Summary: Article 13 and 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. Sections 500/505/120-B/124A, PPC, 7 ATA.ii) Quashment of second FIR of the same incident registered in another district on video of the same incident gone viral on Social Media.iii) After registration of one FIR every second/other version of the same incident shall be considered as a statement recorded u/s 161 Cr.PC.iii) Doctrine of "Double Jeopardy". No one should be punished twice for the same offence. ---- The court, referring to relevant legal provisions and precedents, held that once an FIR is registered for a cognizable offense, it is treated as a "case." Any subsequent versions or circumstances related to the same incident should be investigated under the same case without the need for separate FIRs. The court cited Section 161 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.) and police rules to support this position.The court emphasized that allowing multiple FIRs for the same incident could lead to abuse of the legal process and violate the principle of double jeopardy. It relied on judgments from both Pakistani and Indian courts, such as "Mst. Sughran Bibi vs the State" and "Arnab Ranjan Goswami vs Union of India," to establish the legal principles governing the prohibition of multiple prosecutions for the same offense. ---- The court allowed the petitioner's petitions, quashing the multiple FIRs filed against Muhammad Azam Khan Swati. The court directed the petitioner's release in connection with the questioned FIRs. The judgment highlighted the importance of protecting individuals from double prosecution and ensuring a fair and just legal process.

Summary: ---Quote: "Every citizen has a right of political and social justice, freedom of speech and thought. Print and electronic media are the means of receiving and providing such information to and from the people. Upon exercise of right of freedom of speech and expression, politically motivated FIRs are being registered for offences under sections 121-A, 124, 153-A, 505 of the PPC, without following the procedure, as provided in section 196 of the Cr.P.C., which is an illegality. The Government must tolerate the criticism of its political opponents being the chosen representatives of the people, instead of considering them as enemy of State." -----Background: ---- The High Court had dismissed his criminal revision for acquittal in a case involving allegations of conspiracy and incitement against the state. The FIR, No. 691 dated 09.08.2022, was registered against Shahbaz Gill and others, including the petitioner, under various sections of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) based on views expressed by Gill during a live telecast on ARY News. -----Issues: 1) Whether the Trial Court had jurisdiction to take cognizance of offences under sections 121-A, 124, 153-A, and 505 of the PPC without a complaint by the Federal or Provincial Government as required by Section 196 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. ---2) Whether the registration of the FIR and subsequent proceedings against the petitioner were valid. ---3) Whether there was sufficient material to frame charges against the petitioner. ------Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: Jurisdiction and Section 196 of the Code: The court emphasized that Section 196 of the Code mandates a complaint by the Federal or Provincial Government for offences under sections 121-A, 124, 153-A, and 505 of the PPC. The FIR was registered with the permission of the Secretary, Ministry of Interior, which did not satisfy the requirements of Section 196, as the Secretary was not authorized to delegate this power further. Thus, the Trial Court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of these offences based on the FIR. -----Registration of FIR and Proceedings: The court found that the FIR was registered without adhering to the mandatory procedure prescribed by Section 196. The petitioner was not initially named in the FIR but was implicated later based on the investigation. The main evidence against the petitioner, a transcript allegedly obtained from the main accused, was contested and lacked clear evidentiary value. -----Material for Framing Charges: The court held that there was insufficient material to frame charges against the petitioner. The petitioner could not be held responsible for the actions of the main accused without prima facie cogent evidence. The court highlighted the misuse of authority and the potential chilling effect on media freedom, stressing the importance of protecting constitutional rights. ----Outcome: The petition was converted into an appeal and allowed. The judgments of the High Court and the Trial Court were set aside. The proceedings initiated against the petitioner based on FIR No. 691 were quashed. The petitioner was acquitted from the case. ----Citations/Precedents: Section 196 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. Mustafa Impex v. Government of Pakistan; PLD 2016 SC 808. The State v. Raja Abdul Rehman; 2005 SCMR 1544. Zahoor-ud-Din v. Khushi Muhammad; 1998 SCMR 1840.

