Summary: (a) Defamation Ordinance, 2002 ----Ss. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 & 9, read with Arts. 14 & 19 of the Constitution----Defamation as civil wrong----Concurrent civil and criminal remedies----Right to reputation and freedom of expression----Law and scope----Offence of defamation is provided in S.499, P.P.C. (with S.500 prescribing punishment) while civil defamation has historically been entertained under S.9, C.P.C. as a tort based on justice, equity and good conscience----Defamation Ordinance, 2002 is a special law codifying and consolidating the civil law of defamation, without extinguishing the concurrent tort remedy or the criminal regime under P.P.C.----Under the Ordinance, any wrongful act, publication or circulation of a false oral, written or visual statement that injures a person’s reputation (by lowering him in the estimation of others, or exposing him to ridicule, unjust criticism, hatred, dislike or contempt) is actionable (S.3), and once defamation is proved, publication of defamatory matter is actionable without proof of special damage (S.4)----Court may grant general, special or aggravated damages and order apology or retraction as restorative relief (S.9)----Sections 5, 6 and 7 provide a structured defence framework (truth, fair comment, good faith, absolute and qualified privilege) which balances the right to reputation, a facet of human dignity under Art.14 of the Constitution, against freedom of expression under Art.19, ensuring that truthful, fair and good-faith speech is protected while maliciously injurious speech is not----Civil standard of proof applies, and one appeal lies from the Trial Court’s decision. Cited cases: Liberty Papers Ltd. v. Human Rights Commission of Pakistan PLD 2015 SC 42; Ch. Zulfiqar Ali Cheema v. Farhan Arshad Mir PLD 2015 SC 134; Mir Shakeelur Rehman v. Yahya Bakhtiar PLD 2010 SC 612; Khondkar Abu Taleb v. The State PLD 1967 SC 32; M. Moosa v. Mahomed PLD 1968 SC 25; Adeeb Javedani v. Yahya Bakhtiar 1995 CLC 1246; Capt. Benaras Khan v. Commodore Akhtar Hanif 1988 CLC 1093; Government of Punjab v. Mst. Kamina 1990 CLC 404. (b) Defamation Ordinance, 2002 ----Ss. 2(e), 3 & 4----Defamation----Essential ingredients----Reasonable person test and seriousness of impact test----Standard of proof in civil defamation----To establish a civil claim under the Ordinance, claimant must show: (i) existence of a defamatory statement capable of harming reputation in the eyes of a reasonable person; (ii) reference to or identification of the claimant; and (iii) publication to at least one person other than the claimant----Under S.3, core inquiry is injury to reputation, which may consist of lowering in estimation of others, ridicule, unjust criticism, hatred, dislike or contempt; truth or falsity is not examined at the initial stage of determining injurious character but becomes relevant at the defence stage under S.5----Court must first apply the reasonable person test, i.e. how a reasonable member of society would naturally understand the words in their ordinary meaning, not how the claimant subjectively feels----If the words are capable of bearing a defamatory meaning, court must then apply the seriousness of impact test, requiring proof that the statement actually caused or was likely to cause serious damage to reputation in its real context, assessed through factors such as nature and gravity of the allegation, scale and audience of publication, claimant’s social/professional standing and likely influence on persons who know the claimant----Serious harm may be proved by direct evidence (testimonies showing altered conduct or opinion) or by reasonable inference from surrounding circumstances, but it cannot rest on hypothetical or presumed injury alone----Standard is the civil one, namely balance of probabilities, and criminal concepts or thresholds cannot be imported into civil defamation claims to raise the evidentiary burden beyond that required by the Ordinance----Confusion in earlier case-law between falsity, malice and injury to reputation is clarified and separated by the Court. Cited cases: Muhammad Akram v. Farman Bi PLD 1990 SC 28; Lachaux v. Independent Print Ltd [2019] UKSC 27 (relied upon for serious harm test). (c) Defamation Ordinance, 2002 ----Ss. 2(e), 3, 4, 5(g) & 7----Publication----Internal communication to inquiry committee regarding workplace harassment----Privileged/qualified privileged communication----No wider circulation proved----Whether actionable defamation made out----Respondent, a consultant at the Hospital and Assistant Professor at affiliated medical college, filed suit for Rs.500 million under the Defamation Ordinance, 2002 on the basis of a handwritten letter authored by Petitioner (Medical Director/CEO) and addressed only to a 13-member Inquiry Committee looking into harassment complaints----Letter recounted various incidents and complaints of alleged sexual harassment of female medical officers and students by Respondent----Petitioners admitted authorship and reference to Respondent but pleaded that it was an internal communication placed before the competent Inquiry Committee in connection with an ongoing inquiry, and that it was written in good faith, within official mandate and was privileged----Respondent in plaint pleaded circulation of the letter only to the members of the Inquiry Committee; in evidence he attempted to improve his case by alleging circulation to students and general public, without any supporting evidence or corroboration----Held, evidence beyond pleadings must be disregarded, and no publication beyond the Inquiry Committee was proved----Intended addressees were the members of a formally constituted Inquiry Committee, performing an official duty; for purposes of the reasonable person test, the “reasonable person” in context is a reasonable member of such Inquiry Committee, not the general public----Seen objectively, a reasonable member of the Inquiry Committee would read the letter as information placed