Summary: Punjab Consumer Protection Act (II of 2005)--- ----S.31(g)---Powers of Consumer Court to award lawyers' fee incurred in pre-remand proceedings before the superior courts---Scope---Granting of lawyer's fee by the Consumer Court incurred in pre-remand proceedings before the superior court would amount to exceeding its jurisdiction and mandate of S. 31(g) of the Punjab Consumer Protection Act, 2005---Facts in brevity were that respondent No.2 (consumer) filed a complaint before the Consumer Court against the appellant bank (service provider), alleging defective and sub-standard services regarding an ATM machine and a debit card issued by the bank---The Consumer Court initially returned the complaint for want of jurisdiction, however, the Supreme Court of Pakistan subsequently confirmed the Consumer Court's jurisdiction and directed it to decide the case---Upon remand, the Consumer Court partially accepted the complaint and awarded (i) Rs. 1,500 for the cost of the debit card; (ii) Rs. 50,000 as compensation for non-utilization of the ATM Card; (iii) Rs. 15,000 as litigation charges; (iv) Rs. 100,000 and Rs. 500,000 as lawyers' fees for proceedings before the High Court and the Supreme Court of Pakistan, respectively---The bank filed the present appeal choosing not to press the challenge to the amounts awarded under the first three heads and solely contested the award of lawyers' fees related to the proceedings before the High Court and the Supreme Court---Pivotal question for determination before the High Court was as to "whether the Consumer Court, under S. 31(g) of the Punjab Consumer Protection Act, 2005 (the "Act 2005"), had jurisdiction to award lawyers' fees incurred by a litigant in pre-remand proceedings before superior courts, in addition to costs related to proceedings before the Consumer Court itself"---Held: Awarding lawyers' fee by the Consumer Court to respondent No.2 (consumer) incurred by him to plead his case before the High Court as well as the Supreme Court of Pakistan amounted to exceeding its jurisdiction and stepping into the jurisdiction of superior courts as it was an admitted fact that the Supreme Court of Pakistan had not allowed civil petition filed by respondent No.2 with costs---Awarding fee of lawyers who pleaded the case of respondent No.2 before the High Court as well as the Supreme Court of Pakistan amounted to altering and modifying the judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan which was not covered under S. 31(g) of the Act, 2005---Consumer Court could exercise jurisdiction only to its own extent qua complaints filed before it---Consumer Court, being a subordinate court, could only determine the actual costs of litigation incurred by a litigant in relation to the proceedings pending before it and not the costs incurred during the proceedings before another court, such as the High Court or the Supreme Court of Pakistan---Impugned judgment was set aside to the extent of grant of lawyers' fee to respondent No.2 (consumer) incurred by him before the High Court as well as the Supreme Court of Pakistan---Appeal was partly allowed, in circumstances. M. Wisal Khan for Appellant. Respondent No.2 proceeded against ex parte vide order dated 25.03.2024. Date of hearing: 26th May, 2025.

Summary: (a) Punjab Consumer Protection Act (II of 2005)--- ----Ss. 28(4) & 35---Consumer complaints, limitation of---Filing of claims beyond period of thirty days---Scope---Discretion of Consumer Court to allow or extend limitation period beyond thirty days where there is sufficient cause for not filing the claim within time---Plea of dismissal of claim being frivolous and vexatious---Claim being time barred does not mean same is frivolous and vexatious---Facts in brevity where that the petitioner/service provider (respondent before the Consumer Court) challenged an order of the Consumer Court refusing to summarily dismiss a complaint filed against it by respondent No. 2---Petitioner argued that the complaint was time-barred, as the limitation period under S. 28(4) of the Punjab Consumer Protection Act, 2005 (the "Act 2005") was thirty days from the accrual of cause of action, referring to case reported as PLD 2023 SC 482 titled Pak Suzuki Motors Co. Ltd. v. Faisal Jameel Butt) and also sought dismissal of the complaint under S. 35 of the Act 2005 on grounds that the claim was frivolous or vexatious---Held: The limitation period provided under S. 28(4) of the Act 2005, for