Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860) – S. 302(b) – Qatl-e-Amd –– Dying Declaration –– Ocular Testimony –– Death Sentence Confirmed Accused was convicted under Section 302(b) PPC for the murder of Umair Sarwar and sentenced to death with compensation under Section 544-A Cr.P.C.––The incident occurred in broad daylight, witnessed by Muhammad Usman (PW-12), the deceased’s cousin––Deceased returned to his father in injured condition and clearly named the accused, constituting a dying declaration––Dying declaration held credible as it was made without influence, immediately after the occurrence, and in a conscious state––Held, dying declaration before a private person (father of deceased) is admissible and carries substantial weight––Ocular account of eyewitness supported by medical evidence and recovery of weapon––Prosecution’s case corroborated by (i) postmortem showing firearm injury leading to death due to ruptured lung and liver, (ii) recovery of 30-bore pistol at accused's instance, (iii) ballistic report matching crime empty with weapon, and (iv) positive human blood match with earth sample at scene––No contradiction or material omission found in prosecution evidence despite cross-examination––Conviction upheld––Death sentence confirmed. ----Relied on: Muhammad Saeed & another v. The State, 2024 SCMR 1421 Ijaz Ahmad v. The State, 2009 SCMR 99 Muhammad Latif v. The State, PLD 2008 SC 503 (b) Evidence –– Related Witnesses –– Interested Witness Rule –– Scope and Caution: Mere relationship of witness with the deceased does not render testimony untrustworthy––Witnesses must be shown to have motive for false implication to be deemed interested––Held, Muhammad Usman (eyewitness) and Ghulam Sarwar (father of deceased) deposed truthfully with no material contradiction––Their relationship did not discredit them in absence of animus––Ocular testimony was consistent, natural, and confidence-inspiring. ----Cited Cases: Sharafat Ali v. The State, 1999 SCMR 329 Saeed Akhtar v. The State, 2000 SCMR 383 Sheraz Tufail v. The State, 2007 SCMR 518 (c) Criminal Law –– Circumstantial Evidence –– Forensic Corroboration –– Ballistic and Blood Reports: Recovery of 30-bore pistol at accused’s instance––Matched with crime empty through positive NFSA report (Ex. PT)––Blood-stained earth from the scene matched human blood per PFSA Lahore report (Ex. PU)––Medical evidence (Ex. PR, PS) consistent with prosecution narrative––Deceased received chest shot, declared dead within minutes––Held, forensic reports corroborated ocular and circumstantial evidence––Conviction supported beyond doubt. (d) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss. 342, 340(2) –– Statement of Accused –– Burden of Rebuttal –– Failure to Present Defence: Accused denied allegations in statement under Section 342 Cr.P.C but neither opted to testify under Section 340(2) Cr.P.C nor produced defence evidence––Held, mere denial without evidence does not rebut prosecution's case, especially when unshaken by cross-examination––Trial Court rightly discarded bald denial. ----Disposition: Jail Appeal No. 460 of 2023: Dismissed. Murder Reference No. 27 of 2023: Answered in the affirmative. Death sentence confirmed.

Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860) ----S. 302(b)---Qatl-i-Amd---Conviction on circumstantial evidence---Standard of proof---Duty of court---Prosecution’s case was based entirely on circumstantial evidence including the recovery of a knife, a video clip, and statements of non-eye-witnesses---Court held that in cases resting on circumstantial evidence, the chain of circumstances must be complete, unbroken, and directly connect the accused with the crime---If any link is missing or inconclusive, conviction cannot be sustained---Reference made to Imran alias Dullay v. The State (2015 SCMR 155), Azeem Khan v. Mujahid Khan (2016 SCMR 274), and Hashim Qasim v. The State (2017 SCMR 986). (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ----S. 164---Confessional statement---Legal requirements---Inadmissibility---Statement of co-accused recorded after 11 days of arrest, without reflection period, and without removal of handcuffs---Court held that delay, custodial torture, and absence of legal safeguards rendered the statement involuntary and inadmissible---Further held that the co-accused became a witness of an alleged extra-judicial confession of the appellant, but was wrongly treated as an accused instead of being made a prosecution witness. **(c) Qatl-i-Amd---Medical evidence---Conflict between cause of death and alleged weapon---Doctor opined death due to cardiorespiratory arrest, not specifically caused by sharp or bullet wounds---Injuries listed included deep lacerations and cuts, yet medico-legal certificate ambiguously suggested use of both bullet and sharp weapons without clarity---Such medical inconsistency cast serious doubt on prosecution’s version and weakened evidentiary value of the recovery of knife. **(d) Law of Evidence---Forensic Report---Bloodstained weapon---Absence of blood group match---Knife recovered from the appellant was stained with human blood but FSL report did not confirm it matched deceased’s blood---Court held that mere recovery of bloodstained weapon without forensic linkage to the victim is not sufficient to establish guilt---Relied on Khalid Javed v. The State (2003 SCMR 1419), Hamid Nadeem v. The State (2011 SCMR 1233), and Naveed Asghar v. The State (PLD 2021 SC 600). (e) Penal Code (XLV of 1860) ----S. 13-E---Recovery of knife---Court observed that while the recovery may constitute an offence under the Arms Ordinance, it cannot be considered substantive proof for murder without corroborative forensic evidence. **(f) Criminal Trial---Benefit of doubt---Failure to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt---Prosecution failed to establish motive, chain of events, or forensic linkage conclusively---Confessional statement inadmissible, video clip not verified, and medical report contradictory---Court found material gaps in prosecution's case and held that conviction based on such weak circumstantial evidence was unsafe. (g) Disposition Appeal allowed. Conviction and sentence of the appellant under S. 302(b) PPC by the Trial Court were set aside. Appellant was acquitted and ordered to be released forthwith if not required in any other case.

Summary: Penal Code (Section 302(b)) – Homicide – Conviction based on circumstantial evidence. In cases of homicide where direct evidence is unavailable, a conviction can be based on circumstantial evidence if the prosecution establishes a chain of evidence that conclusively points to the accused's guilt. In this case, the appellant was convicted of murdering his wife based on extra-judicial confession, medical evidence indicating asphyxia with poisoning, and recovery of intoxicant tablets. (See: Muhammad Sharif v. The State (2021 SCMR 879), Ashfaq Ahmad v. The State (2020 SCMR 1258)) ------ 2. Circumstantial evidence – Extra-judicial confession as a link in the chain. An extra-judicial confession is weak evidence on its own but gains probative value when corroborated by other material evidence. The appellant's confession to the murder before independent witnesses provided a strong link in the prosecution's chain of circumstantial evidence. (See: Muhammad Sharif v. The State (2021 SCMR 879), The State v. Manzoor Ahmad (2020 SCMR 1202)) ------ 3. Medical evidence – Confirmation of unnatural death – Asphyxia with poisoning. The medical examination revealed black marks on the victim’s neck consistent with asphyxia, and toxicology reports confirmed lethal levels of lorazepam in her liver. This evidence corroborated the prosecution’s case of poisoning followed by strangulation. (See: Muhammad Aslam v. The State (2019 SCMR 890)) ------ 4. Forensic evidence – Recovery of intoxicants – Corroboration of intent. The recovery of empty lorazepam strips from the crime scene and a full packet from the appellant’s possession, corroborated by forensic evidence, was pivotal. Forensic reports matched the lorazepam levels found in the deceased's body to the tablets recovered from the appellant. (See: Muhammad Akram v. The State (2019 SCMR 249)) ------ 5. Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 (Article 122) – Burden of proof – Fact within special knowledge. When a crime is committed in the privacy of a home, the burden shifts to the person with exclusive access to explain the circumstances of the crime. The appellant failed to provide a plausible explanation for his wife’s death, which occurred in their shared bedroom. (See: Ashfaq Ahmad v. The State (2020 SCMR 1258), Raza v. The State (2020 SCMR 1185)) ------ 6. Motive – Removal of spouse for marriage with another. The appellant's intention to marry his sister-in-law, obstructed by his wife, was established as the motive for the murder. Witnesses corroborated this motive, and it was further substantiated by the appellant’s initial confession to law enforcement. (See: Nadeem Zafar v. The State (2017 SCMR 1182)) ------ 7. Sentencing – Death sentence reduced to life imprisonment – Caution in circumstantial cases. In cases based solely on circumstantial evidence, courts exercise caution when awarding the death penalty. Here, the absence of direct evidence warranted commuting the death sentence to life imprisonment. (See: Ghulam Mohy-ud-Din alias Haji Babu v. The State (2014 SCMR 1034), Mir Muhammad alias Miro v. The State (2009 SCMR 1188)) ------ 8. First plea as admissible evidence. The appellant’s initial admission during investigation, under Article 27 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, was admissible and supported the prosecution’s case. Such statements are considered relevant for showing intent and the state of mind of the accused. (See: Raza v. The State (2020 SCMR 1185)) ------ 9. Judicial principles – Ensuring justice – Role of circumstantial evidence. The court underscored that while safeguarding innocent individuals from punishment is paramount, it is equally crucial to ensure that a guilty person does not evade justice. Circumstantial evidence, when satisfactorily established, can fulfill this dual responsibility. (See: Muhammad Ashraf v. The State (2021 SCMR 987)) ------ Outcome: Appeal dismissed. The conviction under Section 302(b) PPC was upheld; however, the death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment due to the caution required in circumstantial cases. Murder Reference No. 215 of 2019 answered in the negative. Death sentence not confirmed. Compensation under Section 544-A Cr.P.C. and other penalties remained intact, with the appellant granted benefit under Section 382-B Cr.P.C.

Summary: Acquittal granted----(a) Criminal Law—Circumstantial Evidence—Standard of Proof: ----Pakistan Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302(b), 468, 471; Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance (VI of 1979), S. 17(4); Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Arms Act, 2013, Ss. 15 & 19; Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, Art. 71. Accused was charged and convicted under various provisions of the Pakistan Penal Code, the Hudood Ordinance, and the Arms Act for murder, forgery, and illegal possession of arms. The case relied entirely on circumstantial evidence, including last-seen testimony, call data records, identification parade, and recoveries. The Federal Shariat Court held that circumstantial evidence must form an unbroken chain pointing unequivocally towards the guilt of the accused. Any missing link in the chain renders the evidence unreliable. In the instant case, serious discrepancies were noted in the collection, presentation, and corroboration of circumstantial evidence. Delays in recording witness statements, failure to follow protocols in the identification parade, contradictions in call data records, and absence of credible corroboration undermined the prosecution's case. Suspicion, however strong, cannot replace proof in criminal cases. -----Cited Cases: Ibrahim and others v. The State (2009 SCMR 407) Imran alias Dully and another v. The State and others (2015 SCMR 155) Hashim Qasim and another v. The State (2017 SCMR 986) Yasin alias Ghulam Mustafa v. The State (2008 SCMR 336) (b) Criminal Law—Hearsay Evidence—Admissibility: ----Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, Art. 71. The supplementary statement of a witness implicating the accused was deemed inadmissible as it amounted to hearsay. The witness admitted that his knowledge about the accused's involvement was derived from information provided by investigation officials. Hearsay evidence, unless corroborated by direct evidence, cannot be relied upon for conviction. The court emphasized that only direct evidence, as stipulated under Article 71 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, is admissible. ----Cited Cases: Muhammad Azam and another v. Khalid Mehmood and another (2013 PCr.LJ 36) Sajjan Solangi v. The State (2019 SCMR 872) (c) Criminal Law—Identification Parade—Legal Requirements: ----Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss. 161, 164; Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, Art. 40. Identification parade proceedings were marred by procedural irregularities, including the accused being exposed to witnesses prior to the