Summary: Code of Civil Procedure (V of 1908)--- ----S. 36---Execution of orders---Compromise order---Undertaking given before Court---Enforceability---Scope--- Respondents had instituted suit for declaration against inheritance mutation, while during pendency of suit petitioners sought appointment of receiver for collection of their share of produce from disputed land---Matter was settled before High Court on undertaking that if respondents failed in suit, they would compensate petitioners according to their share recorded in mutation---Suit was ultimately dismissed up to High Court and execution proceedings were initiated by petitioners for recovery of amount representing their share of produce---Meanwhile, subsequent proceedings before Supreme Court also ended in compromise, whereby mutation was to stand modified to extent of share of predecessor of petitioners and such arrangement was agreed to be final settlement regarding disputed mutation---Executing Court repeatedly held execution petition maintainable and dismissed objections, but High Court in revision set aside orders of Executing Court and dismissed execution petition---Validity---Supreme Court held that order passed on basis of compromise, even where no formal decree was drawn, remained binding upon parties and was fully enforceable---By virtue of S. 36, C.P.C., provisions relating to execution of decrees apply equally, so far as may be, to execution of orders---Undertaking recorded by Court carries sanctity and enforceability, and party giving such undertaking cannot subsequently resile from it---Order disposing of proceedings in terms of compromise was not mere private arrangement but judicial order possessing full legal force---Executing Court was competent to enforce obligations arising out of undertaking and compromise and respondents could not, through objections, reopen matters that had already attained finality or flowed directly from compromise---High Court had erred in revisional jurisdiction in interfering with well-reasoned orders of Executing Court and in rendering undertaking and compromise ineffective---Petitions were converted into appeal and allowed; impugned judgment of High Court was set aside; Executing Court was directed to proceed with execution petition and conclude proceedings expeditiously in accordance with law. Mehar Zulfiqar Ali Babu and others v. Government of Punjab (1997 SCMR 117); Ranjit Singh Hazari v. Juman Meah (PLD 1961 Dacca 842); Kilachand Devchand & Co. v. Ajodhuaprasad Sukhamnand (AIR 1934 Bombay 452); Hassan Masud Malik v. Dr. Muhammad Iqbal (1995 SCMR 766); Bakhtawar v. Amin (1980 SCMR 89) rel. (a) Compromise recorded by Court---Binding effect--- An order passed on the basis of compromise between parties does not lose its binding force merely because no formal decree has been drawn up---Once proceedings are disposed of in terms of compromise, the order remains operative and binding inter se the parties and cannot be permitted to be defeated on technical grounds. (b) Section 36, C.P.C.---Execution of orders as distinguished from decrees--- Section 36, C.P.C. expressly provides that provisions relating to execution of decrees shall, so far as may be applicable, apply equally to execution of orders---Thus, judicial orders, including compromise orders, are capable of enforcement through execution proceedings. (c) Undertaking given before Court---Sanctity and enforceability--- A party who voluntarily gives undertaking before Court to perform a particular obligation is bound by the same and cannot later wriggle out of it---Such undertaking, once recorded by Court, acquires sanctity and is enforceable through judicial process. (d) Executing Court---Jurisdiction and limitation--- Where obligations arise directly from compromise and undertaking recorded by superior Courts, Executing Court is competent to enforce the same---Objections seeking to reopen issues already settled or having attained finality are legally impermissible, for Executing Court cannot go behind the order sought to be executed. (e) Revisional jurisdiction of High Court---Interference with execution orders---Propriety--- High Court fell into error in upsetting orders of Executing Court and appellate court which had correctly held execution petition maintainable---Such interference had effect of rendering judicial undertaking and compromise insignificant, contrary to settled principles governing enforceability of orders of Court. Petitions converted into appeal and allowed; impugned judgment set aside; Executing Court directed to proceed with execution petition expeditiously.

