Summary: (a) Civil Servants Acts, 1973-74 — Federal & Provincial Service Tribunals Acts ----Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, Art. 212; Limitation Act, 1908, Ss. 3, 5 & 29(2); Civil Servants (Appeal) Rules, 1977; Punjab Civil Services Rules (Vol-I), r. 14.21; Sindh Civil Servants (Appeal) Rules, 1980; Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Civil Servants (Appeal) Rules, 1986; Balochistan Civil Servants (Appeal) Rules, 2013— Service appeal—Departmental appeal barred by limitation—Whether appeal before Service Tribunal competent—Held: Yes. The Service Tribunal is the first independent judicial forum and is statutorily empowered to examine questions of limitation as well as merits. Departmental delay cannot extinguish a civil servant’s statutory right of appeal; the tribunal must itself determine whether “sufficient” or “reasonable” cause existed for delay, review the department’s exercise (or failure) of discretion to condone it, and proceed accordingly. Outright dismissal merely because the departmental appeal was time-barred amounts to abdication of jurisdiction and violates Art. 212(1)-(2). (b) Civil Servants Acts, 1973-74 — Departmental appeals — Power to condone delay — Limitation Act, 1908, S. 5 — Applicability—Held: Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not automatically attracted to departmental proceedings, as S. 29(2)(b) excludes its application unless expressly incorporated; nevertheless, the relevant Rules themselves confer discretion on departmental authorities either to withhold or condone appeals filed out of time on showing of “reasonable cause”. Thus, even under the “withholding” framework (Federal, Punjab) or “condonation” framework (Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Balochistan), the department must apply its mind and record reasons before rejecting an appeal as time-barred. (c) Service Tribunals Acts, 1973-74 — Appellate jurisdiction — Scope and duty— Tribunals, as constitutional creatures under Art. 212, exercise appellate and fact-finding powers akin to civil courts; they are obliged to examine legality, factual foundation, and procedural fairness of departmental decisions, including limitation issues. Failure to consider condonation applications or to address limitation constitutes non-exercise of jurisdiction. (d) Case law — Chairman, P.I.A.C. v. Nasim Malik, PLD 1990 SC 951 — per incuriam— Held: The rule derived from PIAC case and followed in later decisions (e.g. Abdul Wahid, 1998 SCMR 882; Anwar Ali Sahto, PLD 2002 SC 101; Razi Uddin, 2004 PLC (CS) 468; Muhammad Aslam, 2007 SCMR 513; Raja Khan, 2011 SCMR 676; Ghulam Shabbir, 2013 PLC (CS) 1087; Muhammad Asif Chatha, 2015 SCMR 165) that an appeal before the Service Tribunal becomes incompetent when the departmental appeal was time-barred, is declared incorrect in law and per incuriam. The PIAC Regulations themselves envisaged condonation (withholding) of delayed appeals; the omission to appreciate this and the relevant statutory framework vitiated that precedent. (e) Sufficient/Reasonable cause — Concept and application— Both expressions are interchangeable; cause must be bona fide, beyond the applicant’s control, and shown with diligence. Mistaken legal advice or negligence ordinarily not enough unless founded on genuine ambiguity. Public authorities must apply limitation rules equitably, treating them as instruments of fairness rather than exclusion. (f) Practice and procedure — Prospective and consequential directions— All pending appeals where dismissal rested solely on departmental limitation to be re-listed and decided on merits after examining sufficiency of cause; past and closed transactions (including disposed review petitions) remain unaffected. PIAC line of cases overruled to this extent. Cited Cases: • Chairman, P.I.A.C. v. Nasim Malik, PLD 1990 SC 951 ( per incuriam ) • Abdul Wahid v. Chairman, C.B.R., 1998 SCMR 882 • Anwar Ali Sahto v. Federation of Pakistan, PLD 2002 SC 101 • Muhammad Aslam v. WAPDA, 2007 SCMR 513 • Raja Khan v. Manager (Operation) FESCO, 2011 SCMR 676 • Muhammad Asif Chatha v. Chief Secretary Punjab, 2015 SCMR 165 • Khushi Muhammad v. Fazal Bibi, PLD 2016 SC 872 (5-M bench) • Allah Dino v. Muhammad Shah, 2001 SCMR 286 • Muhammad Nazir v. Saeed Subhani, 2002 SCMR 1540 • Secretary to Govt. Punjab (Law & Parliamentary Affairs) v. Ali Ahmad Khan, 2025 SCMR 489 • Pakistan Railways v. Muhammad Amin, 2025 SCMR 646 Disposition: Legal question answered in negative—Appeal before Service Tribunal not rendered incompetent merely because departmental appeal was time-barred—Earlier contrary view in PIAC and following cases overruled—All connected matters to proceed individually on merits before competent benches—Past and closed transactions unaffected—Approved for reporting.

