Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860) ---- Ss. 302(b), 392 & 411 ---- Juvenile Justice System Ordinance, 2000 ---- Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss. 382-B & 544-A ---- Murder and robbery—Juvenile accused—Appreciation of evidence—Ocular account corroborated by medical and recovery evidence—Benefit of concurrent sentence. Held, prosecution successfully established that the petitioner, tried as a juvenile, along with co-accused, intercepted the complainant and his son, snatched valuables, and fired upon the deceased, causing his death. Sole eye-witness, the complainant (father of deceased), gave a confidence-inspiring account consistent with the medical evidence and supported by prompt reporting. Non-production of additional witnesses did not impair prosecution case, as quality of evidence prevailed over quantity. Identification of petitioner in sufficient moonlight and motorcycle light was natural and reliable. Cited Cases: • Abdur Rauf v. The State and another (2003 SCMR 522) (b) Evidence Act (I of 1872) ---- Arts. 71 & 75 ---- Minor discrepancies between ocular and medical evidence—Effect. Minor variation between the seat of injury in medical evidence (right side of lower chest) and the narration in FIR (right side of abdomen) held immaterial. Eye-witnesses are not expected to reproduce exact details under stress of violent events. Such minor inconsistency did not shake the credibility of the witness. (c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860) ---- Ss. 392 & 411 ---- Recovery of stolen property—Corroborative evidence—Value. Petitioner’s arrest and subsequent recovery of the snatched motorcycle, deceased’s mobile phone, complainant’s identity card, and Rs.300/- provided strong corroboration to the ocular account. Recovery was witnessed by the complainant and the investigating officer, whose testimony remained unshaken in cross-examination. (d) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ---- Ss. 397 & 382-B ---- Concurrent running of sentences—Juvenile offender—Discretion of Court. Since both offences (murder and robbery) were part of the same transaction and petitioner was a juvenile at the time of offence, Supreme Court ordered sentences of imprisonment (except imprisonment in default of fine) to run concurrently. Disposition: Petition dismissed. Convictions and sentences under Sections 302(b) and 392 PPC maintained; however, sentences of imprisonment ordered to run concurrently. Benefit of Section 382-B Cr.P.C. extended.

Summary: Acquittal --- (a) Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997) ---- Ss. 6, 7(1)(a) & 7(2) ---- Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302, 34 ---- Arms Act (XX of 1965), S. 13-D ---- Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss. 397 & 382-B ---- Murder in hospital premises—Recovery of weapon—Applicability of Anti-Terrorism Act—Distinction between personal vendetta and terrorism. Occurrence took place in Jinnah Hospital, Karachi, where Abdul Rehman (deceased) was attacked and killed. The accused Saddam Kakar was apprehended on the spot with a Kalashnikov and seventeen live bullets. Recovery of weapon was corroborated by the Firearms Examiner’s positive report matching empties from the scene. His conviction under Ss. 302, 34, P.P.C., and S.13-D, Arms Act, 1965, was upheld. However, the Court found the incident arose from a personal vendetta—the accused sought revenge for his brother’s earlier murder the same day. The mere fact that the occurrence occurred in a public place (hospital) did not attract S.7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, as there was no element of creating public terror or insecurity among the public at large. Cited Cases: • Abrar Ahmad Farooq and others v. The State and another (PLD 2024 SC 815) • Farooq Ahmed v. The State and another (2020 SCMR 78) Held: Provisions of Ss.7(1)(a) & 7(2) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, were inapplicable. Conviction under S.302, P.P.C., and S.13-D, Arms Act, 1965, was maintained. Sentences ordered to run concurrently under S.397, Cr.P.C., with benefit of S.382-B, Cr.P.C. (b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860) ---- S. 302 ---- Evidence—Police witnesses—Recovery corroboration. Prosecution witnesses, both police officials