parade, absence of details regarding dummies, and failure to verify police custody duration. The Magistrate failed to record essential findings and verify compliance with prescribed procedures. The court held that such irregularities render the identification parade unreliable. -----Cited Cases: Muhammad Ayaz and others v. The State (2011 SCMR 769) Imran Ashraf and 7 others v. The State (2001 SCMR 424) (d) Criminal Law—Recovery Evidence—Admissibility and Corroboration: ----Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss. 161, 164; Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, Art. 40. Recovery of incriminating articles, including the weapon of offence and vehicle, failed to meet the required standard of proof. Evidence of recovery was not corroborated by credible witnesses, and procedural flaws were evident. Moreover, forensic analysis of the weapon and empties raised doubts due to irregularities in their handling and documentation. ----Cited Cases: Mian Khalid Perviz v. The State through Special Prosecutor ANF and another (2021 SCMR 522) Muhammad Tasaweer v. Hafiz Zulkarnain and 2 others (PLD 2009 SC 53) (e) Investigation by Unauthorized Officer—Validity: ----Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Police Act, 2017, S. 26(3). The investigation was conducted by an officer (Head Constable) who lacked the requisite legal authority to investigate a murder case. Under the Police Act, cases of murder must be investigated by an officer not below the rank of Sub-Inspector. The investigation by an unauthorized officer vitiated the credibility of the prosecution's case. (f) Criminal Law—Benefit of Doubt—Acquittal: ----General Principles of Criminal Law. The court reiterated the principle that benefit of doubt must always be extended to the accused as a matter of right and not as a concession. The prosecution failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, and multiple inconsistencies created significant doubts. Consequently, the appellant was acquitted. ----Cited Cases: Maqsood Ahmad v. The State and others (2017 MLD 1415) Mukhtiar Hussain v. The State (2017 MLD 745) Pirzada alias Peer v. The State (2017 PCr.LJ 605) ----Disposition: Appeal allowed. Conviction and sentences set aside. Appellant acquitted and ordered to be released forthwith if not required in any other case.

Summary: Acquittal granted----(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860): ----Ss. 302(b), 387, 404 & 34; Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 544-A; Benefit of doubt Murder, extortion, and misappropriation of property—Benefit of doubt—The appellants were convicted under Sections 302(b), 387, and 404 PPC for the murder of a security guard, Muhammad Hussain, along with alleged extortion and misappropriation of property—The prosecution relied on circumstantial evidence, extra-judicial confessions, and recoveries—Held, medical evidence was inconsistent with ocular testimony, particularly regarding the timeline of death and post-mortem findings—Extra-judicial confessions lacked credibility as they were not recorded before a Magistrate under Section 164 Cr.P.C., and recovery of cash and pistol remained doubtful—CCTV footage evidence was unreliable due to the accused's faces being muffled and lack of verification of sources—Prosecution failed to establish safe custody of recovered items and connection between recoveries and the alleged crime—Investigative lapses, contradictions in witness testimonies, and failure to corroborate circumstantial evidence with concrete proof created reasonable doubt—In criminal cases, benefit of doubt must be extended to the accused as a matter of right and not grace. ----Cited Case: Tariq Pervaiz v. The State 1995 SCMR 1345 (b) Criminal Evidence: ----Circumstantial evidence; Burden of proof—Principles governing circumstantial evidence—Prosecution relied heavily on circumstantial evidence to prove guilt—Held, circumstantial evidence must form an unbroken chain leading to a single conclusion of guilt without any plausible alternative explanation—Inconsistencies in witness accounts, contradictions between medical and ocular evidence, and failure to produce supporting witnesses from CCTV footage origins weakened the prosecution case—Recovery of incriminating articles, including cash and a pistol, lacked credibility and chain of custody—The trial court failed to address these deficiencies. ----Cited Case: Tariq Pervaiz v. The State 1995 SCMR 1345 (c) Administration of Justice: ----Burden on prosecution; Standard of proof—In criminal cases, the burden is always on the prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt—Minor or substantial doubts arising from inconsistencies or weak circumstantial evidence must be resolved in favor of the accused—Trial court’s reliance on flawed circumstantial evidence and unsupported recoveries amounted to a miscarriage of justice. ---Disposition: Appeal allowed—Conviction and sentence set aside—Appellants acquitted of all charges—Appellants ordered to be released forthwith unless required in any other case.