Summary: (a) Pakistan Penal Code (XLV of 1860): ----Ss. 124-A, 147, 149, 153, 153-A, 341 – Cognizance of Offenses Against the State – Authority for Complaint – Abuse of Process The petitioners sought to quash FIR No. 92/2023, registered under Sections 124-A, 147, 149, 153, 153-A, and 341 PPC, along with Sections 3 and 4 of the Balochistan Regulation & Control of Loudspeakers and Sound Amplifiers Ordinance, 1965. The allegations involved hate speech and incitement against state institutions during a gathering. Under Section 196 Cr.P.C., no court can take cognizance of offenses against the state (e.g., Sections 124-A, 153-A PPC) unless a formal complaint is filed by the Federal or Provincial Government or an officer empowered by them. Since the FIR was registered by a police sub-inspector without authorization from the competent authority, it lacked legal validity. Reliance was placed on Section 196 Cr.P.C., which serves as a safeguard against misuse of prosecutorial powers in cases involving offenses against the state. (b) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973: ----Arts. 16, 17 & 19 – Fundamental Rights – Freedom of Assembly, Association, and Speech The Constitution guarantees the right to freedom of assembly (Article 16), freedom of association (Article 17), and freedom of speech (Article 19). These rights are subject to reasonable restrictions in the interest of public order, morality, or the integrity and sovereignty of Pakistan. However, such restrictions must be imposed through proper legal mechanisms. In the present case, the FIR and subsequent proceedings were initiated without following due legal process, violating these constitutional safeguards. (c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898): ----S. 196 – Prosecution for Offenses Against the State – Mandatory Procedure Section 196 Cr.P.C. mandates that offenses against the state, including Sections 124-A and 153-A PPC, cannot be prosecuted without explicit authorization from the Federal or Provincial Government or an officer empowered by them. In this case, the FIR was lodged by a police officer without adhering to this legal requirement, rendering the proceedings void ab initio. (d) Abuse of Process of Law – Quashing of FIR: The court emphasized that inherent jurisdiction must be exercised sparingly and only to prevent abuse of the legal process or to secure the ends of justice. The allegations in the FIR were vague, non-specific, and failed to establish any clear role of the petitioners. The court observed that the proceedings appeared to be initiated with mala fide intent to harass and scandalize the petitioners. Reliance was placed on the principle that courts can quash proceedings when they are manifestly groundless or an abuse of legal process. ----Disposition: The petition was allowed. FIR No. 92/2023, dated 4th August 2023, registered at P.S. City Pishin, and all subsequent proceedings were quashed. The court held that the FIR was registered without proper legal authority under Section 196 Cr.P.C., and no specific role was attributed to the petitioners. The court further ruled that the case constituted an abuse of legal process aimed at harassment and reputational damage.

Summary: Background: A constitutional petition challenged the validity of Section 124-A of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC), which criminalizes sedition. The provision penalizes actions, writings, or speech inciting hatred or disaffection towards the government. Petitioners argued that the section contravenes Articles 14, 19, and 19A of the Constitution of Pakistan, asserting that it infringes upon fundamental rights, including the right to freedom of speech. They argued that the law of sedition is a colonial relic used to suppress dissent and is incompatible with a democratic society that values freedom of expression. -----Issues: 1- Does Section 124-A of the PPC contravene the fundamental rights of freedom of speech and press as enshrined in Articles 19 and 19A of the Constitution? -----2- Is the sedition law a colonial relic that is incompatible with the democratic values of modern constitutional law? -----3- Should the court strike down Section 124-A for violating constitutional rights and being outdated in a democratic society? -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court held that Section 124-A of the PPC is unconstitutional as it violates the fundamental rights to freedom of speech and press protected under Articles 19 and 19A. The court reasoned that the provision’s broad language restricts free expression, especially political dissent, and subjects citizens to arbitrary prosecution for merely criticizing the government. The court deemed Section 124-A an outdated colonial tool intended to suppress public opinion rather than maintain public order, rendering it incompatible with modern democratic values. The section was declared void and struck down for violating constitutional protections. -----Citations/Precedents: Kedar Nath Singh v. The State of Bihar (India) R v Sullivan and R v Pigott (1868) R v Collins (1839) Ram Nandan v State (Allahabad High Court, India) New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (U.S. Supreme Court) Whitney v. California (U.S. Supreme Court) Reynolds v. Times Newspaper (UK) Yankov v. Bulgaria (European Court of Human Rights) Packingham v North Carolina (U.S. Supreme Court) Lamont v Postmaster General (U.S. Supreme Court) All Pakistan Newspapers Association v. Federation (Pakistan) Begum Zeb un Nisa v. Pakistan (Pakistan Supreme Court) Attorney General v. Guardian (No.2) (UK) Reynolds v. Times Newspapers (1999)

