Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 497---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 419, 420, 468, 471 & 109---Prevention of Trafficking in Persons Act (XXXIV of 2018), Ss. 3, 4 & 5---Trafficking in persons through forged documents---Bail, dismissal of---Allegations against the accused-applicant were that she transported the minor to a foreign country by showing the minor as her real son whereas she was not biological mother of the minor---Role and material attributed towards the applicant/”KS” reflected that the child was in her custody when they were intercepted at the airport---Child was being taken to M-(Mozambique) by accused-applicant “KS” by claiming herself as the real mother of the child---During such travel accused/applicant “KS” was carrying identification and travel documents of the child, like birth certificate, passport, visa etc., wherein she was shown as the real mother of the child---For procuring all the referred and other documents, money was received and paid through co-accused persons---Birth Certificate of the child was obtained from the concerned Union Council by her in violation of 'Birth Death, Marriage and Divorce Registration Bye-Laws 2017'---No guardianship certificate by a Court of competent jurisdiction was applied by accused/applicant “KS” for adopting the said child---Victim child was being carried out of Pakistan's territory; and as per statement of accused/applicant “KS”, the child was to be handed over by accused/applicant “KS” in M-(Mozambique) to her husband for her boss---No enmity or mala fide against FIA officials had been pointed out for her implication---In view of the said role and material on record, on a tentative and prima facie assessment, a strong prima facie case with ample material establishedapplicant’s connection along with active participation in the alleged crime of child trafficking, in connivance with other co-accused as an 'organised criminal group' with international links and pointed towards her central role in the whole scheme---In view whereof, no case of 'further inquiry' was made out in favour of accused/applicant “KS”---Bail application was dismissed, in circumstances. Sadiq Hussain and another v. Deputy Director, Federal Investigation Agency and others 2025 PCr. Lj 1145 rel. (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 497---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 419, 420, 468, 471 & 109---Prevention of Trafficking in Persons Act (XXXIV of 2018), Ss. 3, 4 & 5---Trafficking in Persons through forged documents---Bail, grant of---Female accused---Old age---Fragile health---Allegations against the applicant/Dr. “MN” were that the birth certificate of the victim child was issued by her, containing information that the accused/”KS” was the real mother of the child---Moreover, a stamp was also affixed on the said certificate, which showed her as working in SSGC Medical Services and Department, which had been verified by the Investigating Officer and had been reported as fake by the said institution, while in reality, she already retired way back in 2016---All subsequent documents, from NADRA and Passport office etc., were prepared based upon such birth certificate---Said applicant on the other hand claimed that she was not present at the time of the birth of the child, since the birth procedure was conducted by a midwife and therefore she issued the certificate in good faith, as per information provided to her by co-accused “YM”---Although the allegedly impersonating stamp might not have much of an impact on the present case, but on a tentative and prima facie assessment, the birth certificate itself was enough to connect her with the crime and take her case out of the ambit of 'Further Inquiry'---Role and material attributed to the third applicant/”YM” was that she actively participated in the crime as the child was given under the care of Lady “L” through “YM”---Arrangements for issuance of birth certificate of the victim child dated 04.09.2024 through Dr. “MN”/applicant was also done by “YM”---Expenses on account of CRC, Passport, caretaker's wages, etc. were borne by the husband of accused “KS” which were paid through “YM”---Lastly, “YM” also visited and took custody of the child from Dr. “L”, the government employee and CEO of the NGO, Nayab Welfare Orphanage---Hence, on a tentative and prima facie assessment, amplematerial in the form of statements, mobile calls, chats and other documents hadbeen collected by the Investigating Officer which connected her with an active role and linked her with the international handlers in M-(Mozambique) and also with local co-accused persons, which was enough to connect her with the crime; hence no case of 'further inquiry' was made out in her favour---However, the only factor, which convinced the court to exercise discretion for grant of bail in favour of these two applicants (Dr. “MN” and “YM”) was that Dr. MN was a retired doctor and widow of advanced age of around 69 years, who was suffering from heart ailment---Whereas “YM” was also an old aged widow lady of around 68 years; and both of them were in custody since past more than three months---Investigating Officer confirmed that challan to their extent had been submitted, whereas further investigation was ongoing---Hence, solely on such considerations of old age and fragile health, the bail applications of Dr. “MN” and “YM” were allowed, in circumstances. Rashid Mustafa Solangi and Imtiaz Ali Jatoi for Applicant (in Criminal Bail Application No. 2267 of 2025). Shaukat Hayyat, Syed Muhammad Abdul Kabir and Miss Amna Magsi for Applicant (in Criminal Bail Application No. 1810 of 2025). Aamir Mansoor Qureshi for Applicant (in Criminal Bail Application No. 1777 of 2025). Shah Hussain, Assistant Attorney General along with IO/SI Rafia Altaf of FIA, AHT Circle, Karachi for the State. Date of hearing: 25th September, 2025. Muhammad Hasan (Akber), J.--- This common order will decide the subject three bail applications, in view of their inter-connected facts in the same crime. The proceedings were initiated in Crime No.191/2025, registered at P.S. FIA AHT Circle, Karachi for offences under Sections 3, 4, 5 of the Prevention of Trafficking in Persons Act, 2018 (Amended 2025), [PTPA] read with Sections 419, 420, 468, 471, 109, P.P.C. Earlier, the bail applications by all three applicants, Kiran Sohail, Dr. Mumtaz Nayani and Yasmin Mawani were rejected by the learned Special Judge (Central-II), Karachi vide common Order dated 23.07.2025, which has been impugned herein.