before it in the discharge of its inquiry function and not as a defamatory campaign; no material was brought on record to show that, in their estimation, Respondent’s reputation was lowered or that they treated him as a person of diminished standing on account of the letter----Restricted internal communication to a body acting under an official mandate, without proof of wider publication or reputational impact, does not satisfy the ingredients of actionable defamation under Ss.3 and 4 of the Ordinance, particularly when it falls within the protective scope of qualified privilege/good-faith reporting. Cited cases: Rehmat v. Zubaida Begum 2021 SCMR 1534; Nazir Ahmad v. M. Muzaffar Hussain 2008 SCMR 1639 (admissions); Muhammad Aslam v. Muhammad Anwar 2023 SCMR 1371; Pak Suzuki Motors Co. Ltd. v. Faisal Jameel Butt 2023 CLD 934 (evidence beyond pleadings). (d) Protection against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act, 2010 ----S. 4(3)(a), (d) & (e), read with Defamation Ordinance, 2002----Workplace harassment inquiries----Confidentiality of complainants and witnesses----Non-production of victims as witnesses to “prove truth” of harassment allegations in civil defamation suit----Effect----Under S.4(3)(a) of the Act, statements and evidence obtained during a harassment inquiry must remain confidential; under S.4(3)(d) & (e), no adverse action is to be taken against complainant or witnesses and the Inquiry Committee must ensure that no hostile environment is created to pressurize them----Insistence by civil courts that complainant female doctors or students must appear to prove “truth” of harassment allegations in a defamation suit stemming from an internal complaint would undermine statutory confidentiality, expose victims to secondary harassment, and frustrate the protective purpose of the Act----Trial Court and High Court erred in drawing adverse inference against Petitioners merely because the complainant women were not produced as witnesses; such approach was termed “absurd” and contrary to the scheme of the Act----Furthermore, Respondent’s own document (Ex.P-13), a letter from the Dean of the College, confirmed that an inquiry on allegations of sexual harassment against Respondent was pending and that relevant individuals had been called, thereby supporting the existence of complaints and the context in which the impugned letter was written----It was not the function of the defamation court to sit in judgment over the merits of harassment allegations; its remit was confined to examining whether an actionable wrong of defamation, as defined by law, was made out. (e) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) & Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 ----Pleadings, burden of proof and evidentiary threshold in defamation claims----Improvement in testimony beyond pleadings----Injury to reputation, psychological harm and professional loss----Need for proof----Respondent pleaded only that the letter was sent to the Inquiry Committee but, while deposing as PW-1, improved his version by alleging its circulation to students and general public; such improvement being beyond the pleadings and unsupported by any independent witness or documentary proof, could not be relied upon----Respondent relied on his educational qualifications, letters of appreciation and a letter of exoneration from the Dean but produced no evidence that any member of the Inquiry Committee or any other relevant person altered their conduct or opinion towards him on account of the letter, nor that his social or professional standing suffered any concrete or serious setback----Bare assertions of being “perturbed, shocked, mentally stressed” and of family having a “bad impression” were not corroborated and, in any event, were irrelevant to the seriousness of impact test when the publication itself stood confined to an inquiry body and not to family or general public----On the balance of probabilities, Respondent failed to prove publication beyond the limited internal context, failed to prove serious reputational injury even within that context, and failed to substantiate alleged psychological or professional damage----Trial Court and High Court misdirected themselves by declaring the letter defamatory without first applying the reasonable person and seriousness of impact tests to the specific audience, content and context. (f) Defamation Ordinance, 2002 ----Ss. 3, 4, 5(g) & 7----Intention, malice, good faith and privilege----Handwritten internal letter to Inquiry Committee regarding harassment allegations----Whether indicative of malice----Effect----Trial Court inferred malice from the fact that the letter was handwritten and that complainant female doctors were not produced as witnesses, and High Court affirmed, focusing on “malice” rather than on core ingredients of actionable defamation----Supreme Court held such reasoning to be illogical and contrary to the statutory framework; the letter explicitly acknowledged the sensitivity of the issue for female complainants and their families and was written to the Inquiry Committee to maintain confidentiality, not to publicize allegations----Handwritten form, in the circumstances, signified care and responsibility rather than malice----Record showed that complaints of harassment against Respondent were already pending, and the letter merely compiled and transmitted information of concern to the competent forum as part of institutional procedure----On cumulative assessment of correspondence and circumstances, Petitioners’ version of acting in good faith and within institutional process inspired greater confidence on the balance of probabilities----Held, the impugned letter was a privileged communication, made honestly and in good faith to a body charged with investigating workplace harassment; no actionable defamation or injury to reputation stood established----Civil petition was converted into appeal and allowed; judgments and decree of Trial Court and High Court were set aside.