filing a claim, was thirty days from the date of accrual of cause of action, however, the said period of limitation was not so absolute as to leave no room for filing claim beyond the stipulated period of thirty days as evident from the first proviso to S. 28(4) of the Act 2005, which vested discretion within the court to allow a claim to be filed within such time as the court might allow, if it was satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing the complaint within the specified period---Similarly, the second proviso provided an upper ceiling of sixty days from the expiry of warranty or guarantee and if no period was specified one year from the date of purchase of the product or providing of services---Thus, the legislature in its wisdom had conferred discretion for extending the limitation for filing of a claim beyond the stipulated period of thirty days---The case of 'Pak Suzuki Motors' relied upon by the petitioner was hardly of any help as it was enunciated therein that the limitation period of thirty days was to run from the date of accrual of case of action, however, the said case by no means denuded the Trial Court from its discretionary power of extension of limitation period vested under the law---In the present case, the respondent also filed an application for condonation of delay, asserting that negotiations were ongoing between the parties regarding compensation---These facts rendered the limitation as a mixed question of law and fact, which could not be adjudicated in summary manner, without recording of evidence, hence, case of 'Pak Suzuki Motors' was not applicable, on account of distinguishable facts---As far as the plea for dismissal of complaint being frivolous and vexatious was concerned it sufficed that such terms did not encompass matters where there existed a genuine legal issue, even if that issue pertained to limitation---A complaint that was barred by time may ultimately fail on legal grounds, but it does not, on that count becomes frivolous or vexatious when relationship of customer-service provider is admitted and the claims that were hit by limitation must be addressed under the scheme provided in S. 28 of the Act 2005---A complaint that might have been time barred would not per se be frivolous---The conjunctive reading of Ss. 28 and 35 of the Act, 2005 showed that claims which are frivolous and vexatious were to be dismissed and did not encompass within its purview such cases where the court below was vested with the discretion to extend limitation provided by the law---Thus, the Trial Court was justified in holding that the plea of limitation could not be resolved without examining the application for condonation of delay---Trial Court was directed to consider whether the explanation furnished in the application for condonation of delay met the standard under S. 28 of the Act, 2005 and to render a reasoned finding on the applicability of the limitation periods contemplated thereunder and its extension; and determine, whether the complaint of the respondent was within time---Petition was dismissed in limine, in circumstances. Pak Suzuki Motors Company Limited through Manager v. Faisal Jameel Butt and another PLD 2023 SC 482 rel. Muhammad Ashraf v. Sheikh Muhammad Akram and others 2022 CLD 638 ref. (b) Punjab Consumer Protection Act (II of 2005)--- ----S. 35---Consumer complaints---Frivolous or vexatious claims, dismissal of---Terms "frivolous and "vexatious"---Definitions---Where a claim is found to be frivolous or vexatious, the Consumer Court shall dismiss the claim and impose fine on the claimant up to an amount not exceeding ten thousand rupees for having willfully instituted a false claim and shall award appropriate compensation to the defendant from the amount of fine so realized---This provision is aimed at curbing baseless or malicious complaints---The terms "frivolous" and "vexatious", as used in S. 35 of the Punjab Consumer Protection Act, 2005 carry distinct legal connotations---According to Black's Law Dictionary (Tenth Edition by Bryan A. Garnder) a "frivolous" action is one that lacks any legal basis or merit and is often brought to harass or embarrass the opposing party, and a "vexatious" proceeding, similarly, refers to one instituted without probable cause, primarily intended to cause inconvenience or expense to the defendant. Barrister Hammad-ur-Rehman Mazari assisted by Saif Ahmed Qureshi and Mohammad Hassan Shaigan for Petitioner.

