Summary: Cancellation of Bail set aside ---(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ---Ss. 435, 439 & 497(5)---Cancellation of bail---Principles governing cancellation of bail---Addition of new sections to invoke the prohibitory clause---Scope Petitioner challenged the order of the Additional Sessions Judge, Islamabad (West), whereby post-arrest bail granted to him in FIR No. 496, dated 28.07.2023, under Sections 420, 468, 471, 381, and 34, PPC, was recalled on the ground that Section 467, PPC was later added, bringing the case under the prohibitory clause of Section 497, Cr.P.C. The court noted that the investigation officer (I.O) had not included Section 467, PPC in the remand applications but subsequently added it after the grant of bail, which was not disclosed before the Magistrate. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Muhammad Tanveer v. The State (PLD 2017 SC 733) held that bail cannot be cancelled merely due to the addition of a new section if the prosecution’s conduct indicates mala fide intent. Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Saeed Ullah v. The State (2023 SCMR 1397) laid down that bail may only be cancelled in exceptional circumstances, such as misuse of bail, interference with prosecution evidence, or likelihood of absconding. The court found that none of these grounds were present, and the prosecution’s act of adding a new section post-bail to bring the case under the prohibitory clause was an attempt to misuse the legal process. Consequently, the cancellation of bail by the Additional Sessions Judge was declared unjustified, and the recall order was set aside. ----- Cited Cases: Muhammad Tanveer v. The State (PLD 2017 SC 733) Saeed Ullah v. The State (2023 SCMR 1397) Muzafar Iqbal v. Muhammad Imran Aziz (2004 SCMR 231) The State v. Muhammad Sarwar (2017 SCMR 1993) ----- Disposition: Revision petition accepted—Cancellation of bail set aside—Bail order restored as its recall was based on mala fide and procedural impropriety.

Summary: Bail granted --- (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----Ss. 497(1), 497(2), 498---- Pre-arrest bail—Rule of consistency—Judicial discretion in bail matters. Petitioner was accused of purchasing stolen goods from co-accused who worked in the complainant’s factory, allegedly causing a loss of approximately two and a half crore rupees—Co-accused, including the principal accused, were granted post-arrest bail—Petitioner was denied pre-arrest bail by the Lahore High Court—Supreme Court held that the considerations for pre-arrest and post-arrest bail are distinct but not absolute, and where an accused would be entitled to post-arrest bail following arrest, the denial of pre-arrest bail would serve no legal purpose—Court reaffirmed that bail in non-prohibitory offenses is the rule, and refusal is an exception, emphasizing the fundamental right to liberty—Reliance placed on Muhammad Ramzan v. Zafarullah (1986 SCMR 1380), Kazim Ali v. The State (2021 SCMR 2086), Muhammad Kashif Iqbal v. The State (2022 SCMR 821), and Javed Iqbal v. The State (2022 SCMR 1424)—Pre-arrest bail granted. (b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---- ----Ss. 381, 411---- Applicability of theft and receiving stolen property charges—Evaluation of allegations. Petitioner was not an employee of the complainant, thus the applicability of S. 381, PPC (theft by servant) was questionable—Only allegation against petitioner was purchasing stolen goods from co-accused, which falls under S. 411, PPC (dishonestly receiving stolen property)—Supreme Court noted that the entire transaction allegedly occurred over four years, yet the FIR was lodged with a delay of 13 days without explanation—Court held that mere financial loss, no matter how substantial, does not automatically justify denial of bail—Since S. 411, PPC carries a maximum punishment of three years and falls outside the prohibitory clause of S. 497(1), CrPC, the accused was entitled to bail. (c) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Art. 185(3)---- Scope of Supreme Court’s jurisdiction—Binding effect of precedent. Petitioner invoked Art. 185(3) of the Constitution to challenge the Lahore High Court’s denial of pre-arrest bail—Supreme Court reiterated that it has the authority to correct lower courts' misapplication of bail principles—Court reaffirmed its precedents that pre-arrest bail can be granted where the accused is prima facie entitled to post-arrest bail upon arrest—Court emphasized that personal liberty cannot be curtailed arbitrarily, especially in non-prohibitory offenses—Lower courts must ensure that bail decisions align with Supreme Court precedents to prevent wrongful detention. (d) Bail Conditions & Judicial Safeguards---- ----S. 498, CrPC---- Pre-arrest bail granted—Requirement of bail bond and surety—Legal safeguards. Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court’s order, and granted pre-arrest bail—Petitioner directed to furnish bail bonds of Rs. 200,000/- with one surety—Court reaffirmed that bail does not mean acquittal, and the trial court retains authority to decide the case on merits—Observations in the bail order were tentative and not binding on the trial court—Court emphasized that prosecution retains the right to seek bail cancellation if the petitioner misuses the concession. Disposition: Appeal allowed—High Court’s order set aside—Pre-arrest bail granted. Petitioner admitted to bail subject to furnishing surety of Rs. 200,000/-. Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle that pre-arrest bail may be granted where post-arrest bail would inevitably follow. Liberty of an accused cannot be restricted arbitrarily—Mere financial loss is not a sufficient ground to deny bail. Trial court to proceed without being influenced by observations in the bail order.

