Summary: Background: The appellant was involved in a case registered under FIR No. 330 of 2018 for offenses under sections 320, 279, and 427 of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) at City Police Station Muzaffarabad on 30.7.2018. During the trial, the prosecution sought to introduce an additional recovery memo for a second motorcycle which was not initially exhibited. The Additional District Court of Criminal Jurisdiction, Muzaffarabad allowed this on 3.4.2019. The appellant challenged this order through a revision petition before the Shariat Appellate Bench of the High Court, which was dismissed on 18.4.2019. The appellant then filed a revision petition before the Supreme Court of Azad Jammu & Kashmir. ----Issues: 1- Whether the trial court's allowance for the prosecution to exhibit an additional recovery memo was valid. 2- Whether the re-examination of a witness to introduce the additional recovery memo constitutes filling a lacuna in the prosecution’s case. 3- Whether the re-examination of the witness adversely affected the rights of the accused. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --Allowance for Additional Recovery Memo: The Supreme Court held that the trial court acted within its discretion to allow the prosecution to exhibit the additional recovery memo. The criminal justice system is inquisitorial, aiming to uncover the truth and ensure justice, and thus, any relevant evidence should be brought on record. --Re-examination of Witness: The Court determined that re-examination or recalling a witness to clarify ambiguities is permissible if it serves the ends of justice. In this case, PW.2's statements regarding the recovery of the motorcycles were ambiguous, and re-examination was necessary to resolve this ambiguity. --Rights of the Accused: The Court found that the re-examination did not constitute an unfair advantage to the prosecution or adversely affect the rights of the accused. The trial court's primary duty is to ensure a fair trial and reach a just decision. The procedure adopted did not fill any lacuna but was essential to address the ambiguity in the evidence. ----Citations/Precedents: Watir Ullah and others vs. The State (PLD 1966 Dacca 422): Clarified that re-examination should relate to matters brought out in cross-examination but new matters can be introduced with the Court's permission. Black’s Law Dictionary and Marriam Webster Dictionary: Provided definitions of 'ambiguity', supporting the decision to allow re-examination to resolve unclear statements.

Summary: Bail Granted ---- (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-------S. 498--- Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 279, 337-G, 427, 302 & 34---Rashdriving or riding on a public way, hurt by rash or negligent driving, mischiefcausing damage to the amount of fifty rupees, qatl-i-amd and common intention---Pre-arrest bail, grant of---Dishonest improvements---Scope---Prosecution case wasthat accused hit the complainant and his friends with his car while they were onmotorcycle as a result of which one of the friends of complainant died on the nextday---Other friend of complainant got recorded his statement under S. 161, Cr.P.C.wherein he stated that the accused had intentionally the motorcycle thrice atdifferent points, which was done in furtherance of previous enmity---Complainant,injured and the accused hailed from the same vicinity and there could be noimpediment in the way of complainant to identify the accused if he was recognized---Accused had remained unidentified, as a result, FIR was lodged against unknownaccused alleging that he had caused injuries to the driver and riders of themotorcycle through rash and negligent driving---Improvements in the case ofprosecution were for no other purpose except to tighten the screw of the accused---Petition for grant of pre-arrest bail was accepted, in circumstances. (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-------S. 498---Pre-arrest bail---Mala fide of prosecution---Scope---Pre-arrest bail isan extraordinary relief, which is to be extended in rareand exceptionalcircumstances to the accused but at the same time, one cannot lose sight of the factthat liberty of a person is one of the paramount and inalienable right guaranteedunder the Constitution, which cannot be abridged lightly---One of the primepurposes of pre-arrest bail is to prevent the mala fide prosecution of innocentpersons---Term "mala fide" is not a uniformly identified term---Being a state ofmind, the term "mala fide" cannot always be proved through direct evidence, and itis often to be inferred from the facts and circumstances of the case.Shahzada Qaiser Arfat alias Qaiser v. The State and another PLD 2021 SC 708 rel.Khair Muhammad and another v. The State through P.G. Punjab and another 2021SCMR 130 ref.(c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-------S. 498---Pre-arrest bail---Scope---Once the Court reaches at the conclusion thatin case of dismissal of pre-arrest bail the accused would become entitled for his release on post-arrest bail then it would be mere futile exercise to send him toprison.Muhammad Ramzan v. Zafar Ullah and another 1986 SCMR 1380; KhalilAhmed Soomro and others v. The State PLD 2017 SC 730 and Khair Muhammadand another v. The State through P.G. Punjab and another 2021 SCMR 130 ref.Syed Azmat Ali Bukhari for Petitioner with Petitioner in person.Naveed Ahmad Warraich, Deputy District Public Prosecutor with Sohail,Inspector and Kashif S.I/SHO for the State.Sardar Abdul Raziq Khan and M. Bashir Paracha for RespondentNo.2/Complainant.