Summary: (a) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877) --- Ss. 12 & 42 --- Compromise decree --- Relief confined to prayer clause --- Decree in respect of unidentified or contingent property --- Scope and limitations. Plaintiff sought specific performance, declaration, and permanent injunction regarding identified land mentioned in prayer clause (a). The suit was disposed of on the basis of a compromise application. The learned Single Judge decreed the suit only in terms of paragraph 1 of the compromise application, holding that the remaining paragraphs referred to events and properties outside the scope of the pleadings. Held, relief in a civil suit must strictly conform to the claims specifically pleaded and prayed for; any compromise terms relating to alternate land or contingent future events—such as possible allotment of land by the Government—could not be enforced through a decree when such relief was not sought in the original prayer clause. A decree cannot cover property that is not yet identified or in existence. Specific performance must be confined to a definite and existing subject matter. The learned Single Judge’s exercise of discretion was proper and consistent with the scope of the suit. (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) --- O. XXIII, R.3 --- Compromise decree --- Discretion of Court to limit decree to permissible scope --- Validity. Where parties file a compromise application, the Court is not bound to incorporate all its terms into the decree if some terms extend beyond the pleadings and relief claimed. Held, the Court rightly confined the decree to paragraph 1 of the compromise application as it alone pertained to the identified suit land mentioned in the prayer clause. Paragraphs concerning future or alternative land were outside the scope of the suit and the pleadings, and therefore could not be made part of the judgment. Discretion exercised by the learned Single Judge in this regard was lawful and did not warrant interference by the appellate Court. (c) Contract --- Contingent agreements --- Specific performance --- Non-identifiable subject matter --- Effect. A valid agreement may contain contingent terms relating to future events, but specific performance can only be granted with respect to definite and existing property. Held, even if compromise terms anticipate possible allotment of alternative land in future, such stipulations cannot be enforced by decree unless the property exists and is properly identified in the suit. Relief cannot be granted in anticipation of hypothetical future events not pleaded. Disposition: Appeal dismissed along with pending applications.

Summary: On 14/06/2024, the Islamabad High Court held that an affidavit filed without proper verification from the Oath Commissioner was invalid and amounted to professional misconduct by the appellants council; the matter was referred to Punjab Bar Council for disciplinary action against the counsel for submitting a forged affidavit. ----Issues: 1.. Whether the affidavit filed without proper verification from an Oath Commissioner is valid. 2. Whether the appellant's counsel had the authority to enter into a compromise on behalf of the appellant. 3. Whether an appeal is maintainable against a consent decree under Section 96(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC). Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --1. Validity of Affidavit: Affidavits from jail inmates must be verified by the Jail Superintendent. Court's Finding: The appellant’s affidavit lacked proper verification. The Oath Commissioner’s tenure had expired, rendering the affidavit invalid. This oversight by the appellant's counsel was deemed professional misconduct. The Court referred the matter to the Punjab Bar Council for disciplinary action against the counsel for submitting a forged affidavit. --2. Authority of Counsel: It is established that an advocate possesses implied authority to enter into compromises on behalf of their client unless there are explicit restrictions placed by the client. The court held that the power to compromise is inherent in the advocate's role. Advocates have the power to compromise claims unless explicitly restricted by their Vakalatnama. --- 3. Appealability of Consent Decree: Section 96(3) of CPC prohibits appeals from decrees passed with the parties' consent. The Court ruled that a consent decree could not be set aside by an appellate court where the counsel had authority to compromise. ----Outcome: The appeal was dismissed as the counsel was deemed to have the authority to compromise, and the consent decree was valid and non-appealable under Section 96(3) of CPC. The appellant was ordered to pay Rs. 25,000 to respondent No.1 within thirty days. Disciplinary Action: The appellant's original counsel was referred to the Punjab Bar Council for misconduct. ---Quote: ''An Advocate is bound by the rules framed under the LPBCA, and also by virtue of being an officer of the Court has a duty to ensure that where an appeal is being instituted by such Advocate, the requirements of law including the filing of affidavits and their verification and/or certification