Summary: (a) Criminal trial ---- Appreciation of ocular, medical and forensic evidence ---- Murder of accused in judicial lockup; injuries to police constables; recovery of weapon; serological and ballistic reports ---- Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302(b), 324, 353 ---- Sindh Arms Act, 2013, S. 24 ---- Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 382-B ----- Abdul Wahab, an accused remanded to judicial custody in a case under Ss. 365-B, 452, 148, 149, P.P.C., was brought to Sub-Jail/Judicial Lockup Warrah in pursuance of a ten-days’ remand order. Due to the absence of the Jailor, he was made to sit handcuffed in the courtyard of the judicial lockup when the appellant, along with co-accused, armed with pistols, entered the lockup and opened indiscriminate fire upon him and the police party, resulting in the deceased’s death on the spot and firearm injuries to Constables Zahid Ali and Muhammad Ayoub. Ocular account was furnished by the Incharge Judicial Lockup (ASI Muhammad Idrees Wahoocho) and the two injured constables, who were independent, disinterested witnesses with no animosity against the appellant; their presence at the scene was natural and unimpeachable, and their testimony was consistent and confidence-inspiring on all material particulars and remained unshaken in cross-examination. The appellant was apprehended at the spot and a 30-bore pistol recovered from his possession; four empties of the same calibre, recovered from the spot, on forensic examination matched the said pistol, thereby providing scientific corroboration to the ocular account. Recovery of blood-stained earth from the place where the deceased fell and his blood-stained clothes, together with a positive serological report, further substantiated the prosecution version. Medical evidence, including M.L.Cs. of the injured constables and post-mortem of the deceased, confirmed fresh firearm injuries on the injured witnesses, categorized as Ghayr Jaifah Hashimah and Ghayr Jaifah Mutalahimah respectively, and four firearm entry wounds on the deceased, with death opined as due to firearm injuries. Held, that on re-appraisal of the entire evidence, the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and High Court regarding the appellant’s guilt under Ss. 302(b), 324, 353, P.P.C. and S. 24 of the Sindh Arms Act, 2013 were based on proper appreciation of reliable ocular, medical and forensic evidence; no misreading or non-reading was found warranting interference. Convictions under the said provisions were, therefore, maintained; benefit of S. 382-B, Cr.P.C., and direction that all sentences run concurrently, was affirmed. (b) Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 ---- S. 6(1)(b), (c), S. 6(2)(m), (n), Ss. 2(j), 2(w), 7(a), 7(b), 7(h) ---- Terrorism ---- Mens rea; “design” and “purpose”; serious coercion/intimidation of public servants; serious violence against members of police force ---- Clarification and refinement of Ghulam Hussain’s case ---- A larger Bench in Ghulam Hussain v. The State (PLD 2020 SC 61) had held that not every heinous offence causing fear or panic amounts to terrorism; where the primary motive is personal vendetta or private enmity, the act, even if it incidentally induces fear, does not per se constitute terrorism unless it satisfies the statutory criteria under S. 6, ATA. In the present case, the Supreme Court examined a specific class of incidents not squarely addressed in Ghulam Hussain’s case, namely where law enforcement personnel suffer injuries or lose their lives in the course of a private dispute between third parties while acting in the line of duty. The Court reiterated that the three cumulative elements of terrorism under S. 6(1), ATA are: (i) commission of an act enumerated in S. 6(2); (ii) the requisite “design” under S. 6(1)(b) or “purpose” under S. 6(1)(c); and (iii) the impact of such act in terms of intimidating or creating fear and insecurity in the public or a section thereof. By substituting the word “design”, the legislature broadened the inquiry to include the scheme or object in the offender’s mind, not merely the actual consequences. Thus, the decisive consideration is whether the act was designed to coerce, intimidate or overawe the Government, its officials, or law enforcement agencies, as opposed to being confined to private vengeance. Serious coercion or intimidation of a public servant in order to force or prevent the discharge of lawful duties (S. 6(2)(m)), and serious violence against a member of the police force or a public servant (S. 6(2)(n)), read with the definitions of “serious violence” and “grievous bodily injury” in Ss. 2(w) and 2(j), ATA, cover violent conduct that endangers life or causes grievous harm to officials/public servants. Comparative reference to “serious violence offence” under the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (New South Wales, Australia) was made only to illustrate that, in other jurisdictions also, “serious violence” is reserved for extreme forms of harm, especially those endangering life or causing grievous injury, thus aligning with the legislative intent underlying Ss. 6(2)(m), (n), ATA. The Court held that this refined analysis does not depart from but supplements the principles in Ghulam Hussain’s case by recognizing that serious violence against law enforcement agencies, even in the context of private feuds between third parties, may, in given circumstances, assume the character of terrorism when it systematically targets those upholding the rule of law. Cited Cases: • Ghulam Hussain v. The State PLD 2020 SC 61 (c) Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 ---- S. 6(1)(b), (c), S. 6(2)(m), (n) ---- Harm to law enforcement personnel during private vendetta; categories of situations; design to resist and overawe law enforcement ---- When private disputes cross into terrorism ---- The Court distinguished two broad situations relating to harm caused to law enforcement personnel: firstly, where police or security officials are directly and deliberately targeted (e.g., ambushes or bombings) with the clear objective of spreading fear or disrupting the State; such attacks straightforwardly fulfill the physical and mental elements of terrorism under the ATA. Secondly, where violence arises from a private conflict but harm is caused to law enforcement officials who intervene or are inherently present, including in premises where police presence is explicit and inevitable, such as courts, police stations or lock-ups, or during transit of accused persons to or from such premises. In the latter category, if the offender arms himself with the deliberate intention to use the weapon against security officials in the event of their intervention or apprehension, the law enforcement authority becomes the foreseeable and primary target of resistance, and violence employed to evade arrest or neutralize resistance constitutes “serious coercion or intimidation” of public servants under S. 6(2)(m) and “serious violence” under S. 6(2)(n), ATA. Likewise, where the offender’s primary target is a private individual but the attack is launched in a location where police presence is inevitable, and the assailant acts with knowledge that harm to security officials is a foreseeable consequence of executing the plan, the resulting injuries or risk to law enforcement personnel can attract the provisions of S. 6(2)(m) & (n), ATA, provided that the design or purpose satisfies S. 6(1)(b) or (c), namely, to intimidate, overawe, or deter law enforcement agencies and undermine State authority. The Court emphasized that in such cases, the harm to police officers/officials is not merely incidental or collateral but forms an integral component of the criminal plan to neutralize lawful resistance and thereby constitutes an attack on the law enforcement machinery of the State. (d) Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 ---- S. 6(1)(b), (c), S. 6(2)(m), (n) ---- Attack in judicial lockup; injuries to police personnel escorting accused; transformation of private vendetta into terrorism; objective test for “serious violence” against police ---- Application to present case ---- In the instant matter, the initial motive of the accused arose from a personal vendetta against the deceased Abdul Wahab, who had been nominated in a case of abduction of the daughter-in-law of a co-accused and was under lawful judicial custody within the precincts of the judicial lockup. Fully aware of the deceased’s custodial status and the inevitable presence of police officials, the appellant and co-accused chose to launch an armed attack in the very courtyard of the judicial lockup, indiscriminately firing not only at their intended private target but also at the police escort, resulting in firearm injuries to Constables Zahid Ali and Muhammad Ayoub. Held, that the location (judicial lockup), timing, and manner of the attack demonstrated preparation, anticipation of resistance by law enforcement, and a willingness to overcome lawful authority through serious violence; harm to the police officials was not collateral or unintended but formed part of the accused’s broader design to execute a targeted killing in custody by neutralizing the resistance of police. Such conduct amounted to serious violence against members of the police force and serious coercion/intimidation of public servants within the meaning of S. 6(2)(m) & (n), ATA, viewed through the objective test whether the act posed a real and substantial danger to the lives of law enforcement personnel acting in the discharge of official duties. Actual fatality among police was not a prerequisite; the use of deadly weapons and indiscriminate firing in a volatile custodial environment where officials were known to be present satisfied both actus reus and mens rea under the ATA. Reliance was placed on Muhammad Nawaz v. The State (PLD 2014 SC 383) to affirm that firing upon a police party in uniform engaged in lawful duties, thereby obstructing discharge of their functions, constitutes serious violence against members of the police force. Accordingly, the Court held that where officers/officials of law enforcement agencies are harmed or killed not due to personal enmity but solely because of their deployment for the discharge of lawful duty, and such attacks are deliberately planned as part of an assault on a person in custody, the intent and effect transcend private vendetta and attract the provisions of the ATA; such acts fall within the statutory definition of terrorism. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Nawaz v. The State PLD 2014 SC 383 (e) Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 ---- S. 6(1)(b), (c), S. 6(2)(m), (n) ---- Harm to officials arising out of discharge of official functions versus purely personal enmity ---- Scope ---- The Court clarified that where harm is inflicted on an official/officer of a law enforcement agency on account of, or as a consequence of, acts performed by such official in discharge of his official duties, even if such harm is caused outside duty hours, the act is to be treated as arising from the official’s role and would fall within the ambit of terrorism, subject to fulfillment of the other statutory elements under S. 6, ATA. Conversely, where a police or law enforcement official is harmed solely due to personal enmity, without any intention of attacking or intimidating law enforcement in its institutional or official capacity, such conduct, though criminal and punishable, does not amount to terrorism and is to be dealt with under the ordinary provisions of the P.P.C. or other applicable laws. The distinction rests on whether the violence is directed at the individual in his personal capacity, or at the authority of the State and law enforcement system which he represents. (f) Anti-Terrorism Courts ---- Joint trial of scheduled and connected offences ---- Effect on nature of offences ---- Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, S. 