present on patrol duty within hospital premises, apprehended the accused immediately after firing and recovered the weapon. Their evidence was found consistent, confidence-inspiring, and corroborated by forensic report. (c) Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997) ---- Ss. 6 & 7 ---- Mere occurrence in public place—Not sufficient to attract jurisdiction of Anti-Terrorism Court. When the motive is purely personal and not aimed at spreading panic or terror among the general public, the case does not fall within the ambit of “terrorism” under S.6, ATA, 1997, even if committed in a public institution. Disposition (Saddam Kakar): Convictions and sentences under Ss.7(1)(a) & 7(2), ATA 1997, set aside. Convictions under Ss.302/34, P.P.C., and S.13-D, Arms Act, maintained. Fine of Rs.500,000 treated as compensation under S.544-A, Cr.P.C., payable to heirs of deceased. Sentences of imprisonment (except default sentence) to run concurrently; benefit of S.382-B, Cr.P.C., extended. (d) Criminal Law ---- Evidence ---- Identification, corroboration, and benefit of doubt. Azhar Hussain’s case—Mere presence in hospital—No specific role—Benefit of doubt. Appellant was not named in FIR, no identification parade held, and CCTV stills merely showed his presence in the hospital, not participation in attack. No injury corresponding to alleged rod blow found on deceased. No weapon recovered and no motive proved. Mere presence at scene insufficient for conviction. Disposition (Azhar Hussain): Appeal allowed. Conviction and sentence set aside. Appellant acquitted of all charges and released forthwith unless required in another case.

Summary: (a) Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 – Ss. 6, 7, 9(c); Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 – Art. 122 —Narcotics—Constructive possession—Driver—Presumption of knowledge—Liability for contraband concealed in vehicle Petitioner Ghazi Khan, driver of a truck intercepted during excise police surveillance, was found transporting 30kg of charas concealed in hidden compartments along with heavy illegal arms and explosives. Supreme Court held that a driver has constructive possession and presumed knowledge of contraband in a vehicle under his control. Accused failed to rebut presumption or offer plausible explanation. The act of attempting to flee further affirmed guilty knowledge. Conviction under S. 9(c), CNSA upheld. Cited Cases: • Kashif Ameer v. The State (PLD 2010 SC 1052) • Nazir Ahmed v. The State (2023 SCMR 1299) (b) Evidence—Credibility of official witnesses—Presumption of truth—Absence of animosity Testimony of Excise Police deemed reliable where no mala fide or enmity shown. Accused from different province; no past hostility proved. Held, official witnesses competent and credible absent proven bias. (c) Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 – S. 9(c); Presumption and burden of proof—Passenger in vehicle—Lack of knowledge or control—Benefit of doubt Petitioner Marzak Khan was seated in passenger seat at time of interception. No evidence linked him to contraband or proved knowledge of hidden narcotics. Held, mere presence in vehicle not sufficient for conviction without possessory control or conscious knowledge. Conviction set aside; petitioner acquitted. Cited Case: • Shahzada v. The State (2010 SCMR 841) (d) Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 – Ss. 397, 382-B —Concurrent sentences—Same transaction—Benefit of sentence computation Where multiple convictions arise from same transaction, sentences to run concurrently under S. 397 Cr.P.C. Petitioner Ghazi Khan granted benefit of S. 382-B Cr.P.C. Cited Case: • Shaista Bibi v. Superintendent Central Jail Mach (PLD 2015 SC 15) ----- Disposition: Petition of Ghazi Khan dismissed—Conviction and sentence upheld; leave refused—Sentences to run concurrently; S. 382-B benefit granted Petition of Marzak Khan converted to appeal and allowed—Acquitted of charges and released forthwith

