Summary: Acquittal ---- (a) Pakistan Penal Code (XLV of 1860)----Ss. 302, 324, 353, 396, 435, 427, 148 & 149---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997)----S. 7---Appreciation of evidence---Unnamed accused---Conviction on capital charge---Sustainability---FIR was lodged against unknown assailants and appellants were not nominated by name---Informant attempted to give physical descriptions of only some assailants, but gave no identifying particulars of the remaining alleged offenders including the driver and the LMG operator---Prosecution case rested mainly on ocular account of two witnesses who, despite alleged indiscriminate firing, remained completely unhurt and whose conduct in immediately chasing heavily armed assailants, though they were in plain clothes, unarmed, and had already witnessed one death and multiple serious injuries, was held to be unnatural and contrary to normal human behaviour---Their claimed ability, during a sudden life-threatening attack, to observe and retain minute features such as age, height, complexion and clothing of the assailants was also found inherently improbable---Presence of said witnesses at the place of occurrence was not established through any independent and unimpeachable evidence---Held, that prosecution version suffered from material improbabilities and could not safely sustain conviction on capital charge. (b) Criminal trial---Identification parade---Evidentiary value---Joint identification parade of multiple accused---Effect---Identification parade in the present case was not conducted through injured witnesses, but through two alleged eyewitnesses, and that too jointly in respect of multiple accused---It is a settled rule that each accused is to be put to identification separately and a joint identification parade is unsafe, unreliable and has consistently been disapproved by the Supreme Court---Such defective identification proceedings lost their corroborative value and could not be safely relied upon for maintaining conviction. Cited cases: Gulfam and another v. The State (2017 SCMR 1189); Lal Pasand v. The State (PLD 1981 SC 142); Ziaullah alias Jaji v. The State (2008 SCMR 1210); Bacha Zeb v. The State (2010 SCMR 1189); Shafqat Mehmood and others v. The State (2011 SCMR 537). (c) Criminal trial---Identification parade---Prior disclosure of identity of accused to police---Effect---Appellants had already been arrested in another criminal case and were in judicial custody when, according to the prosecution itself, they allegedly disclosed involvement in the present occurrence and were thereafter formally arrested in this case---Where identity of accused already stands disclosed to police before holding of identification parade, sanctity and evidentiary worth of such parade becomes highly doubtful---Held, that identification evidence so procured had lost legal significance as corroborative evidence. (d) Qanun-e-Shahadat / criminal jurisprudence principles---Disclosure by accused in another case---Acquittal in that case---Effect---Appellants had allegedly been linked with the present occurrence through disclosures made by them in FIR No.73 dated 24.04.2010, but in that very case they had already been acquitted by the Supreme Court vide judgment dated 17.02.2025 in Criminal Appeal No.627 of 2022---In such circumstances, the alleged disclosure lost legal weight and could not validly connect the appellants with the present crime---Prosecution further failed to produce any independent direct or circumstantial evidence reasonably connecting the appellants with commission of the offence. (e) Criminal trial---Benefit of doubt---Scope---Where prosecution evidence is afflicted with material inconsistencies, inherent improbabilities and defects going to the root of the case, benefit of doubt must be extended to accused---Such benefit is not a matter of grace or concession but a matter of right---Even a single circumstance creating reasonable doubt in the mind of a prudent person is sufficient to dislodge prosecution case---Held, that Courts below failed to properly notice serious infirmities in prosecution evidence and thereby fell into error in maintaining conviction and death sentence. Appeal was allowed, convictions and sentences recorded by the Trial Court and maintained by the High Court were set aside, appellants were acquitted of the charge on benefit of doubt, and were directed to be released forthwith if not required in any other case.

Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 324, 353, 186 & 34---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S. 7---Sindh Arms Act (V of 2013), S. 23(1)(a)---Attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, use of criminal force or assault on public servant while he is performing his duty, obstructing a public servant in the performance of their duties, common intention, possession of illicit weapon, act of terrorism---Appreciation of evidence---Recovery of weapon of offence---Reliance---Scope---Accused was charged that he made firing upon the police party; in retaliation police also made firing due to which appellant sustained firearm injury and was apprehended at the spot---Record showed that 30 bore pistol allegedly recovered from the appellant was, in fact, the very weapon used in the commission of the offence---On that premise, the Trial Court upheld the applicability of S.353, P.P.C and 23(1)(a) of the Sindh Arms Act, 2013---Insofar as S.324, P.P.C was concerned, it was observed that the offence was constituted not merely by the resultant injury, but by the existence of the requisite mens rea to commit qatl-i-amd coupled with an overt act in furtherance thereof---Prosecution case was that the appellant, upon being signaled to stop, opened direct fire upon the police party and, during the ensuing exchange, sustained a firearm injury on his right leg, while crime empties were secured from the spot---Prosecution witnesses had remained consistent on the essential features of the occurrence, namely, the alleged firing by the appellant, the encounter, his injury, apprehension at the spot and the recovery of the unlicensed weapon from his possession---Certain discrepancies were highlighted by the defence with respect to peripheral details---However, upon independent scrutiny of the record, such inconsistencies could be treated as minor in nature, not going to the root of the case, and insufficient to dislodge the prosecution version regarding the occurrence, arrest and alleged recovery---Such discrepancies did not materially impair the evidentiary substratum of the prosecution case---Thus, convictions under S.353 P.P.C and S.23(1)(a) of the Sindh Arms Act, 2013 were maintained---Appeal was disposed of, accordingly. (b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 324, 353, 186 & 34---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S. 7---Sindh Arms Act (V of 2013), S. 23(1)(a)---Attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, use of criminal force or assault on public servant while he is performing