21-M ---- While trying a scheduled offence, an Anti-Terrorism Court is empowered under S. 21-M, ATA to jointly try any other offence committed by the accused, provided such offence is connected with the offence triable under the Act. Held, that merely by virtue of being tried in the Anti-Terrorism Court, a scheduled or non-scheduled offence does not ipso facto assume the character of a terrorism offence; it remains punishable under the ordinary criminal law unless it independently meets the definitional and mens rea requirements of terrorism as laid down in S. 6, ATA. The jurisdictional competence of the Anti-Terrorism Court to try connected offences is thus procedural and does not alter the substantive nature or ingredients of the underlying offences. (g) Criminal appeal ---- Convictions under P.P.C. and Sindh Arms Act maintained ---- Convictions under S. 7(a) & 7(b), ATA altered to S. 7(h), ATA ---- Sentence modified ---- On the basis of re-appraisal of evidence, the Supreme Court found no justification to interfere with the appellant’s convictions and sentences recorded by the Trial Court and maintained by the High Court under Ss. 302(b), 324, 353, P.P.C., and S. 24 of the Sindh Arms Act, 2013; these convictions were upheld. However, in light of the refined legal position regarding the scope and application of the Anti-Terrorism Act to acts of serious violence against law enforcement personnel in the line of duty, the Court set aside the appellant’s convictions under Ss. 7(a) and 7(b), ATA and altered them to a conviction under S. 7(h) of the said Act. Consequently, the appellant was sentenced under S. 7(h), ATA to five years’ imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 50,000/-, and in default of payment of fine, to further undergo simple imprisonment for three months. Benefit of S. 382-B, Cr.P.C. was extended to the appellant and all convictions were ordered to run concurrently. Appeal was, thus, partly allowed.

Summary: Acquittal --- (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860) ---- Ss. 302, 109 & 34 ---- Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Ss. 6 & 7 ---- Sindh Arms Act (V of 2013), Ss. 23(i)A, 24 & 25 ---- Murder—Allegation of abetment—Evidence—Standard of proof—Benefit of doubt—Scope. Prosecution alleged that appellant Sikandar Ali Lashari (then District & Sessions Judge) hired assassins to murder Aqib Hussain, son of another Sessions Judge, on account of the deceased’s alleged relationship with his daughter. Held, prosecution failed to establish the alleged conspiracy or abetment through any admissible or credible evidence. The alleged Call Data Record (CDR) of SIMs was neither issued in the name of the appellant nor proved in accordance with law—being photocopies, unverified by the concerned company, and produced without permission to tender secondary evidence. No CDR of the appellant’s own SIM, nor any recording or transcript of conversation with alleged hired assassins, was produced. Alleged messages between the deceased and the appellant’s daughter were not proved through forensic or company evidence; mobile phones were never seized or examined. Extra-judicial confession made by the appellant while in police custody was inadmissible. Recovery of pistols was from the house of an absconding co-accused, not from premises owned or possessed by the appellant; hence of no evidentiary value. No witness of conspiracy or abetment was produced. Motive was introduced belatedly and remained unproved. Prosecution thus failed to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Cited Cases: • Azeem Khan v. Mujahid Khan (2016 SCMR 274) • Rehmatullah v. The State (2024 SCMR 1782) • Khalid Perviz v. The State (2021 SCMR 522) (b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860) ---- S. 302 ---- Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 537 ---- Criminal trial—Identification of accused—Defective identification parade—Value of evidence. Appellant Muhammad Irfan Khan @ Faheem was charged as one of the unidentified assailants. No description of the culprits regarding age, height or complexion was provided in the FIR. Identification parade held in court premises was unsafe, as it was not shown that the appellant’s face was covered or that witnesses had no prior opportunity to see him. Such identification, being tainted with doubt, carried no evidentiary value. Cited Cases: • State through Advocate-General Sindh v. Sobharo (1993 SCMR 585) • Sabir Ali alias Fauji v. The State (2011 SCMR 563) (c) Evidence Act (I of 1872) ---- Arts. 38, 40, 71 & 91 ---- Evidence—Call Data Records—Messages—Extra-judicial confession—Recovery—Evidentiary value. Photocopies of CDRs, produced without certification or testimony from service providers, were inadmissible; no proof of ownership or authenticity was provided. Messages relied upon were not proved by any competent witness. Extra-judicial confession made in police custody was inadmissible. Recovery of pistols from house of absconding accused could not be used against appellant Sikandar Ali Lashari, as possession was not proved. (d) Criminal trial ---- Benefit of doubt ---- Principle—Single circumstance sufficient—Application of settled law. Where a single circumstance raises reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to acquittal. Instant case was riddled with multiple infirmities including unproved motive, inadmissible documentary evidence, lack of independent corroboration, and doubtful identification; therefore, benefit of doubt was extended. Cited Cases: • Tariq Pervez v. The State (1995 SCMR 1345) • Muhammad Akram v. The State (2009 SCMR 230) Disposition: Appeals allowed. Convictions and sentences awarded by the Anti-Terrorism Court, Karachi (29.09.2018), and affirmed by the High Court of Sindh (20.04.2020), were set aside. Appellants Sikandar Ali Lashari and Muhammad Irfan Khan @ Faheem were acquitted of all charges and ordered to be released forthwith unless required in any other case.

