Summary: (a) Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1950 ----S.3 Import Policy Order, 2022---Status and legal effect---Import Policy Order issued under statutory authority to prohibit, restrict or control imports and regulate trade---IPO 2022 not challenged before any forum---Courts required to give effect to conditions and restrictions imposed thereunder. (b) Import Policy Order, 2022 ----Para 16 & Appendix-E Vehicles---Import under personal baggage, gift and transfer of residence schemes---Eligibility and age cap---Appendix-E, para 3 imposes maximum age limit of three years for passenger cars and five years for other vehicles (within definition provided in Appendix-E)---Vehicles exceeding prescribed age are not permissible for import under the scheme---Conditions and procedure in Appendix-E constitute mandatory legal and procedural requirements without fulfilment of which no enforceable right matures. (c) Import Policy Order, 2022 ----Appendix-E, paras 3, 5 & 6 Interpretation---Misapplication of “secondhand/used category”---Issue is not whether vehicles are secondhand but whether they satisfy specific age restriction under Appendix-E---Relaxation for secondhand/used bulletproof vehicles under the scheme is confined to bulletproof vehicles and cannot be extended to ordinary vehicles covered under Appendix-E 1(d)---High Court’s reliance on “secondhand/used category” and bulletproof relaxation to justify import of over-age ordinary vehicles held erroneous---Para 6 provides re-export permission for vehicles brought in contravention of IPO, subject to its provisos---Court observed clause 6 of Appendix-E could be invoked if respondents so advised. (d) Import Policy Order, 2022 ----Para 5(3) & Appendix-C Scope---Appendix-C concerns goods not importable in used/secondhand condition except specifically exempted---Appendix-C held distinct and having no nexus with vehicles governed exclusively by Appendix-E---Reference to para 5(3) and Appendix-C in context of Appendix-E vehicles held misconceived. (e) Customs Act, 1969 ----Ss.156(1), 181 Confiscation and redemption fine---Option to pay fine in lieu of confiscation---Second proviso to S.181 empowers Federal Board of Revenue to specify goods or class of goods where no option shall be given---Where FBR has exercised power and issued an order specifying non-availability of option, appellate forums are bereft of jurisdiction to allow release by extending option under S.181. (f) S.R.O. 499(I)/2009 dated 13.06.2009 ----Issued under S.181, Customs Act, 1969 No option to pay fine in lieu of confiscation---Clause (f)---Restricted and other items subject to procedural requirements under Import Policy Order, for the time being in force, unless such conditions and procedural requirements are fulfilled---Word “unless” construed as mandatory, making fulfilment of IPO procedural requirements a condition precedent for avoiding the negative outcome of non-availability of option---Vehicles imported under Appendix-E in violation of its age restriction constitute goods subject to IPO procedural requirements; therefore, clause (f) bars release on redemption fine---Tribunal and High Court orders allowing release on redemption fine held contrary to SRO 499 read with S.181 and Appendix-E. (g) Customs adjudication ----Show cause notice and pleading of statutory bars Departmental obligation---Accusations required to be conveyed completely in show cause notice---Where adjudicating authority ordered outright confiscation and found no benefit available under SRO 499, omission to expressly mention non-availability of redemption option in show cause notice did not enable importer to claim such option---Importer may claim benefit under law, but where law does not permit, adjudicating officer rightly refuses such benefit---Collector’s outright confiscation treated as reflective of legal position that no option was available. Cited Case: • Collector of Sales Tax v. Zamindara Paper and Board Mills (2008 SCMR 615). (h) Precedent ----Leave refusing orders Effect---Leave refusing orders generally do not lay down ratio decidendi binding as precedent on point not examined---Earlier leave refusing orders cited by respondents were found not to have discussed true effect of clause (f) of SRO 499 vis-a-vis Appendix-E vehicles and therefore did not constitute binding favourable interpretation---Court examined earlier orders including Muhammad Siyab etc. (CPLA No.3598-L of 2019 etc.) and Sher Muhammad Khan etc. (Civil Petitions No.1720-L and 1721-L of 2021) and held issue of SRO 