Summary: (a) Defamation Ordinance, 2002 ----Ss. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 & 9, read with Arts. 14 & 19 of the Constitution----Defamation as civil wrong----Concurrent civil and criminal remedies----Right to reputation and freedom of expression----Law and scope----Offence of defamation is provided in S.499, P.P.C. (with S.500 prescribing punishment) while civil defamation has historically been entertained under S.9, C.P.C. as a tort based on justice, equity and good conscience----Defamation Ordinance, 2002 is a special law codifying and consolidating the civil law of defamation, without extinguishing the concurrent tort remedy or the criminal regime under P.P.C.----Under the Ordinance, any wrongful act, publication or circulation of a false oral, written or visual statement that injures a person’s reputation (by lowering him in the estimation of others, or exposing him to ridicule, unjust criticism, hatred, dislike or contempt) is actionable (S.3), and once defamation is proved, publication of defamatory matter is actionable without proof of special damage (S.4)----Court may grant general, special or aggravated damages and order apology or retraction as restorative relief (S.9)----Sections 5, 6 and 7 provide a structured defence framework (truth, fair comment, good faith, absolute and qualified privilege) which balances the right to reputation, a facet of human dignity under Art.14 of the Constitution, against freedom of expression under Art.19, ensuring that truthful, fair and good-faith speech is protected while maliciously injurious speech is not----Civil standard of proof applies, and one appeal lies from the Trial Court’s decision. Cited cases: Liberty Papers Ltd. v. Human Rights Commission of Pakistan PLD 2015 SC 42; Ch. Zulfiqar Ali Cheema v. Farhan Arshad Mir PLD 2015 SC 134; Mir Shakeelur Rehman v. Yahya Bakhtiar PLD 2010 SC 612; Khondkar Abu Taleb v. The State PLD 1967 SC 32; M. Moosa v. Mahomed PLD 1968 SC 25; Adeeb Javedani v. Yahya Bakhtiar 1995 CLC 1246; Capt. Benaras Khan v. Commodore Akhtar Hanif 1988 CLC 1093; Government of Punjab v. Mst. Kamina 1990 CLC 404. (b) Defamation Ordinance, 2002 ----Ss. 2(e), 3 & 4----Defamation----Essential ingredients----Reasonable person test and seriousness of impact test----Standard of proof in civil defamation----To establish a civil claim under the Ordinance, claimant must show: (i) existence of a defamatory statement capable of harming reputation in the eyes of a reasonable person; (ii) reference to or identification of the claimant; and (iii) publication to at least one person other than the claimant----Under S.3, core inquiry is injury to reputation, which may consist of lowering in estimation of others, ridicule, unjust criticism, hatred, dislike or contempt; truth or falsity is not examined at the initial stage of determining injurious character but becomes relevant at the defence stage under S.5----Court must first apply the reasonable person test, i.e. how a reasonable member of society would naturally understand the words in their ordinary meaning, not how the claimant subjectively feels----If the words are capable of bearing a defamatory meaning, court must then apply the seriousness of impact test, requiring proof that the statement actually caused or was likely to cause serious damage to reputation in its real context, assessed through factors such as nature and gravity of the allegation, scale and audience of publication, claimant’s social/professional standing and likely influence on persons who know the claimant----Serious harm may be proved by direct evidence (testimonies showing altered conduct or opinion) or by reasonable inference from surrounding circumstances, but it cannot rest on hypothetical or presumed injury alone----Standard is the civil one, namely balance of probabilities, and criminal concepts or thresholds cannot be imported into civil defamation claims to raise the evidentiary burden beyond that required by the Ordinance----Confusion in earlier case-law between falsity, malice and injury to reputation is clarified and separated by the Court. Cited cases: Muhammad Akram v. Farman Bi PLD 1990 SC 28; Lachaux v. Independent Print Ltd [2019] UKSC 27 (relied upon for serious harm test). (c) Defamation Ordinance, 2002 ----Ss. 2(e), 3, 4, 5(g) & 7----Publication----Internal communication to inquiry committee regarding workplace harassment----Privileged/qualified privileged communication----No wider circulation proved----Whether actionable defamation made out----Respondent, a consultant at the Hospital and Assistant Professor at affiliated medical college, filed suit for Rs.500 million under the Defamation Ordinance, 2002 on the basis of a handwritten letter authored by Petitioner (Medical Director/CEO) and addressed only to a 13-member Inquiry Committee looking into harassment complaints----Letter recounted various incidents and complaints of alleged sexual harassment of female medical officers and students by Respondent----Petitioners admitted authorship and reference to Respondent but pleaded that it was an internal communication placed before the competent Inquiry Committee in connection with an ongoing inquiry, and that it was written in good faith, within official mandate and was privileged----Respondent in plaint pleaded circulation of the letter only to the members of the Inquiry Committee; in evidence he attempted to improve his case by alleging circulation to students and general