Summary: Acquittal granted ----- (a) Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997—Benefit of doubt—Failure to prove identification and arrest at scene—Conviction set aside—S. 7(i)(a), Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997—Ss. 302(b), 449, 324, 353, 186, 148, 149, 120-B, 109, 337 PPC—Ss. 3/4 Explosive Substances Act, 1908—S. 13 Arms Ordinance, 1965—Petitioners were convicted and sentenced under multiple provisions including death and life imprisonment—Held, petitioners were not named in FIR or initial police reports, nor identified by any eyewitness including complainant or management of worship place—Star witness (Name withheld) did not appear, and other cited eyewitnesses failed to testify—Claim of arrest at scene contradicted by record—Held, serious doubts in prosecution’s version warranted benefit of doubt—Reliance placed on Tariq Pervez v. The State (1995 SCMR 1345) and Muhammad Akram v. The State (2009 SCMR 230).(b) Criminal trial—Unreliable ocular testimony—Witness not named in FIR or site plan—Declared hostile by prosecution—PW-13 Inspector (name withheld), claimed to witness arrest and recovery but was not mentioned in FIR, site plan, or police narrative—Prosecution itself sought to declare him hostile—No other witness corroborated his presence or version—Held, evidence of witness not cited in FIR or shown present at scene is not trustworthy—Reliance placed on Khial Muhammad v. The State (2024 SCMR 1490).(c) Criminal trial—Contradictory recovery evidence—Recovery of suicide vests and ammunition—Doubtful presence of recovery witnesses—PW-12 and PW-16 claimed recoveries but failed to corroborate each other’s presence or involvement—PW-16 admitted rough site plan was made on his pointation despite not witnessing occurrence—Held, inconsistencies in recovery evidence undermine prosecution case—No credible evidence on actual recovery process.(d) Criminal trial—Failure to produce medico-legal report—Injury fabrication—Adverse inference against prosecution—Investigating Officer claimed one petitioner was injured and treated at Jinnah Hospital, but no MLR was produced—Prosecution failed to call Medical Officer—Held, failure to produce best possible evidence warrants adverse inference under Art. 129(g), QSO, 1984—Petitioner’s version of illegal detention and torture found plausible—Reliance placed on Lal Khan v. The State (2006 SCMR 1846), Riaz Ahmad v. The State (2010 SCMR 846), Abdul Qadeer v. The State (2024 SCMR 1146), and Riasat Ali v. The State (2024 SCMR 1224).(e) Expert testimony—Lack of qualification—Bomb Disposal witness not a chemical expert—No evidentiary value—Bomb Disposal Commander (PW-7) admitted lacking qualifications in chemical analysis—Held, opinion of non-qualified expert not admissible to support explosive-related charges.(f) Criminal trial—Prosecution failure—Principle of benefit of doubt—Multiple material discrepancies including lack of direct evidence, unreliable recoveries, failure to produce key medical and forensic reports, and unqualified expert testimony—Held, case replete with doubts; conviction not sustainable—Petitioners acquitted while extending benefit of doubt.Disposition: Petitions converted to appeals and allowed—Impugned convictions and sentences set aside—Petitioners acquitted of all charges and ordered to be released unless required in any other case.Cited Cases:• Tariq Pervez v. The State (1995 SCMR 1345)• Muhammad Akram v. The State (2009 SCMR 230)• Khial Muhammad v. The State (2024 SCMR 1490)• Lal Khan v. The State (2006 SCMR 1846)• Riaz Ahmad v. The State (2010 SCMR 846)• Abdul Qadeer v. The State (2024 SCMR 1146)• Riasat Ali v. The State (2024 SCMR 1224)

Summary: (a) Criminal Trial – Explosive Substances Act, Anti-Terrorism Act, Arms Ordinance – Requirements of Safe Custody, Recovery and Chain of Custody – Non-Production of Case Property – Effect Failure of the prosecution to produce critical physical evidence, such as explosives, detonators, weapons, and other incriminating items allegedly recovered from the accused, vitiated the entire prosecution case. Non-production and non-exhibition of case property in court created fatal gaps in the chain of custody, drawing adverse presumption under Article 129(g) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984. Reliance placed on Gul Dast Khan v. The State (2009 SCMR 431), Amjad Ali v. State (2012 SCMR 577), and Ahmed Ali v. State (2023 SCMR 781). (b) Electronic Evidence – Video from Mobile Phone – Requirements for Admissibility – Role of Forensic Expert – Standard of Proof: Video evidence allegedly recovered from a mobile phone was held inadmissible due to lack of proper forensic examination, sealing, and authentication. Requirements under Ishtiaq Ahmed Mirza v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2019 SC 675) were not fulfilled. Prosecution failed to produce the person who