499 clause (f) had not been considered in its true spirit in relation to Appendix-E. (i) Statutory interpretation ----Declaratory theory and prospective overruling Retrospective operation---Judicial interpretation ordinarily declaratory and retrospective (Blackstonian view) as courts declare what law has always been---Prospective overruling an exception reserved for exceptional circumstances to avoid grave injustice and protect vested rights---Incorrect understanding of law does not create vested rights; corrected interpretation applies at least to pending cases---Past and closed transactions may be treated differently, but pending matters do not fall within such protection---In present cases, no binding Supreme Court interpretation existed on clause (f) of SRO 499 regarding Appendix-E; therefore, plea for prospective operation rejected. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Yusuf v. The Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner Pakistan (PLD 1968 SC 101). • Malik Asad Ali v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1998 SC 161). • Begum Nusrat Ali Gonda v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2013 SC 829). • Mustafa Impex v. Government of Pakistan (PLD 2016 SC 808). • Pakistan Medical and Dental Council v. Muhammad Fahad Malik (2018 SCMR 1956). • Taisei Corporation v. A.M. Construction Company (Pvt.) Ltd. (2024 SCMR 640). • General Post Office v. Muhammad Jalal (PLD 2024 SC 1276). (j) Customs Act, 1969 and Import Policy Order, 2022 ----S.181, SRO 499(I)/2009, Appendix-E Over-age vehicle import under Appendix-E---Consequences---Vehicles exceeding age cap under Appendix-E held not legally importable under scheme---Confiscation upheld as lawful consequence---Release on payment of 35% redemption fine (including duties and taxes) held impermissible due to bar under clause (f) of SRO 499---Tribunal and High Court interpretation set aside as inconsistent with cumulative legal framework. Cited Cases: • Bashir Ahmad v. Director, Directorate of Intelligence and Investigation (Customs), FBR Peshawar (2025 SCMR 684). • Collector of Customs v. Wali Khan (2017 SCMR 585). Disposition: Civil Petitions No.4334 to 4363 of 2025 converted into appeals and allowed; impugned orders dated 30.07.2025 of the Lahore High Court and judgments of the Customs Appellate Tribunal granting release of vehicles on redemption fine @ 35% set aside; orders-in-original dated 13.12.2024 passed by Collector (Adjudication) restored and vehicles confiscated outright without any option of fine under S.181, Customs Act, 1969; respondents may invoke clause 6 of Appendix-E of IPO 2022 if so advised. (Announced 04.12.2025).

Summary: (a) Customs Act, 1969 –– Ss. 157(2), 168, 180, 181 & 187 –– S.R.O.499(I)/2009 dated 13-06-2009 –– S.R.O.1280(I)/2024 dated 20-08-2024 –– S.R.O.1619(I)/2024 dated 03-10-2024 –– Confiscation of conveyance used for transporting smuggled goods –– Whether a lawfully registered vehicle carrying smuggled goods exclusively can be released on payment of redemption fine after the 2009 SRO and its subsequent amendments –– Scope. Adjudicating officer is empowered under S.181 to offer fine in lieu of confiscation except where the Federal Board of Revenue, under the first proviso, specifies classes of goods/conveyances for which such option shall not be granted –– Through S.R.O.499(I)/2009, the Board expressly withdrew the option of redemption fine in respect of (a) smuggled goods falling under S.2(s), and (b) lawfully registered conveyances used wholly, exclusively, or with false cavities for the carriage of smuggled goods –– The statutory bar created by the SRO divested adjudicating authorities of discretion to release such conveyances –– Subsequent temporary relaxation through S.R.O.1280(I)/2024 for limited categories of first- or second-time seizures not falling under clause (b) did not affect the existing prohibition, and the relaxation stood rescinded by S.R.O.1619(I)/2024 which restored the original and complete prohibition, adding category (ba) –– Held, the statutory embargo remained operative throughout, and confiscation of conveyances used in transportation of smuggled goods is mandatory –– The adjudicating officer, Tribunal, or Board had no jurisdiction to order release on redemption fine of any conveyance falling within SRO 2009 as amended. Cited Case: Bashir Ahmed v. Director, Directorate of Intelligence and Investigation (Customs), FBR, Peshawar (2025 SCMR 684) (b) Customs Act, 1969 –– Ss. 157(2) & 181 –– “Liable to confiscation” –– Whether confers discretion –– Interpretation. The expression “liable to confiscation” in S.157(2) does not confer discretionary authority where the Board has exercised its power under the first proviso to S.181 by issuing a prohibitory notification –– Once discretion is withdrawn through a valid notification, adjudicating or appellate fora cannot invoke S.157(2) to treat confiscation as optional –– The Tribunal’s reasoning that liability to confiscation permitted release on fine was contrary to the statutory framework and to the binding precedent in Bashir Ahmed (supra) –– High Court also erred in treating the post-03.10.2024 notification as merely discretionary rather than restoring and reinforcing the original prohibition. (c) Customs Act, 1969 –– Ss. 168, 180 & 187 –– Burden of proof –– Vehicle carrying only smuggled goods –– Effect. Where a vehicle is intercepted carrying exclusively foreign-origin goods and the driver fails to produce lawful import documents, the burden under S.187 remains undischarged –– The plea that the vehicle was hired public transport does not override the statutory bar created by SRO 2009 –– Upon such recovery, outright confiscation is the only legally permissible course and cannot be substituted by redemption fine. (d) Smuggling –– Vehicle used in transportation of smuggled goods –– Enforcement measures –– Legislative intent. The amendment rescinding earlier relaxation and restoring the complete bar on release of vehicles on redemption fine aims to close a longstanding enforcement loophole that enabled offenders to reclaim transport assets by paying fines –– Legislative policy now mandates permanent removal of such conveyances from circulation to strengthen anti-smuggling enforcement. (e) Customs Appellate Tribunal & High Court –– Jurisdiction –– Failure to apply statutory bar –– Orders without lawful authority. Tribunal and High Court erred in directing release of the vehicle on 40% redemption fine and in construing the amended S.R.O.1619(I)/2024 as non-retrospective and discretionary –– Their interpretations overlooked the continuous operation of SRO 2009 and its amendments –– Orders passed without lawful jurisdiction are liable to be set aside. (f) Result. Petitions converted into appeals and allowed in CPs.2853, 2854 and 3566 of 2025 –– Judgments of the High Court and Customs Appellate Tribunal set aside –– Order-in-Original dated 18.12.2024 directing outright confiscation restored –– CP.3886 of 2025 dismissed; leave refused.

Summary: (a) Customs Act (IV of 1969)---- ----S.27A read with Customs Rules, 2001, r.592 and S.R.O. 450(I)/2001—Mutilation/scrapping of imported goods—Scope confined to notified items—Held, that r.592 prescribes a restrictive (exhaustive) list of “old and used items” eligible for mutilation/scrapping within the meaning of S.27A; “rollers” are not included in any form—Request for mutilation made by the importer was, therefore, rightly declined by Customs; High Court’s direction to allow mutilation set aside and departmental rejection restored. (b) Customs Rules, 2001---- ----R.592—Serviceable versus unserviceable goods—Rule applies where identified items, imported in serviceable condition (with scrap or separately) are to be mutilated/scrapped; unserviceable/patently scrap goods do not fall within r.592—High Court’s conclusion that the goods were unserviceable (based on photographs) was misconceived and contrary to the importer’s own case; in any event, “rollers” being outside the notified list, mutilation could not be ordered. (c) Statutory interpretation---- ----Restrictive list—Legislative intent—Rule 592 has been amended over time (including by S.R.O. 1540(I)/2018 dated 21.12.2018) without adding “rollers,” evidencing conscious legislative choice—Courts cannot expand the notified categories on policy/environmental considerations; the list is restrictive, not illustrative. (d) Procedure---- ----Timing of request—Application for mutilation made prior to filing of goods declaration—Department not having disputed this ground before the High Court, the case proceeded on that footing; nevertheless, eligibility fails on merits due to the item’s exclusion from r.592. (e) Customs concessions---- ----Industrial inputs—S.R.O. 327(I)/2008, r.2(f)—Where relief is sought under the “industrial inputs” category, an analysis certificate/approval is required—Importer obtained no such approval; no case made out on this count either. Disposition: Petition converted into appeal; appeal allowed; High Court order set aside; departmental rejection of mutilation request restored.