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898): ---Sections 397, 382-B---Concurrence of sentences---Discretionary power of courts---Scope---Petitioner was convicted under three separate FIRs for offenses under Sections 364/34, 324/34, 353, 186, PPC; Section 13(e) of the Arms Ordinance, 1965; and Section 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. Sentences included life imprisonment and rigorous imprisonment for various terms, which were ordered to run consecutively by the lower courts. Held, where multiple convictions arise from the same transaction, courts are expected to exercise discretion under Section 397, Cr.P.C., to order sentences to run concurrently unless exceptional circumstances justify otherwise. In the present case, the petitioner was a minor at the time of arrest in 2006 and had served a significant portion of his sentence. The Supreme Court directed all sentences to run concurrently, granting the benefit of Section 382-B, Cr.P.C., ensuring justice in light of the petitioner’s prolonged incarceration and the nature of the offenses. (b) Sentencing principles: ---Leniency for minors---Constitutional and statutory safeguards---Courts are required to exercise discretion favorably for minors unless the facts of the case demand otherwise. The petitioner’s status as a minor and his extensive time in custody warranted the modification of his sentences to run concurrently, ensuring fairness and adherence to legal principles. (c) Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997): ---Section 7---Conviction under ATA alongside other charges---Petitioner’s actions were deemed part of the same transaction involving kidnapping, firing upon police officials, and possession of illegal arms. The Court upheld the convictions under the ATA but ordered that sentences run concurrently, ensuring proportionality and fairness in sentencing. ----Disposition: Petitions allowed to the extent that all sentences shall run concurrently. Convictions and sentences maintained, with the benefit of Section 382-B, Cr.P.C. applied.

Summary: Convictions upheld----(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) — Sentencing discretion — Concurrence of sentences: --- S. 397 — Sentences of imprisonment for life or lesser punishments awarded at the same trial or in separate trials — Power of the court to direct sentences to run concurrently — Principle applied particularly in cases involving minors unless circumstances dictate otherwise. Petitioner, a minor at the time of the incident, was convicted in three FIRs arising from a single transaction. Despite the concurrent nature of the offenses, the courts below failed to exercise discretion under S. 397 Cr.P.C., causing prejudice to the petitioner. Supreme Court held that the sentences awarded in all FIRs should run concurrently, providing relief to the petitioner in light of the principles established in Mst. Shahista Bibi v. The State (PLD 2015 SC 15). (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) — Adjustment of sentence duration — Benefit under S. 382-B Cr.P.C: --- S. 382-B — Deduction of period spent in custody before conviction from the substantive sentence. The petitioner was behind bars since 2006 and had nearly served out the substantive sentence for life imprisonment. The benefit under S. 382-B Cr.P.C. was extended to the petitioner, with the Supreme Court affirming the modification of sentences to ensure fairness and justice. (c) Juvenile justice — Consideration for minors in sentencing: --- Juvenile offenders — Courts expected to exercise leniency in cases involving minors unless circumstances demand otherwise. Petitioner was a minor at the time of arrest and had already served a substantial part of the sentence. The Supreme Court emphasized the need for a lenient approach in such cases, aligning with precedents emphasizing juvenile rights. (d) Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997) — Conviction under multiple sections: --- S. 7 ATA, 1997 read with Ss. 364, 365-A, 324/34 PPC — Sentences of rigorous imprisonment and fines imposed in multiple FIRs — Convictions sustained but sentences modified to run concurrently. The petitioner was convicted under three separate FIRs for offenses involving kidnapping, attack on police, and possession of illegal arms. While the convictions were upheld, the sentences were modified to run concurrently under S. 397 Cr.P.C. ----Cited Cases: Mst. Shahista Bibi v. The State (PLD 2015 SC 15) Rahib Ali v. The State (2018 SCMR 418) ----Disposition: Petitions partially allowed. Convictions upheld; sentences modified to run concurrently. Benefit of S. 382-B Cr.P.C. extended.