made or handled the video, and the device was not sealed or forensically verified, undermining evidentiary value. (c) Explosive Substances Act, 1908 – Section 7 – Mandatory Requirement of Sanction from Government – Failure to Obtain – Effect: No sanction under Section 7 of the Explosive Substances Act was obtained from the competent authority before prosecution. This was a jurisdictional defect rendering the proceedings and conviction under Sections 4 and 5 ESA void ab initio. Reliance placed on Abdul Aziz @ Sadam v. The State (2023 YLR 1821 [Balochistan]). (d) Criminal Conspiracy – Section 120-B PPC – Ingredients – Proof of Common Intention – Requirement of Agreement: Prosecution failed to prove any agreement or meeting of minds between appellants necessary to establish conspiracy under Section 120-B PPC. No independent corroboration or electronic evidence was provided to link the appellants to each other or to any proscribed organization. (e) Anti-Terrorism Act – Prosecution under ATA & General Law – Requirement for Separate Charges and Sentences: Trial court erred by merging charges under Anti-Terrorism Act and general penal statutes in single sentencing phrases. Convictions must be separately recorded under each statutory provision. Reliance placed on Akhtar Muhammad v. The State (PLD 2017 Peshawar 55). (f) Enforced Disappearance – Defense of Abduction by State Agencies – Burden on Prosecution – FIR for Missing Person – Failure to Refute Defense: Appellants’ claim of abduction by law enforcement agencies was corroborated by FIR No. 1024/2022, lodged prior to the alleged recovery. Prosecution failed to rebut this defense or provide credible explanation for the delay or absence of due process under Articles 9, 10, and 14 of the Constitution. Burden of disproving enforced disappearance was not discharged, and adverse inference was drawn. (g) Criminal Procedure – Section 103 Cr.P.C. – Failure to Associate Independent Witnesses – Recovery at Public Place – Effect: Despite alleged recovery from a public place and the presence of bystanders, no private witness was associated with recovery proceedings. This omission raised serious doubt as to the veracity of the prosecution case and undermined the credibility of police witnesses. (h) Forensic Chain of Custody – Delay in Sending Samples – Absence of Mallkhana Registers – Vitiation of NFSA Report: Explosive samples were sent to NFSA after an unexplained delay of six days. Mallkhana Register No. 19 and Roznamcha entries were not produced. Such lapses cast doubt on the integrity and authenticity of the NFSA report, rendering it unreliable. -----Disposition: Appeals allowed. Conviction and sentences set aside. Appellants acquitted of all charges. Judgment also directed Inspector General Police, Islamabad, to take cognizance of CTD officials' conduct and recommended that enforced disappearance be declared a distinct criminal offence.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure—Pre-Arrest Bail: ----Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 (XLV of 1860), Ss. 324 & 337-F(ii); Arms Ordinance, 1965, S. 13(d); Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (V of 1898), S. 497 Grant of pre-arrest bail—Scope—Elements of mala fide—Assessment of incriminating material—Further inquiry. The petitioner-complainant challenged the Islamabad High Court’s order granting pre-arrest bail to the respondent-accused in an attempted murder case. The FIR alleged that the respondent-accused, armed with a pistol, fired at the complainant’s son, injuring him in the leg. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s findings that (i) no crime empty was recovered from the scene, (ii) the alleged weapon had already been recovered by the police, and (iii) a tentative assessment of the available material suggested that the case fell within the ambit of further inquiry under Section 497(2), Cr.P.C. The Court reaffirmed that pre-arrest bail is not to be withheld where no reasonable grounds exist to justify the arrest of an accused or where prosecution evidence does not prima facie connect the accused with the offense. (b) Criminal Procedure—Mala Fide in Pre-Arrest Bail: ----Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (V of 1898), S. 497(2); Judicial Precedents Mala fide—Requirement for proving mala fide—Inferences from circumstances. The petitioner contended that the element of mala fide was not properly considered by the High Court. The Supreme Court reiterated that mala fide is not always proved by direct evidence and must often be inferred from surrounding facts and circumstances. The Court found that in the absence of any compelling material demonstrating mala fide on the part of the investigating agency, no interference was warranted with the High Court’s order. Reference was made to Shahzada Qaiser Arfat v. State PLD 2021 SC 708, reinforcing that where mala