Summary: (a) Law of Torts—Negligence—Res Ipsa Loquitur—Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 9—West Pakistan Motor Vehicles Ordinance, 1965, S. 67 r/w Thirteenth ScheduleClaim for damages arising from a road accident involving a passenger bus—Plaintiffs sought damages amounting to Rs. 100 million alleging negligence on part of the bus company and mechanical defects in the vehicle—Trial Court partly decreed claim under Motor Vehicles Ordinance awarding Rs. 140,000 and Rs. 40,000 to two plaintiffs—Plaintiffs appealed seeking higher compensation—Held, doctrine of res ipsa loquitur not attracted where no conclusive proof of negligence was brought forth—Plaintiffs failed to substantiate their specific allegation of mechanical failure with expert or documentary evidence—Defendant rebutted inference of negligence by producing bus driver, hostess, terminal manager, and maintenance head as witnesses, all confirming fitness of vehicle and attributing accident to fault of third-party vehicle—Maxim res ipsa loquitur merely permits inference of negligence and does not create conclusive presumption—Burden remained on plaintiffs to prove actionable fault, which they failed to discharge—Appeal dismissed.----Cited Cases:• Mst. Kamina v. Al-Amin Goods Transport Agency 1992 SCMR 1715• Pakistan Steel Mills Corp. Ltd. v. Malik Abdul Habib 1993 SCMR 848• Brown v. Rolls Royce Ltd. [1960] 1 All ER 577• Pakistan Television Corp. v. Noor Sanat Shah 2023 SCMR 616• Sardar Yar Muhammad Rind v. Election Tribunal PLD 2020 SC 137**(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 9—Jurisdiction of civil court—Claim under tort—Fatal Accidents Act, 1855, inapplicable in Punjab—Held, while no specific statutory remedy exists in Punjab for recovery of tortious damages, civil court jurisdiction under S. 9 CPC remains intact—Mere absence of codified tort law in Punjab does not oust civil court jurisdiction—Plaintiffs could file suit in tort; however, successful invocation required proof of breach of legally protected rights coupled with proximate causation, which was absent in instant case.----Cited Cases:• SNGPL v. Noor CNG Filling Station 2022 SCMR 1501• Keramat Ali v. Muhammad Yunus Haji PLD 1963 SC 191• Abbasia Cooperative Bank v. Hakeem Rafiz Ghaus PLD 1997 SC 3**(c) Evidence Act (1872), Ss. 101–103—Burden of proof—Civil suit for damages—Claim for special damages requires specific pleading and proof—Plaintiffs failed to produce expert testimony, maintenance records, or credible mechanical evidence—Most documents produced were exhibited through counsel’s statement, depriving opposing party of right to cross-examine—Held, such documents inadmissible as per settled law—Trial court rightly disregarded them—No interference warranted in impugned judgment.----Cited Cases:• Rustam v. Jehangir 2023 SCMR 730• Akhtar Sultana v. Major (R) Muzaffar Khan PLD 2021 SC 715• Manzoor Hussain v. Misri Khan PLD 2020 SC 749• Hameeda Begum v. Irshad Begum 2007 SCMR 996**(d) Jurisprudence—Compassion versus Law—Relief—Courts are bound to adjudicate according to law, not based on subjective sympathy—Despite severe trauma and lifelong disability of Plaintiff No. 1, liability cannot be imposed on mere hardship or misfortune in absence of proven negligence—Held, relief cannot be granted merely on compassionate grounds in disregard of legal standards of evidence and liability.----Cited Cases:• Sundas v. Khyber Medical University 2024 SCMR 46• Superintendent of Police v. Ijaz Aslam 2024 SCMR 1831• POSCO International Corp. v. RIKANS International PLD 2023 LHR 116

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----S. 151 & O. XLI, R. 33---Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances ) Ordinance ( XLVI of 2001 ), Ss. 7(4) & 9---Specific Relief Act (I of 1897), Ss. 42 & 54---Suit for declaration, cancellation, damages and permanent injunction---Right of party---Remedy not granted by the Court---Act(s) of the Subordinate Court(s) not granting relief / right to party---Inherent/ex delicto justitiae powers of High/Appellate Court---Scope---Owner of residential property, through original papers, furnished surety in a criminal case on behalf of two accused persons pursuant to their bail order, however, later he did not receive any final outcome on his application for release of surety, i.e. return of his original property papers---Then, owner received a notice from a non-banking finance leasing company ('Leasing Company') stating that the property was mortgaged to them and they intended to auction the same---Then the owner filed a civil suit for a declaration, etc., before the High Court in its Original Civil Jurisdiction, inter alia, seeking to restraint Leasing Company from auction / sale of the property but the Single Judge