public, without any supporting evidence or corroboration----Held, evidence beyond pleadings must be disregarded, and no publication beyond the Inquiry Committee was proved----Intended addressees were the members of a formally constituted Inquiry Committee, performing an official duty; for purposes of the reasonable person test, the “reasonable person” in context is a reasonable member of such Inquiry Committee, not the general public----Seen objectively, a reasonable member of the Inquiry Committee would read the letter as information placed before it in the discharge of its inquiry function and not as a defamatory campaign; no material was brought on record to show that, in their estimation, Respondent’s reputation was lowered or that they treated him as a person of diminished standing on account of the letter----Restricted internal communication to a body acting under an official mandate, without proof of wider publication or reputational impact, does not satisfy the ingredients of actionable defamation under Ss.3 and 4 of the Ordinance, particularly when it falls within the protective scope of qualified privilege/good-faith reporting. Cited cases: Rehmat v. Zubaida Begum 2021 SCMR 1534; Nazir Ahmad v. M. Muzaffar Hussain 2008 SCMR 1639 (admissions); Muhammad Aslam v. Muhammad Anwar 2023 SCMR 1371; Pak Suzuki Motors Co. Ltd. v. Faisal Jameel Butt 2023 CLD 934 (evidence beyond pleadings). (d) Protection against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act, 2010 ----S. 4(3)(a), (d) & (e), read with Defamation Ordinance, 2002----Workplace harassment inquiries----Confidentiality of complainants and witnesses----Non-production of victims as witnesses to “prove truth” of harassment allegations in civil defamation suit----Effect----Under S.4(3)(a) of the Act, statements and evidence obtained during a harassment inquiry must remain confidential; under S.4(3)(d) & (e), no adverse action is to be taken against complainant or witnesses and the Inquiry Committee must ensure that no hostile environment is created to pressurize them----Insistence by civil courts that complainant female doctors or students must appear to prove “truth” of harassment allegations in a defamation suit stemming from an internal complaint would undermine statutory confidentiality, expose victims to secondary harassment, and frustrate the protective purpose of the Act----Trial Court and High Court erred in drawing adverse inference against Petitioners merely because the complainant women were not produced as witnesses; such approach was termed “absurd” and contrary to the scheme of the Act----Furthermore, Respondent’s own document (Ex.P-13), a letter from the Dean of the College, confirmed that an inquiry on allegations of sexual harassment against Respondent was pending and that relevant individuals had been called, thereby supporting the existence of complaints and the context in which the impugned letter was written----It was not the function of the defamation court to sit in judgment over the merits of harassment allegations; its remit was confined to examining whether an actionable wrong of defamation, as defined by law, was made out. (e) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) & Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 ----Pleadings, burden of proof and evidentiary threshold in defamation claims----Improvement in testimony beyond pleadings----Injury to reputation, psychological harm and professional loss----Need for proof----Respondent pleaded only that the letter was sent to the Inquiry Committee but, while deposing as PW-1, improved his version by alleging its circulation to students and general public; such improvement being beyond the pleadings and unsupported by any independent witness or documentary proof, could not be relied upon----Respondent relied on his educational qualifications, letters of appreciation and a letter of exoneration from the Dean but produced no evidence that any member of the Inquiry Committee or any other relevant person altered their conduct or opinion towards him on account of the letter, nor that his social or professional standing suffered any concrete or serious setback----Bare assertions of being “perturbed, shocked, mentally stressed” and of family having a “bad impression” were not corroborated and, in any event, were irrelevant to the seriousness of impact test when the publication itself stood confined to an inquiry body and not to family or general public----On the balance of probabilities, Respondent failed to prove publication beyond the limited internal context, failed to prove serious reputational injury even within that context, and failed to substantiate alleged psychological or professional damage----Trial Court and High Court misdirected themselves by declaring the letter defamatory without first applying the reasonable person and seriousness of impact tests to the specific audience, content and context. (f) Defamation Ordinance, 2002 ----Ss. 3, 4, 5(g) & 7----Intention, malice, good faith and privilege----Handwritten internal letter to Inquiry Committee regarding harassment allegations----Whether indicative of malice----Effect----Trial Court inferred malice from the fact that the letter was handwritten and that complainant female doctors were not produced as witnesses, and High Court affirmed, focusing on “malice” rather than on core ingredients of actionable defamation----Supreme Court held such reasoning to be illogical and