Summary: Background: The petitioner was arrested under offences including sedition, provocation of riots, public mischief, and criminal intimidation. His physical custody was initially extended by the Trial Court but later refused further extension, leading to a criminal revision which was then allowed by the Additional Sessions Judge, granting further physical remand. The petitioner challenged this order under Article 199 of the Constitution. -----Issues: 1- Whether the High Court has jurisdiction to interfere in the investigation and remand orders under Article 199 of the Constitution. 2- Whether the petitioner was subjected to torture during police custody. 3- Whether the FIR could proceed without the sanction of the Federal Government as required under sections 196 and 196-A, Cr.P.C. 4- Whether the physical remand granted by the Additional Sessions Judge was legally valid. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --Jurisdiction under Article 199: The High Court emphasized that it cannot adjudicate a petition under Article 199 like an appeal, and it should only determine whether there was an error of law or jurisdiction. Interference in the investigation can only occur under specific circumstances, such as mala fide intentions or actions beyond the jurisdiction of the investigating agency, which were not proven in this case. --Allegation of Torture: The petitioner claimed torture during police custody. The jail authorities noted bruises on his body upon his admission, but no further action was taken to investigate these injuries. The Court observed that allegations of torture are serious and suggested an inquiry by a retired High Court Judge to investigate the matter thoroughly. --Sanction under Sections 196 and 196-A, Cr.P.C.: The Court held that the provisions of sections 196 and 196-A, Cr.P.C., relate to the Court taking cognizance of the offence, not to the investigation itself. It referenced Supreme Court rulings that investigations could proceed without the sanction, but cognizance by a Court would require it. Therefore, the FIR could continue, and the issue of sanction would be relevant when the Court takes cognizance. --Legality of Physical Remand: The Court found that the Additional Sessions Judge correctly examined police diaries and other materials before granting further physical remand. The decision was not based on conjectures but on the need for further investigation, including the recovery of the cellular phone and conducting a polygraph test. The petition was dismissed, and the order for further physical remand was upheld. The Court suggested an inquiry into the allegations of torture by a retired High Court Judge and expected the Ministry of Interior to ensure this. -----Citations/Precedents: Ghulam Sarwar Zardari v. Piyar Ali alias Piyaro 2010 SCMR 624 Hayatullah Khan and another v. Muhammad Khan and others 2011 SCMR 1354 Muhammad Hanif v. The State 2019 SCMR 2029 Muhammad Nazir v. Fazal Karim and others PLD 2012 Supreme Court 892 General (R) Pervez Musharaf v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2020 Lah. 285 Ali Raza and another v. Federation of Pakistan and another PLD 2017 Isl. 64 Salman Taseer v. Judge, Special Court 1993 SCMR 71

Summary: Who can be complainant in case under section 121, 121-A, 124-A 131 and 153 PPC. Principle laid down -----------Issues: 1)Whether the FIR against Captain (Rtd) Muhammad Safdar was legally valid given the requirements of ---Section 196 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. ----2)Whether the allegations in the FIR constituted an offence under the PPC. ----3)Whether there was evidence of mala fide intent in registering the FIR without forensic verification of the video evidence. ---4)Whether the petitioner’s actions constituted waging war against the state or instigating mutiny. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court held that per Section 196 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, the complainant was not competent to lodge the FIR without the authorization of the Federal or Provincial Government. No such authorization was produced, rendering the FIR legally invalid. The court found no material evidence that the petitioner’s actions met the legal criteria for the alleged offences. Criticism of government policies by a politician does not equate to waging war against the country. The court noted the lack of forensic verification of the video evidence as indicative of mala fide intent, further invalidating the FIR. The allegations did not constitute waging war against the state or instigating mutiny, as no concrete evidence, such as pamphlets, literature, or arms, was presented. Consequently, W.P. No. 2843-P of 2021 was allowed, and the FIR was quashed. Cr.M.(B.B.A.) No. 809-A of 2021 became infructuous and was dismissed. W.P. No. 1297-P of 2021 was disposed of with directions to the respondents to provide case details to the petitioner upon request. ----Citations/Precedents: Section 196 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. Sections 121, 121-A, 124-A, 131, 153, 505, and 511 of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC).