returned the plaint, with an observation to approach the court of proper jurisdiction---Then the owner approached the Banking Court and filed suit seeking redressal of his grievance, however, when the matter proceeded to the final arguments the Judge-Banking Court, while holding that the Banking Court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter, returned the plaint with the direction to file the same before the (civil) court of competent jurisdiction---Owner/Appellant approached Appellate / High Court---Validity---Banking Court, undoubtedly, has authority to decide its own jurisdiction as provided in S. 7(4) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances ) Ordinance, 2001 ('the Ordinance 2001') being a special law; the jurisdiction of which (Banking Court) is only invoked when there is dispute between a financial institution and a customer, as defined under the Ordinance 2001---In the present case, it is an accepted position that the appellant does not fall into either category, which forms the basis of the impugned judgment and return of the plaint---Both the Courts (Civil and Banking), at separate times, have returned the plaint to the appellant, in essence leaving the appellant non-suited; which is contrary to the provisions of law and natural justice, i.e. ubi jus ibi remedium, meaning where there is a right, there is a remedy---Similarly, "actus curiae neminem gravabit" means an act of court should prejudice no man, both the said principles would be called into effect to the aid of the appellant to support him in present matter---Mere technicalities cannot forgo justice, nor can technicalities be allowed to operate as tyrant masters so as to frustrate genuine claims as it remains incumbent upon a court to remedy any wrong suffered by a litigant---Additionally, the High /Appellate Court holds inherent jurisdiction and power, the Court remains duty-bound to ensure that complete justice is done and technicalities are avoided---Such power has been granted vide statute, i.e. under S. 151 as well as O. XLI, R. 33, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908---Additionally, the Appellate Court can also act ex delicto justiciae and supply for an omission in any procedure---The Appellate Court exercises powers to make such orders to cover ostensibly impossible situations for complete dispensation of justice---The appellant has been in pursuit of his property, which has eluded him for nearly 20 years, and the matter to-date remains in limbo---The Appellant is no better off today than he was 20 years ago, despite pursuing his matter before the courts of law---It would by any standard be unjust, if the appellant was not aided to conclude his claim---Thus, to serve a more reasonable and justiciable purpose, High / Appellate Court, while invoking inherent powers, transferred the suit filed by Appellant from the Banking Court to the relevant Civil Court holding pecuniary and territorial jurisdiction over the Property; the matter would commence at the stage of Final Arguments on the basis of evidence already adduced by both the parties---Appeal was disposed of accordingly. 2016 CLD 461; 2003 CLD 1026; 2003 CLD 1843; 2007 CLD 1532; 2004 CLD 689; 2023 SCMR 1451; 2024 CLD 1099; Dr. Asma Noreen Syed v. Government of the Punjab and others 2022 SCMR 1546; Abid Jan v. Ministry of Defence and others 2023 SCMR 1451; Particular reference can be made under Articles 4, 8, 10-A, 23, 24 and 25; Abdul Qudoos v. Commandant Frontier Constabulary KPK, Peshawar and another 2023 SCMR 1334; Messrs Grain System v. Agricultural Development Bank 1993 SCMR 1996, 2004 SCMR 108; 2010 CLD 981; 2009 CLD 172 and 2022 SCMR 870 ref. (b) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Arts. 4, 8, 10-A, 23, 24 & 25---Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), S. 9---Specific Relief Act (I of 1897), Ss. 42 & 54---Suit for a declaration, etc. cancellation, damages and permanent injunction---Right of party---Remedy not granted by the Court---Act(s) of the Subordinate Court(s) not granting relief / right to party---Fundamental rights of litigant---Scope---Owner provided his residential property, through original papers, as a surety in a criminal case on behalf of two accused persons pursuant to their bail order, however, later he did not receive any final outcome on his application for release of surety, i.e. return of his original property papers---Then, owner received a notice from a non-banking finance leasing company ('Leasing Company') stating that the Property was mortgaged to them, and they intended to auction the same---Then the owner filed a Civil Suit for a declaration, etc. before the High Court in its Original Civil Jurisdiction, inter alia, seeking to restraint Leasing Company from