contrary to the statutory framework; the letter explicitly acknowledged the sensitivity of the issue for female complainants and their families and was written to the Inquiry Committee to maintain confidentiality, not to publicize allegations----Handwritten form, in the circumstances, signified care and responsibility rather than malice----Record showed that complaints of harassment against Respondent were already pending, and the letter merely compiled and transmitted information of concern to the competent forum as part of institutional procedure----On cumulative assessment of correspondence and circumstances, Petitioners’ version of acting in good faith and within institutional process inspired greater confidence on the balance of probabilities----Held, the impugned letter was a privileged communication, made honestly and in good faith to a body charged with investigating workplace harassment; no actionable defamation or injury to reputation stood established----Civil petition was converted into appeal and allowed; judgments and decree of Trial Court and High Court were set aside.

Summary: (a) Defamation Ordinance (LVI of 2002)--- ----Ss.5, 6, 7 & 15---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.VII, R.11--- Companies Act (XIX of 2017), S.483---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss.193 & 228---Suit for recovery of damages on account of defamation---Defence of 'absolute privilege', availability of---Rejection of plaint---Scope---Factual controversy---Recording of evidence, requirement of---Order of Trial court rejecting the plaint set aside as the matter required recording of evidence---The appellant filed a defamation suit against the respondents for allegedly issuing a defamatory letter to the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) which he claimed damaged his reputation---Trial court rejected the plaint under O.VII R.11 CPC on the ground that the impugned letter was issued in the respondents' official capacity and was protected under "absolute privilege" as per S.6 of the Defamation Ordinance, 2002 (the Ordinance, 2002) and S.483 of the Companies Act, 2017 (the Act 2017)---The appellant challenged this rejection in the present appeal contending that such determinations required evidence and could not be resolved at the preliminary stage---Two important points for consideration by the High Court were as to "i. Whether the defamatory letter qualified as a "judicial proceeding" within the meaning of S.483 of the Act, 2017? and; ii. Whether the defamatory letter was written by the respondents in their personal or official capacity?"---Held: Perusal of S.483 of the Act, 2017 revealed that whilst powers of the civil court had been vested in the Commission for the purposes outlined in subsection (1) of S.483 in respect of any "proceedings" or "enquiry", the same attained the status of a "judicial proceeding" only within the meaning and for the purposes of Ss.193 and 228 of the P.P.C.---The defamatory letter visibly did not fall in the said category and it could not be classified as part of a "judicial proceeding"---Therefore, reliance of the Trial court on the above noted provision, at least for the purposes of rejection of plaint, was unfounded and incorrect---With regards to the second question for determination by the High Court, same required evidence to be recorded---The appellant should have been given an opportunity to examine the respondents and put forward necessary questions to them to determine the capacity in which the defamatory letter was written---The conclusion by the Trial Court in reference to the said letter being written by the respondents in their "official positions" could not have been made prior to recording of evidence--- Trial Court went over and above the permissible scope of O.VII R.11 C.P.C.---Perusal of the impugned order reflected that the Trial court had not distinguished between rejection of the plaint and dismissal of the suit---Matter was remanded back to the Trial Court with a direction to conclude the proceedings within six months---Order of rejection of plaint was set aside and present appeal was allowed, in circumstances. Haji Abdul Karim v. M/s. Florida Builders (Pvt.) Ltd. PLD 2012 SC 247 rel. (b) Defamation Ordinance (LVI of 2002)--- ----S.8---Suit for recovery of damages on account of defamation---Prerequisites---Notice of action, requirement of---Scope---The scheme under the Defamation Ordinance, 2002, being special law, is peculiar---Prior to institution of the suit the plaintiff is mandated to issue a notice under S.8 of the Ordinance, 2002 within the time stipulated in the said provision. Muhammad Ali Lakhani for Appellant along with Farmanullah and the Appellant Asim Iqbal. Ghazi Khan Khalil along with Ameer Nausherwan, Zeeshan Ahmed Kalhoro, Kumail Abbas and Aftab Ali for Respondents. Ahmed Khan Khaskheli, A.A.G for the State. Date of hearing: 25th April, 2025. judgment Muhammad Jaffer Raza, J .--- The instant Miscellaneous Appeal has been filed under Section 15 of the Defamation Ordinance, 2002 ("Ordinance") impugning the order dated 29.07.2024 passed in Defamation Suit No.183/2023, whereby the plaint filed by the Appellant was rejected under Order VII Rule 11, C.P.C. 2. Succinctly stated, the Appellant filed Suit No.183/2023 against the Respondents for damages on account of defamation before the learned trial Court. Thereafter, the Respondents filed an application under Order VII Rule 11, C.P.C. and the same was allowed vide Impugned order dated 29.07.2024. 