has been undertaken in accordance with law. Such obligation forms part of the responsibility that an Advocate undertakes when he/she accepts a brief. To rely on some abhorrent practice, if such practice exists at all, where Advocates acquiesce in filing affidavits that are either not signed by the person issuing the affidavit or have not been certified and/or verified in accordance with law cannot be condoned. -----Citations/Precedents: Sourendra Nath Mitra and others Vs. Tarubala Dasi (AIR 1930 PC 158) Dr. Ansar Hassan Rizvi Vs. Syed Mazahir Hussain Zaidi and 03 others (1971 SCMR 634) M/s Arokey Limited and another Vs. Munir Ahmad Mughal and 03 others (PLD 1982 SC 204) Mst. Noor Jahan Farooqi Vs. Azmat Hussain Farooqi and another (1992 SCMR 876) Hassan Akhtar Vs. Azhar Hameed (PLD 2010 SC 657) Mohammad Ali Vs. Mohammad Ishaq (1992 MLD 741) Siraj Din Vs. Mohammad Yousaf etc. (1982 SCMR 539) Fazal Mehdi and others Vs. Allah Ditta (PLD 2007 SC 343) Mohammad Riaz Hussain Vs. Zahoor-ul-Hassan (2021 SCMR 431) ---Quote: ''An Advocate by virtue of being a professional is bound by the rules framed under the Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Act, 1973, and also by virtue of being an officer of the Court has a duty to ensure that where an appeal is being instituted by such Advocate, the requirements of law including the filing of affidavits and their verification and/or certification has been undertaken in accordance with law. Such obligation forms part of the responsibility that an Advocate undertakes when he/she accepts a brief. To rely on some abhorrent practice, if such practice exists at all, where Advocates acquiesce in filing affidavits that are either not signed by the person issuing the affidavit or have not been certified and/or verified in accordance with law cannot be condoned. If the Courts are unable to trust the representation made by counsels who as officers of the court appear before them, the ability of Courts to dispense justice in accordance with law would be seriously handicapped. As the regulator of the legal profession it thus for the Bar Council to take appropriate steps to ensure that Advocates discharge their obligation to ensure that the memos and affidavits filed in Court are duly authorized, executed and verified in accordance with law, and that any Advocate who indulges in filing forged documents faces appropriate disciplinary consequences. ''

Summary: Background:The legal conflict stems from a suit filed by Muhammad Aslam (Respondent No.3) for possession through pre-emption against Mst. Rehmat Bibi, which was decreed based on a purported compromise. The heirs of Mst. Rehmat Bibi contested this decree, asserting that it was invalid as Mst. Rehmat Bibi had already passed away on May 20, 2000, making the compromise and subsequent decree (dated May 25, 2000) legally untenable.----Issues:The legitimacy of the decree given the claim that Mst. Rehmat Bibi had died before the suit was initiated.The reliability and authenticity of the documentary and oral evidence regarding the date of Mst. Rehmat Bibi's death.The procedural adequacy of the lower courts in handling the evidence and exercising their jurisdiction.----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The Lahore High Court found that both lower courts failed to properly assess the authenticity of the death certificate and other documentary evidence. The Court criticized both parties for not presenting the full truth and the lower courts for not exercising their jurisdiction effectively to uncover the truth. The judgment stressed the importance of documentary evidence over oral testimony and highlighted the procedural lapses in relying on unverified documents and witnesses with conflicts of interest. Consequently, the petition was accepted, the decisions of the lower courts were set aside, and the matter was remanded to the Trial Court for fresh decision-making, with the directive to consider all relevant evidence and witnesses to achieve justice.----Citations/Precedents:Muhammad Younas and another v. Ghazanfar Abbas and 12 others (2017 YLR 2229): Highlighted the importance of properly proving the contents of a document through the testimony of the individual who signed it.Commissioner of Income-Tax, Companies Zone-II, Karachi v. Messrs Sindh Engineering (Pvt.) Limited, Karachi (2002 SCMR 527): Discussed the implications of a tribunal's failure to exercise its jurisdiction.Mst. Saadia v. Mst. Gul Bibi (2016 SCMR 662): Warned against the reliance on interested witnesses without corroboration from documentary evidence.Tassaduq Hussain Shah and others v. Allah Ditta Shah and others (2023 SCMR 1635): Affirmed that documentary evidence has precedence over oral testimony.Mst. Zarsheda v. Nobat Khan (PLD 2022 SC 21): Addressed the adverse inference drawn from non-production of evidence.Ch. Muneer Hussain v. Mst. Wazeeran Mai alias Mst. Wazir Mai (PLD 2005 SC 658): Emphasized the need for independent advice for females executing documents.Mst. Safia Begum v. Muhammad Ajmal (2007 YLR 3030): Discussed the proof requirements for documents and the credibility of advocate's statements in the absence of corroboration.