auction / sale of the Property but the Single Judge returned the Plaint, with an observation to approach the court of proper jurisdiction---Then the owner approached the Banking Court and filed Suit seeking redressal of his grievance, however , when the matter proceeded to the final arguments the Judge-Banking Court, while holding that it (Banking Court) did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter, returned the Plaint with the direction to file the same before the (civil) court of competent jurisdiction---Owner / Appellant approached Appellate / High Court---Validity---It is abundantly clear that distress has been caused to the Appellant, due to the various courts below sending him from pillar to post in an attempt to safeguard his own Property---Said actions also appear violative to Appellants' rights having been guaranteed under Arts. 4, 8, 10-A, 23, 24 and 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan---Appellant has now been left in a situation whereby his Property appears to be lost in an abyss, not through any fault of his own, but due to actions of the courts below in returning his plaint---Mere technicalities cannot forgo justice, nor can technicalities be allowed to operate as tyrant masters so as to frustrate genuine claims---Thus, to serve a more reasonable and justiciable purpose High/Appellate Court, while invoking inherent powers, the Suit filed by Appellant from the Banking Court to the relevant Civil Court holding pecuniary and territorial jurisdiction over the Property; the matter would commence at the stage of Final Arguments on the basis of evidence already adduced by both the parties---Appeal was disposed of accordingly. Particular reference can be made under Articles 4, 8, 10-A, 23, 24 and 25 ref. Abdul Shakoor and Fahad Ali for Appellant. Nemo for Respondents. Date of hearing: 11th February, 2025.

Summary: (a) Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 – Negligence – Vicarious Liability: ----Suit for damages filed under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 by the legal heirs of two deceased individuals who lost their lives in a road accident caused by the negligent driving of a dumper truck by Defendant No.1 (Driver) – Defendant No.1, while operating a heavy vehicle with only an LTV license, negligently collided with a motorcycle, causing the death of both riders – Defendant No.2 (Owner) permitted the Driver to operate the vehicle despite his lack of qualification, thereby making him vicariously liable – Plaintiffs sought damages amounting to Rs. 50,400,000/-. (b) Burden of Proof – Application of "Res Ipsa Loquitur": ----Plaintiffs successfully established the factum of the accident – Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, once the accident was proven, the burden shifted upon the Defendants to disprove negligence – Defendants failed to appear in civil proceedings despite participating in related criminal proceedings – The absence of cross-examination on the Plaintiffs' evidence led to an adverse presumption against the Defendants under Article 129 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 – Factum of accident held to be established. Cited Cases: • Najma Parveen v. Karachi Transport Corporation (2004 MLD 518) • Ehteshamuddin Qureshi v. Pakistan Steel Mills Corporation (2004 MLD 361) • Pakistan Steel Mills Corporation Ltd. v. Malik Abdul Habib (1993 SCMR 848) • Punjab Road Transport Corporation v. Zahid Afzal (2006 SCMR 207) (c) Composite Negligence – Liability of Vehicle Owner: ----Owner of the vehicle held jointly and severally liable with the Driver under the doctrine of composite negligence – As the vehicle was negligently entrusted to an unqualified driver, the Owner became liable for damages arising from his actions – Supreme Court precedent confirmed that a master is liable for the tortious acts of his servant within the scope of employment – Both Defendants ordered to pay damages jointly and severally. Cited Cases: • National Logistics Cell v. Irfan Khan (2015 SCMR 1406) • Pakistan Railways v. Abdul Haqique (1991 SCMR 657) (d) Computation of Damages – Life Expectancy – Loss of Earning Capacity: ----Court computed damages based on the victims' assumed life expectancy of 65 years – Victim No.1’s monthly income taken as Rs.50,000, and damages calculated for remaining 32 years – Victim No.2’s earnings were estimated post-majority at the same rate, resulting in total damages of Rs.47,400,000/- – Defendants ordered to pay additional markup at 15% per annum from the date of suit till realization – Decretal amount to be distributed among legal heirs as per Shariah law. ----Disposition: Suit decreed. Defendants held jointly and severally liable for damages, with markup at 15% per annum until realization.