his duty, obstructing a public servant in the performance of their duties, common intention, possession of illicit weapon, act of terrorism---Appreciation of evidence---Act of terrorism, applicability of---Scope---Accused was charged that he made firing upon the police party; in retaliation police also made firing due to which appellant sustained firearm injury and was apprehended at the spot---Mere commission of a violent or firearm-related offence, by itself, did not ipso facto bring it within the ambit of "terrorism" unless the prosecution affirmatively established that such act was committed with the specific object of striking terror, creating fear or insecurity in the public at large or in any section of the society, or to achieve any of the purposes enumerated in S.6(1) of the Act, 1997---In order to constitute terrorism, the act must not only fall within the mischief of subsection (2) of S.6 but must also be intrinsically connected with the objectives mentioned in subsection (1) thereof---Even heinous or violent acts springing from personal disputes, situational encounters or isolated events, lacking the requisite design to terrorize society, would fall outside the purview of the Anti-Terrorism Act---When the facts of the present case were examined, it was evident that the prosecution had failed to bring on record any material whatsoever to show that the alleged act of the appellant was actuated by any intent or design to spread terror amongst the public---At the highest, the prosecution case disclosed an alleged encounter occurring during routine patrolling, in which, according to the prosecution itself, only the appellant sustained a firearm injury, while no member of the police party received even a scratch and no independent member of the public was affected---There was neither any allegation nor any evidence suggesting that the alleged firing created panic, fear or insecurity in the locality or among the general public---Occurrence, as projected by the prosecution, at best emanated from a situational confrontation between the police and the appellant, lacking the essential mens rea required to attract the extraordinary jurisdiction of the Anti-Terrorism Act---Offences arising out of personal or situational encounters with the police do not fall within the fold of terrorism in the absence of the requisite terrorising intent---Consequently, the conviction of the appellant under S.7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 was legally unsustainable and was set aside---However, convictions under S.353, P.P.C and S.23(1)(a) of the Sindh Arms Act, 2013 were maintained---Appeal was disposed of, accordingly. Ghulam Hussain and others v. The State and others PLD 2020 Sc 61; Ali Gohar and others v. Pervez Ahmed and others PLD 2020 SC 427 and Muhammad Farhan alias Irfan v. The State 2021 SCMR 488 rel. (c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 324, 353, 186 & 34---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S. 7---Sindh Arms Act (V of 2013), S. 23(1)(a)---Attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, use of criminal force or assault on public servant while he is performing his duty, obstructing a public servant in the performance of their duties, common intention, possession of illicit weapon, act of terrorism---Appreciation of evidence---Offence under S.186, P.P.C---Applicability---Accused was charged that he made firing upon the police party; in retaliation police also made firing due to which appellant sustained firearm injury and was apprehended at the spot---Section 186, P.P.C, was attracted only when an accused was shown to have voluntarily obstructed a public servant in the discharge of his public functions, and such obstruction must be established through clear, specific and affirmative evidence independent of the mere use of force or resistance contemplated under other penal provisions---In the present case, the prosecution version, even if taken at its face value, was that the appellant allegedly fired upon the police party upon being signaled to stop and was apprehended after sustaining injury---There was no distinct or independent evidence on record to demonstrate any separate act of "obstruction" as envisaged under S.186, P.P.C, separate from the alleged act of firing itself---Moreover, none of the prosecution witnesses had attributed any specific overt act to the appellant constituting obstruction of public duty in the statutory sense contemplated by S.186, P.P.C---Where the alleged obstructive conduct is inseparably merged with the use of criminal force against a public servant, the invocation of S.186, P.P.C becomes legally redundant and impermissible---In absence of proof of a separate and independent ingredient of obstruction, the conviction of the appellant under S.186, P.P.C could not be legally sustained and was, therefore, liable to be set aside---However, convictions under S.353, P.P.C and S.23(1)(a) of the Sindh Arms Act, 2013, were maintained---Appeal was disposed of, accordingly. (d) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 324, 353, 186 & 34---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S. 7---Sindh Arms Act (V of 2013), S. 23(1)(a)---Attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, use of criminal force or assault on public servant while he is performing his duty, obstructing a public servant in the performance of their duties, common intention, possession of illicit weapon, act of terrorism---Appreciation of evidence---Sentence, reduction in---Accused was charged that he made firing upon the police party; in retaliation police also made firing due to which appellant sustained firearm injury and was apprehended at the spot---In the present case, the prosecution had failed to satisfy the essential jurisdictional prerequisites for the applicability of S.7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997; consequently, the conviction recorded against the appellant thereunder could not be legally sustained---Similarly, the convictions of the appellant under S.324, P.P.C was also not tenable---However, the prosecution had been able to establish the guilt of appellant beyond reasonable doubt for the offences punishable under S.353, P.P.C and S.23(1)(a) of the Sindh Arms Act, 2013---Resultantly, the convictions of the appellant under S.7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 and S.324, P.P.C as recorded through the impugned judgment, were set aside, while his convictions under S.353, P.P.C and S.23(1)(a) of the Sindh Arms Act, 2013 were maintained---Nevertheless, keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the nature of the occurrence, and the period of incarceration already undergone by the appellant, the sentences awarded to him in respect of the said surviving offences were modified and reduced to the period he already undergone---Appeal was disposed of, accordingly. Muhammad Immad Qamar for Appellant. Mumtaz Ali Shah, Assistant Prosecutor General, Sindh for the State. Date of hearing: 28th November, 2025.