Summary: Acquittal ---- (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860) & Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 ----Ss. 409, 420, 468, 471 & 34, PPC; S. 5(2), PCA—Embezzlement of departmental funds—Standard of proof—Benefit of doubt. Convictions of postal officials for alleged embezzlement of Rs.14,931,650/- set aside—On appraisal of record, prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt; material infirmities and contradictions in the inquiry and investigation rendered the case doubtful—Benefit of doubt extended; acquittal recorded. (b) Criminal trial—Best evidence rule—Withholding of vital evidence—Adverse inference. Department and FIA failed to produce CCTV footage from the treasury room; inquiry officers admitted footage was not obtained or made part of record, and investigating officer neither seized the system nor recorded statements to prove it was inoperative—Non-production of the best available evidence undermined the prosecution case and invited adverse inference. (c) Departmental proceedings—Procedural irregularities—Denial of fair opportunity. Fact-finding inquiry initiated 2–3 months after the incident; witnesses examined in the absence of accused; no statement of allegations served; accused were not allowed to cross-examine witnesses; inquiry members unable to identify governing rules in Post Office Manual—Such irregularities eroded the probative worth of the departmental findings relied upon for criminal prosecution. (d) Evidence—Missing necessary accused—Break in chain of liability. Record showed MR handed Rs.15,000,000/- to Javed Akhtar Bhatti (Deputy Senior Postmaster) for deposit in SBP; preliminary report also noted non-deposit by JAB on relevant dates—Yet JAB was neither arrayed as an accused nor effectively investigated; even his alleged confessional statement was not brought on record—Failure to investigate/arraign the pivotal custodian of the cash created a decisive gap in prosecution’s chain. (e) Documentary/arithmetical anomalies—Cash verification and forms. Physical cash verification was conducted after two months; the treasury form contained facially erroneous denominations (showing “five lac” notes of Rs.5,000/- leading to an impossible total), further casting doubt on the reliability of the accounting trail. (f) Circumstantial and corroborative evidence—Personal bank accounts. Bank managers’ statements reflected negligible balances in accuseds’ personal accounts; absence of unexplained accretions weakened the allegation of personal appropriation of the missing funds. (g) Appellate review—Concurrent findings—Non-reading/misreading. Despite concurrent convictions by the Trial Court and High Court, Supreme Court interfered where critical evidence was ignored, vital witnesses/evidence were withheld, and material irregularities existed—Convictions could not stand on such tainted footing. Disposition—Both Criminal Petitions allowed; convictions and sentences recorded by the Trial Court (27.06.2019) and affirmed by the High Court (23.01.2023) set aside; petitioners acquitted by extending benefit of doubt.