Summary: ''Power of attorney --- authority of counsel to get a decree of compromise on the basis of his statement power of attorney must be strictly construed'' ---- Facts:The petitioners challenged the judgments and cost memos from lower courts, which had dismissed their application under Section 12(2) C.P.C., regarding a suit for possession through pre-emption initiated by the respondents' predecessors in 1990.The suit involved a piece of land sold to the petitioners, which the respondents sought to pre-empt. After extensive legal proceedings, including remand by the High Court, the suit was decreed in favor of the respondents in 2004 based on an alleged compromise.The petitioners contended that the compromise was fraudulently claimed by their counsel without their authorization, leading them to challenge the decree through an application under Section 12(2) C.P.C.-----Issues:Whether the judgment and decree dated 22.06.2004 resulted from fraud.Whether the petitioners' counsel had authority to enter into a compromise on their behalf.-----Judgments:The Trial Court and Revisional Court dismissed the petitioners' application, leading to the filing of the instant Constitutional Petition.Analysis by High Court:The High Court scrutinized the entire sequence of events, including the alleged compromise and the authority of the petitioners' counsel to enter into such an agreement.The Court found no explicit authority given to the counsel to compromise, nor was there any evidence of a genuine agreement between the parties.The High Court criticized the lower courts for not applying judicial mind and relying on surmises, leading to the setting aside of the impugned judgments/memos of cost and the decree.-----Conclusion:The High Court accepted the petition, set aside the previous judgments and decree, and deemed the suit to be still pending. The Trial Court was directed to decide the matter expeditiously within three months.----Significance:This judgment underscores the importance of explicit authorization for attorneys to enter into compromises on behalf of their clients and highlights the courts' duty to verify the authenticity and voluntariness of such agreements, especially when they are purported to resolve long-standing and hotly contested litigation.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----O. XXIII, R. 1(3)---Withdrawal of suit simpliciter---Scope---Fresh/second suit, filing of---Maintainability-- --Second suit filed by the appellant/plaintiff was not entertained by the Trial Court---Validity---Relevant Civil Court's order whereby the earlier suit was withdrawn showed that counsel of the plaintiff/appellant had recorded a statement to the effect that the suit was being withdrawn due to a compromise arrived at between the parties---Neither were the terms of the compromise brought on record nor was the suit decided in terms of any compromise---However, plaintiff instituted a second suit for specific performance of the agreements against the vendor---Though there was reference to a compromise in (plaint of) second suit, on the basis of which the earlier suit was withdrawn but there was no mention as to the terms of the compromise---In relevant paragraph of plaint the said suit, there was a bald assertion that Defendant/vendor had violated the terms of the compromise---Therefore, the withdrawal of the first suit instituted by plaintiff/appellant would be treated as a withdrawal simpliciter having the consequences envisaged by O.XXIII, R.1(3) of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, as said Rule, inter alia, mandates that where a plaintiff withdraws from a suit without the permission of the Court to file a fresh suit on the same subject matter, he shall be precluded from instituting any fresh suit in respect of such subject matter---Plaint in the second suit for specific performance instituted by plaintiff/appellant was rightly rejected by the Civil Court because O.XXIII, R.1(3), C.P.C., precluded him from instituting the suit on the same subject matter as the earlier suit instituted by him---Said (withdrawal) order was accepted by the plaintiff himself as he never challenged the same before a higher forum---Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances. (b) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)--- ----Ss. 12, 18 & 54---Suit for specific performance of agreements to sell, permanent injunction and compensation / damages---First purchaser entering into agreement to sell with third party purchaser without acquiring rights from original owner---Scope and effect---Civil Court, allowed/decreed the suit instituted by third party purchaser to the extent of relevant prayer in the said suit i.e. "the recovery of an amount as compensation along with mesne profit @ 15% per annum w.e.f agreed date of payment till final realization of the amount" ---Appellants (two in