3. Learned counsel for the Appellant has argued that the Impugned order is beyond the permissible scope of Order VII Rule 11, C.P.C. as expounded by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Haji Abdul Karim v. M/s. Florida Builders (Pvt.) Ltd. Learned counsel has stated that the letter dated 29.04.2023 ("defamatory letter"), written and signed by the Respondents, was defamatory in nature, which gave rise to the cause of action against the Respondents. It is specified that in the instant judgment the term "defamatory letter" is used for the purposes of identifying the said letter only and is not a determination on whether the said letter was defamatory. 4. The learned counsel in compliance of the provisions of Section 8 of the Ordinance issued legal notice dated 22.05.2023 to the Respondents and thereafter preferred the above-mentioned suit. The learned counsel has stated that the application filed by the Respondents under Order VII Rule 11, C.P.C. was primarily filed on the ground that the defamatory letter, which is the subject matter of the above-mentioned suit, was written by the Respondents in their official capacity and therefore their employer should have impleaded as Defendant in the said suit. Learned counsel has argued that even if the above was a permissible defence under Section 5 of the Ordinance, even then a rejection of the plaint was not warranted under the permissible scope of the above noted provision. 5. Conversely learned counsel for the Respondents has argued that Sections 6 and 7 of the Ordinance are squarely applicable to the case at hand as the defamatory letter which is the subject matter of the above-mentioned suit is covered by "absolute privilege" as defined under Section 6 of the Ordinance. In the same vein the learned counsel has also placed reliance on Section 483 of the Companies Act, 2017 ("Act") and states that the alleged defamatory letter, written to the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan ("SECP") qualifies as "judicial proceeding" and therefore can be classified as "absolute privilege". He has further argued that no evidence in respect of the said defence needs to be recorded and the plaint can be rejected without appreciating the contents of the written statement. Learned counsel has further contended that the ground of absolute or qualified privilege, being legal in nature, can be taken at any stage. 6. Further the learned counsel has argued that the defamatory letter does not give rise to cause of action against the present Respondents as the defamatory letter was issued under the instructions of their employer. Therefore, the Respondents could not be sued personally for their acts and omissions which were done in their "official capacity". Learned counsel has further advanced the said argument and averred that the application filed by the Appellant under Order I Rule 10, C.P.C. seeking impleading of the employer of the Respondents as party further buttresses his contention. Lastly, he has relied upon the case of M. Moosa v Mahomed and others. 7. In rebuttal, learned counsel for the Appellant has argued that Section 483 of the Act is specific to proceedings under Sections 193 and 228 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 ("P.P.C.") and therefore is not attracted to present case. Learned counsel has argued that the defamatory letter was sent in reply to the letter issued by SECP dated 18.04.2023. It is argued that the notice to SECP was sent by the Appellant as counsel for his client and the Respondents used this as an opportunity to defame the Appellant and tarnish his reputation. Lastly, learned counsel has contended that if the Impugned order is set aside, he will during the course of evidence, cross-examine the Respondents vis-?-vis their above noted contentions. 8. I have heard the learned counsel and perused the record. The scheme under the Ordinance, being special law, is peculiar. Prior to institution of the suit the Plaintiff is mandated to issue a notice under Section 8 of the Ordinance within the time stipulated in the said provision. At this juncture it will be relevant to reproduce Section 8 of the Ordinance which reads as follows: - "8. Notice of action. - No action lies unless the plaintiff has, within two months after the publication of the defamatory matter has come to his notice or knowledge, given to the defendant, fourteen days notice in writing of his intention to bring an action, specifying the defamatory matter complained of." 9. Further, the defences available to the Defendant in a suit under the Ordinance have been clearly defined in Sections 5, 6 and 7 of the Ordinance, which are reproduced below: - "5. Defences.- In defamation proceedings a person has a defence if he shows that- (a) he was not the author, editor, publisher or printer of the statement complained of; (b) the matter commented on is fair and in the public interest and is an expression of opinion and not an assertion of fact and was published in good faith; (c) it is based on truth and was made for public good; (d) assent was given for the publication by the plaintiff; (e) offer to tender a proper apology and publish the same was made by the defendant but was refused by the plaintiff; (f) an offer to print or publish a contradiction or denial in the same manner and with the same prominence was made but was refused by the plaintiff; (g) the matter complained of was privileged communication such as between lawyer and client or between persons having fiduciary relations; and (h) the matter is covered by absolute or qualified privilege. 