on wayto the hospital---Accused/appellant had admitted the incident as well as death of thedeceased---Accused also admitted that he was driving the offending vehicle but stated that hewas not driving the same in a rash and negligent manner---Only aspect, which remained to beexamined, was whether the appellant was driving the offending vehicle in a rash or negligentmanner---Complainant had stated during cross-examination that he himself did not see theaccident---Eyewitness had stated in cross-examination that at the time of incident he waspresent in his guardroom and he himself did not see the accident---Said witnesses were theonly eye witnesses of the occurrence but they stated before the Trial Court that theythemselves did not see the incident---Both the said witnesses also stated that at the time ofoccurrence one truck which was loaded with stones was parked on the road side and when theincident took place the deceased was checking the said truck---Admittedly, the incident tookplace at 9.00 p.m.---Keeping in view the time of accident, it could safely be inferred that atthe time of accident it was pitch dark---When witnesses had not seen the accident then howcould they say that the accident took place due to negligence and carelessness of the accused---Even the record was silent about recording statement of any other passengers of bus anddriver and cleaner of the truck which was parked on the road side---Visual sketch map of theplace of occurrence was silent about any roadside light as well as about rear lights of themini bus---Site map was also silent about presence of any eye witnesses on the spot, despitethe fact that site map showed katcha houses near the opposite side of the road but still no onefrom the inmates of the said houses were associated as a witness of the occurrence---Noevidence was available about over speeding of bus by the appellant nor the visual sketch mapshowed any signs of tyres as no rubber marks of the tyres being caused while applying thebrakes with extreme power had been shown on the sketch map---Minibus was not examinedby the Motor Vehicle Examiner nor the same was verified with regard to working conditionof the brakes---Case against the accused was one of no evidence particularly with regard tohis rash or negligent driving, simply because no one from the travelling passengers or fromthe nearby houses were associated as witnesses by the prosecution---Record was also silent regarding the fact that the bus was being driven in violation of the traffic rules, which led tothe accident, therefore, could be equated with rashness and negligence---Circumstancesestablished that the prosecution had not succeeded to bring any reliable and convincing pieceof evidence to establish a rash and negligent driving of the accused---Appeal againstconviction was allowed, in circumstances.(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-------Ss. 320 & 279---Qatl-i-Khata, rash driving on public way---Negligence---Scope---Nomathematical formula was available to measure negligence---Negligence could only bejudged and gauged upon the attending and surrounding facts and circumstances---Mere factthat a vehicle was running at fast speed would not prove rashness and negligence, therefore,it could safely be concluded that speed did not matter in case of accident rather the rashnessand negligence were condition precedents to prove the offence under S.320, P.P.C.

Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-------Ss. 320 & 279---Qatl-i-Khata, rash driving on public way---Appreciation of evidence---Appeal against acquittal---Prosecution case was that accused-respondent, driver of oil tanker,had collided with Frontier Constabulary Post, resultantly, five persons died at the spot, theofficial vehicle and official weapons were damaged and driver and conductor fled away fromthe scene---Prosecution, in order to establish the charge had produced nine witnesses, whichwere not consistent and confidence-inspiring---Complainant of the case mostly reiterated thecontents of his fard-e-bayan---Evidence of said witness was not helpful to the case ofprosecution for the reasons that he himself had not witnessed the crime rather at the time ofalleged occurrence he was 80 kms. away from the place of occurrence and receivedinformation through wireless set---Entire statement of said witness was silent to the effect asto who had told him the story of the incident in such a sequence---Admittedly, the statementof said witness was hearsay and the same was only to the extent of setting criminalmachinery into motion---Statements of both the alleged eye-witnesses were contradictorywith each other on certain counts---Both the witnesses had unanimously brought on recordthat they witnessed the crime directly---Both the said witnesses had admitted in their crossexamination that their statements under S. 161, Cr.P.C. were recorded after delay of 13-daysof the incident, though they were very much present in the area---Admission of both theprosecution witnesses depicted the complete failure of the Investigating Officer to record thestatements of both the said witnesses immediately---No explanation was available on therecord as to why such statements were delayed for 13-days and till that the accused-appellanthad voluntarily surrendered him before the police---No solid or concrete evidence wasavailable against the accused/respondent connecting him with the commission of allegedoffence---Trial Court after proper appreciation of evidence in its true perspective had rightlyacquitted the accused-respondent of the charge---Appeal was dismissed accordingly.(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-------S. 161---Delay in recording the statement of witnesses under S. 161, Cr.P.C.---Effect---Such evidence could not be given that sanctity as was generally given to the evidence of awitness whose statement had been recorded promptly soon after the occurrence---Statements of prosecution witnesses under S. 161, Cr.P.C. recorded after the arrest of the accusedcreated reasonable doubt in the case of prosecution---Witnesses appeared to have beenplanted by the prosecution subsequently after the arrest of the accused/respondent.(c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-------Ss. 320 & 279---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 22---Qatl-i-Khata, rash driving onpublic way---Appreciation of evidence---Identification parade---Scope---Identification of theaccused/respondent in the Trial Court was doubtful---According to the case of prosecution,soon after the occurrence the culprits decamped from the place of occurrence---InvestigatingOfficer arrested five persons on the basis of suspicious, who were subsequently dischargedfrom the case under the provisions of S. 169, Cr.P.C.---Circumstances suggested that theInvestigating Officer as well as the alleged eye-witnesses were not sure about the culprit---First Information Report was silent with regard to physique and personal appearance of theescaped accused persons---Investigating Officer after the arrest of the accused/respondentwas supposed to have conducted the identification parade of the accused/respondent whichwas not done---Material dent caused to the case of prosecution due to failure to holdidentification parade during the course of investigation, which was not curable.Khawar v. The State 2014 YLR 2120 rel.(d) Criminal trial-------Benefit of doubt---Principle---Single circumstance if creating reasonable doubt in aprudent mind was sufficient for acquittal of accused not as a matter of grace, but as a matterof right.Ghulam Qadir and 2 others v. The State 2008 SCMR 1221 rel.(e) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-------S. 417--- Appeal against acquittal--- Presumption--- Double presumption of innocencewas attached to the order of acquittal---Interference in acquittal was unwarranted unless thesame was arbitrary, capricious, fanciful or against the record.