number), who were defendants in suit being first purchasers (vendees), assailed the said judgment and decree---Plea of the appellants (vendees/first purchasers) was that the terms of the first agreement authorized them to resell the suit plot at any price and to any person; that it was also agreed that in the event they resell the suit-plot before its transfer in their name, vendor (original owner) would have no objection and would execute such documents as they might require---Validity---Record revealed that in furtherance of the terms of the First Agreement, appellants had paid Rs.20,00,000/- to vendor (original owner ) and the remaining amount of Rs.1,20,00,000/- was to be paid within one month of date of execution of (first) agreement with a grace period of one week---There was nothing on the record to show that appellants had paid the remaining sale consideration to the vendor (original owner) or were in a position to make such a payment-- -Vendor (original owner) forfeited Rs.20,00,000/- which had been paid as earnest money by them (appellants /vendees)---Despite the First Agreement, the fact remained that the ownership of the suit-plot at all relevant times remained with the vendor (original owner), due to which, appellants(defendants / first vendees) were in no position to transfer title in the suit plot in favour of plaintiff (third party purchaser) under the terms of the Second Agreement---Appellants represented, by executing the Second Agreement with plaintiff (third party purchaser), that they were authorized to transfer the suit-plot and professed to transfer the same for consideration mentioned in the said agreement---Since the Second Agreement had no reference to the First Agreement, they (appellants) fraudulently (not erroneously) represented to plaintiff that they were authorized to sell the suit-plot---Even if it was assumed that they did so erroneously, the fact remained that they did not acquire ownership in the suit plot by the date stipulated in the Second Agreement for the transfer of the suit plot---However, plaintiff (respondent/third party purchaser) could not expect the Court to pass a decree for specific performance of the Second Agreement in his favour---Civil Court was wise in turning down plaintiff's prayer for a decree for specific performance of the Second Agreement and allowing his prayer for compensation---No illegality or infirmity had been noticed in the impugned judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court---Appeal, filed by the defendants, was dismissed with costs throughout. (c) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)--- ----Ss. 12 , 18 & 54---Suit for specific performance of agreements to sell, permanent injunction and compensation / damages---First purchaser entering into agreement to sell with third party purchaser without acquiring rights from original owner---Scope and effect---Civil Court, allowed/decreed the suit instituted by third party purchaser to the extent of relevant prayer in the said suit i.e. "the recovery of an amount as compensation along with mesne profit @ 15% per annum w.e.f agreed date of payment till final realization of the amount" ---Appellants (two in number), who were defendants in suit being first purchasers (vendees), assailed the said judgment and decree---Validity---It has become common place these days that when the value of real estate increases by the day people execute agreements to purchase immovable property having no resources to pay the sale consideration but soon after executing such agreements they start searching for third party purchasers so as to generate funds to pay the sale consideration to the original owners---In said process, they aim to make a quick profit by selling the immovable property to third-party purchasers at a rate higher than the sale consideration agreed with the original owner and that too within the period stipulated for the performance of the agreement with the original owner---It is also not unusual that such people are not able to generate funds within the period stipulated in the agreement to sell executed with the original owner for the payment of the sale consideration---This scenario leads to multiplicity of litigation not just between the original owner and the person who claims a right in the immovable property on the basis of an agreement to sell but also between such person and the third party purchaser---Thus, plaintiff/ respondent could not expect the Court to pass a decree for the specific performance of the Second Agreement in his favour---Civil Court was wise in turning down plaintiff's prayer for a decree for specific performance of the Second Agreement and allowing his prayer for compensation---Appeal, filed by the defendants, was dismissed with costs throughout. (d) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)--- ----Ss. 12, 18 & 54---Suit