6. Absolute privilege. - Any publication of statement made in the Federal or Provincial legislatures, reports, papers, notes and proceedings ordered to be published by either House of the Parliament or by the Provincial Assemblies, or relating to judicial proceedings ordered to be published by the Court or any report, note or matter written or published by or under the authority of a Government, shall have the protection of absolute privilege. Explanation. - In this section legislature includes a local legislature and Court includes any tribunal or body exercising the judicial powers. 7. Qualified privilege. - Any fair and accurate publication of parliamentary proceedings, or judicial proceedings which the public may attend and statements made to the proper authorities in order to procure the redress of public grievances shall have the protection of qualified privilege." 10. At this juncture it will be expedient to bifurcate the grounds taken by the learned counsel for the Respondent for rejection of plaint and frame points of determination accordingly. The following points of determination are framed for effective adjudication: - i. Whether the defamatory letter qualifies as a "judicial proceeding" within the meaning of Section 483 of the Act? ii. Whether the defamatory letter was written by the Respondents in their personal or official capacity? POINT NO.1 11. Prior to adjudicating this question, it will be germane to reproduce Section 483 of the Act. The same reads as follows: - 483. Powers of the Commission in relation to enquiries and proceedings.-(1) The Commission, an authorised officer or the registrar, as the case may be, shall, for the purposes of a proceeding or enquiry in exercise of its or his powers and discharge of functions, have the same powers as are vested in a Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act V of 1908), while trying a suit, in respect of the following matters, namely- (a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any witness and examining him on oath or affirmation; (b) compelling the discovery or production of any document or other material object; (c) receiving evidence on affidavit; and (d) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses and documents. (2) Any proceeding before the Commission, an authorised officer or registrar, as the case may be, shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of section 193 and section 228 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 (Act XLV of 1860), and the Commission, an authorised officer or registrar shall be deemed to be a civil court for the purposes of section 195 and Chapter XXXV of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act V of 1898). (Emphasis added) 12. Bare perusal of the above reproduced section reveals that whilst powers of the civil court have been vested in the commission for the purposes outlined in subsection (1) of Section 483 in respect of any "proceedings" or "enquiry", the same attain the status of a "judicial proceeding" only within the meaning and for the purposes of Sections 193 and 228 of the P.P.C. The defamatory letter visibly does not fall in the said category and in that respect, it is held that the said letter cannot be classified as part of a "judicial proceeding". Therefore, reliance of the learned trial court on the above noted provision, at least for the purposes of rejection of plaint, was unfounded and with respect, incorrect. 13. For the purposes of the present appeal it will be beneficial to discuss another ancillary aspect of what has already been held above. Even if the defamatory letter is held to be a part of a "judicial proceeding" the Impugned order is unclear as to whether the same attracts absolute or qualified privilege within the meaning ascribed to them under the Ordinance. I will leave it to a more opportune moment to adjudicate whether either privilege can be a ground for rejection of plaint. For the purposes of the instant judgment, the same is immaterial in light of what has already been held in paragraph No.12 above. Consequently, the reliance of the learned counsel for the Respondent on the judgement in the case of M. Moosa (supra) is misplaced. POINT NO.2 14. Bare reading of the question framed indicates that the same requires evidence to be recorded. The Appellant ought to be given an opportunity to examine the Respondents and put forward necessary questions to them to determine the capacity in which the defamatory letter was written. The conclusion by the learned trial court in reference to the said letter being written by the Respondents in their "Official Positions" could not have been made prior to recording of evidence. 15. It is therefore held that the learned trial Court went over and above the permissible scope of Order VII Rule 11, C.P.C. and failed to appreciate the dicta laid down in the judgment of Florida Builders (supra). Bare perusal of the Impugned order reflects that the learned trial Court has not distinguished between rejection of the plaint and dismissal of the suit. 16. In light of what has been held above, the instant appeal is allowed within no order as to costs. The matter is remanded back to the learned trial Court who is further directed to conclude the proceedings in the above-mentioned suit within a period of six (06) months from today. The pending CMAs are disposed of accordingly. UN/A-46/Sindh Appeal allowed.