Summary: Bail granted---Background:In Criminal Petition No. 251 of 2020, Alamgir Khan, the petitioner, sought admission to bail after being arrested on December 1, 2019. He was accused of delivering an inflammatory speech at a rally on November 29, 2019, on the Mall Road in Lahore. The speech allegedly incited participants against state institutions.---Issues:Whether Alamgir Khan's speech constituted sedition under section 124-A of the Pakistan Penal Code.Whether Alamgir Khan's release on bail would jeopardize public peace, security, and tranquility.Whether Alamgir Khan's right to freedom of speech was violated, considering the reasonable restrictions under Article 19 of the Constitution.---Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The Court recognized freedom of speech as a fundamental right under the Constitution, subject to reasonable restrictions. The determination of whether Alamgir Khan's speech violated these restrictions would be best decided by the trial court after considering the full context of the discourse.Despite the serious nature of the charges, the petitioner's status as a student and the lack of usefulness in his continued incarceration led the Court to grant bail. The Court emphasized the importance of the state being tolerant of dissent and criticism from its citizens, even if expressed crudely or emotionally.The criminal petition was converted into an appeal, and Alamgir Khan was granted release on bail upon furnishing a bond of Rs. 100,000 with one surety to the satisfaction of the trial court or Duty Magistrate.---Citations/Precedents:Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1960Punjab Sound Systems (Regulations) Act, 2015Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, Article 19

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-------S. 561-A---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 196, 153-A, 123-A & 124-A---Inherentpowers of High Court---Quashing of FIR---Scope---Prosecution for offences against theState---Condemnation of the creation of the State, and advocacy of abolition of itssovereignty, sedition, promoting enmity between different groups---Scope---Petitionersought quashing of FIR registered with the allegation of hateful speeches and promotingfeelings of hatred amongst different racial, regional groups and communities---FirstInformation Report was registered under Ss. 123-A, 153-A & 124-A, P.P.C. which were noncognizable---Cognizance could only be taken on the complaint instituted by the FederalGovernment or Provincial Government concerned---Provisions of section 196, CrPC werecouched in negative language which were mandatory in nature as opposed to being merelydirectory---Competent authority had not initiated the process, thus, jurisdiction under S. 561-A, Cr.P.C., could be invoked to prevent abuse of process of the court---Petition under S. 561-A, Cr.P.C. was allowed and the FIR was quashed.(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-------S. 561-A---Inherent powers of High Court---Scope---Inherent powers under S. 561-A,Cr.P.C. are rarely and sparingly invoked, only in the interest of justice, so as to redressgrievances for which, considering the facts and circumstances of the case, no other procedureor remedy is available---Jurisdiction under S. 561-A, Cr.P.C., is an extraordinaryjurisdiction, which cannot over-ride provisions of the Code, but cases may arise wheredemands of justice require immediate, real and substantial justice---Court, in suchcircumstances, would be justified to exercise its jurisdiction to save a party from harassmentand abuse of the process of court---Section 561-A, Cr.P.C., may be used sparingly, but itconfers wide powers on the court to meet such eventualities and pass any order, which theends of justice may require.(c) Administration of justice-------Where a particular thing is required to be done in a particular manner then it should be done in that manner or it should not be done at all.