Summary: Background: The petitioner, seeks an order for his sentences of imprisonment to run concurrently, which were awarded in two different trials. He was convicted and sentenced to death in two separate cases: FIR No. 72 dated 26.06.2005 under Section 302 PPC and FIR No. 145 dated 30.09.2006 under Sections 302 and 34 PPC, both from the P.S. Jand, Attock. The death sentence in FIR No. 72 was converted to life imprisonment by the Lahore High Court, while the death sentence in FIR No. 145 was confirmed by the Lahore High Court but later converted to life imprisonment by the Supreme Court. ----Issues: 1- Whether the sentences of imprisonment awarded in two different trials should run concurrently or consecutively. 2- Whether the petitioner is entitled to the benefit of Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.), which allows for the concurrent running of sentences. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: Concurrent Running of Sentences: The court held that Section 397 Cr.P.C. provides the discretion to direct that subsequent sentences run concurrently with previous sentences. This discretion should be exercised judiciously, especially in cases of hardship, to avoid unnecessary and prolonged imprisonment. Benefit of Section 397 Cr.P.C.: The court emphasized that Section 397 Cr.P.C. allows the court to order that the sentences run concurrently, taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of each case. Denying this benefit would amount to unjust treatment and defeat the legislative intent behind this provision. The petition was allowed, and the court directed that the sentences of life imprisonment awarded to Sher Afzal in both cases (FIR No. 72 dated 26.06.2005 and FIR No. 145 dated 30.09.2006) shall run concurrently. Additionally, the benefit of Section 382-B Cr.P.C. (regarding the period of detention to be counted towards the sentence) was also granted to the petitioner. -----Citations/Precedents: Section 397 Cr.P.C.: Sentence on offender already sentenced for another offence. 2018 SCMR 418 “Rahib Ali v. The State”: Emphasized the court's discretion under Section 397 Cr.P.C. Section 561-A Cr.P.C.: Inherent powers of the court to ensure justice. ----Quote: Sentences of the appellant in different cases shall run concurrently.

Summary: Background: In the Federal Shariat Court, a petitioner sought relief under Section 35(2) read with Section 397 of The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, to have sentences from two separate trials computed concurrently. The petitioner was convicted in two separate cases: Case 1: Registered under Section 17(4) of The Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance VI of 1979, resulting in a death sentence converted to life imprisonment with a fine by the appellate court. Case 2: Registered under Section 13-E of The Arms Ordinance, 1965, resulting in a two-year imprisonment with a fine and additional imprisonment for default. The petitioner, after serving a significant portion of the sentence, requested that the sentences be served concurrently. ----Issues: 1- Whether the Federal Shariat Court has the authority to grant relief by ordering concurrent sentences for convictions from separate trials. 2- Whether the relief sought, which includes computing sentences concurrently, should be granted based on the legal and factual circumstances. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the application for concurrent sentencing. This is supported by the constitutional mandate which allows the Court to review its decisions under Article 203(E)(9) of The Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan. The omission to direct concurrent sentencing in the original judgment does not preclude the Court from rectifying this oversight. The Court exercised its discretionary power under Section 397 of The Code to direct that sentences from separate trials run concurrently. This decision is based on the fact that both cases were related, occurred on the same day, and the petitioner had served a substantial part of the sentences. Granting concurrent sentences aligns with judicial principles of fairness and the legal precedent that judges must apply the correct law even if omissions occur. ----Citations/Precedents: HUSSAIN BAKHSH v. SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER, RAWALPINDI AND OTHERS (PLD 1970 SC I) MUZAFFAR ALI v. MUHAMMAD SHAFI (PLD 1981 SC 94) GOVERNMENT OF KHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA through Secretary Home and Tribal Affairs Department Peshawar and others v. MEHMOOD KHAN (2017 SCMR 2044)