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) ----O.VII, R.11—Rejection of plaint—Repetitive and vexatious applications—Abuse of process of law Petitioner’s second application under O.VII, R.11, C.P.C. in a suit for malicious prosecution was dismissed with costs for being identical to his earlier application under the same provision and another under S.21, General Clauses Act, 1897 r/w S.13 of Defamation Ordinance, 2002—Earlier orders had attained finality and could not be re-agitated—Repeated filing of similar applications held to be frivolous and intended merely to delay proceedings; such conduct constitutes misuse of the process of law—Concurrent findings of Trial and Revisional Courts warranted no interference. (b) Limitation Act (IX of 1908) ----Art.120—Limitation in suits for malicious prosecution—Mixed question of fact and law Determination of limitation in a claim for malicious prosecution depends upon factual inquiries and legal evaluation—Properly triable only after recording of evidence—Trial Court rightly declined to reject plaint summarily on limitation grounds. (c) Defamation Ordinance, 2002 ----Ss.8, 12 & 13—Distinction between defamation and malicious prosecution Underlying suit sought damages for malicious prosecution and not defamation under Defamation Ordinance, 2002—Contentions regarding limitation and exclusive jurisdiction under the Ordinance held misconceived—Courts below correctly found the Ordinance inapplicable to the controversy. (d) Constitution of Pakistan (1973) ----Art.199—Constitutional jurisdiction—Scope of interference High Court’s jurisdiction under Art.199 confined to correcting jurisdictional or constitutional errors—No such infirmity or violation found—Concurrent orders of lower courts based on sound reasoning; interference declined. (e) Practice and procedure ----Vexatious litigation by an advocate party-in-person—Imposition of costs Petitioner, an Advocate, repeatedly filed frivolous applications after settlement of issues, demonstrating a pattern of obstinate and abusive litigation—Courts are empowered to discourage such conduct through imposition of realistic costs—Costs of Rs.35,000 imposed, payable to the Sindh High Court Clinic within fourteen days. Cited cases: None reported. (g) Disposition — Petition dismissed with costs of Rs.35,000/-, to be deposited with the Sindh High Court Clinic within fourteen (14) days—All pending applications dismissed accordingly.

Summary: Background:Muhammad Musharaf Hassan, the petitioner, initiated a criminal revision (Crl. Rev. No.16003 of 2024) challenging the decision made by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Lalian, District Chiniot, on 09.01.2024. The challenged order declined to summon respondent No.2 in a private complaint filed by the petitioner under sections 500, 501, 34 PPC against respondents Nos.2 & 3. The complaint arose from a defamation allegation linked to a suit titled ?Abid Hassan vs. Muhammad Musharaf Hassan, etc.? filed on 17.04.2021, where defamatory language was allegedly used against the petitioner. The petitioner was dissatisfied that while respondent No.3 was summoned, respondent No.2, a practicing advocate who had drafted the plaint, was not.----Issues:The primary issue was whether respondent No.2, the advocate who drafted the plaint on behalf of respondent No.3 (the petitioner's brother), should be summoned to face trial for the defamation charges filed by the petitioner. The concern was whether the advocate could be held accountable for the content of the legal documents he prepared based on his client's instructions.-----Holding/Reasoning:The Court dismissed the petitioner's revision, upholding the decision of the Additional Sessions Judge. It reasoned that the advocate (respondent No.2) acted solely on his client's instructions and merely signed the plaint to identify the client, without being the originator of the defamatory content. The Court emphasized that accepting the petitioner's allegations would deter advocates from drafting pleadings for clients due to the fear of defamation charges. The Court found no prima facie case against respondent No.2 and recognized that he acted in good faith, protected under Exception 9 to Section 500 of the Pakistan Penal Code (P.P.C.), which pertains to good faith expressions for protection of one's or another's interests. The Court concluded that the trial judge made a well-grounded decision not to summon respondent No.2, and there was no compelling reason to interfere with this decision in the revisional jurisdiction, as there was no observed illegality, perversity, or jurisdictional error in the impugned order.-----Citations/Precedents:The judgment did not explicitly cite previous cases or legal precedents but relied on legal principles concerning the responsibilities and protections afforded to legal practitioners in their professional capacity, as well as the standards for exercising revisional jurisdiction under sections 435 and 439 of the Cr.P.C. (Criminal Procedure Code). The decision was grounded in the interpretation of defamation laws, particularly the exceptions under Section 500 of the P.P.C., and the established legal principle that advocates cannot be held liable for executing their professional duties based on clients' instructions unless malice or bad faith is evident.