Summary: (a) Punjab Consumer Protection Act (II of 2005)--- ----S. 33---Judgment passed by the Consumer Court---Appeal, filing of---Limitation--- Sufficient cause---Scope---Appellant (air-conditioner seller) filed appeal against the order passed by the Consumer Court with a delay of 41 days---Appellant filed application seeking condonation of delay---Contention of the applicant/appellant, while attaching a travel history (proof of tickets), was that he was out of country at the time of passing of adverse orders in the matter and was not even available in Pakistan at the time of announcement of the impugned order---Validity---Contents of the appli cation seeking condonation of delay drew an inference that the reason assigned was inexplicit, general and not true, which was neither permissible nor satisfactory to convince the Court to condone the delay in filing the appeal---Appellant had placed on the record contrary documents, which could not strengthen his cause---Appellant opted the stance that the impugned order was passed in his absence, when he was abroad, however, his travel history revealed that, he came back to Pakistan after four days of passing of the impugned order, meaning thereby, that prima facie he had knowledge of passing of the impugned order---In terms of S. 33 of the Punjab Consumer Protection Act, 2005 ('the Act 2005'), any person aggrieved may file an appeal within 30 days against final order of the Consumer Court passing such an order---The rationale behind said provision is to ensure that judgments become conclusive within a reasonable timeframe to prevent indefinite litigation and fair opportunity for appeal---Aggrieved party is granted adequate time to challenge an order while maintaining procedural discipline that statutory limitation periods are not mere technicalities but substantive provisions that serve to promote finality in litigation and judicial efficiency---Even, from perusal of travel history of the appellant, it was manifestly clear that he was available in Pakistan, during the last /cut-off date(s) of limitation for challenging the impugned order, thus, stance of the appellant appeared to be intangible---The appellant's failure to challenge the impugned order within the prescribed time despite being available in the country during the relevant period reflected a lack of diligence in pursuing his legal remedy---The explanation offered for the delay, in light of the appellant's presence in Pakistan, did not appear to be convincing or sufficient to justify the delay in filing the appeal---Law is well settled that mere filing of an application for condonation of delay is not sufficient to persuade the Court to condone the delay in preferring an appeal---The object of law of limitation is to help the vigilant and not the indolent---Law of limitation is required to be construed strictly and the delay of each day has to be explained---Appellant had to satisfy as to why he took about 41 days to prefer present appeal against the impugned order of the Consumer Court---The reasons provided in the application for condonation of delay did not constitute a sufficient cause within the meaning of law---Thus, in the absence of sufficient cause, a time-barred appeal must be dismissed---Application for condonation of delay being merit-less, was dismissed along with the appeal. Ghulam Sarwar through L.Rs. v. Province of Punjab through District Collector, Lodhran PLD 2025 SC 60 ref. (b) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)--- ----S. 5---Condonation of delay----Circumstances---Scope---Law mandates strict adherence to limitation period---Courts possess discretion to condone delay in exceptional circumstances---Said discretion, however, must be exercised sparingly and cautiously---A party seeking condonation must prove that the delay resulted from circumstances beyond its control, such as, force majeure events (e.g., natural disasters, unforeseen emergencies); court closures due to extraordinary circumstances; legal impediments preventing timely filing---A casual approach or mere administrative lapses do not constitute sufficient cause for condonation of delay---If the delay is found to be intentional, avoidable or due to negligence, the appeal must be dismissed---The doctrine of limitation is based on the principle that "condonation of delay is an exception, not the rule"---Impediments of limitation cannot be traversed under pretense of hardships or imaginary inherent discretionary jurisdiction of the Court---Negligence, mistake or hardship do not save from limitation nor does poverty of the parties. Khushi Muhammad through L.Rs. and others v. Mst. Fazal Bibi and others PLD 2016 SC 872 ref. (c) Punjab Consumer Protection Act (II of 2005)--- ----Ss. 33 & 34---Judgment passed by the Consumer Court---Filing of appeal beyond period of limitation---Finality of order---Effect---Appellant (air-conditioner seller ) filed appeal against the order passed by the Consumer Court with a delay of 41 days---Validity---Section 34 of the Punjab Consumer Protection Act, 2005 ('the Act 2005'), deals with the finality of order---Said provision in consumer law is acknowledged as finality clause which stipulates that once the statutory appeal period, typically 30 days, expires, the judicial order issued by the Consumer Court attains finality and becomes legally enforceable---Said provision is crucial for upholding judicial discipline, preventing the misuse of appellate mechanisms and ensuring that justice is not indefinitely delayed---Without such a clause, Courts would be susceptible to an influx of untimely or repetitive appeals, which could obstruct the prompt enforcement of consumer remedies and exacerbate judicial backlog---Through imposition of a fixed limitation period for appeals, the legal framework provides certainty and closure to both parties, ensuring that judicial orders rest on a firm legal foundation---Said requirement compels aggrieved parties to act within the prescribed timeframe, discouraging dilatory tactics designed to evade legal obligations---The strict enforcement of appeal deadlines except in exceptional circumstances is vital for preserving the efficiency of judicial proceedings and safeguarding consumer rights---Ultimately, the finality clause functions as a legal safeguard that solidifies the binding nature of judicial orders once the appeal period lapses, thereby promoting the expeditious resolution of consumer disputes and reinforcing stability as well as predictability of legal proceedings---Appellant had badly failed to substantiate his claim for condonation of delay in filing the appeal---Application for condonation of delay being merit-less was dismissed along with the appeal. Abid Ali Bodla for Appellant.