Summary: The companies filed a petition under Sections 279 to 282 of the Companies Act, 2017, seeking approval for a Scheme of Arrangement. The scheme aimed to separate and transfer assets, shareholding, and intellectual property among the companies. The court received reports, resolutions, and observations from regulatory bodies such as the Securities & Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP). Some concerns were raised, including the need for no objection certificates (NOC) from specific banks, disclosure of the value of intellectual property, and approval from shareholders. The petitioners addressed objections, providing NOCs and justifying the lack of valuation for intellectual property due to common ownership within the Dawood Family. The court, acting as a sanctioning authority, evaluated the compliance with legal requirements, the fairness of the scheme, and the commercial wisdom of the involved parties. The court found that all essential statutory benchmarks were met, and the proposed schemes did not violate laws or public policy. Consequently, the court granted approval and sanctioned the Scheme of Arrangement outlined in the document.

Summary: Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-------Ss. 320, 337-A (i) (ii) (iii), 337-F, 337-G & 279---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898),S.342---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Arts. 117 & 120---Qatl-i-Khata, Shajjah-i-Khafifa,Shajjah-i-Hashimah, Shajjah-i-Mudihah, Ghayr-Jaifah, rash and negligent driving---Appreciation of evidence---Rash and negligent driving---Onus to prove---Plea of accused---Effect---Accused while driving a vehicle caused accident which resulted into death of threepersons---Trial Court convicted the accused for Qatl-i-Khata and causing injuries by drivingrash and negligently---Trial Court did not discuss statements of prosecution witnesses andconvicted accused on the basis of his reply to a question put to him under S. 342 Cr.P.C.---Prosecution was to prove guilt of accused beyond reasonable doubt---Judgment of TrialCourt was based on statement of accused recorded under S.342 Cr.P.C. and that on physicalexamination of the vehicle of which tie-rod was not found broken---First Information Reportwas registered on 6.1.2016 while vehicle was produced by prosecution witness in Court on3.10.2016, which remained parked with concerned police station---No report of Motormechanic was produced to prove that vehicle was checked after accident---High Courtobserved that when law had provided a thing to be done the same had to be done in thatparticular manner---Trial Court was to first discuss the case in order to come to anindependent conclusion with regard to truthfulness of prosecution witnesses then to examinestatement of accused under S. 342 Cr.P.C.---If the Court had disbelieved prosecutionevidence then it should have accepted the statement of accused as a whole with certainty---None of the ocular witnesses supported prosecution case---Mere driving in high speed didnot constitute the offence where element of negligence was lacking---High Court set asideconviction and sentence awarded to accused by Trial Court and he was acquitted of thecharge---Appeal was allowed in circumstances.

Summary: ---Ss. 279, 280, 281 & 282--- Compromise with creditors and members--- Power ofSecurities and Exchange Commission (Commission) to enforce compromises andarrangements---Information as to compromises or arrangements with creditors and members---Powers of Co

Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-------Ss. 320 & 279---Qatl-i-Khata, rash driving on public way---Appreciation of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Accused was charged for rash and negligent driving the bus which hit aPolice Constable, due to which he sustained head injuries and succumbed to the same on wayto the hospital---Accused/appellant had admitted the incident as well as death of thedeceased---Accused also admitted that he was driving the offending vehicle but stated that hewas not driving the same in a rash and negligent manner---Only aspect, which remained to beexamined, was whether the appellant was driving the offending vehicle in a rash or negligentmanner---Complainant had stated during cross-examination that he himself did not see theaccident---Eyewitness had stated in cross-examination that at the time of incident he waspresent in his guardroom and he himself did not see the accident---Said witnesses were theonly eye witnesses of the occurrence but they stated before the Trial Court that theythemselves did not see the incident---Both the said witnesses also stated that at the time ofoccurrence one truck which was loaded with stones was parked on the road side and when theincident took place the deceased was checking the said truck---Admittedly, the incident tookplace at 9.00 p.m.---Keeping in view the time of accident, it could safely be inferred that atthe time of accident it was pitch dark---When witnesses had not seen the accident then howcould they say that the accident took place due to negligence and carelessness of the accused---Even the record was silent about recording statement of any other passengers of bus anddriver and cleaner of the truck which was parked on the road side---Visual sketch map of theplace of occurrence was silent about any roadside light as well as about rear lights of themini bus---Site map was also silent about presence of any eye witnesses on the spot, despitethe fact that site map showed katcha houses near the opposite side of the road but still no onefrom the inmates of the said houses were associated as a witness of the occurrence---Noevidence was available about over speeding of bus by the appellant nor the visual sketch mapshowed any signs of tyres as no rubber marks of the tyres being caused while applying thebrakes with extreme power had been shown on the sketch map---Minibus was not examinedby the Motor Vehicle Examiner nor the same was verified with regard to working conditionof the brakes---Case against the accused was one of no evidence particularly with regard tohis rash or negligent driving, simply because no one from the travelling passengers or fromthe nearby houses were associated as witnesses by the prosecution---Record was also silent regarding the fact that the bus was being driven in violation of the traffic rules, which led tothe accident, therefore, could be equated with rashness and negligence---Circumstancesestablished that the prosecution had not succeeded to bring any reliable and convincing pieceof evidence to establish a rash and negligent driving of the accused---Appeal againstconviction was allowed, in circumstances.(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-------Ss. 320 & 279---Qatl-i-Khata, rash driving on public way---Negligence---Scope---Nomathematical formula was available to measure negligence---Negligence could only bejudged and gauged upon the attending and surrounding facts and circumstances---Mere factthat a vehicle was running at fast speed would not prove rashness and negligence, therefore,it could safely be concluded that speed did not matter in case of accident rather the rashnessand negligence were condition precedents to prove the offence under S.320, P.P.C.

Summary: ----Ss. 279, 280, 281 & 282---Scheme of Arrangement for merger/amalgamation betweentwo private companies---Legality---Unanimous approval of merger scheme and swap ratio byall the shareholders---No Objections Certificates from creditors and competition reg

Summary: Acquittal --- (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-------Ss. 302(b), 279, 337-G & 427---Qatl-i-amd, rash driving or riding on a public way, hurtby rash and negligent driving, mischief causing damage to the amount of fifty rupees---Appreciation of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Prosecution case was that a coach and a tankervehicle had met with an accident, due to which seven passengers of the coach died on thespot and eleven were injured---Allegedly, appellant was driving the coach/bus and due to hisrash and negligent driving, coach/bus collided with oil tanker resultantly, seven passengerswere died on the spot and eleven sustained injuries---Record transpired that there was onlyone eye-witness, who stated that he was driving oil tanker when incident had taken place---Prosecution recorded the statement of said witness under S. 161, Cr.P.C. where he stated thatoil tanker had been driven by his senior while in the Trial Court stated that he himself wasdriving oil tanker at the time of incident---Said witness made dishonest improvement in hisstatement---Statement of eye-witness was recorded by Investigating Officer on the spot at 5/6p.m. while Investigating Officer remained at the place of occurrence till about 06:00 p.m.---Record transpired that FIR was lodged at 10:45 p.m. (night) which meant that investigationhad been conducted prior to registration of FIR which was not permissible under the law---Record transpired that collided bus had not been examined by the vehicle inspector norstatement of analyst was recorded in that regard to ascertain whether incident had taken placeby over-speeding or mechanical fault---Prosecution was bound to prove over-speeding or thatthe driver was guilty of driving rashly and negligently, but no such evidence was availableon the record---Mere driving vehicle on high speed did not constitute offence---No evidencewas available on record to show that at what speed the driver was driving the bus---Although, appellant in his statement under S. 342, Cr.P.C. admitted that he was driving thevehicle, but denied rashly or negligently---Statement of accused/appellant under S. 342,Cr.P.C., could be taken in toto not in peace meal---Prosecution must prove his case withcogent, confidence inspiring evidence that the appellant was driving negligently, which waslacking---Appeal was allowed and accused was acquitted by setting aside conviction andsentences recorded by the Trial Court, in circumstances.

Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-------Ss. 320 & 279---Qatl-i-Khata, rash driving on public way---Appreciation of evidence---Appeal against acquittal---Prosecution case was that accused-respondent, driver of oil tanker,had collided with Frontier Constabulary Post, resultantly, five persons died at the spot, theofficial vehicle and official weapons were damaged and driver and conductor fled away fromthe scene---Prosecution, in order to establish the charge had produced nine witnesses, whichwere not consistent and confidence-inspiring---Complainant of the case mostly reiterated thecontents of his fard-e-bayan---Evidence of said witness was not helpful to the case ofprosecution for the reasons that he himself had not witnessed the crime rather at the time ofalleged occurrence he was 80 kms. away from the place of occurrence and receivedinformation through wireless set---Entire statement of said witness was silent to the effect asto who had told him the story of the incident in such a sequence---Admittedly, the statementof said witness was hearsay and the same was only to the extent of setting criminalmachinery into motion---Statements of both the alleged eye-witnesses were contradictorywith each other on certain counts---Both the witnesses had unanimously brought on recordthat they witnessed the crime directly---Both the said witnesses had admitted in their crossexamination that their statements under S. 161, Cr.P.C. were recorded after delay of 13-daysof the incident, though they were very much present in the area---Admission of both theprosecution witnesses depicted the complete failure of the Investigating Officer to record thestatements of both the said witnesses immediately---No explanation was available on therecord as to why such statements were delayed for 13-days and till that the accused-appellanthad voluntarily surrendered him before the police---No solid or concrete evidence wasavailable against the accused/respondent connecting him with the commission of allegedoffence---Trial Court after proper appreciation of evidence in its true perspective had rightlyacquitted the accused-respondent of the charge---Appeal was dismissed accordingly.(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-------S. 161---Delay in recording the statement of witnesses under S. 161, Cr.P.C.---Effect---Such evidence could not be given that sanctity as was generally given to the evidence of awitness whose statement had been recorded promptly soon after the occurrence---Statements of prosecution witnesses under S. 161, Cr.P.C. recorded after the arrest of the accusedcreated reasonable doubt in the case of prosecution---Witnesses appeared to have beenplanted by the prosecution subsequently after the arrest of the accused/respondent.(c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-------Ss. 320 & 279---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 22---Qatl-i-Khata, rash driving onpublic way---Appreciation of evidence---Identification parade---Scope---Identification of theaccused/respondent in the Trial Court was doubtful---According to the case of prosecution,soon after the occurrence the culprits decamped from the place of occurrence---InvestigatingOfficer arrested five persons on the basis of suspicious, who were subsequently dischargedfrom the case under the provisions of S. 169, Cr.P.C.---Circumstances suggested that theInvestigating Officer as well as the alleged eye-witnesses were not sure about the culprit---First Information Report was silent with regard to physique and personal appearance of theescaped accused persons---Investigating Officer after the arrest of the accused/respondentwas supposed to have conducted the identification parade of the accused/respondent whichwas not done---Material dent caused to the case of prosecution due to failure to holdidentification parade during the course of investigation, which was not curable.Khawar v. The State 2014 YLR 2120 rel.(d) Criminal trial-------Benefit of doubt---Principle---Single circumstance if creating reasonable doubt in aprudent mind was sufficient for acquittal of accused not as a matter of grace, but as a matterof right.Ghulam Qadir and 2 others v. The State 2008 SCMR 1221 rel.(e) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-------S. 417--- Appeal against acquittal--- Presumption--- Double presumption of innocencewas attached to the order of acquittal---Interference in acquittal was unwarranted unless thesame was arbitrary, capricious, fanciful or against the record.

Summary: Acquittal granted--- The revision petition challenged a judgment affirming the conviction and sentence imposed by the Magistrate Section 30, Sahiwal, on the petitioner for offenses under Sections 320, 279, and 427 PPC. The case arises from a collision between a Yamaha motorcycle and a Hilux Pick-up driven by the petitioner, resulting in the death of Mukhtar Ahmad. The prosecution argued that the petitioner drove negligently and rashly, causing the accident. The court noted discrepancies in the prosecution's evidence, including contradictions in witness testimonies and inconsistencies in the accounts of the accident. It emphasized the importance of the Inquest Report, which did not identify the driver at the time of its preparation. The court concludes that there is reasonable doubt about the petitioner's involvement and questions the credibility of the prosecution's case. The judgment delved into legal principles related to rash and negligent driving, highlighting the need for a careful examination of the circumstances. The court concluded that the prosecution failed to prove the case against the petitioner, resulting in the acquittal of the charges.