for specific performance of agreements to sell, permanent injunction and compensation / damages---First purchaser Entering into agreement to sell with third party purchaser without acquiring rights from original owner---Scope and effect---Third party purchaser, entitlement of---Civil Court allowed/decreed the suit instituted by third party purchaser to the extent of relevant prayer in the said suit i.e. "the recovery of an amount as compensation along with mesne profit @ 15% per annum w.e.f agreed date of payment till final realization of the amount" ---Appellants (two in number), who were defendants in suit being first purchasers (vendees), assailed the said judgment and decree---Validity---A third party purchaser has no right under the law to seek the specific performance of the agreement to sell between the original owner and the first purchaser---This is because he is not privy to the agreement to sell between the original owner and the first purchaser---A third party purchaser can also not enforce an agreement to sell against a party who does not have title in the immovable property with respect to which such an agreement is executed, but such a third party purchaser cannot be denied the right to be refunded the amount paid as earnest money where the seller is unable to transfer title in the property to him---It is only when the original owner transfers title in the immovable property to the first purchaser that the latter will be in a position to transfer title in the property to the third party purchaser---A transferee stepping in the shoes of a transferor who was not a lawful owner of the property would not get a better title---When a person has no title in an immovable property, he could not enter into an agreement for the transfer of such property---Thus, plaintiff/ respondent could not expect the Court to pass a decree for the specific performance of the second agreement in his favour---Civil Court was wise in turning down plaintiff's prayer for a decree for specific performance of the Second Agreement and allowing his prayer for compensation---Appeal, filed by the defendants, was dismissed with costs throughout. Abdul Hameed v. Shamasuddin PLD 2008 SC 140 and Nadeem Sadiq v. Dewan Masih Gulraiz 2022 YLR 2151 ref. (e) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)--- ----Ss. 12, 18 & 54---Suit for specific performance of agreements to sell, permanent injunction and compensation / damages---First purchaser entering into agreement to sell with third party purchaser without acquiring rights from original owner---Scope and effect---Agreement to sell---Scope---Civil Court allowed/decreed the suit instituted by third party purchaser to the extent of relevant prayer in the said suit i.e. "the recovery of an amount as compensation along with mesne profit @ 15% per annum w.e.f agreed date of payment till final realization of the amount" ---Appellants ( two in number), who were defendants in suit being first purchasers (vendees), assailed the said judgment and decree---Validity---Mere agreement to sell does not invest a purchaser with title in the property so as to enable him to sell it further---It is only when a document of title / sale deed / allotment letter is executed in a purchaser's favour that he is empowered to convey title--- An agreement to sell is not a document which, by itself, creates a title in the immovable property---Agreement to sell only creates a right to obtain another document i.e., a sale deed in favour of the person in whose favour the agreement to sell is executed---Practice of selling immovable property by persons who neither have title in such property nor are in a legal position to have title in such property transferred in their favour, needs to be deprecated in the strongest terms---Such transactions lead to wasteful litigation and consume the Courts' public time---Thus, plaintiff/ respondent could not expect the Court to pass a decree for the specific performance of the Second Agreement in his favour---Civil Court was wise in turning down plaintiff's prayer for a decree for specific performance of the second agreement and allowing his prayer for compensation---Appeal, filed by the defendants, was dismissed with costs throughout. Rasheeda Begum v. Muhammad Yousuf 2002 SCMR 1089; Shah Muhammad v. Atta Muhammad 2005 SCMR 969 and Muhammad Ibrahim v. Fateh Ali 2005 SCMR 1061 ref. (f) Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882)--- ----S. 43---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss. 12, 18 & 54---Suit for specific performance of agreements to sell, permanent injunction and compensation / damages---First purchaser entering into agreement to sell with third party purchaser without acquiring rights from original owner---Scope and effect---Civil Court allowed/decreed the suit instituted by third party purchaser to the extent of relevant prayer in