Summary: (a) Competition Act, 2010 – Section 10(2)(c) Deceptive Marketing Practices – Misleading Advertisement – Frozen Desserts vs. Ice Cream The Competition Commission of Pakistan (CCP) imposed penalties of PKR 75 million each on M/s Unilever Pakistan and M/s Friesland Campina Engro for misleading consumers by falsely advertising their frozen desserts as "ice cream." The CCP referred to the PSQCA PS 969-2010 and the Punjab Pure Food Regulations 2018, which distinguish "frozen dessert" from "ice cream." While "ice cream" is made from dairy products, "frozen desserts" are prepared using vegetable oils. The companies were directed to cease deceptive advertisements and ensure compliance with Section 10(2)(c) of the Competition Act. (b) False Health Comparisons – Misleading Claims M/s Unilever Pakistan was further penalized PKR 20 million for promoting false health comparisons of its products as healthier alternatives to traditional dairy ice cream. The CCP found this claim in violation of Section 10(2)(c) of the Competition Act. (c) Compliance and Remedial Measures The CCP directed both undertakings to desist from presenting frozen desserts as ice cream in their advertisements. They were also required to remove such misleading advertisements from all platforms and ensure transparency in future marketing practices. Cited Standards and Regulations: PSQCA PS 969-2010 Punjab Pure Food Regulations, 2018 International references: USA FDA regulations, Australia, and Indian quality standards. Disposition: The CCP imposed a total penalty of PKR 170 million on the undertakings and mandated compliance reports to be submitted within 30 days.

Summary: (a) Punjab Consumer Protection Act, 2005, S. 28(4) Limitation—Filing of complaints—Application of the Limitation Act, 1908 The petitioner’s complaint regarding missing family baggage was dismissed on the ground of limitation. The Supreme Court affirmed that under section 28(4) of the Punjab Consumer Protection Act, 2005, a claim must be filed within 30 days of the cause of action. While the proviso allows a Consumer Court to condone delays upon showing sufficient cause, the petitioner failed to provide a valid justification. The Court clarified that section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908, which provides for condonation of delay, does not apply to the Consumer Court proceedings under the Act of 2005. The argument that section 5 of the Limitation Act was applicable was based on a misconception of law. (b) Limitation Act, 1908, Ss. 3 & 29(2) Exclusion of Limitation Act provisions in special or local laws The Supreme Court reiterated that section 29(2) of the Limitation Act excludes the application of section 5 for condonation of delay in cases governed by special or local laws, such as the Punjab Consumer Protection Act, 2005. The Consumer Protection Act provides its own mechanism for addressing delays, rendering the Limitation Act inapplicable in these circumstances. Disposition: The petition was dismissed for lack of merit, and leave to appeal was refused. ----- Legal Principles: Section 28(4) of the Punjab Consumer Protection Act governs limitation for filing complaints and allows condonation of delay only if sufficient cause is shown. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply to proceedings under the Punjab Consumer Protection Act, 2005, as it is excluded by section 29(2) of the Limitation Act.

Summary: Background: This case involves M/s Options International (SMC-Pvt.) Ltd, which was penalized by the Competition Commission of Pakistan for using the trademarked name and logo of Starbucks, an international brand, without authorization. The penalty imposed by the Commission was contested by the appellant before the Competition Appellate Tribunal, which adjusted the penalties but ultimately upheld the Commission's decision. The appellant then appealed to the Supreme Court of Pakistan. ----Issues: 1- Whether the appellant’s use of the Starbucks name and logo constitutes a violation under the Competition Act, 2010. 2- Whether the penalties imposed by the Competition Commission and modified by the Tribunal were legally justified. 3- Whether the Competition Act applies to actions involving trademarks registered by foreign entities that do not operate within Pakistan. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Competition Appellate Tribunal, dismissing the appeal. The Court found that: The use of the Starbucks name and logo by the appellant, despite being unauthorized, was likely to distort competition within Pakistan. This could mislead the public into believing they were purchasing genuine Starbucks products, thereby disadvantaging local competitors. The penalties imposed by the Commission, as modified by the Tribunal, were within the legal framework of the Competition Act, 2010, specifically under Section 38, which the appellant's counsel conceded. The appellant's argument that the Act should not apply because Starbucks does not have an outlet in Pakistan was rejected. The Court reasoned that the unauthorized use of a well-known trademark could still impact competition within the country, irrespective of the physical presence of the trademark owner. The appeal was dismissed with no order as to costs since the respondent (Starbucks Corporation USA) did not enter an appearance. ----Citations/Precedents: The decision was primarily based on the interpretation of the Competition Act, 2010, with specific reference to: Section 1(3) of the Competition Act, 2010. Section 38 of the Competition Act, 2010, which authorizes penalties for violations.