fide is not apparent from the record, the benefit of doubt must favor the accused. (c) Bail Proceedings—Competency of Second Bail Petition: ----Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (V of 1898), Ss. 497 & 498 Re-filing of bail petition before a higher forum—Competency of successive bail applications. The Supreme Court dismissed the argument that the High Court erred in entertaining the respondent-accused’s bail petition after the Sessions Court had earlier found his second bail plea to be incompetent. The Court clarified that dismissal of a bail application by a lower court does not bar an accused from filing a fresh bail petition before a higher forum, nor does it prevent the High Court from independently assessing the matter. The High Court had correctly exercised its jurisdiction in evaluating the case on its merits. ----Disposition: The Supreme Court found no perversity or legal infirmity in the High Court’s decision and held that the petitioner-complainant failed to establish any exceptional grounds warranting interference. Accordingly, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, and leave to appeal was declined.

Summary: Sentence upheld ---- (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860) ----S. 302(b)—Qatl-e-Amd—Discretion in sentencing—Normal vs. alternate punishment—Appellant convicted for murdering his wife by firearm—Trial court sentenced appellant to life imprisonment considering mitigating factors, including his young age, first-offender status, and unproven motive—High Court enhanced sentence to death on the ground that trial court did not comply with S. 367(5), Cr.P.C.—Held, S. 302(b), P.P.C. provides two alternate punishments: death or life imprisonment as tazir, and the courts must exercise discretion having regard to the facts and circumstances—Appellate court may not interfere with trial court’s discretion where mitigating factors exist—Trial court had explicitly recorded reasons for not awarding death—High Court erred in treating death sentence as the normal punishment without appreciating the mitigating circumstances already judicially acknowledged— Cited Cases: • Ghulam Mohyuddin v. The State 2014 SCMR 1034 • Hassan v. The State PLD 2013 SC 793 • Dilawar Hussain v. The State 2013 SCMR 1582 • Muhammad Aslam v. The State 2007 SCMR 1412 • Khalid Mehmood v. The State 2011 SCMR 664 • Najiba v. Ahmed Sultan 2001 SCMR 988 • Khurram Malik v. The State PLD 2006 SC 354 (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ----S. 367(5)—Punishment other than death in capital offences—Requirement to record reasons—Held, where sentence of life imprisonment is awarded instead of death in an offence punishable under S. 302(b), P.P.C., trial court must record specific reasons—Trial court in present case complied with this obligation by noting age, lack of prior record, and lack of proven motive—High Court misapplied S. 367(5) and erroneously assumed reasons were absent—Provision applies to trial courts only and not to appellate or revisional courts. Cited Cases: • Ghulam Mohyuddin v. The State 2014 SCMR 1034 • Haji Muhammad Ilahi v. Muhammad Altaf 2011 SCMR 513 • Asad Mehmood v. Akhlaq Ahmed 2010 SCMR 868 **(c) Criminal Trial—Sentence— ----Principle of proportionality—Mitigating circumstances— Held, in sentencing for qatl-e-amd under S. 302(b), P.P.C., courts must balance retributive, deterrent, and reformative goals—Multiple precedents hold that even a single mitigating factor may justify awarding life imprisonment instead of death—Factors such as unproven motive, young age, lack of prior criminal record, and questionable recovery of weapon were present in this case—Appellant’s conviction was upheld, but sentence of death was not warranted in light of mitigating factors. Cited Cases: • Amjad Shah v. The State PLD 2017 SC 152 • Nadeem alias Nanha v. The State 2010 SCMR 949 • Zafar Iqbal v. The State 2017 SCMR 1721 • Muhammad Asif v. Muhammad Akhtar 2016 SCMR 2035 • Abdul Haque v. The State PLD 1996 SC 1 (d) Sindh Arms Act, 2013 ----S. 23(1)(a)—Conviction for unlawful possession of firearm—Sentence upheld—Recovery of firearm led by appellant was questioned due to simultaneous submission of spent bullets and weapon to Forensic Lab—Held, even if firearm recovery deemed doubtful, prosecution proved guilt through consistent and confidence-inspiring ocular and medical evidence—Conviction under Sindh Arms Act and corresponding sentence and fine maintained. (e) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ----S. 544-A—Compensation to heirs of deceased—Amount of Rs. 200,000/- awarded to legal heirs by trial court—Held, compensation to remain intact and recoverable as arrears of land revenue—In case of default, appellant to undergo six months’ simple imprisonment. (f) Constitution of Pakistan ----Art. 9—Right to life—Judicial discretion in awarding sentence—Held, life and liberty