Summary: Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-------S. 381-A---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss. 35 & 397---Theft of vehicle---Appreciation of evidence---Conviction for several offences at one trial---Concurrentcommutation of sentence---Accused was charged for stealing the cars of differentcomplainants---Said cases were tried and accused was convicted and sentenced in both thecases---Accused contended that the sentences awarded to him might be ordered to runconcurrently as required under Ss. 35 & 397, Cr.P.C.---Validity---Section 35, Cr.P.C.,described that when a person was convicted at one trial of two or more offences, the TrialCourt was obliged to sentence him for approved offences, according to the separatepunishments prescribed---Such punish-ments when consisting of imprisonment wouldcommence one after the expiry of the other, unless the court directed that such punishmentswould run concurrently, meaning thereby that the sentences of imprisonment in two or moreoffences tried at one trial would run consecutively---Direction that such punishment wouldrun concurrently was an exception---Provision of S.35, Cr.P.C. was only applicable when aperson was convicted at one trial of two or more offences---Court under said section coulddirect a concurrent running of sentences only when the accused was convicted at one trial oftwo or more distinct offences---In the present case, both the offences were committed withdistinct and separate criminal objectives sought to be achieved at different points of time, assuch, justification to seek concurrent running of all the offences, in particular circumstances,did not arise at all---Section 397, Cr.P.C., prescribed for the running of different sentencesinflicted on an offender, at separate trials, for different offences, without any clog of time,place and nature of the offence---Section 35, Cr.P.C., enjoined that it would come into playwhen a person was convicted at one trial of two or more offences---Since direction under S.35 of the Cr.P.C. was contingent on the conviction of a person for several offences at onetrial, as such, said section did not attract in the circumstances of the present case, because theaccused had been convicted at different trials for the offences committed at different timesand places---Trial Court had ample discretion under S.397, Cr.P.C., to direct the subsequentand previous sentence of imprisonment to run concurrently, however, the Trial Court seizedof the subsequent trial and the appellate/revisional court in appeal/revision arising there-fromwas competent to direct that the subsequent conviction and sentence would run concurrentlywith previous one---Appeals were dismissed, in circumstances, however, all the sentences awarded to the accused were directed to run concurrently.Mst. Zubaida v. Falak Sher and others 2007 SCMR 548; Mst. Shaista Bibi andanother v. Superintendent, Central Jail, Mach and 2 others PLD 2015 SC 15; Sajjad Ikranand others v. Sikandar Hayat and others 2016 SCMR 467 and Rahib Ali v. State 2018 SCMR418 rel.

Summary: #NAME?

Summary: S.381-A,419,420,411 PPC, 14 FAIllegal stay, prima facie connected with commission offence (Bail dismissed)

Summary: Bail granted ---- The petitioner sought post-arrest bail in connection with FIR No. 116, dated 17.02.2014, registered under Section 381-A of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) at Police Station Margalla, Islamabad. The case involved the theft of a motorcycle from the vicinity of Bahria University on 14.02.2014. The complainant alleged the motorcycle was stolen by unknown individuals. The petitioner was subsequently arrested, and the stolen motorcycle was recovered, allegedly in his possession. ------ Issues: ------ 1) Does the evidence provided by the prosecution justify continued detention of the petitioner? ------ 2) Does the case fall under the prohibitory clause of Section 497 Cr.PC, justifying denial of bail? ------ Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: Evidence of Theft: The court noted that the prosecution failed to provide any direct evidence linking the petitioner to the theft. The only evidence relied upon was the recovery of the stolen motorcycle, which was later identified by the complainant. ------ Nature of the Offense: The court observed that the recovery of the motorcycle may constitute an offense under Section 411 PPC (dishonestly receiving stolen property), which carries a maximum punishment of three years. Since the offense does not fall under the prohibitory clause of Section 497 Cr.PC, bail could be considered. ------ Petitioner’s Circumstances: The petitioner had been in custody since his arrest and was no longer required for further investigation. The lack of substantive evidence and the applicability of Section 411 PPC made the case fit for bail. ------ Outcome: The court granted bail, directing the petitioner to furnish bail bonds of Rs. 100,000/- with PR bonds in the same amount to the satisfaction of the trial court.

Summary: Section 381-4 PPC carried maximum punishment of seven years and did not fall within the prohibitory clause of S.497 Cr.P.C ---- Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-------S. 497---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S.381-A---Theft of a car or other motor vehicles---Bail, grant of---Further inquiry---Offence under S.381-4, P.P.C. carried maximumpunishment of seven years and did not fall within prohibitory clause of S.497, Cr.P.C.---Case against accused required further inquiry---Interim bail granted to accusedwas confirmed.

Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860) ----Ss. 299 to 338---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 203-F---Repugnancy to Injunctions of Islam---Offences against human body---Provisions of Ss. 299 to 338, Penal Code, dealing with offences against human body, held repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam as they: (a) do not provide for Qisas in cases of Qatl-al-Amd (deliberate murder) and Jurh-al-Amd (deliberate hurt) as prescribed by the Holy Qur'an and Sunnah; (b) lack provision for Diyat in cases of Shibh-ul-Amd and Khata for both murder and hurt; (c) do not recognize Sulh (compromise) between parties based on agreed compensation in cases of Qatl and Jurh; (d) fail to allow the offender to be pardoned by the victim or heirs in cases of Jurh or Qatl, respectively; (e) do not exempt non-pubert or insane offenders from the death penalty in murder cases; (f) do not define distinct categories of Qatl and Jurh with their prescribed punishments according to Islamic injunctions. (b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860) ----S. 109---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 203-F---Repugnancy to Injunctions of Islam---Provision of S. 109, making abettors liable to the same punishment as the principal offender regardless of varying degrees of abetment, held repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam. (c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860) and Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ----S. 54, Ss. 401-402-B---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 203-F---Repugnancy to Injunctions of Islam---Provisions empowering the Central or Provincial Governments to commute the death sentence in cases of Qatl-al-Amd or Jurh-ul-Amd are repugnant to Islamic injunctions, as they violate Huqooq-ul-Ibad (rights of individuals). (d) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ----S. 345---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 203-F---Repugnancy to Injunctions of Islam---Provision restricting the composition of offences to specified offences against the person, held repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam. (e) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ----S. 381---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 203-F---Repugnancy to Injunctions of Islam---Failure to allow heirs of a murder victim to pardon the offender or enter into a compromise, even at the last moment before execution, held repugnant to Islamic injunctions. (f) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ----Ss. 337 to 339-A---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 203-F---Repugnancy to Injunctions of Islam---Provisions allowing tender of pardon to an offender without consulting the victim or heirs of the victim in cases of Qatl or Jurh, held repugnant to Islamic injunctions. (g) Evidence Act (I of 1872) ----S. 133---Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, Art. 16---Repugnancy to Injunctions of Islam---Section 133 of the Evidence Act, prescribing conditions for using uncorroborated testimony of accomplices, is no longer applicable due to its repeal by the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984. ------ Disposition: The provisions declared repugnant to Islamic injunctions shall cease to have effect from 23rd March 1990. Appeals relating to personal grievances dismissed or referred to appropriate forums. Remaining appeals partially allowed as per findings on specific provisions.

Summary: Bail granted ---- The petitioner, sought post-arrest bail in connection with an FIR filed against him, accusing him of forgery, criminal breach of trust, and fraudulent transactions during his tenure as CEO of a joint venture management committee (JVMC). He was alleged to have issued 37 cheques totaling Rs. 1,468,100,000 to a third party without proper authorization, executed fraudulent agreements, and filed a civil suit with a forged power of attorney. ----- Issues: ----- 1) Whether the alleged offenses under Sections 420, 468, 471, 408, and 381 PPC justify the continued detention of the petitioner. ----- 2) Whether the conditions for granting bail are met, particularly in cases involving forgery and breach of trust. ----- Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: Forgery Allegations: The court noted that the allegations of forgery had not yet been confirmed through a handwriting expert’s analysis, and the agreements did not contain any forged signatures. Further, the petitioner only countersigned the agreement in question, with another party primarily responsible for the transaction. Hence, the court found no concrete evidence of forgery at this stage. ----- Criminal Breach of Trust: The court observed that the funds in question came from the account of Bahria Town Pvt. Ltd., not from the Defense Housing Authority (DHA). As a result, the petitioner had no dominion over DHA funds, a key requirement for a charge under Section 408 PPC. ----- Applicability of Bail: The court emphasized that offenses under Sections 420 and 471 PPC are bailable and that non-bailable offenses under Sections 408 and 468 PPC do not attract the prohibitory clause of Section 497 Cr.P.C., as they carry a maximum sentence of seven years. Citing the precedent of Tariq Bashir v. The State, the court highlighted that bail is the norm in cases where the prohibitory clause does not apply. ----- No Exceptional Grounds for Denial of Bail: The court found no exceptional circumstances, such as risk of absconding, repeating the offense, or tampering with evidence, that would justify refusing bail. The petitioner had no criminal antecedents, and the evidence was primarily documentary, reducing the likelihood of interference with the investigation. ----- Conclusion: The court granted post-arrest bail to the petitioner, subject to furnishing bail bonds worth Rs. 50,000,000, along with two sureties of the same amount. ----- Citations/Precedents: Tariq Bashir and 05 others v. The State (PLD 1995 SC 34) Subhan Khan v. The State (2002 SCMR 1797) Muhammad Tanveer v. The State and another (PLD 2017 SC 733) Saeed Ahmad v. The State (1996 SCMR 1132)