Summary: This case involved two separate criminal appeals adjudicated jointly by a Division Bench of the Islamabad High Court. Both appeals originated from decisions made by the Islamabad Consumer Court concerning its jurisdiction and authority under the Islamabad Consumer Protection Act, 1995, specifically relating to its ability to award general and special damages and litigation costs. The appeals challenged the Consumer Court's refusal to award damages beyond the direct costs related to the transactions in question. ---Issues: Does the Islamabad Consumer Protection Act empower the Consumer Court to award general and special damages, including litigation costs? Do the claims for damages by the appellants fit within the ambit of "unfair trade practices" under the Act? ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Consumer Court under the Islamabad Consumer Protection Act is authorized to award compensation for any damages or losses suffered as a result of unfair trade practices, which includes general and special damages, as well as litigation costs. The term "any damage or loss" in Section 9(3) of the Act has a broad scope, encompassing all forms of damages that a consumer might suffer due to unfair trade practices. The necessity to seek separate legal recourse for different types of damages related to the same incident would lead to procedural multiplicity and hardship, which the Act aims to prevent. The appeals were allowed, and the judgments of the lower court were set aside. The matters were remanded to the Consumer Court for further proceedings in accordance with the findings regarding the Consumer Court’s broader compensatory powers. ----Citations/Precedents: Ashfaq Ahmed Khan v. PTCL [PLD 2016 Islamabad 112]: Previously followed by the Consumer Court, it limited the award of damages to actual losses and did not recognize general damages. Waqas and Brothers Enterprises (Private Limited) v. Messrs DHL Express and another [PLD 2021 Islamabad 333]: This case influenced the decision by establishing that damages could be granted by the Consumer Court. M/s Multiline Associates vs. Ardeshir Cowasjee [PLD 1995 SC 423]: Referenced by the Single Bench in referring the matter to a larger bench for authoritative interpretation. Lucknow Development Authority v. M.K. Gupta [AIR 1994 Supreme Court 787]: Discussed the significance of the word "any" in legal terms, emphasizing its broad amplitude. Noman Ahmed and others v. Capital Development Authority [PLD 2021 Islamabad 75]: Cited for the definition of compensation and damages. Mehr Ashraf v. Station House Officer [PLD 2022 Lahore 328]: Used to illustrate the purpose of compensation and damages in restoring a person to their pre-injury status. TCS (Private) Limited v. Mst. Haseena Begum [PLD 2022 Lahore 524]: Supported the recoverability of special and general damages under consumer protection legislation. Consumer Unity & Trust Society, Jaipur v. The Chairman & Managing Director, Bank of Baroda, Calcutta [(1995) 2 SCC 150]: Indian Supreme Court case that described 'loss' as a generic term. Muhammad Akram v. Mst. Farman Bi [PLD 1990 SC 28]: Supreme Court case discussing the nature of litigation costs.

Summary: (a) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Consumer Protection Act, 1997—S. 13(2)—Limitation—Ten-day period for filing complaint—Scope of discretion in proviso—Complaint against inflated electricity bill— Complainant challenged an electricity bill issued on 20.07.2022, payable by 05.08.2022—Complaint was filed on 03.08.2022—Consumer Court dismissed complaint as time-barred under S.13(2), KPK Consumer Protection Act, 1997—High Court held that the lower court erred in ignoring the cause of action (i.e., the disputed bill), which arose shortly before filing the complaint—Earlier disconnection in 2020 was not the basis of grievance—Further held that limitation must be assessed in light of the discretion granted in the first proviso to S.13(2), which allows condonation for sufficient cause. Held, summary rejection on limitation grounds without considering discretion under proviso to S.13(2) amounts to jurisdictional error—Consumer protection laws must be interpreted in favor of legitimate consumer rights. (b) Consumer Protection—Purpose and interpretation—Beneficial legislation— KPK Consumer Protection Act, 1997 is a beneficial statute aimed at protecting consumers and ensuring fair commercial practices—Such statutes must be interpreted liberally to extend protection and access to remedy, not deny it on technicalities. Held, consumer courts must adhere to liberal construction of procedural provisions like limitation to prevent miscarriage of justice—Dismissal of complaint without adjudication on merits frustrates the statutory object. Disposition: Appeal Allowed—Impugned order set aside—Case remanded to Consumer Court, Nowshera for decision on merits in accordance with law—Parties directed to appear as and when summoned.