Summary: (a) Passports Rules, 2021--- ----R. 22---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 15---Placing name on Passport Control list (PCL)---Whether power to do so laid with Federal Investigation Agency or Federal Government---Petitioners were implicated in FIR registered under Ss.419, 420, 468, 471, 473, 109 & 34, P.P.C, read with Ss.36 & 37 of the Electronic Transactions Ordinance and S.4 of Anti Money Laundering Act, 2010---Initially they were admitted to bail, but were subsequently acquitted by the District Court, however, the acquittal appeal filed against their acquittal order was partly accepted and matter was remanded for fresh decision, but in the post-remand proceedings, they were convicted---On filing of appeal, this Court suspended the conviction and sentence, and released the petitioners on bail---When the petitionersattempted to travel abroad to perform Umrah, they were stopped at the airport and informed that their names had been placed on the blacklist/Passport Control List by the DG Immigration & Passport on the recommendation of Federal Investigation Agency (FIA)---Held: Right to travel formed an essential part of the fundamental rights to life and liberty and could only be restricted under a valid law enacted in the public interest---Any restraint on movement must have lawful justification and could not be imposed arbitrarily---Executive discretion must be exercised fairly, reasonably and in good faith and within the bounds of law---Administrative instructions or policies could not curtail constitutional rights beyond statutory authority and mere pendency of criminal proceedings was not sufficient to prohibit movement---Restrictions such as blacklisting must be applied sparingly, after application of mind and must not be indefinite or disproportionate---Executive must not act mechanically on departmental recommendations---Placement on an exit or Passport Control List could not be automatic upon registration of FIR or even upon pendency of proceedings; if a person was on bail, released or not a proclaimed offender, the authority must give cogent, specific reasons before curtailing his/her constitutional right to travel---Suspension of sentence did not ipso facto amount to acquittal; however, suspension neutralized theoperative effect of a conviction for the time being and enlivened the petitioners' right to be treated as persons entitled to procedural fairness---Even for persons who stand convicted, any preventive restriction on fundamental rights must have clear statutory backing and must be exercised after application of mind and by giving reasons---Rules could not be used in a mechanical fashion to perpetuate deprivation of a constitutional right without review and without the administrative authority stating cogent grounds---Absence of any record of reconsideration of any fresh security assessment, or of any contemporaneous reasons why the petitioners should continue to be prevented from travelling, led the Court to the conclusion that the placement on Passport Control List was not the result of an exercise of reasoned discretion---Where the rule was invoked the authority must showed that the case fell squarely within the categories enumerated in the Rule; that the decision was not taken mechanically, but after application of mind; that the restriction was proportionate to the mischief sought to be prevented; and that the person affected was given an opportunity to be heard, unless the urgency of the circumstance rendered such hearing impracticable and then the authority must nevertheless record reasons for not giving such hearing---None of those safeguards were visible on the record before this Court in respect of the petitioners---Rule 22(1) contemplated that the Federal Government was vested with the power to regulate departure and entry and the Division concerned and Directorate General shall prepare and maintain the Passport Control List; yet there was nothing on record to indicate that any approval by the Federal Government, where required, hadbeen obtained in relation to those entries, or that the competent Division applied its mind to the matter---For reasons of good governance and to avoid arbitraryexercise of power, entries on Passport Control List could not be made or maintained in a clandestine, mechanical and non-reviewable manner---Respondents had not produced any material to show that the petitioners posed a continuing security risk, which could not be addressed by less restrictive measures, for instance, by conditional travel permission, surrendering of passports to the Trial Court, or by Court-ordered restrictions tailored to ensure presence for trial---Record showed that the petitioners were on bail, their appeal was pending and their conviction was suspended---Principal rationale advanced in support of the Passport Control List entry (fear of absconsion) had not been supported by evidence of any attempts to flee or of any threat to national security---In the absence of such material, continuing the bar on travel was disproportionate---Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances. Federation of Pakistan v. General (Retd). Pervez Musharraf PLD 2016 SC 570; Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif v. President of Pakistan PLD 1993 SC 473; Pakistan Muslim League (N) v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2007 SC 642; Al-Jehad Trust v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1996 SC 324; Federal Government v. Ayyan Ali 2017 SCMR 1179; Sheikh Shan Ilahi v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2023 Lah. 359; Dada Amir Haider Khan’s case PLD 1987 SC 504; Wajid Shams-ud-Hassan v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1997 Lah. 617; Shabana Noor Ahmed v. DG Immigration and Passport PlD 2019 Sindh 456; Sayed Zulfikar Abbas Bukhari v. Federation of Pakistan PlD 2019 Isl. 316 and Riaz Ahmed v. Government of Pakistan PLD 2014 Isl. 29 rel. (b) Passports Rules, 2021--- ----R. 22---Placing name on Passport Control list (PCL)---Requirements and guidelines---No person shall be placed on the Passport Control List without a contemporaneous record of reasons showing application of mind;wherever practicable a show-cause notice shall be issued before placing a person on Passport Control List and an opportunity of hearing he afforded; where emergency action is taken without prior notice, reasons for omission of prior notice must be recorded in writing and the matter must be reviewed within a reasonable time; andperiodic review of entries on Passport Control List must be undertaken to ensure no person is kept on the list mechanically or indefinitely. Raja Rizwan Abbasi for Petitioner. Ms. Shaista Tabassum, A.A.G for the State. Mohsin Afzal, A.D CCRC, Islamabad.