Summary: Background: This case involves a dispute between an employee of Pakistan International Airlines Corporation (PIA) and the airline regarding the non-payment of post-retirement benefits, including provident fund, gratuity, pension, and damages. The employee, after serving PIA for over 37 years, sought early retirement but faced delays in receiving his retirement benefits due to an inquiry initiated by PIA alleging abuse of power and wrongful inductions. The employee filed a suit seeking recovery of his retirement benefits and damages for the mental agony caused by the delay. The Civil Court ruled in favor of the employee, awarding him retirement benefits and damages, which PIA subsequently challenged in this appeal. -----Issues: 1- Whether the Civil Court's judgment in favor of the respondent for recovery of post-retirement benefits and damages was justified. ----2- Whether the inquiry initiated against the respondent justified the withholding of his retirement benefits. ----3- Whether the award of Rs. 3 million in damages for mental agony and delay in payment was appropriate, given the lack of specific evidence regarding the loss suffered. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Islamabad High Court upheld the Civil Court’s judgment, concluding that the respondent was entitled to post-retirement benefits, and the withholding of these benefits by PIA was unlawful. The inquiry against the respondent was found to be unjustified, as there was no evidence proving his involvement in any wrongdoing. It was also established that PIA could not conduct an inquiry against a retired employee under the terms of employment. Regarding the damages, the Court ruled that general damages for mental agony and suffering could be granted even in the absence of specific evidence. The awarded sum of Rs. 3 million was deemed reasonable, considering the financial and emotional impact on the respondent due to the delay in receiving his benefits. The appeal was dismissed, and the Court further ordered that interest be paid on the damages and the decretal amount from the date of judgment until the final payment. Additionally, the respondent was awarded litigation costs of Rs. 500,000. -----Citations/Precedents: A. Ismailjee & Sons Ltd. Vs. Pakistan (PLD 1986 SC 499) Miss Irshad Jehan vs. P.N.S.C (1999 CLC 192) Pakistan International Airlines Corporation vs. Syed Ali Raza Rizvi (1996 CLC 627) Abdul Qadir vs. S. K. Abbas Hussain (PLD 1997 Karachi 566) M/s Emirates Airline vs. Daoud Shami (PLD 2003 Lahore 358) Mrs. Zahra Zaidi vs. M. Anwar Khan Ghauri (2004 CLC 223) Muhammad Sharif vs. Nawab Din (PLD 1957 (W.P) Lahore 283) Abdul Majeed Khan vs. Tawseen Abdul Haleem (2012 PLC (C.S) 574) Islamic Republic of Pakistan vs. Sh. Nawab Din (2003 CLC 991) Gohar Ali vs. M/s Hoechst Pakistan Limited (PLJ 2009 SC 303) Habib Bank Limited vs. Mehboob Rabbani (2023 SCMR 1189) Sufi Muhammad Ishaque vs. The Metropolitan Corporation Lahore (PLD 1996 SC 737)

Summary: Summary Pending - related to unnecessary adjournments.

Summary: Essentials of (a) Tort—Malicious Prosecution—Civil damages claim after criminal acquittal—Essential elements— Respondents instituted a suit for damages alleging malicious prosecution after Respondent No.1 was acquitted in a criminal case lodged by Appellant—Court reiterated that to succeed in a claim of malicious prosecution, plaintiff must prove: (i) prosecution by defendant; (ii) absence of reasonable and probable cause; (iii) malice; (iv) termination of proceedings in plaintiff’s favour; and (v) damage suffered—Held, mere benefit of doubt acquittal does not preclude civil claim for malicious prosecution—Initiation of prosecution after full settlement, lack of CCTV evidence, and no bank records supported inference of malice—Suit rightly decreed by learned Single Judge. (b) Evidence Act, 1872 ----Adverse inference—Failure to produce crucial documentary evidence— Appellant alleged fraudulent withdrawal of Rs.785,000/- by Respondent No.1 but failed to produce bank statements or CCTV footage—Admitted in cross-examination that partial restitution was received and acknowledged in affidavit—Held, such omissions and admissions seriously undermined the credibility of the prosecution case and reinforced inference of lack of probable cause. **(c) Criminal Law—Acquittal—Honourable vs. simpliciter acquittal— Court held that all acquittals, whether on merit or benefit of doubt, are honourable—No legal distinction exists between types of acquittal in context of malicious prosecution—Relying on Dr. Muhammad Islam v. Govt. of NWFP, 2006 SCMR 1455, court emphasized that failure to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt confers right to sue for wrongful prosecution. Disposition: Appeal dismissed—Judgment and decree awarding Rs.3 million in general damages for malicious prosecution, along with 10% markup and suit costs, upheld—Appellant ordered to pay Rs.35,000/- in costs to Respondents within 20 days. Cited Authorities / Precedents: • Dr. Muhammad Islam v. Government of NWFP (2006 SCMR 1455) • Faraz Naveed v. DPO Gujrat (PLD 2022 SC 553) • Suit No. 434/2019; FIR No. 56/2011 • Elements of Malicious Prosecution: See para 10 of judgment