Summary: (a) Punjab Consumer Protection Act ( II of 2005 ) --- ----Ss. 25 & 28 (4)---Limitation Act ( IX of 1908 ) , S. 5---Defective and faulty services_---Cause of action, accrual of---Complaint, filing of---Limitation---Tractor Manufacturer filed appeal as District Consumer Court accepted claim of excess charging with regards to purchase of tractor---Validity---In the present case, the cause of action accrued to the respondent / claimant on the date (16.11.2011) when she deposited the purported excess amount and received the delivery of tractor; however, she issued legal notice to the appellants (on 24.02.2012 ) after about three months and one week of said date and filed the complaint (on 27.04.2012) after more than two months of issuing legal notice, which otherwise should have been filed within 30 days from accrual of cause of action, because the provision of law under S.28(4) of the Punjab Consumer Protection Act , 2005, provides period of 30 days for filing such claim from the date of accrual of cause of action---Respondent/claimant did not file any application for condonation of delay under S.5 of the Limitation Act, 1908, showing sufficient cause for delay--- High Court set-aside the impugned judgment passed by District Consumer Court, consequently, the complaint filed by the respondent stood dismissed --- Appeal filed by manufacturer , was allowed, in circumstances. Messrs Pak Suzuki Motors Company Limited through Manager v. Faisal Jameel Butt and another PLD 2023 SC 482 ref. (b) Limitation --- ---- Principles---Limitation is not merely a technicality---Where the limitation period has expired, the right accrues in favour of the other side which cannot be lightly brushed aside. Muhammad Anwar v. Essa PLD 2022 SC 716 and Asad Ali v. The Bank of Punjab PLD 2020 SC 736 ref. (c) Administration of justice --- ----When law requires a particular thing to be done in a particular manner, it has to be done in that manner alone or not at all. Messrs Tri-Star Industries (Pvt) Limited v. Trisa Burstenfabrik AG Triengen and another 2023 SCMR 1502 and Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Finance, Islamabad and another v. E-Movers (Pvt.) Limited and another 2022 SCMR 1021 ref. (d) Punjab Consumer Protection Act (II of 2005 ) --- ----Ss. 2(d) & 25---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 9 ---Defective and faulty service---General damages , claim of---Jurisdiction---Consumer Court or Civil Court---Claimant cannot claim general damages because the same is not governed by S.2(d) of the Punjab Consumer Protection Act, 2005, rather in order to determine the civil rights, the claimant could resort to court of plenary jurisdiction under S.9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908--- High Court set-aside the impugned judgment passed by District Consumer Court, consequently, the complaint filed by the respondent stood dismissed --- Appeal filed by manufacturer was allowed, in circumstances. Umer Abdullah and Muhammad Irfan for Appellant. Qaiser Mahmood Sra and Mohsin Abbas Sra for Respondent. Date of hearing: 17th April, 2024. Judgment Shahid Bilal Hassan, J .--- Succinctly, the respondent filed a complaint before the District Consumer Court, Lahore under section 25 of the Punjab Consumer Protection Act, 2005, against the appellants, for providing alleged defective and faulty services with regards to purchase of tractor. The parties produced their oral as well as documentary evidence. The learned Consumer Court vide impugned judgment dated 03.12.2012 accepted the complaint and directed the appellant(s) to pay Rs.43,000/-charged towards excess price of tractor, Rs.6,880/-towards receive of excess GST and Rs.50,000/- damages total Rs.99,880/- to the respondent/complainant within 30 days; hence, the instant appeal. 2. Heard. 3. Subsection (4) of Section 28 of the Punjab Consumer Protection Act, 2005 provides: "(4) A claim by the consumer or the Authority shall be filed within thirty days of the arising of the cause of action: Provided that the Consumer Court, having jurisdiction to hear the claim, may allow a claim to be filed after thirty days within such time as it may allow if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing the complaint within the specified period: Provided further that such extension shall not be allowed beyond a period of sixty days from the expiry of the warranty or guarantee period specified by the manufacturer or service provider and if no period is specified one year from the date of purchase of the products or providing of services.' In the present case, admittedly the cause of action accrued to the respondent on 16.11.2011, when she deposited the purported excess amount and received the delivery of tractor; the respondent issued legal notice to the appellants on 24.02.2012 and filed the complaint under section 25 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2005 on 27.04.2012, which otherwise should have been filed within 30 days from accrual of cause of action, because the above provision of law provides period 30 days for filing such claim from the date of accrual of cause of action. The respondent did not file any application