the said suit i.e. "the recovery of an amount as compensation along with mesne profit @ 15% per annum w.e.f agreed date of payment till final realization of the amount" ---Appellants (two in number), who were defendants in suit being first purchasers (vendees), assailed the said judgment and decree---Held, that a person who has not acquired title in the immovable property cannot transfer the same to a third party purchaser by executing an agreement to sell with him---But the law does not prohibit a person who has entered into an agreement to purchase immovable property to enter into another agreement for the sale of such property to a third party purchaser--- Where such a person does enter into an agreement to sell with a third party purchaser, the latter's right to seek the specific performance of the agreement to sell in his favour is postponed until proprietary rights in the immovable property are acquired by the person who executes the agreement to sell---Because S. 43 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, provides that where a person fraudulently or erroneously represents that he is authorized to transfer certain immovable property and professes to transfer such property for consideration, such transfer shall, at the option of the transferee, operate on any interest which the transferor may acquire in such property at any time during which the contract of transfer subsists---Thus, plaintiff/ respondent could not expect the Court to pass a decree for the specific performance of the Second Agreement in his favour---Civil Court was wise in turning down plaintiff's prayer for a decree for specific performance of the second agreement and allowing his prayer for compensation---Appeal, filed by the defendants, was dismissed with costs throughout. (g) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)--- ----Ss. 12, 18 & 54---Suit for specific performance of agreements to sell, permanent injunction and compensation / damages---First purchaser entering into agreement to sell with third party purchaser without acquiring rights from original owner---Agreement to transfer land before proprietary rights conferred on the vendor---Enforceability of---Civil Court allowed/decreed the suit instituted by third party purchaser to the extent of relevant prayer in the said suit i.e. "the recovery of an amount as compensation along with mesne profit @ 15% per annum w.e.f agreed date of payment till final realization of the amount" ---Appellants (two in number), who were defendants in suit being first purchasers (vendees), assailed the said judgment and decree-- -Validity---An agreement to transfer land before proprietary rights have been conferred on the vendor cannot be enforced where a person executes an agreement to sell immovable property to a third party purchaser at a stage when the seller in such an agreement has not acquired title in the immovable property from the original owner---Thus, plaintiff/ respondent could not expect the Court to pass a decree for the specific performance of the second agreement in his favour---Civil Court was wise in turning down plaintiff's prayer for a decree for specific performance of the second agreement and allowing his prayer for compensation---Appeal, filed by the defendants, was dismissed with costs throughout.

Summary: Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----Ss. 345, 417 & 561-A---Compromise of case---Jurisdiction of High Court---Petitioners assailed final disposal of a matter on the basis of compromise---Petitioners claimed to be Wali and legal heirs of deceased but for reasons known to deceased party and notables, they were neither made party to the compromise nor any thing was brought on record regarding all surviving legal heirs of the deceased---Contention of petitioners was that their mother was illiterate lady who was not properly represented in the compromise as well as before Trial Court and petitioners were minors, who were unaware about the fact of the murder of their late father and acceptance of the compromise, which was only arrived at between the widow of deceased and respondent---Validity---As per photocopies of CNICs of petitioners issued by NADRA authorities petitioners were minors at the time of filing of petition---There was nothing on record to show the circumstances, which compelled widow of deceased and respondents not to disclose their names at the time of compromise---Such fact also escaped from the notice of Trial Court---It was not possible for High Court to re-open the case on merits in exercise of power conferred under S. 561-A, Cr.P.C., that too, after lapse of more than ten (10) years---Petitioners were at liberty to avail remedy under S. 417, Cr.P.C. by following the law with legal exceptions---Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances. Ghulam Farid alias Farida v. the State PLD 2006 SC 53 rel.