Summary: (Against the orders dated 24.06.2025 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore passed in Criminal Miscellaneous Nos. 2147-B, 2149-B, 2150-B, 2151-B, 2153-B of 2025, 2155-B, 2152-B and 2148-B of 2025). Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 497---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 320, 324, 337-A, 337-F, 337-L , 353, 354, 395, 436, 506-B, 120-B, 121, 121-A, 188 & 201---Qatl-i-amd, attempt to Qatl-i-amd, shajjah, ghayr-jaifah, other hurt, assault or use of criminal force to deter public servant, outraging modesty of woman, dacoity, criminal intimidation, damage to property, criminal conspiracy, waging war, disobedience of order by public servant and causing disappearance of evidence---Bail, grant of---Principle of consistency---Applicability---Plea raised by accused was that co-accused persons had already been released on bail---Validity---Material brought on record regarding alleged criminal conspiracy attributed to accused required further scrutiny and the same would be best adjudged after recording pro and contra evidence during trial---In view of the principle of consistency, other similarly placed accused persons were granted bail by Supreme Court---Bail was allowed. Salman Safdar, Advocate Supreme Court and Jawaid Masood Tahir Bhatti, Advocate-on-Record assisted by Mazhar Ali Haider, Advocate for Petitioner (in all cases). Syed Zulfiqar Abbas Naqvi, Special Prosecutor, Punjab assisted by Mudassar Hussain Malik, Advocate Supreme Court, Dr. Javaid Asif, DSP, Mumtaz Kakar, Inspector, Afzal Sandhu, Inspector, M. Ashraf, Inspector and Alam Langrial, Inspector for the State (in all cases). Ahmed Raza Gillani, Additional Prosecutor General, Punjab on Court's call. Date of hearing: 21st August, 2025. ORDER YAHYA AFRIDI, CJ.--- Through these petitions, Imran Ahmad Khan Niazi (the "petitioner") has sought leave to appeal against the orders dated 24.06.2025 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Crl. Misc. Nos. 2147-B, 2149-B, 2150-B, 2151-B, 2153-B, 2155-B, 2152- B and 2148-B of 2025, whereby post-arrest bail was refused to him in case FIR Nos. 852, 768, 1570, 103, 109, 1271, 108 and 96 registered at different Police Stations Race Course, Shadman, Mughalpura, Sarwar Road and Gulberg of District Lahore on 10.05.2023, 11.05.2023, 12.05.2023 and 13.05.2023 ('FIRs') in respect of offences under sections 302, 324, 395, 436, 452, 440, 427, 353, 354, 391, 186, 290, 291, 153, 152, 148, 149, 147, 109, 505, 506-B, 120, 120-B, 225-B, 337-F(i), 337-L(2), 337-A(i), 337-F(v), 337-A(iii), 336, 449, 153-A, 153-B, 146, 131, 121-A, 121, 188, 201 and 34 P.P.C. read with section 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, section 16 of the Punjab Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, 1960 and section 11-B of Arms Ordinance, 1965. 2. We have heard the learned counsel for both the parties. 3. The main thrust of the prosecution revolves around the allegation that the petitioner hatched a conspiracy for the commission of the offences mentioned in the FIRs. To this end, the learned Special Prosecutor drew the attention of the Court to the ocular statements of three witnesses, as well as electronic media, and argued that these clearly implicate the petitioner and connect him with the commission of the alleged offences. 4. When confronted with the grant of bail rendered by this Court to Mr. Ejaz Ahmad Chaudhary, Mr. Imtiaz Mehmood, and Mr. Hafiz Farhat Abbas, who were linked to the same occurrence and charged similarly to the present petitioner, the learned Special Prosecutor responded that the case of the present petitioner was clearly distinguishable and, therefore, the principle of consistency would not apply in the instant bail matters. 5. Further, when the learned Special Prosecutor was confronted with the definite findings regarding the merits of the case recorded in the impugned order refusing bail to the present petitioner, he explained that it is by now settled that the findings so recorded in a bail granting order are tentative in nature, to be restricted only to the proceedings of bail and are not considered during the trial of an accused. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner, in rebuttal, vehemently opposed the contentions raised by the learned Special Prosecutor. In particular, he emphasized that the principle of consistency had to be applied in favour of the petitioner, as all three accused, namely, Ejaz Ahmad Chaudhary, Imtiaz Mahmood, and Hafiz Farhat Abbas, were charged with alleged criminal conspiracy, and thus the case of the petitioner would surely fall within the domain of parity, which had to be positively considered in favour of the present petitioner. He further explained that the cases of the present petitioner were on a better footing, in particular, than that of Ejaz Ahmad Chaudhary, who had been granted bail by this Court. He pointed out that in the case of Ejaz Ahmad Chaudhry, the investigation had been completed and the trial had commenced, whereas in the case of the present petitioner those stages had not yet been reached, and thus, his entitlement to bail is comparatively stronger. 7. This Court has noted that the definite findings recorded by the learned High Court in the impugned order, which go to the very root of the contested claims of the parties. However, without passing any findings on the legality and veracity of the said findings, our concern at this stage is confined only to the fact that such findings have been recorded at the stage of bail. 8. Let this Court pass any findings on the merits of the case which may prejudice either party at trial, it is sufficient to state that the material brought on record regarding the alleged criminal conspiracy attributed to the petitioner requires scrutiny, and the same would be best adjudged after recording pro and contra evidence during the trial. In addition thereto, the case of the petitioner has to be positively considered in view of the principle of consistency, as others similarly placed have been granted bail by this Court. 9. In view of the above, these petitions are converted into appeals and allowed. The petitioner is granted post-arrest bail in the above mentioned cases, subject to his furnishing bail bond in the sum of Rs.100,000/- with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the Trial Court in each case. MH/I-14/SC Bail allowed.

Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 324, 396 & 149---Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance (VI of 1979), S. 17(4)---Qatl-i-amd, murder with dacoity, unlawful assembly, haraabah---Appreciation of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Withholding source of information regarding names and identities of accused---Scope---Accused were charged that they made firing upon the complainant party; the brother of complainant was hit and died during the dacoity---Complainant claimed that about two/four days prior thereto the main occurrence, he and his two brothers had the opportunity to see accused “GS” along with four unknowns---One of brothers of complainant was the deceased, his other brother had not been produced to state in Court about that fact, therefore, complainant became the sole person of that first episode to describe and prove as to the reconnaissance by the said accused and the exposure of their names and identity to him---Admittedly, all the four unknowns were strangers to complainant but he nominated them in the occurrence relying upon his queries from other persons of the town and claimed having knowledge about their identity by name---Complainant was bound to prove source of his knowledge of revealing the names and identity of said unknown accused but he did not opt to disclose even when asked in cross-examination, therefore, withholding his such knowledge gave rise to the mystery, making his statement regarding their nominations in the FIR as inadmissible in evidence to be culminated as hearsay---Role of Investigating Officer was to collect the evidence, he had not uttered single word about the first episode nor collected any evidence as to how the names of the unknowns were exposed to the first informer, hence nomination of the said unknown in the FIR remained a mystery and inadmissible in evidence--- Moreover, it was in evidence that FIR had been registered prior to the claimed arrest of the accused persons---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. (b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 324, 396 & 149---Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance (VI of 1979), S. 17(4)---Qatl-i-amd, murder with dacoity, unlawful assembly, haraabah---Appreciation of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Defective investigation---Accused were charged that they made firing upon the complainant party, the brother of complainant was hit and died during dacoity---In this case, the claim of prosecution regarding arrest of four accused persons after a police encounter was important and had to be proved before the Court---Investigating Officer had not prepared any sketch of the said place of encounter---Although cross firing had been claimed by Investigating Officer, an act of firing upon the police party could not be considered as a minor offence, which otherwise was punishable under S.353, P.P.C and even under S.7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, if it was covered under S.6 (m) (n) of the Act ibid, and as per Rule 25.13 of the Police Rules 1934, yet operative plan of the scene was required to be prepared for explanation of the scene but the same had not been prepared for highlighting the said venue---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. (c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 324, 396 & 149---Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance (VI of 1979), S. 17(4)---Qatl-i-amd, murder with dacoity, unlawful assembly, haraabah---Appreciation of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Credibility of the recovery witnesses doubtful---Accused were charged that they made firing upon the complainant party; the brother of complainant was hit and died during dacoity---Investigating Officer and SHO claimed the arrest of the accused from place of encounter, whereafter along with the contingent of the police the accused allegedly got recovered unlicensed pistols with empty magazine, cash amount, one gold chain, one wrist watch, two mobile phones from their personal search---Investigating Officer also claimed sealing the said recovered articles in presence of two witnesses, and prepared the recovery memos attested by them and then shifted the accused persons to the Police Station and registered the FIRs and handed over the said arrested accused to the Investigating Officer for investigation along with the total case property---Time of police encounter as stated by Investigating Officer was 10:40 a.m. to 11:20 a.m. and he also claimed the presence of recovery witness there, who signed the recovery memos at the place---Said recovery witness had been cross-examined on this point and stated that the police encounter continued from 11:00 a.m. to 11:15 a.m.---Identification of dead-body was made before the Medical Officer at the commencement of the post-mortem examination---Time as 10:30 a.m. was documented and proved by the Medical Officer---Time of identification of the dead-body and that of SHO joining from the place of occurrence for proceeding to the pursuit was concurrent, thus, the recovery witness was bound to explain his presence concurrently at two places otherwise manipulations on part of the police would be the result---Other recovery witness was also the marginal witness of Mashirnama of dead body and the memo. of possession of last worn clothes of the deceased---Said witness signed the said recovery memo, but it suffered with the same situation as that of other recovery witness---Simultaneously said witness claimed to be a member of the police raiding party and also a signatory to the recovery memos at the place of arrest of the culprits---One could not be deemed present simultaneously at two places apart, and if one claimed so and was proved in evidence to be present at two places, the onus shifted to such claimant---Therefore, it became clear that there existed manipulations and fabrications especially on part of the police---Hence, it could be inferred that either there was no police encounter or thatwitness was not present there---Hence, the credibility of the testimony of the said witnesses became doubtful and not believable---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. (d) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 