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 497(1), third proviso---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 409, 419, 420, 468, 471, 472, 473, 109 & 34---Prevention of Corruption Act (II of 1947), S. 5(2)---Criminal breach of trust by public servant, cheating by personation, cheating and dishonestly inducing someone to deliver property, forgery for the purpose of cheating, use of a forged document as genuine, counterfeit seals, making or possessing a counterfeit seal or instrument with the intent to commit forgery, abetment, common intention, criminal misconduct---Statutory delay in conclusion of trial---Accused sought their bail on the ground of delay in conclusion of trial---Held: Allegations against the accused-petitioners were that they being Administrators and Officers of the Cooperative Societies Department, in active connivance with a land grabber illegally usurped the Society, misplaced original records, filed fake memberships before Court, engineered elections in September 2020 and installed a dummy management, thereafter, bogus plot files were prepared and sold to the public, crime proceeds of approx. Rs.130 million were laundered through various accounts and two properties were purchased in an other Society---In the instant case, the applicants were charged with offences punishable under Ss.409/419/420/ 471/472/473/109/34, P.P.C. read with S.5(2) PCA-II, 1947, which were not punishable up to death, hence their bail plea was covered under part(a) of the third proviso to S.497(1), Cr.P.C.---Said provision provided that if an accused remained detained exceeding one year without conclusion of trial, the law mandated his release on bail---For the purposes of commencement of time under the third proviso to S.497(1), Cr.P.C., period for the conclusion of the trial was to be calculated from the date of the arrest/detention of the accused and it was of little importance as to when the charge was framed and the trial commenced---In the absence of any material to the effect that the applicants were previously convicted, on a tentative assessment, the applicants did not appear to fall under the parameters of hardened, desperate or dangerous criminals---Certified copies of diaries of the Trial Court as available on record also clearly depicted that delay had not been caused in trial due to act or omission from the side of the applicant/accused---Both the applicants were arrested on 16.05.2024 and had remained detained since past more than one year and three months---Prosecutor informed that there were total number of 26 accused involved in this case out of which 6 had absconded whereas 18 accused persons had already been granted bails on different grounds and only present two applicants were presently behind bars---Prosecutor further informed about the position of the trial that 'Charge' had not been framed as yet, whereas the Court was presently vacant---In these circumstances, it appeared that the trial had not even commenced as yet, and the same was not likely to conclude in near future---On a tentative assessment, a case for grant of bail on the ground of statutory delay in the conclusion of trial was prima facie made out within the ambit of S.497, Cr.P.C.---Bail application was allowed, in circumstances. Nadeem Samson v. the state and others PLD 2022 SC 142; Shakeel Shah v. The State and others 2022 SCMR 1; Muhammad Usman v. The State and another 2024 SCMR 28; Nazir Hussain v. Zia-ul-Haq and others 1983 SCMR 72; Moundar and others v. The State PLD 1990 SC 934; Sher Ali alias Sheri v. The State 1998 SCMR 190; Akhtar Abbas v. State PLD 1982 SC 424; Abdul Rashid v. The State 1998 SCMR 897; Zahid Hussain Shah v. The State PLD 1995 SC 49; Muhammad Siddique v. Muhammad Behram and another 1998 PCr.LJ 358; Allah Wasaya v. The State and others PLD 2022 SC 541; Shahzad Ahmed v. The State through FIA Islamabad 2010 SCMR 1221; Shameel Ahmed v. The State 2009 SCMR 174; Riaz Ahmed and others v. Federation of Pakistan through Chairman, National Accountability Bureau NAB and others 2021 PCr.LJ 1182 and Tallat Ishaq v. National Accountability Bureau through Chairman PLD 2019 SC 112 rel. (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 497---Bail order---Observations of the Court---Scope---Observations made in bail order being tentative in nature, should not influence the Trial Court to independently adjudicate the case on its own merits. Nisar Ahmed Tarar for Applicants (in Criminal Bail Application No. 1514 of 2025). Saad Fayaz for Applicant (in Criminal Bail Application No. 1519 of 2025). Muhammad Najeeb Jamali for the Complainant (in Criminal Bail Applications Nos. 1514 and 1519 of 2025). Muhammad Ahmed, Assistant Attorney General for the State. Date of hearing: 21st August, 2025. Muhammad Hasan (Akber), J .--- Through this single order, both the subject bail applications are being decided which have been filed against the common order dated 02.06.2025 passed by learned Special Judge, `(Central-II), Karachi in FIR No.16/2024, registered under Sections 409/419/420/468/471/472/473/109/34 P.P.C read with Section 5(2) PCA-II, 1947 at Police Station F.I.A ACC, Karachi, whereby post a risk bill to both the applicants has been rejected.