Summary: Background: The petitioners filed two suits for declaration based on a registered sale deed, which were initially dismissed. Upon appeal, a compromise decree was entered on 29.02.1994, based on statements by two of the respondents, without the involvement of their sister contending that the compromise was fraudulently entered to deprive her of her rightful inheritance, filed applications under Section 12(2) of the Civil Procedure Code (C.P.C.), which were initially dismissed. She then filed civil revisions, which led to the setting aside of the compromise decree by the Lahore High Court. This judgment was further challenged by the petitioners. -----Issues: 1- Jurisdiction of the Court: Whether the Lahore High Court had the jurisdiction to dismiss the original suits while allowing the revision petitions related to the Section 12(2) C.P.C. applications. 2- Right to a Fair Hearing: Whether the petitioners were denied the opportunity to present their defense, violating the principle of audi alteram partem (the right to be heard). 3- Legal Consequence of Accepting Applications under Section 12(2) C.P.C.: Should the case be restored for trial on the merits instead of dismissing the suit outright? -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Court held that it lacked jurisdiction to dismiss the original suits after setting aside the compromise decree. Once the compromise was nullified under Section 12(2) C.P.C., the appropriate action would have been to restore the appeals and decide the case on its merits, rather than dismissing the suits outright. The dismissal deprived the petitioners of the opportunity to defend themselves and seek a decision on the merits of the appeals. The Court recognized that the petitioners were not given a fair hearing, as they were not present or represented when the decision was made, and the principle of audi alteram partem was violated. This warranted a reconsideration of the case. In line with the precedent established by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in Haji Farman Ullah v. Latif-ur-Rehman (2015 SCMR 1708), the Court ruled that upon setting aside the compromise decree, the proper course of action was to restore the appeals and include Mst. Mumtaz Mai as a necessary party. The appeals should be decided on their merits, not dismissed summarily. -----Citations/Precedents: Mst. Mumtaz Mai v. Sajjad Hussain (PLJ 2015 Lahore 581) Haji Farman Ullah v. Latif-ur-Rehman (2015 SCMR 1708)

Summary: Background: The petitioner filed a civil revision challenging the judgment and decree passed by the Additional District Judge, Yazman, who had overturned a trial court's decision and decreed a suit for declaration filed by the respondent, Muhammad Farooq. The dispute involved the inheritance of Muhammad Ali, who died on 10.10.2012. Muhammad Farooq (the respondent) was excluded from the inheritance as he was accused and convicted of murdering his father, Muhammad Ali. A compromise was later reached, and Muhammad Farooq was acquitted, leading him to claim his right to inherit his father’s property. The trial court dismissed the suit, but the appellate court allowed the appeal and decreed the suit, prompting this civil revision. -----Issues: 1- Whether the respondent, having been convicted of murdering his father but later acquitted on the basis of compromise, is entitled to inherit his father’s property. -----2- Whether the appellate court's judgment was in accordance with Islamic principles and the law. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court held that under Islamic law and Pakistani law, a person who commits patricide (murder of their father) is debarred from inheriting the estate of the deceased. The court referred to Section 317 of the Pakistan Penal Code, which expressly prohibits a murderer from succeeding to the estate of the victim. The court also cited various Hadiths and case law, including Aminullah v. The State (PLD 1982 SC 429), where the Supreme Court of Pakistan held that a patricide is excluded from inheritance rights. Although the respondent was acquitted due to a compromise, the court emphasized that the act of patricide, which was established, precludes the respondent from inheriting his father's property. The court criticized the appellate court for misreading and misapplying the law, as its judgment contradicted established Islamic principles and legal precedents. The court reversed the findings of the appellate court and upheld the trial court's decision to dismiss the suit. The civil revision was allowed, and the respondent was excluded from inheriting his father's estate. -----Citations/Precedents: Aminullah v. The State (PLD 1982 SC 429) Fazle Ghafoor v. Chairman, Tribunal Land Disputes, Dir (1993 SCMR 1073) Mst. Beguman and 2 others v. Saroo (PLD 1964 (W.P.) Lahore 451) Syed Muhammad Nawaz Shah and others v. Amir Hussain Shah and others (1989 CLC 1712) Noor Zaman alias Maney v. The State (2008 YLR 2352) Muhammad Shafi Tarar v. Fehmida Yasmin and others (2018 CLC 860)

Summary: When the compromise between the parties was developed during the course of arguments and the terms thereof were duly recorded in the order and it was also held that in case of failure to abide by the compromise, the civil revisions are liable to be dismissed, the applicants/petitioners cannot take a somersault by asserting that the petitions were part heard and proceedings were never concluded and on misrepresentation of the respondents side, the decision was rendered inasmuch as such assertions do not fall under the purview of Section 12(2) CPC, more particularly, when the counsels, who appeared on the date of passing of the impugned order, never supported the said assertions by way of an affidavit and amounts to an assault on the sanctity of judicial proceedings under Article 129 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 which act is liable to be deprecated in strongest terms possible.