for condonation of delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 showing sufficient cause for delay. Reliance in this regard can safely be placed on judgment reported as Messrs Pak Suzuki Motors Company Limited through Manager v. Faisal Jameel Butt and another (PLD 2023 SC 482), wherein it has invariably been held that:- 'A perusal of the above provision indicates that before filing that a claim before the Consumer Court, the consumer or the Authority has to issue a written notice under Section 28(1) to the manufacturer or service provider notifying him of the defect in the product or service or if the conduct of the manufacturer or service provider is in contravention of the provisions of the Act, seeking that he should remedy the defect or give damages, or cease to contravene the provisions of the Act. Under Section 28(2), the manufacturer or service provider is to respond to the notice within 15 days. Section 28(3) provides no claim shall be entertained by the Consumer Court unless the consumer provides proof of sending and delivery of the said notice. Section 28(4) stipulates that a claim shall be filed within 30 days of the arising of the cause of action. The Proviso to Section 28(4) provide that the Consumer Court may extend this limitation period beyond the period of 30 days if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing the complaint within the specified period, however, this extension shall not be beyond a period of 60 days from the expiry of the warranty or guarantee period specified by the manufacturer or service provider, or if no period is specified, then one year from the date of purchase of the product or provision of service. 9. In our view, even though no limitation period is provided for sending a written notice under Section 28(1) of the Act, it is apparent that Section 28(4) of the Act in unequivocal terms stipulates and clarifies that a claim with regards to a defective or faulty product or service, or contravention of the provisions of the Act by the manufacturer or service provider has to be filed within 30 days of the arising of the cause of action. The cause of action, in such circumstances where a product or service is faulty, therefore, arises the moment the consumer obtains knowledge that the product or service is defective or faulty. If the provision is interpreted to mean that despite having knowledge of the defect in the product or the Service, the consumer can issue a written notice under Section 28(1) of the Act at any time the consumer desires, pursuant to which, after 15 days of such receipt of the notice, the cause of action for the purposes of the 30-day limitation period would ensue, this would make Section 28(4) of the Act as redundant, and a claim under the Act can be filed at any time without any limitation period subsequent to obtaining knowledge of the defect or fault in the product or the service. 10. The limitation period in such consumer protection claims becomes more significant especially because claimants should bring a claim as quickly as possible due to the potential depreciation of the product in question, the characteristics of which may differ according to the specific product. Delaying the filing of a claim can lead to challenges in establishing the product's condition at the time of purchase and linking any defects to the consumer's use or handling. As time passes, the product may deteriorate, be repaired or modified, or become unavailable, making it more difficult to prove the defects or assess its original condition. Bringing a claim promptly helps ensure that the product's condition and any defects can be accurately evaluated and documented. This can also contribute to a stronger case by providing evidence that directly supports the consumer's claim. Additionally, timely action demonstrates the consumer's diligence and commitment to addressing the issue. 11. The legislative intent behind Sections 28(1), (2) and (3) of the Act is to grant rights to both the consumer and the manufacturer or service provider to address the defects or faults in the product or service before the matter proceeds to litigation. It ensures that the consumer firstly brings the issue to the attention of the manufacturer or the service provider through a written notice, so that the defect or fault is rectified and they fulfill their obligation to the consumer before the consumer has to file a claim before the Consumer Court, so that there is a possibility of settling the claim of the consumer without the need to initiate litigation, which would be more cumbersome for a simple consumer. At the same time, it also affords the manufacturer or the service provider the right to respond to the notice within a specified timeframe, enabling them to address any legitimate concerns, protect their reputation, and mitigate potential costs that may be incurred under the Act. In effect, it provides for a mechanism to settle the dispute before initiation of litigation and the same cannot be construed as giving a fresh cause of action wherefrom the 30-day limitation provided under Section 28(4) would commence. Therefore, when the consumer obtains knowledge of the defect