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898): ----S. 397—Concurrence of sentences—Scope and exercise of discretion—Petitioner was convicted in three separate FIRs arising out of one and the same transaction, including charges under Ss. 364/34, 353/186/324/34, P.P.C., S. 13(e) of Arms Ordinance, 1965, and S. 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997—Trial Court sentenced petitioner separately in each case without directing that sentences would run concurrently—Held, when multiple convictions arise from the same transaction, the court has discretion under S. 397, Cr.P.C. to order sentences to run concurrently—Such discretion ought to be exercised particularly in cases involving minors, unless specific aggravating circumstances exist—In present case, petitioner was a minor at the time of arrest and had remained incarcerated since 2006, having already served most of his substantive sentence—Failure to exercise discretion for concurrency resulted in manifest prejudice—Supreme Court modified sentence by ordering that all sentences would run concurrently—Petitions accordingly dismissed with modification. ----Cited Cases: • Rahib Ali v. The State • Mst. Shahista Bibi v. The State (b) Criminal Law—Sentencing—Minor accused—Benefit of leniency: ----Sentencing discretion in favour of minors—Principles—Courts are expected to exercise leniency where the accused is a minor at the time of commission of the offence unless circumstances dictate otherwise—In present case, petitioner was a juvenile at the time of his arrest and had remained behind bars for nearly two decades—Held, failure of courts below to consider the accused’s minority and prolonged detention justified intervention by Supreme Court—Convictions upheld but sentences directed to run concurrently with benefit of S. 382-B, Cr.P.C. ----Disposition: Petitions dismissed with modification—Sentences ordered to run concurrently.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199 — Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC), Ss. 35, 382-B & 397 — Sentences from multiple cases — Power to order concurrency — Jurisdiction of High Court — Scope Concurrent running of sentences — Two separate murder cases — Trial courts and appellate courts silent on concurrency — Jail authorities treating sentences as consecutive — Scope of High Court’s power to intervene — Petitioner was convicted in two separate murder trials (FIRs No. 297/2001 and 47/2006) and awarded life imprisonment in both cases — In both appeals, High Court had modified death sentences to life but did not specifically order concurrency of sentences — Petitioner sought relief under Art. 199 of the Constitution to have his sentences run concurrently — Jail authorities were treating the sentences consecutively due to absence of specific order — Held, in light of Rahib Ali v. The State (2018 SCMR 418) and Noor Muhammad v. The State (2025 SCMR 540), the High Court has jurisdiction under S. 397 CrPC read with S. 561-A and S. 35 CrPC to direct concurrency of sentences arising out of separate trials where circumstances justify — Petitioner had been in custody since 2006, had served his sentence in one case with remission, and no appeal/review was pending — Relief granted. Held, the High Court has constitutional and statutory jurisdiction to direct concurrent running of sentences in multiple trials, especially when justice demands it and no statutory bar exists. Cited Cases: • Rahib Ali v. The State (2018 SCMR 418) • Noor Muhammad v. The State (2025 SCMR 540) (b) Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC), Ss. 35, 382-B & 397 — Concurrent sentences — Principle of judicial discretion — Remissions and fairness in sentencing Convict had earned over five years of remission and completed sentence in one case by March 2023 — Second sentence had commenced without concurrency order — Held, once benefit of S. 382-B CrPC and remission has been granted, further incarceration due to administrative interpretation offends fairness — Courts are expected to exercise discretion in favour of concurrency unless public interest dictates otherwise — No evidence of aggravating circumstances justifying consecutive execution — Benefit of concurrency directed to be applied to all substantive sentences except default imprisonment for non-payment of fine, compensation, and Daman. Held, concurrency is to be presumed in absence of express direction to the contrary when no compelling reason exists to treat sentences consecutively. (c) Disposition Writ petition accepted in terms — Petitioner’s sentences in FIR No. 297/2001 and FIR No. 47/2006 to run concurrently — Sentences in default of compensation, fine, and Daman excluded — Petition disposed of accordingly. "If any person has been convicted and sentenced to imprisonment in more than one case and it is not mentioned in the judgments of the cases about running of sentences concurrently, then High Court can pass order for running of sentences in all the cases "concurrently".