Summary: i. As in case of circumstantial evidence, the prosecution is under the bounden duty to collect the reliable pieces, to place them together, to shape and design, artistically, which under all circumstances must produce an organic whole. We do admit that the manner in which the unfortunate deceased was killed and disposed of, finds no match, but we as a court of law must not be influenced from the manner in which the brutality was committed, but we must be positive in our approach to the evidence on file and the recorded statement.ii. There is no cavil with the preposition that the confessional statement is either to be accepted or rejected in totality, and that cheery picking is not permissible. If we wish to accept the confessional statement in totality, then it is exculpatory and that no positive liability is accepted by its maker.iii. Now we are to determine that once the confessional statement was found exculpatory and that once its maker excluded himself from the liability, whether in that eventuality the same can be pressed into service for the conviction of the co-accused. The law is settled that the confessional statement of an accused can be taken as a circumstantial evidence against his co-accused, who is on joint trial, but once the same is disbelieved to the extent of its maker then under no circumstance the same can be pressed into service, more particularly, for the conviction of the co-accused.iv. The prosecution case is based upon the circumstantial evidence and no independent witness came forward to claim the witnessing of incident, so the investigating officer and the prosecution was under the obligation to search and collect independent pieces of evidence and then to reunite these pieces in such a manner that a chain could be formed, so that its one end would touch the body of the deceased and the other the neck of the accused/appellants, but unfortunately, the prosecution could not succeed in creating a well built chain.v. When the chain is broken and the link is missing, then liabilities cannot be fixed and convictions cannot be awarded. In this particular case, we are confirmed that the links are missing and the chain is broken.

Summary: Criminal Appeal.Held:(i). There is no cavil to the proposition that believing or disbelieving a witness dependsupon the intrinsic value of the statement made by the witness and there is no universalprinciple that in every case, interested witness should be disbelieved or disinterestedwitnesses be believed, rather it depends upon the rule of prudence and reasonablenessto hold that a particular witness was present on the scene of crime and that he ismaking a true statement. What is relevant is what statement has been given and it is notthe person, but the statement of that person, which is to be seen and adjudged.(ii). As on one hand, case of the prosecution has independently been proved throughdying declaration, trustworthy ocular account coupled with the collected evidence onrecord, whereas, on the other, we cannot lose sight of the fact that besides the recoveryweapon of offence, the crime empties and spent bullet recovered from the spot havebeen found to be that of .30 & 9mm bores, which aspect suggests the offence to be thejob of two assailants. In the given circumstances, we hold that mere acquittal in theconnected case under section l5-AA cannot be taken as a sole ground for acquittal inthe murder case, more particularly, when the charges have independently been provedthrough trustworthy evidence like ocular account, dying declaration, and other evidencewhich inspires confidence as is the case before us.(iii). True that medical evidence is confirmatory in nature and that alone is not sufficientfor conviction of an accused charged, but equally true that when the prosecutionotherwise succeeds in bringing on record strong evidence in its favour, then medicalevidence can be read and considered in aid of the collected evidence. The locale,number, and nature of injuries on person of the deceased then injured coupled with theweapons used in perpetrating the offence are in line with the dying declaration, ocularaccount as well as the collected evidence and, therefore, the medical evidence lendsfull support to the prosecution case.(IV). It was vehemently argued that dying declaration is a weak kind of evidence and ishardly sufficient for the conviction of an accused charged, but we are afraid that thedefence went wrong while asking our indulgence in its favour. It has never been heldthat the declaration of a dying man merits no consideration, but instead, much care isadvised and for the purpose, precautionary measures were asked while relying uponsuch a statement. If we say that it is a weak type of evidence, it does not mean that ithas lost sanctity as in that eventuality, we will commit an error, which is hard to berectified. The legislature was fully conscious of its importance, that's why its glimpsescan be seen in the erstwhile Evidence Act, 1872 in the form of section 22, which wasimplanted in the shape of Article 46 in the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984.(V). We are cognizant of the fact that failure to prove motive is a factor to be consideredagainst the prosecution, but it is not the rule of thumb that in every case, if prosecutionfails to prove motive, it would automatically lead to acquittal of accused charged, ratherthe failure is not always fatal to prosecution, more particularly, when the charge isotherwise proved through trustworthy evidence as is the case in hand. Such failure may,however, react upon the quantum of sentence on a capital charge.(Criminal Appeal Dismissed).