or fault in the product or the service, the 30-day limitation period stipulated under Section 28(4) of the Act commences. It is during this period that the consumer has to first put his grievance before the manufacturer or service provider, seeking rectification of the defect or fault in the product or service, or damages, and provide 15 days to the manufacturer or service provider to remedy the same, as required under Section 28(2). It is only after the manufacturer or the service provider responds to the written notice, or where he fails to respond within the stipulated 15-day period, that the consumer can file a claim before the Consumer Court if the cause of action still subsists. The consumer can still file a claim before the Consumer Court by giving sufficient cause for filing the claim beyond 30 days which will be examined by the Consumer Court, as per the provisos to Section 28(4) of the Act.' (Emphasis supplied) 4. When this Court has reached to a conclusion that the complaint of the respondent was barred by limitation, there is no need to touch the other merits of the case, because limitation is not mere a technicality and where the limitation period has expired, the right accrues in favour of the other side which cannot be lightly brushed aside. Reliance is placed on Muhammad Anwar v. Essa (PLD 2022 SC 716) and Asad Ali v. The Bank of Punjab (PLD 2020 SC 736). 5. Additionally, it is a settled principle of law that when law requires a particular thing to be done in a particular manner, it has to be done in that manner alone or not at all. Reliance is placed on Messrs Tri-Star Industries (Pvt) Limited v. Trisa Burstenfabrik AG Triengen and another (2023 SCMR 1502) and Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Finance, Islamabad and another v. E-Movers (Pvt.) Limited and another (2022 SCMR 1021). 6. Besides, the respondent cannot claim general damages because the same is not governed by section 2(d) of the Consumer Protection Act, 2005, rather in order to determine the civil rights, the respondent could resort to court of plenary jurisdiction under section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. 7. The crux of the discussion above is that the appeal in hand succeeds; resultantly, the impugned judgment is set aside, consequent whereof, the complaint filed by the respondent stands dismissed. No order as to the costs. MQ/M-85/L Appeal allowed.

Summary: Background: The case involves an appeal filed by Tranzum Courier Service (TCS) Private Limited and another party against the judgment of the District Consumer Court, Sialkot, which directed them to refund the booking price of a parcel and pay damages amounting to Rs. 150,000. The respondent, a government school teacher, had hired TCS to send her original educational certificates to the Higher Education Commission (HEC) for attestation, which were lost during transit. The respondent filed a claim under the Punjab Consumer Protection Act, 2005, which was allowed by the trial court. The appellants challenged this decision on the grounds of limitation and failure to comply with mandatory legal notice requirements. ----Issues: 1- Whether the respondent’s claim was barred by limitation under Section 28(4) of the Punjab Consumer Protection Act, 2005. 2- Whether the legal notice required under Section 28(1) of the Act was properly issued and delivered to the appellants. 3- Whether the respondent was entitled to damages, despite having received duplicates of the lost certificates. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --Limitation Issue: The Lahore High Court held that the respondent's claim was not barred by limitation. The court determined that the cause of action accrued on July 21, 2022, when the respondent was informed by TCS that her documents were lost. The legal notice was issued on August 3, 2022, and the claim was filed on August 18, 2022, within the statutory period. The plea that the claim was time-barred was therefore rejected. --Legal Notice Compliance: The court found that the respondent had fulfilled the requirement of serving a legal notice under Section 28(1) of the Act. The evidence presented showed that the notice was issued and delivered to the appellants, and the appellants did not effectively challenge the authenticity of the notice during the trial. --Damages Awarded: The court upheld the award of Rs. 150,000 in damages, ruling that this amount was reasonable and proportionate to the mental agony and inconvenience suffered by the respondent due to the defective service provided by TCS. The court referred to a similar case (TCS (Private) Limited v. Mst. Haseena Begum, PLD 2022 Lahore 524) to support the reasonableness of the damages awarded. ----Citations/Precedents: Messrs Pak Suzuki Motors Company Limited through Manager v. Faisal Jameel Butt and another (PLD 2023 SC 482) Muhammad Khalil Khan and others v. Mahbub Ali Mian (PLD 1948 Privy Council 131) TCS (Private) Limited v. Mst. Haseena Begum (PLD 2022 Lahore 524) The appeal was dismissed, and the judgment of the District Consumer Court was upheld. The appellants were required to comply with the original order, including the payment of damages.