Summary: Cancellation of Bail set aside ---(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ---Ss. 435, 439 & 497(5)---Cancellation of bail---Principles governing cancellation of bail---Addition of new sections to invoke the prohibitory clause---Scope Petitioner challenged the order of the Additional Sessions Judge, Islamabad (West), whereby post-arrest bail granted to him in FIR No. 496, dated 28.07.2023, under Sections 420, 468, 471, 381, and 34, PPC, was recalled on the ground that Section 467, PPC was later added, bringing the case under the prohibitory clause of Section 497, Cr.P.C. The court noted that the investigation officer (I.O) had not included Section 467, PPC in the remand applications but subsequently added it after the grant of bail, which was not disclosed before the Magistrate. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Muhammad Tanveer v. The State (PLD 2017 SC 733) held that bail cannot be cancelled merely due to the addition of a new section if the prosecution’s conduct indicates mala fide intent. Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Saeed Ullah v. The State (2023 SCMR 1397) laid down that bail may only be cancelled in exceptional circumstances, such as misuse of bail, interference with prosecution evidence, or likelihood of absconding. The court found that none of these grounds were present, and the prosecution’s act of adding a new section post-bail to bring the case under the prohibitory clause was an attempt to misuse the legal process. Consequently, the cancellation of bail by the Additional Sessions Judge was declared unjustified, and the recall order was set aside. ----- Cited Cases: Muhammad Tanveer v. The State (PLD 2017 SC 733) Saeed Ullah v. The State (2023 SCMR 1397) Muzafar Iqbal v. Muhammad Imran Aziz (2004 SCMR 231) The State v. Muhammad Sarwar (2017 SCMR 1993) ----- Disposition: Revision petition accepted—Cancellation of bail set aside—Bail order restored as its recall was based on mala fide and procedural impropriety.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S.497---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 409, 468, 471, 420, 161, 465, 109 & 34---Prevention of Corruption Act (II of 1947), S. 5---Criminal breach of trust by public servant, cheating and dishonestly inducing someone to deliver property, forgery for valuable security, use of a forged document as genuine, criminal breach of trust by public servant, public servant accepting any gratification other than legal remuneration, offence of forgery, abetment, common intention, criminal misconduct---Bail, grant of---Further inquiry---Rule of consistency---Allegations against the accused-petitioner were that he through forged document and with the connivance of Naib Tehsildar sold out land measuring 1410 kanals including common village lands and public grazing land fraudulently---Admittedly, the accused/petitioner was not a Government servant hence S.409, P.P.C, and S.5(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 were not applicable to the extent of the petitioner in the present case---Co-accused, who were arrested by the police in the instant case, had already been granted post arrest bail by the Chief Court and another nominated accused, the then Naib Tehsildar was on interim bail, as such the present petitioner became entitled for concession of bail on the basis of rule of consistency---Moreover, there was unexplained delay of one year and two months in lodging of the FIR and the documentary evidence available on the prosecution file suggested the matter being of private transaction---Piece of land regarding which the transaction was alleged was not Government land as per revenue record, rather the same was recorded as Jagir of Raja's of the area in the revenue documents---Investigation in the matter to the extent of the present petitioner was completed and the petitioner was behind bars without any trial in the case---Nothing was available on case file to prove the entrustment of the petitioner for the offence of criminal breach of trust, hence, the application of S.409, P.P.C., in the instant matter required further inquiry to the extent of present petitioner---Other sections did not fall under the prohibitory clause of S.497,Cr.P.C.---Petitioner was local habitant of the area and the prosecution had not taken the plea of abscondance or tampering with the evidence by the accused, as such in absence of any allegation of abscondance or tempering with the prosecution evidence by the petitioner, bail was not to be withheld as punishment, because the accused/ petitioner would face the sentence, if ultimately convicted by the Trial Court at the time of conclusion of the trial---Bail petition was allowed, in circumstances. (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 497---Bail---Tentative assessment---Scope---Findings made in bail order are tentative in nature and the Trial Court needs not be influenced by them in any way. Abdul Karim, Ammar Sadib and Tariq Shah for Petitioner. Faqeer Shah Special Prosecutor for Anti-Corruption Department GB for the State. Date of hearing: 13th February, 2025.