324, 396 & 149---Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance (VI of 1979), S. 17(4)---Qatl-i-amd, murder with dacoity, unlawful assembly, haraabah---Appreciation of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Safe custody of all the case property and transmission of the said articles to the Ballistic Expert not proved---Accused were charged that they made firing upon the complainant party, the brother of complainant was hit and died during dacoity---Investigating Officer collected four crime empties from the place of main occurrence besides the blood on the same date---Said witness was cross-examined by the defence; during the cross-examination he accepted it as correct that he did not make marking over the weapons in order to identify that which one was recovered from which accused and accepted it correct that at present he was not able to segregate the weapon recovered from accused---Said witness further deposed that he was unable to identify those empties recovered by him---Investigating Officer admitted that presently he could not identify the pistol recovered from accused and stated that at present it was not identifiable---Said witness stated that he did not remember at present that from the date of recovery till receipt of the weapons by the Ballistic Expert, where the case property was kept or retained---Said witness did not remember the name of the officials throughwhom the case property was transmitted to the Ballistic Expert---Said witness stated it correct that he could not say that which weapon was recovered from whom, whereas he accepted it correct that report of the Forensic Division contained the date of receipt of the weapons as 09.12.2010---Later on a Fire Arm Expert was summoned by the Court, he also clarified that the correct date of receipt of case property with the Ballistic Expert was 09.12.2010, meaning thereby that from the date of recovery that was 02.11.2010, the empties and the recovered pistols remained at some unknown place---Statement of Investigating Officerrevealed that the official who transmitted the case property remained unknown and was not a witness in this case---Police Official who kept the case property in the police station was also not a witness, therefore, the prosecution failed to prove on record the safe custody of all the case property vis-a-vis the transmission of the concerned articles to the Ballistic Expert---Place of arrest of the accused persons became doubtful and the claim of recoveries from the accused persons stood not proved and became inconsequential---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. (e) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 324, 396 & 149---Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance (VI of 1979), S. 17(4)---Qatl-i-amd, murder with dacoity, unlawful assembly, haraabah---Appreciation of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Ocular account not proved---Accused were charged that they made firing upon the complainant party; the brother of complainant was hit and died during dacoity---Ocular account was advanced by complainant and recovery witnesses, who deposed the story of main occurrence---Worth of testimony of recovery witnesses showed that they were not the witnesses of the previous occurrence and also they were not the witnesses ofexposures of names of the unknown accused persons to complainant---Complainant himself failed to prove that fact of the exposure of names and identity of the said unknown culprits, therefore, the specific attribution of snatching of the articles during the occurrence of dacoity without holding of any identification parade and not be believed---Similarly the specific attribution of fire shots could not be believed for the same reason---Therefore, statements of said witnesses in that regard before the Court could not be considered of any worth---Beside that said witnesses were part of the manipulations carried out by the police--- Complainant had assigned specific role to each of the five accused with names for snatching of cash, mobile phones, wrist watch and gold chain---Complainant admitted that he and the eye-witnesses did not become injured and even did not receive any scratch nor any sign of bullet was highlighted inside the shop on any place or object---Only four crime empties were recovered---Defence denied the presence of all the witnesses at the place of occurrence---Complainant categorically stated that after fall of deceased, the other accused persons who were also armed with pistols also made straight fire shots towards them with intention to kill but they fell down and their fire shots missed; this statement did not fit in the scenario so depicted of indiscriminate firing---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. (f) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 324, 396 & 149---Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance (VI of 1979), S. 17(4)---Qatl-i-amd, murder with dacoity, unlawful assembly, haraabah---Appreciation of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Justification for the presence of eye-witnesses at the time and place of occurrence not proved---Chance witnesses, evidence of---Accused were charged that they made firing upon the complainant party; the brother of complainant was hit and died during dacoity---Alleged eye0-witnesses were residents of a village located at six/seven kilometers from the place of occurrence, therefore, they might be considered as chance witnesses unless their presence at the scene of occurrence could be substantiated through any corroborative piece of evidence---Reasons for the presence of said witnesses as advanced by them was receiving of sale cash which otherwise remained an oral assertion as they did not provide any receipt of sale/purchase nor the Investigating Officer opted to collect any such evidence---Said witnesses had been contradicted qua their presence at the place of stated encounter and arrest with their presence at the hospital at the relevant times inter-se---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. Wazeer Hussain Khoso for Appellants. Khadim Hussain Khuharo, Additional Prosecutor General, Sindh for the State. Date of hearing: 13th February, 2025.