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 ---- Ss. 35, 382-B, 397, 401; Penal Code (XLV of 1860) ---- Ss. 302/34, 460; Pakistan Prisons Rules, 1978 ---- Rr. 40, 140, 199, 204, 205, 217, 218 Undertrial detention benefit in case of consecutive life sentences --- Petitioner, convicted on four counts (three under S.302/34 and one under S.460 PPC), sentenced to life imprisonment on each count to run consecutively --- Petitioner claimed that his undertrial detention period of 1 year, 7 months, and 24 days should be deducted four times (once per life sentence) under S. 382-B Cr.P.C. --- Held, S. 382-B Cr.P.C., though a beneficial provision, refers to “an offence” and its applicability to multiple consecutive sentences must be judicially interpreted --- Cumulative sentence of 100 years, though passed on multiple counts, is to be treated as a single sentence for purpose of release calculation under Rule 40 of Prisons Rules and S. 35(3) Cr.P.C. --- Accordingly, benefit of undertrial detention is to be counted once only --- No illegality in administrative or jail authority’s calculation --- However, the Prison Department is authorized to refer petitioner’s case to the Government for remission under Rr. 140(iii), 199, and 217 of the Prisons Rules and S. 401 Cr.P.C., subject to conditions including consent of legal heirs of deceased victims. (b) Criminal Law --- Remission of sentence --- Scope and entitlement under Prisons Rules and Cr.P.C. Petitioner earned remissions totaling 59 years on a 100-year cumulative sentence --- Held, remissions (ordinary and special) cannot reduce a life sentence below 15 years under Rr. 140 and 217 of the Pakistan Prisons Rules, 1978 --- Remissions awarded on all four counts cumulatively by jail authorities not supported by record or material justification --- Inspector General of Prisons directed to ensure strict compliance with remission rules and maintain clarity in application of Rule 217 cap on one-third remission unless special orders are obtained from Government. (c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860) ---- S. 302/34, 460; Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 ---- S. 397 Consecutive life sentences and calculation of start of imprisonment --- Supreme Court while converting death penalty to life imprisonment on three counts under S.302/34 directed sentences to run consecutively, not concurrently --- Petitioner was already serving life imprisonment under S.460 PPC --- Held, under S. 397 Cr.P.C., a subsequent sentence begins only after expiration of the previous unless the court directs otherwise --- No such direction by Supreme Court; hence, sentences to run back-to-back --- Total sentence of petitioner extended to 100 years. (d) Interpretation of statutes ---- Beneficial interpretation and use of singular/plural forms --- Ss. 4 & 9, Cr.P.C.; Interpretation of Section 382-B Cr.P.C. Argument that S. 382-B Cr.P.C. should be applied multiple times due to plural interpretation of “offence” rejected --- Held, although definitions in Ss. 4 & 9 Cr.P.C. allow singular to include plural, this cannot override express statutory structure where consecutive sentences are treated as one for release computation --- Judicial determination upheld that undertrial period must be deducted only once in cumulative life sentence cases. (e) Constitutional Petition ---- Mandamus --- Interference in administrative calculation of sentence Petitioner filed constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution for direction to count undertrial detention four times --- Held, no violation of law or miscarriage of justice found --- Sentence computation by jail authorities found consistent with law and rules --- Petition dismissed. Disposition: Constitutional petition dismissed. Cited Cases: Javid Shaikh v. The State (1985 SCMR 153) Jumma Khan v. The State (1986 SCMR 1573) Bashir and others v. The State (PLD 1991 SC 1145) Qadir and another v. The State (PLD 1991 SC 1065) Shah Hussain v. The State (PLD 2009 SC 460) Asfaq Ahmad v. The State (2017 SCMR 307) Muhammad Zahir alias Tiko v. The State (2011 SCMR 38) Ghulam Murtaza v. The State (PLD 1998 SC 152) Sajjad Ikram v. Sikandar Hayat (2016 SCMR 467) Others referenced in para 7 of judgment. ------ "Detention period during trial shall be counted once in case of consecutive sentence."