are constitutionally protected rights—Exercise of sentencing discretion must favor preservation of life where justified—Recognition of mitigating circumstances aligns with constitutional principles protecting individual rights. **(g) Criminal Appeal—Scope of interference with acquittal— ----Standard of review—High Court had acquitted co-accused after reappraisal of evidence for lack of incriminating material—Held, presumption of double innocence attaches to acquittal—Supreme Court declined to interfere, finding acquittal to be well-reasoned and not perverse. Cited Case: • Haji Muhammad Ilahi v. Muhammad Altaf 2011 SCMR 513 Disposition: Appeal partially allowed—Conviction under S. 302(b), P.P.C. maintained—High Court’s enhancement of sentence from life imprisonment to death set aside—Life sentence awarded by trial court restored—Compensation under S. 544-A, Cr.P.C. upheld—In case of default, appellant to undergo six months’ simple imprisonment—Conviction and sentence under S. 23(1)(a) of the Sindh Arms Act also upheld—All sentences to run concurrently—Benefit of S. 382-B, Cr.P.C. extended to the appellant—Appeal against acquittal of co-accused dismissed.

Summary: Bail granted --- (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) — S. 497 — Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302, 34, 202 — Arms Ordinance (XX of 1965), S. 13 — Bail, grant of — Post-arrest bail — Tentative assessment — Allegation of murder and concealment of dead body — No specific role attributed to petitioner in FIR — No recovery made from him — Co-accused (petitioner’s brother) confessed and led to recovery of body and weapon — No incriminating statement by other co-accused (petitioner’s father) against petitioner — Held, allegation against petitioner appears limited to concealment of offence, punishable under S. 202, P.P.C., which does not fall within prohibitory clause — Bail granted. (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) — S. 497(1), 497(2) — Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S. 202 — Bail, grant of — Further inquiry — Where material collected during investigation does not directly implicate accused in commission of murder, and alleged role is only that of concealment — Offence not falling within prohibitory clause — Accused entitled to bail as matter requires further inquiry — Long incarceration pre-trial without substantive evidence not warranted. Rel. 2024 PCr.LJ 1305 & 2021 YLR 347 ref. Disposition: Petition allowed — Post-arrest bail granted to petitioner on furnishing surety of Rs. 500,000 with two solvent sureties — Trial Court directed to decide matter uninfluenced by observations made in bail order.

Summary: Bail granted----(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 497—Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302/34 & 202—Arms Ordinance (XX of 1965), S. 13 —Bail—Post-arrest—Scope—No specific role assigned—Offence not falling under prohibitory clause— Accused was nominated in FIR for murder but no specific role was attributed to him—No incriminating article recovered from his possession—The weapon of offence and recovery of the deceased's body were attributed to co-accused Israr Ahmad, on whose pointation both recoveries were made—Held, even though accused was named in FIR, the only tentative role possibly attributable was concealment under S.202, P.P.C., which carries a maximum sentence of six months and does not fall under the prohibitory clause of S.497, Cr.P.C.—No evidence of direct involvement or participation in the murder—Bail allowed. Cited Cases: • 2024 PCr.LJ 1305 • 2021 YLR 347 (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 497—Principles for grant of bail—Tentative assessment— Court held that bail decisions must rest upon tentative assessment of material collected during investigation—In present case, no direct or circumstantial evidence connecting petitioner with commission of murder—Father of petitioner, who was a co-accused, exonerated him in his S.161, Cr.P.C. statement and implicated another co-accused—Prosecution evidence failed to meet the threshold required to deny bail—Held, liberty of accused cannot be curtailed indefinitely in absence of cogent material. Held, bail granted subject to furnishing bail bonds. (c) Criminal Trial—Multiple accused—Assigning distinct roles—Scope— Where multiple accused are charged in a serious offence like murder, the prosecution must clearly assign specific roles to each—Mere joint nomination in FIR without clear attribution is insufficient—In present case, petitioner’s role was vague and not corroborated by recovery or statements—Held, court must distinguish between principal offender and others, especially when co-accused’s confession and recoveries shift culpability. Principle: In serious criminal cases, courts must assess individual liability rather than collective implication. Bail granted.