Summary: (a) Companies Act (XIX of 2017)--- ----Ss.476, 477 & 497---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss. 154 & 561-A---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 419, 420, 468, 471, 408 & 409---Quashing of FIR---Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court---Scope---Petitioners/accused sought quashing of FIR by invoking constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court---Held: Allegations against the petitioners were that they being coordinator and servant of a registered company while being hand in glove with each other prepared fake and fictitious rent deed and wrongfully obtained possession of the company's outlets along with wrongful dispossession of the servants of the company, thus cheated the company---When the company was a registered one and completely came within the four corners of Companies Act, 2017 ('the Act') the best course for the company was to move a complaint as required under S. 477 of the Act and not to move an application before the SHO for registration of a criminal case against the petitioners---When the law provides a mechanism for doing a thing in a particular manner, then it must be done in that way and not otherwise---Section 476 of Companies Act, 2017, provides cognizance to be taken in the case of registered companies while S. 477 provided the way of making a complaint for such offences whereas S. 497 provides the penalty /punishment for the offences committed---Section 476 of the Companies Act, being non obstante clause which excludes other provisions of the general law and full mechanism has been provided while taking the cognizance as provided under S. 497 of the Act, which is also a scheduled offence, provided in Eighth Schedule of the Act---Thus, the contents of FIR fully constituted an offence under S. 497 of the Companies Act, hence, lodging of the FIR by the local police was without any competence and was patently illegal on the face of record---Constitutional petition was allowed, accordingly. Syed Mushahid Shah and others v. Federal Investigating Agency and others 2017 SCMR 1218; 2013 SCMR 85 and FIA through Director General FIA and others v. Syed Hamid Ali Shah and others PLD 2023 SC 265 rel. (b) Interpretation of statutes--- ----General and special law---Applicability---Wherever there is a special and general law applicable to a certain matter, the special law will prevail. Muhammad Iqbal others v. Nasrullah 2023 SCMR 273 and Safi-ud-Din Kazi v. Pranab Chandra Roy Choudhary PLD 1950 Dacca 37 rel. Waheed Jan Muhammad for Petitioner. Shoaib Ali, Assistant Advocate General for the State. Malik Asif Ali for Respondent No.2. Date of hearing: 12th February, 2025.

Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 409, 420, 468, 471 & 109----Criminal breach of trust by public servant, cheating and dishonestly inducing someone to deliver property, forgery for the purpose of cheating, use of a forged document as genuine, abetment---Appreciation of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Prosecution case was that the co-accused in connivance with the appellant committed fraud with the bank and willfully and intentionally withdrew an amount of Rs. 1,050,000/- from the bank account through fake/bogus cheques---Perusal of record revealed that neither in the application addressed to Deputy Director FIA nor in his statement the complainant had mentioned that it was the appellant who had committed fraud with the bank by using forged and bogus cheque books---In both these documents the complainant stated that co-accused had encashed one cheque amounting to Rs.6,40,000/- and transferred an amount of Rs.3,65,000/- through second cheque in the account of appellant---Said amount might have been transferred in the account of appellant but the prosecution had failed to bring on record any iota of evidence showing that he was in active connivance with the co-accused, who had withdrawn the cash amount from the bank and transferred some of the amount in the account of appellant---Not only the complainant had failed even to name the appellant that he had committed the offence but even General Banking Officer also never ever named the appellant to have committed the offence--- Thus, the essential ingredients of the offences were found missing in the case as neither the appellant was found to have committed breach of trust or forgery/cheating or using a forged document as genuine nor he had taken benefit of such cheques himself but as per evidence adduced at the trial the active role of using the cheques in question and taking benefit thereof had been attributed to absconding co-accused---Although the prosecution had levelled serious allegations against the appellant that he had withdrawn huge amount from the account of "QI", however, interestingly when said "QI" appeared before the Court, he stated to have neither known the appellant nor charged him for any offence---Besides, the record available on the file was totally silent about the fact that how and who prepared the disputed cheques and in what manner the same was used for the purpose of cheating in order to constitute offence under S.468/471, P.P.C---Moreover, the prosecution had also badly failed to prove the element of mens rea, actus reus and theoutcome of the offence, which were the essential requirement of law for bringing the charge home against the appellant---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. Bashir Dawood and 2 others v. Tanveer Ahmad and another 2020 PCr.LJ 1230; Syed Fayyaz Hussain Zaidi, Advocate v. SHO Police Station Chehliyak Multan and another 2004 MLD 1403; Abdul Rasheed Nasir and others v. The State 2009 SCMR 517; Syed Hamid Saeed Kazmi and others v. The State 2017 PCr.LJ 854 and Nasir Abbas v. The State 2011 SCMR 1966 rel. (b) Criminal trial--- ----Benefit of doubt---Principle---Single reasonable doubt is sufficient for the acquittal of accused. 1997 SCMR 449; 2007 SCMR 1825 and Muhammad Akram v. The State 2009 SCMR 230 rel. Nadeem Abbas Waseer for Appellant Noman Malik, Deputy Attorney General and (Branch Manager MCB) By none for the Respondents. Date of hearing: 11th February, 2025.