Summary: (a) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)----Arts. 151 & 156----Appeal against order making arbitral award rule of the Court----Whether governed by Art.151 (20 days) or Art.156 (90 days)----Scope---Single Judge of High Court, in exercise of original civil jurisdiction, made award rule of the Court on 22.01.2013 and directed decree to be drawn; decree was drafted the same day and signed on 31.01.2013---Certified copy applied for on 26.04.2013 (after expiry of 20 days); copies supplied on 29.04.2013; High Court Appeal filed on 11.06.2013---Held, decision making award rule of the Court and consequent decree was a “decree or order of a High Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction”, thus squarely attracting Art.151 which provides 20 days’ limitation---Even assuming Art.156 (90 days) to apply, the appeal was still hopelessly time-barred on the admitted dates---High Court rightly dismissed appeal as barred by time; no question of law arose to justify interference. (b) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)----S.5 & Art.151----Condonation of delay---“Sufficient cause”---Obligation to explain each day’s delay---Effect of plea that impugned award/order is “void”---Appellant’s application under S.5 for condonation of delay neither disclosed any plausible ground nor explained each day’s delay; only plea taken was that award/ proceedings were “void”, hence no limitation would run----Held, mere assertion that an award or decree is void does not by itself constitute “sufficient cause” for condoning delay; party seeking condonation must furnish bona fide, detailed and satisfactory explanation for entire period of delay; carelessness, inattention or lack of bona fide cannot be rewarded by extending limitation---In absence of any convincing explanation, High Court was justified in refusing condonation and dismissing time-barred appeal. (c) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)----S.3----Duty of Court to examine limitation; public policy; law aids the vigilant and not the indolent----Scope---Law of limitation is founded on public policy to secure finality in litigation and prevent stale claims from being agitated after lapse of the prescribed period; under S.3 it is the Court’s inherent duty to examine limitation and dismiss proceedings instituted after expiry of prescribed period, whether or not limitation is pleaded as a defence---Expression “sufficient cause” in S.5 is conditioned by bona fide conduct; concocted or fanciful grounds cannot displace statutory bar; law assists vigilant litigants, not those sleeping over their rights, as encapsulated in maxims “Leges vigilantibus non dormientibus subserviunt” and “Vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniunt”---Government departments, autonomous bodies and private entities are all to be treated alike; no extra leniency is to be extended to institutional litigants in condonation matters; delay caused by negligence or lack of diligence must not be condoned. Cited case: Regional Police Officer, Dera Ghazi Khan Region v. Riaz Hussain Bukhari (2024 SCMR 1021 = 2023 SCP 323). Disposition: Civil appeal dismissed; impugned judgment of High Court dismissing High Court Appeal as hopelessly time-barred maintained; no interference warranted.