Summary: (a) Customs Act (IV of 1969)---- ----S.14A(2), read with Customs Rules, 2001, r.556(iv) and S.156(1)(7A)---Interpretation of the term ‘entertain’---Mandatory obligation of port and terminal operators to honour Delay and Detention Certificates issued by Customs authorities---Scope and effect---Held, that the word ‘entertain’ in subsection (2) of section 14A, read together with rule 556(iv) of the Customs Rules, 2001, imposes a statutory and mandatory duty upon all port authorities, terminal operators, and container freight stations to receive, acknowledge, and act upon Delay and Detention Certificates issued by a Customs officer not below the rank of Assistant Collector---Once such certificate confirms that delay in clearance occurred without fault of the importer or exporter, the concerned private operator must refund or waive demurrage and detention charges for the certified period---Failure to do so constitutes a violation of statutory duty and attracts penal consequences under section 156(1)(7A) of the Act---Argument that the term ‘entertain’ authorizes the port operator to adjudicate entitlement rejected; a licensee cannot be a judge of its own cause---Rule 556(iv) explicitly requires that the terminal operator “shall honour” such certificates, leaving no discretion for refusal or independent assessment---Provision being couched in mandatory terms, its non-compliance entails legal consequence. Cited Cases: • All Pakistan Newspaper Society v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2004 SC 600) • The State through Regional Director ANF v. Imam Bakhsh (2018 SCMR 2039). (b) Customs Rules, 2001---- ----R.556(iv)---Rights and obligations of terminal operator---Rule 556(iv) creates an independent statutory obligation binding the terminal operator to honour delay and detention certificates issued by the Customs authority---The rule, being part of the Customs Computerized System framework, overrides any contrary contractual stipulation between the port operator and the Government---Held, that the issuance of a valid delay and detention certificate conclusively determines the importer’s entitlement to waiver or refund; any counterclaim by the terminal operator lies separately against the Customs Department or under its operating agreement, but cannot be enforced against the importer after certification---Purpose of the rule is to ensure expeditious release of goods and prevent further accrual of demurrage once delay is found not attributable to the importer. (c) Statutory interpretation--- ----Mandatory versus directory provisions---Test for determining mandatory nature of statutory obligation---Held, that where non-compliance with a statutory requirement entails a penalty or legal consequence, the provision must be treated as mandatory---Since failure to honour delay and detention certificates invites penal action under section 156(1)(7A) of the Act, section 14A(2) is mandatory in nature---Legislative intent, reinforced by Finance Act, 2013, was to impose absolute and enforceable duty upon port and terminal operators to act upon such certificates without discretion. (d) Jurisdiction--- ----Customs department versus terminal operator---Determination of liability for demurrage---Held, that the Customs authorities alone are competent to adjudge whether the importer was at fault in causing delay; once so adjudged and certified, the terminal operator must comply and refund demurrage---Port operator’s contention that it possessed jurisdiction to determine entitlement under section 14A(2) was misconceived and contrary to the statutory scheme---A licensee under governmental authorization cannot assume adjudicatory authority in its own cause. Disposition: Petition converted into appeal; appeal dismissed.

Summary: (a) Customs Act, 1969 (IV of 1969) — Ss. 25A, 25D — Determination and revision of customs value — Interpretation of “any person” — Scope of revisional power of Director General (Customs Valuation). Held, the phrase “any person” in s. 25A(1) is of widest amplitude and includes local manufacturers of goods identical or similar to imported goods under valuation. Such manufacturers are not strangers to the process and may provide relevant material to assist in fair determination of customs value; exclusion of local manufacturers from that expression is unwarranted. The subsequent insertion of the words “a local manufacturer” in s. 2(pa) by the Finance Act 2018 merely clarified existing law and overcame the restrictive interpretation adopted by the High Court. (b) — Anti-Dumping Duties Act, 2015, distinction from customs valuation — Remedies compared. Anti-dumping investigations under the 2015 Act address injury caused by goods exported at “dumped” prices below their normal value in the exporting country, whereas customs valuation under ss. 25–25D seeks to ascertain the true transaction value for duty assessment and to prevent under-invoicing. These are parallel but distinct regimes; resort to the National Tariff Commission is no substitute for participation in proceedings under s. 25A. (c) — Local manufacturers — Standing. A local manufacturer affected by under-invoiced imports may validly make a reference to the Director of Customs Valuation under s. 25A and furnish evidence such as price lists, catalogues, comparative market data, or production-cost information to aid determination. Their role is facilitative and does not convert the valuation process into protectionism. (d) — Revision under s. 25D — Extent of power. Revisional jurisdiction of the Director General (Customs Valuation) under s. 25D is broader than that under s. 115 C.P.C.; it is not confined to mere remand. The DG-CV may, on revision, revise or rescind the determination made under s. 25A, and may substitute, modify, increase or decrease the assessed customs value on the basis of material available, provided he acts within law. The High Court erred in holding that the DG-CV could only set aside and remand. (e) Statutory interpretation — Word “any” — Scope. The expression “any person” ordinarily denotes universality and is to be construed broadly unless the context compels restriction; inclusion of local manufacturers is therefore consistent with the object of s. 25A to ensure accurate and transparent valuation. ------ Disposition — Appeals allowed; impugned judgment of the High Court of Sindh dated 19-03-2018 set aside to the extent inconsistent herewith. Civil Miscellaneous Applications for impleadment and stay dismissed as infructuous.