Summary: Background: The appellant, Syed Asad Ali Shah, filed an appeal against the judgment and decree dated 05.04.2017, passed by the Additional District Judge-West, Islamabad, dismissing his defamation suit for damages of Rs. 9.9 million under the Defamation Ordinance, 2002. The defamation suit was filed following a news item published in the Daily Jang on 01.04.2014, which alleged that the appellant's degree was forged and proposed action against him. ----Issues: 1- Whether the news item published by the respondents was defamatory. 2- Whether the respondents published the news item in good faith and under qualified privilege. 3- Whether the trial court's dismissal of the appellant's suit was justified. 4- The appropriate amount of damages to be awarded for defamation, if any. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: ---Defamatory Nature of the News Item: The court found that the news item published in the Daily Jang was defamatory. The item accused the appellant of possessing a forged degree, which was widely circulated and damaged his reputation. Despite the respondents' claim of qualified privilege, the court concluded that the publication lacked verification and was not published in good faith. ---Qualified Privilege and Good Faith: The respondents claimed that the news was published in public interest and without malice. However, the court noted that the allegations were not verified by the respondents. The Assistant Director (H.R) PHA, Abdul Qadir, testified that the appellant's degree was genuine and verified by the HEC. The court held that the respondents failed to prove their defense of qualified privilege and good faith. ---Trial Court's Dismissal: The trial court's decision to dismiss the appellant's suit was found to be incorrect. The trial court did not properly consider the evidence and admissions made by the respondents. The appellate court set aside the trial court's judgment, finding that the defamatory publication caused harm to the appellant's reputation. The appellant sought Rs. 9.9 million in damages but failed to prove special damages. The court awarded Rs. 500,000 as general damages, recognizing the injury to the appellant's reputation and the mental agony suffered. The court also directed the respondents to publish an apology in the newspaper in the same manner as the defamatory news item within 30 days. ----Citations/Precedents: Faqir Muhammad vs. Muhammad Shakil (2013 CLC 2284 Lahore) Munawar Ahmed, Chief Editor Daily Sama vs. Muhammad Ashraf (PLD 2021 [SC] 564) Abdul Majeed Khan vs. Tawseen Abdul Haleem (PLD 2012 [SC] 80) Qazi Dost Muhammad vs. Malik Dost Muhammad (1997 CLC 546) Muhammad Zaman Tabbasum vs. Mehmood (2017 CLC [Azad Kashmir] 1221) Jalil Khan Dostani vs. Dawood Ahmed (2010 CLC [Balochistan] 1434) Mst. Akhtar Sultana vs. Major Retd. Muzaffar Khan Malik (PLD 2021 Supreme Court 715) State vs. Ahmed Omer Sheikh (2021 SCMR 873)

Summary: Brief Facts --- ARY News aired a news bulletin on 19.01.2022 and 20.01.2022 related to Supreme Court proceedings.The appellant, a journalist, claimed her image was deliberately associated with false remarks, causing reputational harm.Appellant filed a complaint with PEMRA under Rule 8 of PEMRA (Council of Complaints) Rule, 2010. --- PEMRA Council dismissed the complaint, stating it didn't violate PEMRA's Code of Conduct and advised the appellant to seek defamation remedies elsewhere --- Held: The appellant's image was wrongly associated with news content. --- PEMRA failed to consider the fundamental principles of its Code of Conduct ---- Defamation Ordinance, 2002, is not barred by PEMRA Ordinance, and both can be applied independently ----- PEMRA's inaction and ARY News' conduct warranted nominal damages of Rs. 50,000 and a broadcasted apology ---- The appellant retains the right to seek further damages under defamation law.