Summary: Acquittal granted ----- (a) Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997—Benefit of doubt—Failure to prove identification and arrest at scene—Conviction set aside—S. 7(i)(a), Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997—Ss. 302(b), 449, 324, 353, 186, 148, 149, 120-B, 109, 337 PPC—Ss. 3/4 Explosive Substances Act, 1908—S. 13 Arms Ordinance, 1965—Petitioners were convicted and sentenced under multiple provisions including death and life imprisonment—Held, petitioners were not named in FIR or initial police reports, nor identified by any eyewitness including complainant or management of worship place—Star witness (Name withheld) did not appear, and other cited eyewitnesses failed to testify—Claim of arrest at scene contradicted by record—Held, serious doubts in prosecution’s version warranted benefit of doubt—Reliance placed on Tariq Pervez v. The State (1995 SCMR 1345) and Muhammad Akram v. The State (2009 SCMR 230).(b) Criminal trial—Unreliable ocular testimony—Witness not named in FIR or site plan—Declared hostile by prosecution—PW-13 Inspector (name withheld), claimed to witness arrest and recovery but was not mentioned in FIR, site plan, or police narrative—Prosecution itself sought to declare him hostile—No other witness corroborated his presence or version—Held, evidence of witness not cited in FIR or shown present at scene is not trustworthy—Reliance placed on Khial Muhammad v. The State (2024 SCMR 1490).(c) Criminal trial—Contradictory recovery evidence—Recovery of suicide vests and ammunition—Doubtful presence of recovery witnesses—PW-12 and PW-16 claimed recoveries but failed to corroborate each other’s presence or involvement—PW-16 admitted rough site plan was made on his pointation despite not witnessing occurrence—Held, inconsistencies in recovery evidence undermine prosecution case—No credible evidence on actual recovery process.(d) Criminal trial—Failure to produce medico-legal report—Injury fabrication—Adverse inference against prosecution—Investigating Officer claimed one petitioner was injured and treated at Jinnah Hospital, but no MLR was produced—Prosecution failed to call Medical Officer—Held, failure to produce best possible evidence warrants adverse inference under Art. 129(g), QSO, 1984—Petitioner’s version of illegal detention and torture found plausible—Reliance placed on Lal Khan v. The State (2006 SCMR 1846), Riaz Ahmad v. The State (2010 SCMR 846), Abdul Qadeer v. The State (2024 SCMR 1146), and Riasat Ali v. The State (2024 SCMR 1224).(e) Expert testimony—Lack of qualification—Bomb Disposal witness not a chemical expert—No evidentiary value—Bomb Disposal Commander (PW-7) admitted lacking qualifications in chemical analysis—Held, opinion of non-qualified expert not admissible to support explosive-related charges.(f) Criminal trial—Prosecution failure—Principle of benefit of doubt—Multiple material discrepancies including lack of direct evidence, unreliable recoveries, failure to produce key medical and forensic reports, and unqualified expert testimony—Held, case replete with doubts; conviction not sustainable—Petitioners acquitted while extending benefit of doubt.Disposition: Petitions converted to appeals and allowed—Impugned convictions and sentences set aside—Petitioners acquitted of all charges and ordered to be released unless required in any other case.Cited Cases:• Tariq Pervez v. The State (1995 SCMR 1345)• Muhammad Akram v. The State (2009 SCMR 230)• Khial Muhammad v. The State (2024 SCMR 1490)• Lal Khan v. The State (2006 SCMR 1846)• Riaz Ahmad v. The State (2010 SCMR 846)• Abdul Qadeer v. The State (2024 SCMR 1146)• Riasat Ali v. The State (2024 SCMR 1224)

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898): ---Sections 397, 382-B---Concurrence of sentences---Discretionary power of courts---Scope---Petitioner was convicted under three separate FIRs for offenses under Sections 364/34, 324/34, 353, 186, PPC; Section 13(e) of the Arms Ordinance, 1965; and Section 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. Sentences included life imprisonment and rigorous imprisonment for various terms, which were ordered to run consecutively by the lower courts. Held, where multiple convictions arise from the same transaction, courts are expected to exercise discretion under Section 397, Cr.P.C., to order sentences to run concurrently unless exceptional circumstances justify otherwise. In the present case, the petitioner was a minor at the time of arrest in 2006 and had served a significant portion of his sentence. The Supreme Court directed all sentences to run concurrently, granting the benefit of Section 382-B, Cr.P.C., ensuring justice in light of the petitioner’s prolonged incarceration and the nature of the offenses. (b) Sentencing principles: ---Leniency for minors---Constitutional and statutory safeguards---Courts are required to exercise discretion favorably for minors unless the facts of the case demand otherwise. The petitioner’s status as a minor and his extensive time in custody warranted the modification of his sentences to run concurrently, ensuring fairness and adherence to legal principles. (c) Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997): ---Section 7---Conviction under ATA alongside other charges---Petitioner’s actions were deemed part of the same transaction involving kidnapping, firing upon police officials, and possession of illegal arms. The Court upheld the convictions under the ATA but ordered that sentences run concurrently, ensuring proportionality and fairness in sentencing. ----Disposition: Petitions allowed to the extent that all sentences shall run concurrently. Convictions and sentences maintained, with the benefit of Section 382-B, Cr.P.C. applied.