Summary: (a) Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894) —S. 34—Compensation—Interest—Additional charges— Referee Court enhanced compensation in land acquisition reference, awarding interest @ 6% per annum from date of possession, 15% compulsory acquisition charges, and additional compensation @ 15% per annum from date of notification under S.4 till payment—High Court maintained enhancement—Supreme Court held that findings of Referee Court were based on consideration of necessary legal components; no misreading or non-reading of evidence shown—Interference not warranted. (b) Limitation Act (IX of 1908) —Condonation of delay—Government litigation—Principles— Appeal filed by Province of Sindh barred by 30 days—Application for condonation contained only generic assertions of administrative delays in obtaining certified copies and processing file—Held, law aids the vigilant, not the indolent—Mere inter-departmental correspondence or procedural delay does not constitute “sufficient cause”—Government and autonomous bodies cannot be accorded preferential treatment; cases to be dealt with uniformly like ordinary litigants—Routine filing of mechanical applications for condonation deprecated. (c) Limitation Act (IX of 1908) —Condonation of delay—Doctrine of equality before law— Court emphasized that careless or intentional delay undermines rule of law—Condonation cannot be granted as a matter of course—Latin maxim “Leges vigilantibus non dormientibus subserviunt” applied—Law of limitation does not create a right but extinguishes stale claims through efflux of time—Duty of Court to consider limitation even if not raised. (d) Administration of justice —Government litigation—Duty of vigilance— Trend of belated appeals by government departments on stereotypical excuses condemned—Such approach viewed as mala fide or intended to benefit opposite side—Court reiterated principle that adjudication on merits cannot override the mandatory requirement of limitation without sufficient cause. Cited Cases Regional Police Officer, Dera Ghazi Khan Region v. Riaz Hussain Bukhari 2024 SCMR 1021 = 2023 SCP 323. Disposition Appeal dismissed, being barred by limitation as well as on merits.

Summary: (a) Customs Act, 1969 –– S. 179(3) & (4) –– Time limits for adjudication –– Mandatory nature –– Extension of time only in “exceptional circumstances” –– Extension granted without proper justification –– Order-in-original held void –– The adjudicating authority passed the order-in-original beyond the mandatory 120-day period prescribed under S. 179(3), Customs Act, 1969. Although an extension was sought under S. 179(4), the Board granted it without recording any "exceptional circumstances" as required by law. The Supreme Court held that such power to extend adjudication deadlines is narrow and conditional upon exceptional circumstances. Mere reference to the revenue involved or internal delays does not suffice. The Collector's failure to act in a timely manner could not be cured retroactively by an unlawful extension. Consequently, the order-in-original was invalid and rightly set aside by the Appellate Tribunal and the High Court. Cited cases: Collector of Sales Tax v. Super Asia 2017 SCMR 1427; Mujahid Soap and Chemical Industries Ltd. v. Customs Appellate Tribunal 2019 SCMR 1735; Wak Ltd. v. Commissioner Inland Revenue (Larger Bench judgment dated 14.05.2025). (b) Administrative Law –– Exercise of statutory discretion –– Power must be exercised strictly within legal bounds –– Board’s extension order invalid due to lack of application of mind –– Subjective satisfaction not sufficient –– The Court reiterated that statutory powers must be exercised within the express limits of the statute. The Board's extension under S. 179(4) was not preceded by any objective inquiry or justification regarding “exceptional circumstances.” Reliance on subjective satisfaction or vague justifications such as revenue stakes renders the act ultra vires. No material was placed on record to establish that the Board applied its mind to the requirement of "exceptional circumstances." Cited cases: Super Asia 2017 SCMR 1427 (reaffirmed in Larger Bench ruling of 14.05.2025); Wak Ltd. (CA 634/2018). (c) Customs Act, 1969 –– S. 224 –– Extension of time limits by “aggrieved party” –– Inapplicable to Collector –– Limited applicability of condonation provision –– S. 224 of the Customs Act permits condonation of delay by the Board, but only upon application by an “aggrieved party.” The Court clarified that the Collector, acting as the adjudicating authority, could not claim to be an aggrieved party under this provision. Therefore, S. 224 was not applicable, and the Collector’s reliance on the concept of condonation was misplaced. (d) Interpretation of tax statutes –– Harmonious