Summary: Bail granted --- (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ----S. 497(2)---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302, 109 & 34---Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Arms Act, S. 15---Bail, grant of---Post-arrest bail---Further inquiry---Multiple versions---Tentative assessment---Petitioner was implicated in a murder case through varying and conflicting versions by the complainant party---Initially, FIR nominated one accused on suspicion without eyewitness account---Subsequently, complainant in her S. 164, Cr.P.C. statement implicated petitioner along with another co-accused---Meanwhile, deceased’s mother submitted a separate application accusing a different individual---Court held that such contradictory narratives cast serious doubt requiring further inquiry as to the actual role of the petitioner---Determination of veracity of these versions required recording of evidence by the Trial Court---Held, case falls within the ambit of further inquiry as contemplated under S. 497(2), Cr.P.C.---Reference made to settled principle that where reasonable doubt exists regarding an accused’s involvement, bail should be granted rather than allowing prolonged incarceration pending trial. (b) Criminal trial---Conflicting versions by complainant party---Effect---Scope of further inquiry ----Where prosecution case rests upon multiple inconsistent accusations emerging from the same complainant side, benefit of doubt must be extended to accused at bail stage---Petitioner should not be kept behind bars merely due to unverified and uncorroborated shifting allegations---Court emphasized that in such cases, liberty must prevail pending trial. (c) Disposition Bail application was allowed. Petitioner was admitted to post-arrest bail on furnishing bail bonds of Rs. 200,000/- with two sureties each in the like amount to the satisfaction of the Trial Court. Observations made were held to be tentative and not to prejudice trial proceedings.

Summary: (a) Qatl-i-Amd — Sentencing under Section 302(b), A.P.C. — Discretion of Court between death and life imprisonment ----Principles for awarding Tazir punishment—Judicial discretion, mitigating circumstances and legislative intent examined. Section 302(b), A.P.C. provides two alternative punishments—death or life imprisonment as Tazir—depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The Court held that these are not hierarchically fixed but alternative sentences, and that the judiciary must exercise its discretion with caution, mercy, and consideration of individual circumstances. Even a single mitigating circumstance may justify the substitution of life imprisonment for the death penalty, as the sanctity of human life demands utmost circumspection in capital sentencing. (b) Evidence — Ocular account and corroboration — Credibility of related witnesses ----Related and interested witnesses—Distinction recognized. Presence of the deceased’s wife at the scene was natural; her testimony, corroborated by post-occurrence witnesses and recovery of weapon and empties, was reliable. Relationship per se does not render a witness untrustworthy unless enmity or motive for false implication is shown. “Related” and “interested” witnesses are distinct concepts; the latter requires proof of ulterior motive. (c) Recovery under Section 103, Cr.P.C. — Non-compliance — Effect ----Recovery at instance of accused—Section 103, Cr.P.C.—Applicability. The Court reaffirmed that Section 103, Cr.P.C. applies strictly to searches; recoveries made pursuant to information supplied by the accused do not require the same degree of compliance, and non-production of both recovery witnesses is not fatal where one credible witness is examined. (d) Sentencing — Mitigation—Absence of premeditation and exoneration of co-accused ----Mitigating circumstances—Effect of exoneration of co-accused and lack of premeditation. The initial implication of eight alleged abettors later exonerated under Section 169, Cr.P.C. indicated exaggeration in the prosecution version and invoked the judicial duty to “sift the grain from the chaff.” Absence of premeditation and possibility of false implication of others were recognized as strong mitigating factors warranting reduction of death penalty to life imprisonment. Disposition: Appeal partly allowed—Conviction under Section 302(b), A.P.C. maintained—Death sentence converted into life imprisonment—Benefit of Section 382-B, Cr.P.C. extended. Cited Cases: PLD 1996 SC 122; 2013 SCMR 1582; 2014 SCMR 1034; 2022 SCR 365; 2015 SCR 1007. Cited Provisions: Sections 302(b), 304, 109, 544-A A.P.C./Cr.P.C.; Section 13 Arms Act; Sections 169, 342, 382-B, Cr.P.C.; Section 103 Cr.P.C.