Summary: Background: The appellants, M.L. Traders, challenged the consolidated judgment and decree dated 28.07.2015 by the Banking Court, which decreed the recovery suit filed by the respondent, Habib Bank Ltd., for Rs.7,268,401 against a claimed amount of Rs.10,306,894. The appellants’ suit for damages of Rs.32,817,314 was dismissed. The dispute arose from a letter of credit (L/C) No.800371/0813 dated 13.09.1997, under which the appellants alleged the financial institution acted contrary to the terms by allowing transshipment. -----Issues: 1- Whether the financial institution was under a legal obligation to make payment to the beneficiary under the Credit arrangement despite a violation of the prohibition of transshipment. 2- Whether the payment made by the financial institution was contrary to the terms of the Credit. 3- Whether the appellants were liable to repay the amounts disbursed by the financial institution. 4- Whether the conversion of PAD (Payment against Documents) to FIM (Finance against Imported Merchandise) was valid. 5- The effect of non-presentation of drafts with the documents. 6- The role and responsibility of the Insurance company regarding the damaged goods. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: ---Obligation of the Financial Institution: The court emphasized that the enforceability of the financial institution's obligation under the Credit arrangement, despite the prohibition of transshipment, needed to be evaluated under Article 23 of UCP 500. The Banking Court failed to undertake such an inquiry. ---Payment Contrary to Credit Terms: The court noted that there was a failure to examine the terms of the bill of lading in the context of the prohibition of transshipment in the Credit. The Banking Court did not consider whether the bill of lading provided continuous cover from the port of shipment to the port of discharge or whether it contained any specific disclaimer regarding transshipment. ---Liability of the Appellants: The court observed that the Banking Court did not properly address the appellants' liability to repay the amounts disbursed by the financial institution, especially considering the alleged breach of the Credit terms. ---Conversion of PAD to FIM: The court identified the need to determine the legality of converting PAD to FIM and whether the doctrine of novation applied, which was not addressed by the Banking Court. ---Non-Presentation of Drafts: The court highlighted that the non-presentation of drafts with the documents needed to be examined to determine compliance with the Credit terms. ----Insurance Company's Role: The court noted the importance of evaluating the role and responsibility of the Insurance company regarding the alleged damage to the goods. The court set aside the impugned judgment and decree dated 28.07.2015 and remanded the matter to the Banking Court. The Banking Court was directed to frame additional issues regarding the observations made and call upon the parties to lead evidence on these issues. The suits were to be decided afresh on merits without being influenced by any observations made in the appeal decision. The appeal of the financial institution (RFA No.1443/2015) was rendered infructuous. -----Citations/Precedents: Master Muhammad Bashir vs. Moinuddin (1990 CLC 703) Muhammad Arshad Khan vs. Chairman, M.D.A and 6 others (1997 MLD 3066) Bashir Ahmad vs. Abdul Wahid (PLD 1995 Lahore 98) Habib Bank Limited vs. Judge Banking Court and others (2015 CLD 1875) Crescent Leasing Corporation Limited vs. Messrs Sarhad Goods Transport Company (2013 CLD 854) Rehmatullah Khan and another vs. Ghulam Farid and others (2009 SCMR 371) Administration Municipal Corporation, Multan vs. Haider Zaman Qureshi (2012 MLD 948) Shah Nawaz and another vs. Nawab Khan (PLD 1976 SC 767) MCB Bank Limited vs. Sunshine Cloth Limited (C.O.S No. 152/2010) United Bank Limited vs. Messrs Ilyas Enterprises (2004 CLD 1338) Messrs Sazco (Pvt) Ltd vs. Askari Commercial Bank Limited (2021 SCMR 558) S.A. Hameed and others vs. Allied Bank of Pakistan Limited (2004 CLD 1620) Habib Bank Limited vs. Tauqeer Ahmed Siddiqui and another (2009 CLD 312) ----Quote: Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits (1993 Revision), International Chamber of Commerce, Publication No.500