Summary: Bail granted ---- Background:The petitioner and ex-Prime Minister of Pakistan, sought pre-arrest bail under section 498 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 (Cr.P.C.) in case FIR No.365/23 dated 05.03.2023. The FIR was registered under sections 186, 353, 148, 149, 212, 506ii, 172, 173 & 174 PPC at Police Station Race Course, Lahore. The petitioner argued that due to serious security threats, he could not safely approach the Court of Sessions without proper security measures. He cited an arrangement in Islamabad for securing his presence in a similar situation and sought interim pre-arrest bail until similar arrangements could be made in Punjab. Interim pre-arrest bail was granted on 11.07.2023.-----Issues:Whether the petitioner, now a convicted prisoner serving his sentence in Adyla Jail, Rawalpindi, can seek bail in absentia.Whether the Court can decide the bail petition on merits in the absence of the accused.Whether the petitioner?s pre-arrest bail can be secured through video link.-----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The Court held that the petitioner, who had been granted interim pre-arrest bail and is now in custody in another case, could seek a decision on his bail petition on merits. It was noted that the presence of the accused is essential for pre-arrest bail on the first hearing date, but the Court has the discretion to decide the petition on merits in his absence. The Court referred to several precedents that allowed for the decision of bail petitions on merits even if the accused is not present due to being in custody in another case. The Court also acknowledged the possibility of securing the petitioner?s presence through video link. Ultimately, the petition for pre-arrest bail was allowed, and the ad-interim pre-arrest bail was confirmed subject to the petitioner furnishing fresh bail bonds.----Citations/Precedents:Sh. Zahoor Ahmad vs. The State (PLD 1974 Lahore 256)Abdul Majid Afridi vs. The State (2022 SCMR 676)Rais Wazir Ahmad vs. The State (2004 SCMR 1167)The State vs. Malik Mukhtar Awan (1991 SCMR 322)Mst. Salima Bibi and others vs. The State (2000 P Cr. L J 138)Subedar (Rtd.) Abdul Rehman and another vs. The State (1981 P Cr. L J 61)Sahibzada Ahmad Raza Khan Qasuri and 4 others vs. The State (1974 P Cr. L J 482)Maulana Fateh Muhammad vs. The State (PLD 1973 Lahore 874)Muhammad Shafique vs. The State and another (2018 YLR 323)Farhan Masood Khan vs. State etc. (PLJ 2021 Cr. C Lahore 550)Shahzaib and others vs. The State (PLD 2021 Supreme Court 886)Shabbir Ahmad vs. The State (PLD 1981 Lahore 599)Noor Ahmad and another vs. The State (PLD 1982 Lahore 214)Muhammad Ayub vs. (1) Muhammad Yaqub and (2) The State (PLD 1966 Supreme Court 1003)Sadiq Ali vs. The State (PLD 1966 Supreme Court 589)Zeeshan Kazmi vs. The State (1997 M L D 273)Shahzada Qaiser Arfat alias Qaiser vs. The State and another (PLD 2021 Supreme Court 708)Khair Muhammad and another vs. The State through P.G. Punjab and another (2021 SCMR 130)Javed Iqbal vs. The State through Prosecutor General of Punjab and another (2022 SCMR 1424)Muhammad Umar Waqas Barkat Ali vs. The State and another (2023 SCMR 330)Abdul Rehman alias Muhammad Zeeshan vs. The State and others (2023 SCMR 884)

Summary: bail denied ---- Background: The petitioners sought post-arrest bail under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.) in relation to FIR No. 370/2022, dated 10.06.2022, registered at Police Station City Taunsa Sharif, District Dera Ghazi Khan. The FIR included offences under Sections 324, 353, 186, 337-H(2), 148 & 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) read with Section 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. The court observed that the investigation report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. had not been submitted despite the case being registered on 10.06.2022. Consequently, the District Police Officer (DPO) and the Incharge of Investigations were directed to appear in person, and reports were requisitioned from the Anti-Terrorism Court and the Special Public Prosecutor. ----Issues: 1- Whether the delay in the submission of the investigation report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. affects the right to a timely and fair trial. 2- Whether the petitioners are entitled to post-arrest bail given the circumstances of the case and the delays in the investigation process. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court denied the petitioners' request for post-arrest bail and emphasized the importance of timely submission of investigation reports to ensure a fair and efficient criminal justice system. The court observed that delays in submitting investigation reports undermine the integrity and reliability of criminal trials, violating Constitutional provisions such as due process and the right to a fair trial. The court stressed the collaborative responsibility of investigating officers, prosecutors, magistrates, and other stakeholders to ensure timely submission of reports. The court issued several directives to address the systemic issue of delayed investigation reports, including strict adherence to legal principles, accountability for delays, and the active involvement of the Criminal Justice Coordination Committee. ----Citations/Precedents: Hakeem Mumtaz Ahmed and another v. The State, PLD 2002 SC 590 Subhan Khan v. The State, 2002 SCMR 1797 Human Rights Case No.3212 of 2006, 2006 SCMR 1547 Muhammad Aslam and others v. District Police Officer, Rawalpindi and others, 2009 SCMR 141 Rehan v. The State, 2009 SCMR 181 Adnan Prince v. The State through P.G., Punjab and another, PLD 2017 Supreme Court 147 Gul Rehman v. The State through AG, KP, Peshawar, PLD 2021 Supreme Court 795 Amjid Khan v. The State through A.G. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and others, 2021 SCMR 1458 Khizer Hayat and others vs. Inspector General of Police (Punjab), Lahore and others – PLD 2005 Lahore 470 ----Quote: Distinction between ?defective investigation report' and ?defective investigation' elaborated. Directions issued for timely submission of investigation reports to ensure strict compliance of Section 173 Cr.P.C.