Summary: Principles of when and in what circumstancial evidence of an injured eyewitness is to be relied upon ''In the Peshawar High Court, Cr.A.No.1154 of 2018 was heard on 03.11.2022, involving appellants convicted under sections 302(b), 427 PPC in a case originating from FIR No.27 dated 30.10.2012. The judgment also addresses Cr.R No.170-P of 2018 related to sentence enhancement. The deceased, Baz Muhammad, reported being fired upon by appellants Manzoor and Ayaz, leading to his death. The appellant's uncle, Fida Muhammad, testified as a key eyewitness. The judgment raises concerns about the lack of corroboration in Fida Muhammad's testimony, emphasizing the need for independent evidence to support related witness accounts. It questions the reliability of the eyewitness due to his conduct, leaving the critically injured deceased alone in the hospital. The judgment points out discrepancies, including the absence of an FSL report and the non-production of an essential witness, Sher Afsar. Concluding that the trial court did not appreciate the evidence correctly, the judgment allows the appeal, setting aside the conviction and sentence. The appellants are acquitted, and the related criminal revision for sentence enhancement is dismissed as infructuous.

Summary: Background: The case involves the conviction of an individual (appellant) for the murder of a person (deceased) who was reported missing by their sibling (complainant). After the deceased’s disappearance, suspicion fell on the appellant and others, leading to an FIR being registered. During the investigation, the appellant allegedly led the police to the recovery of the dead body. The trial court convicted the appellant under section 302(b) PPC and sentenced them to death, while co-accused individuals were acquitted. The appellant challenged the conviction, while the complainant sought to overturn the acquittal of the co-accused. -----Issues: 1- Whether the circumstantial evidence, including the recovery of the dead body and other items, was sufficient to convict the appellant. ----2- Whether the DNA report, postmortem findings, and other forensic evidence credibly linked the appellant to the murder. ----3- Whether the motive presented by the prosecution was supported by sufficient evidence. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --Circumstantial Evidence: The court determined that the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution was insufficient. The recovery of the dead body from the graveyard could not be solely attributed to the appellant’s exclusive knowledge, as the police and other parties had prior information about the location. --DNA and Postmortem Reports: The DNA report was deemed unreliable due to a broken chain of custody for the forensic samples. The postmortem report failed to conclusively determine the cause or time of death, and the doctor’s testimony was considered unreliable. --The prosecution’s motive theory, based on family grievances, lacked sufficient supporting evidence. The defense introduced alternate explanations for the conflict, raising doubts about the prosecution’s version of events. Due to inconsistencies in the prosecution’s case, the court held that the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt had not been met. The court allowed the appellant’s appeal, acquitted them, and ordered their immediate release. The complainant's appeal to overturn the acquittal of the co-accused was dismissed, and the death sentence was not confirmed. -----Citations/Precedents: R v. Taylor, Weaver, and Donavan (1928) 21 Cr App Rep 20 (CA) R v. Exall (1866) 4 F & F 922 DPP v. Kilbourne [1973] AC 729 Lejzor Teper v. The Queen (PLD 1952 Privy Council 119) Zahid Hussain v. The Crown (PLD 1954 Lah. 710 (DB)) Ali Muhammad v. Crown (PLD 1953 BJ 17) The State v. Manzoor Ahmed (PLD 1966 Supreme Court 664) Allah Ditta v. The Crown (1969 SCMR 558) Muhammad Arshad v. The State (1992 SCMR 1187) Hamid Mahmood and another v. The State (2013 SCMR 1314) Fayaz Ahmed v. The State (2017 SCMR 2026) Gul Muhammad and others v. The State (2021 SCMR 381) Naveed Asghar and 2 others v. The State (PLD 2021 Supreme Court 600) Muhammad Ismail and others v. The State (2017 SCMR 898) Azeem Khan and another v. Mujahid Khan and others (2016 SCMR 274) Akhtar v. The State (2020 SCMR 2020)

Summary: 1. Whenever there is a conflict in the ocular and medical evidence from the tentative assessment, then a benefit of such conflict has to be given to the accused even at bail stage.