Summary: Acquittal granted----Background: The appellant was tried and convicted under sedition, abetting mutiny, and forgery, based on an FIR registered against him. He was sentenced by the Sessions Judge, Islamabad, but appealed the decision on grounds of procedural violations and political victimization. -----Issues: 1- Whether the proceedings and conviction under Section 124-A, PPC (sedition), were valid without a complaint instituted by the Federal Government as required by Section 196, Cr.P.C. 2- Whether the entire process, from registration of the FIR to the trial, complied with mandatory legal provisions. 3- Whether the actions and statements of the appellant constituted sedition, abetting mutiny, and forgery. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --Violation of Section 196, Cr.P.C.: The Court found that Section 124-A, PPC, is non-cognizable, and its cognizance can only be taken upon a complaint by the Federal Government. Since no such complaint was made, the entire proceedings were invalid. The mandatory nature of Section 196, Cr.P.C., was emphasized, and non-compliance vitiated the proceedings. --Procedural Violations: The Court noted multiple procedural violations, including improper registration of the case and investigation processes. The rules of procedure are meant to protect the right to liberty and ensure justice, which were not followed in this case. --Evidence and Mens Rea: The prosecution failed to prove the essential elements of the charges, particularly the requisite mens rea for sedition and abetting mutiny. The trial court did not adequately consider these aspects, leading to an erroneous conviction. The appeal was accepted, and the conviction and sentences were set aside. The appellant was acquitted of all charges, and the surety was discharged from liability. The criminal revision for enhancement of the sentence was dismissed. ------Citations/Precedents: Muhammad Khan v. Government of West Pakistan PLD 1960 W.P. Lah. 434 Bashir Ahmad v. The State 2000 PCr.LJ 902 Fazal-i-Raziq v. Riaz Ahmad PLD 1978 Lah. 1082 Gokulchand Dwarkadas v. The King PLD 1948 PC 11 Dost Muhammad v. The State 1976 PCr.LJ 184 Salman Taseer v. Judge Special Court 1993 SCMR 71

Summary: S.353,324,120,124-A PPC,17(3)Haraba,7 ATA:No recovery & not directly charged(Bail allowed) ---- ----Background: In Criminal Miscellaneous Nos. 72 and 81 of 2011, Fazal Mabood and other petitioners sought bail in connection with FIR No. 22 dated 4-2-2009 registered at Police Station Ghalegay, Swat. The FIR charged them under sections 353, 324, 120, 124-A, 148, 149, 365, and 427 of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC), sections 3 and 4 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908, section 17(2)(3)(4) of the Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979, and section 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. ----Issues: 1) Whether the petitioners, who were not named in the FIR, were sufficiently connected with the alleged offences to deny them bail. ---2) Whether the recovery of stolen items and the statement of an eyewitness were enough to justify the denial of bail. ---3) Whether the accused were entitled to bail despite the severity of the charges. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: ---Connection to Offences: The court observed that none of the petitioners were named in the FIR. None of the stolen items from the law enforcement personnel were recovered from the petitioners. Recovery memos of articles from the destroyed check post did not connect the petitioners to the crime as no one had named them for selling those items. ----Evidence and Statement: The only piece of evidence against Fazal Mabood was the recovery of about 19 maunds of iron from his house, which was insufficient to connect him with the offence. Although one Painda Muhammad named the petitioners in his statement under section 164, Cr.P.C., the record revealed that similar cases were registered against the petitioners through different FIRs, casting doubt on the credibility of the statement. ----Entitlement to Bail: The court referenced Abid Ali alias Ali v. The State (2011 SCMR 161) and Amir v. The State (PLD 1972 SC 277), reaffirming that law should not be stretched in favor of the prosecution even for bail purposes. Despite the charges being heinous, the petitioners were found fit for bail as their connection to the crime was not sufficiently established. ----Outcome: The petitions for bail were allowed. The petitioners were granted bail on furnishing bail bonds of Rs. 5,00,000 each with two sureties in the like amount. The sureties had to be reliable and men of means. The petitioners were required to undertake that they would remain peaceful, not join any militant group, inform the police before leaving their district, and disclose the place and duration of their stay in case they moved to another district. This condition was to remain in force for one year, after which it would become ineffective if the petitioners were found to be of good character during this period. ----Citations/Precedents: Abid Ali alias Ali v. The State 2011 SCMR 161 Amir v. The State PLD 1972 SC 277