Summary: This case involved two separate criminal appeals adjudicated jointly by a Division Bench of the Islamabad High Court. Both appeals originated from decisions made by the Islamabad Consumer Court concerning its jurisdiction and authority under the Islamabad Consumer Protection Act, 1995, specifically relating to its ability to award general and special damages and litigation costs. The appeals challenged the Consumer Court's refusal to award damages beyond the direct costs related to the transactions in question. ---Issues: Does the Islamabad Consumer Protection Act empower the Consumer Court to award general and special damages, including litigation costs? Do the claims for damages by the appellants fit within the ambit of "unfair trade practices" under the Act? ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Consumer Court under the Islamabad Consumer Protection Act is authorized to award compensation for any damages or losses suffered as a result of unfair trade practices, which includes general and special damages, as well as litigation costs. The term "any damage or loss" in Section 9(3) of the Act has a broad scope, encompassing all forms of damages that a consumer might suffer due to unfair trade practices. The necessity to seek separate legal recourse for different types of damages related to the same incident would lead to procedural multiplicity and hardship, which the Act aims to prevent. The appeals were allowed, and the judgments of the lower court were set aside. The matters were remanded to the Consumer Court for further proceedings in accordance with the findings regarding the Consumer Court’s broader compensatory powers. ----Citations/Precedents: Ashfaq Ahmed Khan v. PTCL [PLD 2016 Islamabad 112]: Previously followed by the Consumer Court, it limited the award of damages to actual losses and did not recognize general damages. Waqas and Brothers Enterprises (Private Limited) v. Messrs DHL Express and another [PLD 2021 Islamabad 333]: This case influenced the decision by establishing that damages could be granted by the Consumer Court. M/s Multiline Associates vs. Ardeshir Cowasjee [PLD 1995 SC 423]: Referenced by the Single Bench in referring the matter to a larger bench for authoritative interpretation. Lucknow Development Authority v. M.K. Gupta [AIR 1994 Supreme Court 787]: Discussed the significance of the word "any" in legal terms, emphasizing its broad amplitude. Noman Ahmed and others v. Capital Development Authority [PLD 2021 Islamabad 75]: Cited for the definition of compensation and damages. Mehr Ashraf v. Station House Officer [PLD 2022 Lahore 328]: Used to illustrate the purpose of compensation and damages in restoring a person to their pre-injury status. TCS (Private) Limited v. Mst. Haseena Begum [PLD 2022 Lahore 524]: Supported the recoverability of special and general damages under consumer protection legislation. Consumer Unity & Trust Society, Jaipur v. The Chairman & Managing Director, Bank of Baroda, Calcutta [(1995) 2 SCC 150]: Indian Supreme Court case that described 'loss' as a generic term. Muhammad Akram v. Mst. Farman Bi [PLD 1990 SC 28]: Supreme Court case discussing the nature of litigation costs.

Summary: (a) Tort—Malicious Prosecution—Essential elements—Acquittal on benefit of doubt—Effect— Plaintiff (appellant) claimed damages of Rs. 59 million alleging malicious prosecution by ex-wife (respondent No.1), following his acquittal in a private criminal complaint. Held, to sustain a claim for malicious prosecution, plaintiff must prove: (i) malice; (ii) lack of reasonable and probable cause; (iii) prosecution on criminal charge; (iv) termination in plaintiff’s favour; (v) interference with liberty or reputation; and (vi) resultant damages—Acquittal based on benefit of doubt does not establish falsity or malice—Court found that complaint was not declared false and was based on allegations relating to misrepresentation in marriage—No evidence of malice or improper motive produced—Ingredients of malicious prosecution not established. (b) Evidence Act, 1872—Standard of proof in malicious prosecution suits—Failure to testify personally—Consequences— Plaintiff did not enter the witness box; instead, his attorney and one other witness testified without producing documentary evidence—Held, failure of plaintiff to personally appear and lead direct evidence weakens the claim—Cross-examination exposed material contradictions—No cogent proof of damage, reputational loss, or special injury provided. (c) Damages—General vs. Special—Requirement of strict proof— General damages require proof of direct and proximate consequences; special damages require concrete evidence of actual loss—In this case, both were unsubstantiated—Held, in absence of proven malicious intent and causative damage, claim for both general and special damages fails—Trial court rightly dismissed the suit. -----Disposition: Appeal Dismissed—Trial court’s decree upheld—No interference warranted as no illegality or misreading of evidence found—Claim for damages for malicious prosecution held unfounded—No order as to costs. Cited Authorities / Precedents: PLD 2016 SC 478 (Muhammad Yousaf v. Abdul Qayyum) PLD 2002 SC 1060 (Mumtaz Ali Shah case) 1999 SCMR 734 (UBL v. Raja Ghulam Hussain) AIR 1944 PC 1 (Raja Braja Sunder Deb v. Bamdeb Das) 1999 SCMR 700 (Subedar (R) Fazale Rahim v. Rab Nawaz) 2012 CLD 6 PLD 1994 SC 476 (Abdul Rauf v. Abdul Razzak)