Summary: The Supreme Court of Pakistan has ruled that FIRs cannot be quashed once a challan has been filed, affirming the limited scope for judicial intervention during the investigative process. Justice Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi emphasized that "quashment of FIR during investigation tantamounts to throttling the investigation, which is not permissible in law," underlining that such judicial powers are reserved for truly exceptional cases. ------ - Key Points of the Judgment include: ------ 1) Judicial and Investigative Roles Are Distinct: Justice Rizvi highlighted the complementary, non-overlapping roles of the judiciary and law enforcement, stating that law enforcement is obligated under Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to investigate cognizable offences. Courts should not interfere with this duty unless the case is extraordinary. ------ 2) Concurrent Civil and Criminal Proceedings: The judgment clarified that a concurrent civil dispute does not preclude criminal proceedings. Justice Rizvi referenced precedent, stating that "a criminal case must be allowed to proceed on its own merits, regardless of any parallel civil matters." Criminal and civil cases can coexist and be adjudicated independently. ------ 3) Grounds for Quashment Must Be Exceptional: FIR quashment is only permissible if there is clear evidence of misuse of legal authority or if the allegations lack legal basis. Justice Rizvi noted that concerns over conviction probability should be handled within trial proceedings and not preempt the investigation. ----- 4) No Premature Judicial Intervention: The Court emphasized that quashing an FIR should not impede the police's statutory role in evidence gathering. Interference should be limited to cases where allegations unequivocally indicate no offence or a clear abuse of process. ------ This case involves Civil Petitions No. 671-L and 672-L of 2017, where the State challenged the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench’s decision to quash FIR No. 58/2012. This FIR, registered on August 2, 2012, alleged that the respondents fraudulently transferred significant state land in Tehsil Jalalpur to private persons using forged orders from the Deputy Settlement Commissioner. An inquiry by the Anti-Corruption Establishment (ACE) revealed irregularities, leading to FIR registration. However, the respondents contended that the FIR was baseless and filed with malafide intent, ultimately convincing the High Court to quash it. ------Issues ------1) Whether the High Court erred in quashing an FIR involving alleged fraudulent land transfers under Article 199 of the Constitution. ------2) Whether the existence of a civil dispute negates the necessity for criminal proceedings. ------3) Whether the High Court’s quashing of the FIR was justified based on the improbability of conviction. ------Holding/Reasoning/Outcome The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s order, finding that quashing the FIR was improper. Key points of reasoning include: The High Court’s jurisdiction under Article 199 to quash FIRs is limited to cases where the FIR is evidently without legal basis or constitutes an abuse of legal authority. Criminal proceedings should not be prematurely quashed, especially when material evidence supports a cognizable offense. The existence of a civil dispute does not preclude criminal liability; both civil and criminal proceedings can proceed concurrently if the facts disclose a criminal offense. Probable conviction or acquittal is a matter for trial courts to decide, and without strong evidence of malafide intent by investigative authorities, the FIR should not have been quashed at this stage. ------Citations/Precedents Ajmeel Khan v. Abdul Rahim and others (PLD 2009 SC 102) – On the complementary roles of judiciary and police and the conditions under which an FIR may be quashed. FIA, Director General FIA and others v. Syed Hamid Ali Shah and others (PLD 2023 SC 265) – Reaffirming the High Court’s power to quash FIRs when the allegations do not constitute a cognizable offense. Seema Fareed and Others v. The State and another (2008 SCMR 839) – Civil disputes do not bar criminal proceedings if criminal liability is indicated. Neeharika Infrastructure v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 2021 SC 5041) – Guidelines on judicial restraint in staying investigations and quashing FIRs in India. Mst. Tayyeba Ambareen v. Shafqat Ali Kiyani (2023 SCMR 246), Amir Jamal v. Malik Zahoor-ul-Haq (2011 SCMR 1023), Fida Hussain v. Mst Saiqa (2011 SCMR 1990) – High Court’s limited scope under Article 199 in cases requiring factual determinations. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, thereby reinstating the FIR for investigation and trial.