Summary: Background: A defamation case arises from a blog post alleging misconduct by a public figure during a school board election. The post, claiming the candidate engaged in unethical behavior, was posted by a third party on a prominent local news site. The candidate sued the news site for defamation. ----Issues: 1- Whether the news site is liable for defamation based on the third party's blog post. 2- Whether the news site can claim immunity under the Communications Decency Act (CDA). ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court held that the news site was not liable for defamation. It reasoned that under Section 230 of the CDA, interactive computer services are not publishers of third-party content and thus cannot be held liable for such content. The court found that the news site merely provided a platform for others to post content and did not contribute to or modify the content in question. Therefore, the news site was immune from liability under the CDA.

Summary: ----S. 9(3)---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 164--- Defamation Ordinance (LVI of 2002), S. 9---Defamation---Suit for recovery of damages---Audio and video evidence---Forensic examination---Scope---Application of the petitioner, filed after closure of evidence, for sending the video for forensic report/expert opinion regarding its originality was dismissed by the Trial Court---Validity---By now, it is possible with the advancement of science and technology to get a forensic examination, audit or test conducted through an appropriate laboratory, so as to get it ascertained as to whether a video or tape is genuine or not and such examination, audit or test can also reasonably establish, if such video has been edited, doctored or tampered with or not---Any party could make a request for forensic examination of an audio tape or video through an appropriate laboratory, so as to get it ascertained as to whether the audio tape or video is genuine or not through moving a proper application to the concerned court---Trial Court had totally overlooked the fact that the petitioner was seeking expert opinion of the video regarding its originality or otherwise and production of additional evidence in light thereof---Trial Court also failed to appreciate that by virtue of O. XVIII, R. 17, C.P.C., the additional evidence could be allowed at any stage---Even if one or the other party had failed to produce all the material documents and/or failed to request for proper examination of the disputed documents/ signatures/video, the court had ample power to do the needful so as to advance justice rather than injustice---Trial was at the verge of conclusion, but in order to ascertain as to whether the video in question was genuine or not, there was no harm, even at such stage, to accept the request of the petitioner qua sending the video for forensic report regarding its originality and genuineness in the larger interest of the justice---Civil revision was allowed, in circumstances, while accepting the application of the petitioner for sending video for forensic report/expert opinion. Ishtiaq Ahmad Mirza and 2 others v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2019 SC 675 and Zar Wali Shah v. Yousaf Ali Shah and 9 others 1992 SCMR 1778 rel. Khalid Mahmood for Petitioner. Amjad Ali Khan for Respondent. Date of hearing: 28th September, 2023.

Summary: Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----O.VII, R.11 & O.XIV, R.2---Defamation---Recovery of damages---Rejecting of plaint--- Preliminary issue---Plaintiff was a government official who assailed defamatory statement made by defendant against him---Trial Court after hearing parties on legal issues, dismissed the suit---Validity---Where an issue of law and facts had arisen in plaint of the suit and Trial Court believed that case or part thereof on the issue of law only, Trial Court under the provision of O.XIV, R.2, C.P.C., could decide the issue related to (a) jurisdiction of the court or (b) a bar to the suit created by any law for the time being in force---To invoke provisions of O.VII, R.11(d), C.P.C., no evidence could be looked into and conclusion that the suit was barred under the law must be drawn from averments made in the plaint---Allegation of defamation was a mixed question of law and facts---Such issue could not be tried as a preliminary issue in other words, such issues could be those where no evidence was required and on the basis of plain reading of plaint of suit, it appeared that jurisdiction of Court was barred, then the Court could decide such issue of law at the first stance---High Court set aside judgment and decree passed by Trial Court and remanded the suit to Trial Court for decision afresh on merits---Appeal was allowed accordingly.

Summary: Suit for recovery of damages under Section 4 & 9 of the Defamation Ordinance --- Under Rule 8, 9 & 21 of Order XI CPC. it is imperative for the defendant to file answer to the interrogatories within seven days or the time as specified by the Court --- and in failure whereof, the adjudicating Court is well within jurisdiction to strike out the right of defence of the defaulting party.