Summary: Acquittal granted ---- (a) Criminal Trial—Benefit of Doubt & Presumption of Innocence----S. 324, S. 353, S. 225, S. 337-A(i), S. 337-F(i), S. 337-H(ii), S. 147, S. 148, S. 149, P.P.C. r/w Ss. 6 & 7 of ATA, 1997—ScopeCriminal trial—Principle of benefit of doubt—Presumption of innocence—Applicability—Held, the prosecution case, as advanced, was fraught with contradictions and inconsistencies—The ocular account was unconvincing, forensic evidence was inconclusive, and no public witnesses were associated despite the incident allegedly occurring in a populated area—Ballistic examination of the recovered firearm was delayed by seven days without explanation, and malkhana entries were found tampered with and incomplete—Failure of prosecution to establish the chain of custody of case property rendered the forensic report unreliable—Court reaffirmed that the burden lies on the prosecution to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, failing which the accused is entitled to acquittal.(b) Police Testimony—Reliability & Standards of Proof----Conviction solely based on police witnesses—Evidentiary valueHeld, police witnesses must be subject to the same level of scrutiny as any other witness, and their testimony cannot be accepted merely because they are public officials—The trial court erred in placing undue reliance on police statements, despite glaring contradictions in the prosecution’s version—Lack of independent corroboration and improvement in witness depositions cast serious doubt on the veracity of the case.(c) Unexplained Delay in Forensic Examination & Case Property Handling----Effect of procedural lapses on evidentiary valueHeld, the delay of seven days in sending the weapon for forensic examination, absence of police station stamp on malkhana entries, and contradictory depositions by officials regarding case property handling cast serious doubts on the reliability of the forensic report—Failure to establish an unbroken chain of custody weakened the prosecution’s case and reinforced the defense's stance of false implication.(d) Test Identification Parade—Necessity & Legal Requirement----Failure to conduct TIP—Impact on accused identityHeld, no test identification parade was conducted for the unknown accused—In cases where identity is disputed, TIP becomes crucial to link the accused with the crime—Prosecution’s failure to establish the identity of unknown accused rendered their conviction unsustainable—Reliance on mere police assertions without concrete identification evidence violated the settled principles of criminal jurisprudence.(e) Application of Islamic & Common Law Principles of Justice----Falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus—Presumption of innocenceHeld, the doctrine of benefit of doubt is deeply entrenched in Islamic jurisprudence and common law traditions—Islamic principles dictate that it is better to err on the side of acquittal than to convict an innocent person—The entire case was riddled with deliberate and dishonest improvements, casting grave doubts on the prosecution’s version—Superior courts have consistently held that when the prosecution evidence is doubtful, its benefit must go to the accused as a matter of right, not discretion.(f) Acquittal of the Accused Due to Lack of Corroboration----Prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubtHeld, trial court erred in convicting the appellants despite weak and contradictory evidence—The prosecution failed to prove beyond doubt that the injuries and firearm use were attributable to the accused—As a result, convictions and sentences were set aside, and all appellants were acquitted—They were ordered to be released forthwith unless required in any other case.Disposition:Appeal allowed—Conviction set aside—Accused acquitted and ordered to be released.

Summary: Acquittal granted ---- The petitioner, Subha Sadiq, sought leave to appeal under Article 185(3) of the Constitution against the Lahore High Court's judgment upholding his conviction and sentence for charges under sections 302, 324, 353, 186, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code, as well as sections 7 and 21-L of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. The charges stemmed from the murder of a police constable during an encounter with three unidentified suspects. The petitioner was later identified in a test identification parade as one of the suspects. The trial court convicted him, a decision affirmed by the High Court. ----- Issues ----- Whether the evidence, particularly the test identification parade, was reliable enough to sustain the conviction. ----- 2) Whether inconsistencies in witness testimonies and procedural lapses in the identification process warranted acquittal based on reasonable doubt. ----- Holding/Reasoning/Outcome The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment, extending the benefit of doubt to the petitioner. Key points include: ----- Reliability of Testimonies: The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, particularly the complainant, were inconsistent and lacked credibility. It was unlikely that the witnesses could identify the petitioner accurately, given they arrived after the incident. ----- Identification Parade Flaws: The test identification parade, supervised by the Judicial Magistrate, had serious procedural issues. The petitioner’s features were not properly recorded, and there was a high possibility the witnesses may have seen him post-arrest, undermining the reliability of their identifications. ----- Guideline Non-Compliance: The court highlighted the magistrate's lack of adherence to established protocols for identification parades, as outlined in previous case law. This lapse further weakened the evidentiary value of the identification process. ----- Given these flaws, the Court found that the conviction could not stand and granted the petitioner the benefit of doubt, leading to his acquittal. ----- Citations/Precedents Muhammad Siddique and others v. The State (2020 SCMR 342) – Importance of procedural adherence in test identification parades. Javed Khan Bacha v. The State (2017 SCMR 524) – Test identification as corroborative, not conclusive, evidence. M.Akram Rahi v. The State (2011 SCMR 877) – Importance of compliance with identification protocols. Kanwar Anwar Ali (PLD 2019 Supreme Court 488) – Guidelines for conducting test identification parades. Mian Sohail Ahmed v. The State (2019 SCMR 956) – Necessity of assessing eyewitness credibility in conjunction with identification parade results. ----- The Court converted the petition into an appeal, allowing it, and ordered the petitioner’s release based on the benefit of doubt.