reading with Sales Tax and Excise laws –– Time bars interpreted strictly –– Adjudication orders passed after lapse of limitation are without legal effect –– The Court applied the principles laid down in indirect tax jurisprudence, including the Sales Tax Act, 1990 and Federal Excise Act, 2005, to the Customs Act. The time limits in S. 179(3) were interpreted as mandatory, consistent with interpretations under S. 74 of the Sales Tax Act. Late adjudication, even if technically extended, must satisfy statutory thresholds and cannot be justified post facto without proper legal basis. Disposition: Leave to appeal refused. Petition dismissed. The order-in-original under Section 179, Customs Act, 1969, was held unlawful and void due to lack of lawful extension. High Court judgment upholding Appellate Tribunal’s decision affirmed.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) ---- S. 11, O. VII Rr. 11 & 13, S. 149 ---- Res judicata --- Rejection of plaint --- Fresh suit --- Scope and limitations Where a plaint is rejected under Order VII Rule 11, CPC, the rejection does not constitute adjudication on merits and, by fiction of law, is considered a “decree” appealable under Section 2(2), CPC. The Court held that such rejection does not preclude the institution of a fresh suit under Order VII Rule 13 CPC, provided it is not barred by limitation or the principle of res judicata. The doctrine of res judicata under Section 11 CPC requires a judicial determination that the matter was directly and substantially in issue in a previous suit between the same parties, and conclusively decided. Mere observations on title in a prior suit for damages do not bar a subsequent suit for possession and declaration, unless the ingredients of res judicata are strictly met. (b) Limitation Act, 1908 ---- Ss. 3, 5, 14 to 16, Art. 142 ---- Condonation of delay --- Applicability to suits --- Misconception of law --- Mixed question of law and fact The Court clarified that Section 5 of the Limitation Act applies to appeals and applications, not suits. Delay in filing a suit cannot be condoned under Section 5, but exclusion of time may be claimed under Sections 14 to 16 where applicable. In the instant case, the plaintiffs erroneously filed an application under Section 5 for condonation of delay in instituting the suit for possession. Nonetheless, the Court held that under Article 142 of the Limitation Act, the limitation period was twelve years from the date of dispossession, and the suit was within time. Dismissal of the suit by the Trial Court for being time-barred, without properly examining the cause of action, was declared a grave illegality. (c) Court Fees Act, 1870 ---- Ss. 4 & 6; Civil Procedure Code, 1908 ---- Ss. 148, 149 ---- Deficiency in court fee --- Discretion to allow cure --- Harmonious construction The Court held that a deficient court fee does not render a proceeding fatally defective. Under Section 149 CPC, the Court may allow payment of deficient court fee at any stage of the proceedings. Section 149 acts as a proviso to Sections 4 and 6 of the Court Fees Act, permitting the court to regularize proceedings upon payment of deficient court fee subsequently. The dismissal of the petitioners' appeal by the First Appellate Court without providing an opportunity to cure the deficiency was held to be erroneous and contrary to the principles laid down in PLD 1984 SC 289 (Siddique Khan v. Abdul Shakoor Khan) and AIR 1976 SC 1503 (Diwan Bros. case). (d) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) ---- Ss. 2(2), 96; O. VII R. 11 ---- Rejection of plaint vs. dismissal of suit --- Decree by fiction --- Scope of appealability The Court reiterated that rejection of a plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC is deemed a decree under Section 2(2) CPC, appealable under Section 96 CPC. However, such rejection must be based on a proper examination of whether the plaint discloses a cause of action, and whether the suit is barred by law or limitation. The Trial Court’s mechanical dismissal of the suit, without applying Section 3 of the Limitation Act or giving the plaintiff an opportunity to correct procedural defects, was declared unjustified. (e) Judicial duty --- Application of correct law --- Responsibility of judges irrespective of parties’ errors The Court emphasized that judges are duty-bound to apply the correct law, even if the parties or their counsel fail to point it out. Misguided legal advice or poor pleading does not absolve courts of their responsibility to administer justice according to law. The judge must “wear all laws on the sleeve of his robe.” Failure to address key legal provisions, such as limitation or res judicata, in a reasoned manner vitiates judicial orders. (f) Concurrent findings --- When revisable --- Misreading or non-reading of law or evidence --- Corrective jurisdiction of higher courts Concurrent findings of lower courts are not immune from interference where they suffer from legal infirmities, misreading, non-reading, or flawed application of law. The Supreme Court held that when lower courts ignore binding legal provisions or dismiss a suit on misconceived grounds, such findings must be set aside in exercise of appellate jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice. Disposition: Petition converted into appeal and allowed; impugned orders set aside; matter remanded to Trial Court for decision on merits within six months. Cited Cases: • Siddique Khan v. Abdul Shakoor Khan (PLD 1984 SC 289) • Abdul Hamid v. Dilawar Hussain (2007 SCMR 945) • Ahmed Ali Talpur v. Sub-Registrar Latifabad, Hyderabad (PLD 2025 SC 302) • Kh. Muhammad Fazil v. Mumtaz Munnawar Khan Niazi (2024 SCMR 1059) • Meeru Khan v. Mst. Naheed Aziz Siddiqui (PLD 2023 SC 912) • Diwan Bros. v. Central Bank of India (AIR 1976 SC 1503) • Deepchand v. Land Acquisition Officer (AIR 1994 SC 1901) Cited Provisions: • Civil Procedure Code, 1908, Ss. 2(2), 3, 5, 11, 96, 148, 149, O. VII Rr. 11 & 13 • Limitation Act, 1908, Ss. 5, 14–16, Art. 142 • Court Fees Act, 1870, Ss. 4 & 6

Summary: (a) Limitation Act, 1908 (IX of 1908): ----Ss. 5, 14---Condonation of delay---Appeal filed before the wrong forum---Good faith and due diligence---Scope. Petitioners challenged an arbitration award, but their appeal was filed before the wrong forum. The appellate court dismissed the appeal as time-barred, and the High Court upheld this decision. The petitioners sought condonation of delay under S. 14 of the Limitation Act, 1908, arguing that they pursued the appeal in good faith. The Supreme Court held that condonation under S. 14 requires proof of due diligence and good faith, which were absent in this case. Petitioners failed to justify the delay of nearly two years and did not provide a reasonable explanation. The Court emphasized that government departments are treated like ordinary litigants and cannot claim special treatment regarding limitation laws. Ignorance, negligence, or mistake do not excuse non-compliance with statutory time limits. ----Cited Cases: Messrs SKB-SNK Joint Venture Contractors v. WAPDA (2022 SCMR 1615) East Pakistan v. Abdul Hamid Darfi (1970 SCMR 558) Commissioner of Income Tax v. Rais Pir Ahmad Khan (1981 SCMR 37) Federation of Pakistan v. Niaz Ahmad (1997 SCMR 959) Mst. Khadija Begum v. Mst. Yasmeen (PLD 2001 SC 355) (b) Arbitration Act, 1940 (X of 1940): ----S. 14(2)---Arbitration award---Objections dismissed by trial court---Confirmation of award as rule of court---Finality of arbitral proceedings---Scope. Respondents filed an application under S. 14(2) of the Arbitration Act, 1940, and the matter was referred to arbitrators. The award was made a rule of the court, and objections raised by the petitioners were dismissed. The appellate court and the High Court affirmed the award, rejecting the appeal as time-barred. The Supreme Court upheld the finality of arbitration awards, emphasizing that once an award is confirmed by a trial court and upheld on appeal, further challenges must strictly comply with procedural limitations. (c) Civil Courts Jurisdiction---Pecuniary Limits---Determination of Appellate Forum: ----West Pakistan Civil Courts Ordinance, 1962 (W.P. Ordinance II of 1962), S. 18---Jurisdictional value for appeals---Forum determination---Scope. The High Court correctly transferred the appeal to the District Judge as the claim amount was below Rs. 50 million, falling under the pecuniary jurisdiction of civil courts under S. 18 of the West Pakistan Civil Courts Ordinance, 1962. The Supreme Court held that there was no ambiguity in the law regarding forum determination, and filing an appeal before the wrong forum due to negligence does not warrant condonation of delay. ----Cited Cases: Ghulam Ali v. Akbar alias Akoor (PLD 1991 SC 957) Abdul Ghani v. Mst. Mussarat Rehana (1985 CLC 2529) (d) Legal Principle---Law of Limitation and Judicial Precedents: ----Statute of repose---Equity does not override limitation laws---Duty of litigants to act diligently. The Supreme Court reaffirmed that limitation laws must be strictly adhered to, and litigants must act with due diligence. The principle of repose ensures that litigation is brought to a final conclusion within prescribed time limits. ----Cited Cases: Akhtar Nasir Ahmed v. Province of Punjab (PLD 2024 SC 1268) Khushi Muhammad v. Mst. Fazal Bibi (PLD 2016 SC 872) Kiramat Khan v. IG, Frontier Corps (2023 SCMR 866) Imtiaz Ali v. Atta Muhammad (PLD 2008 SC 462) ----Disposition: Petition dismissed, as no reasonable justification for condonation of delay was presented. Leave to appeal refused.