Summary: Acquittal granted----(a) Criminal Law—Circumstantial Evidence—Standard of Proof: ----Pakistan Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302(b), 468, 471; Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance (VI of 1979), S. 17(4); Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Arms Act, 2013, Ss. 15 & 19; Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, Art. 71. Accused was charged and convicted under various provisions of the Pakistan Penal Code, the Hudood Ordinance, and the Arms Act for murder, forgery, and illegal possession of arms. The case relied entirely on circumstantial evidence, including last-seen testimony, call data records, identification parade, and recoveries. The Federal Shariat Court held that circumstantial evidence must form an unbroken chain pointing unequivocally towards the guilt of the accused. Any missing link in the chain renders the evidence unreliable. In the instant case, serious discrepancies were noted in the collection, presentation, and corroboration of circumstantial evidence. Delays in recording witness statements, failure to follow protocols in the identification parade, contradictions in call data records, and absence of credible corroboration undermined the prosecution's case. Suspicion, however strong, cannot replace proof in criminal cases. -----Cited Cases: Ibrahim and others v. The State (2009 SCMR 407) Imran alias Dully and another v. The State and others (2015 SCMR 155) Hashim Qasim and another v. The State (2017 SCMR 986) Yasin alias Ghulam Mustafa v. The State (2008 SCMR 336) (b) Criminal Law—Hearsay Evidence—Admissibility: ----Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, Art. 71. The supplementary statement of a witness implicating the accused was deemed inadmissible as it amounted to hearsay. The witness admitted that his knowledge about the accused's involvement was derived from information provided by investigation officials. Hearsay evidence, unless corroborated by direct evidence, cannot be relied upon for conviction. The court emphasized that only direct evidence, as stipulated under Article 71 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, is admissible. ----Cited Cases: Muhammad Azam and another v. Khalid Mehmood and another (2013 PCr.LJ 36) Sajjan Solangi v. The State (2019 SCMR 872) (c) Criminal Law—Identification Parade—Legal Requirements: ----Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss. 161, 164; Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, Art. 40. Identification parade proceedings were marred by procedural irregularities, including the accused being exposed to witnesses prior to the parade, absence of details regarding dummies, and failure to verify police custody duration. The Magistrate failed to record essential findings and verify compliance with prescribed procedures. The court held that such irregularities render the identification parade unreliable. -----Cited Cases: Muhammad Ayaz and others v. The State (2011 SCMR 769) Imran Ashraf and 7 others v. The State (2001 SCMR 424) (d) Criminal Law—Recovery Evidence—Admissibility and Corroboration: ----Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss. 161, 164; Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, Art. 40. Recovery of incriminating articles, including the weapon of offence and vehicle, failed to meet the required standard of proof. Evidence of recovery was not corroborated by credible witnesses, and procedural flaws were evident. Moreover, forensic analysis of the weapon and empties raised doubts due to irregularities in their handling and documentation. ----Cited Cases: Mian Khalid Perviz v. The State through Special Prosecutor ANF and another (2021 SCMR 522) Muhammad Tasaweer v. Hafiz Zulkarnain and 2 others (PLD 2009 SC 53) (e) Investigation by Unauthorized Officer—Validity: ----Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Police Act, 2017, S. 26(3). The investigation was conducted by an officer (Head Constable) who lacked the requisite legal authority to investigate a murder case. Under the Police Act, cases of murder must be investigated by an officer not below the rank of Sub-Inspector. The investigation by an unauthorized officer vitiated the credibility of the prosecution's case. (f) Criminal Law—Benefit of Doubt—Acquittal: ----General Principles of Criminal Law. The court reiterated the principle that benefit of doubt must always be extended to the accused as a matter of right and not as a concession. The prosecution failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, and multiple inconsistencies created significant doubts. Consequently, the appellant was acquitted. ----Cited Cases: Maqsood Ahmad v. The State and others (2017 MLD 1415) Mukhtiar Hussain v. The State (2017 MLD 745) Pirzada alias Peer v. The State (2017 PCr.LJ 605) ----Disposition: Appeal allowed. Conviction and sentences set aside. Appellant acquitted and ordered to be released forthwith if not required in any other case.