Summary: (a) Punjab Consumer Protection Act, 2005, S. 28(4) Limitation—Filing of complaints—Application of the Limitation Act, 1908 The petitioner’s complaint regarding missing family baggage was dismissed on the ground of limitation. The Supreme Court affirmed that under section 28(4) of the Punjab Consumer Protection Act, 2005, a claim must be filed within 30 days of the cause of action. While the proviso allows a Consumer Court to condone delays upon showing sufficient cause, the petitioner failed to provide a valid justification. The Court clarified that section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908, which provides for condonation of delay, does not apply to the Consumer Court proceedings under the Act of 2005. The argument that section 5 of the Limitation Act was applicable was based on a misconception of law. (b) Limitation Act, 1908, Ss. 3 & 29(2) Exclusion of Limitation Act provisions in special or local laws The Supreme Court reiterated that section 29(2) of the Limitation Act excludes the application of section 5 for condonation of delay in cases governed by special or local laws, such as the Punjab Consumer Protection Act, 2005. The Consumer Protection Act provides its own mechanism for addressing delays, rendering the Limitation Act inapplicable in these circumstances. Disposition: The petition was dismissed for lack of merit, and leave to appeal was refused. ----- Legal Principles: Section 28(4) of the Punjab Consumer Protection Act governs limitation for filing complaints and allows condonation of delay only if sufficient cause is shown. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply to proceedings under the Punjab Consumer Protection Act, 2005, as it is excluded by section 29(2) of the Limitation Act.

Summary: Background: M/s. Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Limited (appellant) filed a Regular First Appeal (RFA) seeking condonation of delay in filing an appeal against the consolidated judgment and decree dated 17.03.2022 passed by the Additional District Judge, Faisalabad. The appellant's suit for recovery of Rs.12,19,57,918/- was dismissed, while the respondent's (M/s. Bhatti Fabrics) suit for declaration, mandatory, and permanent injunction was decreed. The appeal was filed after the prescribed period, and the appellant sought condonation of the delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908. ----Issues: 1- Whether the delay in filing the appeal should be condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908. 2- Whether the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1908 apply to a case governed by the Gas (Theft Control and Recovery) Act, 2016. 3- Whether the appeal was filed within the prescribed period of limitation. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: ---Condonation of Delay: The court noted that the appeal was initially filed on 07.05.2022, within the limitation period. However, the office raised objections, and the appeal was re-filed on 08.06.2024, after a delay of over two years. The appellant's reason for the delay was that the case file was misplaced and mixed up with other files. The court found this explanation insufficient and unconvincing. ---Applicability of the Limitation Act, 1908: The court held that the Gas (Theft Control and Recovery) Act, 2016, which is a special law, provides a limitation period of 30 days for filing an appeal. Therefore, the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1908, a general law, do not apply. The court emphasized that special laws take precedence over general laws. ---Limitation Period: The court found that the appeal was filed after a substantial delay, and the appellant failed to remove the office objections within the stipulated time. The court ruled that the statutory remedy of appeal cannot be left open indefinitely, and the delay in re-filing the appeal was not justified. The court dismissed the application for condonation of delay and the appeal itself as time-barred. The court also expressed concern over the negligent conduct of the appellant's officers and officials, which led to the delay and potential monetary loss to the company. The Managing Director of Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Limited was directed to conduct a thorough inquiry and take action against the responsible officers and officials. ----Citations/Precedents: Gulistan Textile Mills Ltd. and another Vs. Soneri Bank Ltd. and another (2018 CLD 203) Messrs MCB Bank Ltd. Vs. Commissioner Inland Revenue (2014 PTD 1874) Asad Ali and 9 others Vs. The Bank of Punjab and others (PLD 2020 SC 736) Lahore Development Authority v. Muhammad Rashid (1997 SCMR 1224) Zulfiqar Ahmad Vs Malik Sarfraz (deceased) through his L.Rs., etc. [C.P.No.1334-L/2021] Ainuddin and others Vs. Abdullah and another (2019 SCMR 880) Shahid Pervaiz alias Shahid Hameed v. Muhammad Ahmad Ameen (2006 SCMR 631) Messrs Blue Star Spinning Mills Ltd. VS Collector of Sales Tax and others (2013 SCMR 587) Ghulam Hussain Ramzan Ali VS Collector of Customs (Preventive), Karachi” (2014 SCMR 1594) Ashiq Hussain Sabri Vs Secretary Health, Government of the Punjab & 8 Others (PLD 2011 Lahore 490 (D.B)) Muhammad Din Vs Abdul Ghani & Another (2012 SCMR 1004) ----Quote: Appeal under Section 13 of the Gas (Theft Control and Recovery) Act, 2016--- Period of filing such appeal is 30 days. Applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908--- Appeal initially filed within time--- Office raised certain objections granting 3 days' time to remove said objection---Appeal re-filed after 749 days with application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act? Held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable to proceedings under special enactment, wherein a specific period of limitation is provided--- Special Law always takes preference over the general law. Appeal dismissed being barred by limitation? Court ordered for holding of inquiry and recovery of the amount of claim in the suit from the delinquent officials of the appellant company.

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Summary: Background:This judgment by the Islamabad High Court involves appeals under section 17(13) of the Anti-Dumping Duties Act, 2015 ("ADD Act"), filed by various appellants, including M/s Amal Steel, against the Anti-Dumping Appellate Tribunal and other entities. The appeals fall into two categories: Category-A includes those who did not appeal to the Tribunal under section 70(1) of the ADD Act but filed a second appeal directly to the Court, and Category-B includes appeals against Tribunal judgments dismissed due to being filed beyond the limitation period.----Issues:Whether the Tribunal has authority under the ADD Act and the Limitation Act to condone delays in filing appeals beyond the prescribed period of limitation.Can the High Court condone delay in filing an appeal against a Tribunal's final determination and direct the Tribunal to hear the appeal on merit?Can the High Court entertain a direct appeal against a Tribunal's final determination where the appellant did not avail the first appeal right, or decide an appeal on merits dismissed by the Tribunal on grounds of limitation?Holding/Reasoning/OutcomeThe High Court dismissed the appeals, finding them not maintainable based on the principles of law and limitations. It was determined that:The Tribunal does not have the authority to condone delays in filing appeals.The High Court cannot condone delays on behalf of appellants and direct the Tribunal to hear such appeals on their merits, as it would alter the adjudicatory scheme prescribed by the ADD Act.Parties who have not availed the right to file a first appeal before the Tribunal or whose appeals were dismissed on grounds of limitation do not have the right to a hearing in the High Court.-----Citations/Precedents:Mohammad Ashraf and others Vs. UBL and others (2019 SCMR 1004)M/s Spirit Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. Vs. National Tariff Commission, Islamabad and 2 others (2021 PTD 647)M/s Al-Ahad Steel Vs. National Tariff Commission and others (C.M.A. No.64/2023)Khushi Mohammad through LRs. and others Vs. Mst. Fazal Bibi and others (PLD 2016 SC 872)Taufiq Asif Vs. General (Retd.) Pervez Musharraf and others (Civil Petition No.3797 of 2020)Mohammad Hussain Vs. Walayat Shah (PLD 1959 LHR 526)H.M. SAYA & Co. Karachi Vs. Wazir Ali Industries Ltd. Karachi and another (PLD 1969 SC 65)Government of Balochistan through Chief Secretary Quetta Vs. Dr. Mohammad Tariq Jafar (2020 SCMR 1689)Hameed Akhtar Niazi Vs. Secretary, Establishment Division Government of Pakistan (1996 SCMR 1185)