Summary: (a) Customs Act, 1969 (IV of 1969) ----S. 179(3) & proviso; S. 2(s)—Limitation for passing order-in-original—Extension of time—Collector’s jurisdiction—Scope. Show cause notice was issued on 27-04-2020 alleging smuggling under S. 2(s) of the Act; order-in-original was passed on 10-08-2020. Tribunal (Referee Member concurring with Member Judicial) and High Court found the order time-barred. Supreme Court held that under the proviso to S. 179(3), where proceedings invoke S. 2(s), the order-in-original must be passed within 30 days of the show-cause notice and no extension is permissible. Collector’s self-granted extension without recorded reasons had no legal effect. Both Collector (Adjudication) and Tribunal wrongly presumed a 90-day period applicable to S. 2(s) matters. The 30-day limitation is absolute, leaving no discretion for extension. (b) Statutory construction—Mandatory time-limits in fiscal statutes. Court reiterated that limitation provisions in taxing laws are mandatory; administrative convenience cannot justify deviation. Once the statutory period lapses, adjudication stands void ab initio. The Collector’s purported extension was ultra vires, and the order-in-original passed beyond limitation was invalid. (c) Jurisdiction—Failure to act within prescribed time. Passing an order beyond the statutory time limit deprives the adjudicating authority of jurisdiction; the defect goes to the root and cannot be cured by consent or subsequent validation. Disposition: Petition dismissed—Leave to appeal refused—Judgment of Islamabad High Court upholding Tribunal’s view maintained.

Summary: (a) Customs Act, 1969 (IV of 1969) ----S. 169(5)—Claim to sale proceeds of confiscated goods—Prerequisites—Held, entitlement to sale proceeds of seized goods arises only after adjudication or appellate declaration that the goods were not liable to confiscation—Petitioner, without obtaining such declaration, directly claimed the proceeds of confiscated “black tea” under S.169(5)—Such claim was premature and not maintainable—To invoke S.169(5), the claimant must first establish ownership and wrongful confiscation through proper adjudication or court proceedings; absent such finding, no right to proceeds accrues. (b) Customs law—Confiscation and sale proceeds ----S. 168, S. 169(5), Ss. 156(1)(8)(89), 201—Once goods are lawfully confiscated under adjudication (Order-in-Original No.123/2011, dated 19.08.2011), the sale proceeds remain property of the State unless later adjudged otherwise—Findings in Custom Reference No. 27-P of 2018 and dismissal of subsequent Civil Appeal No.176 of 2020 upheld the confiscation; thus, petitioner’s ownership claim stood negated. Held: Petitioner failed to obtain requisite declaration that the goods were not liable to confiscation; claim for sale proceeds under S.169(5) was misconceived and premature. Disposition: Leave to appeal refused—Petition dismissed. Statutes and Provisions Cited: • Customs Act, 1969 (IV of 1969), Ss. 2(s), 16, 156(1)(8)(89), 157, 168, 169(5), 201. • Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1950, Ss. 3(1) & 3(3). Result: Petition dismissed; leave to appeal refused.

Summary: (a) Sales Tax Act, 1990 (VII of 1990) ----S. 36(1), (2) & (3)–––Time limitation for passing order after issuance of show cause notice–––Scope and effect–––Mandatory nature of prescribed period–––Where statute provides that order-in-original shall be made within 120 days of issuance of show cause notice, extendable only by 60 days for recorded reasons, any order made thereafter would be time-barred–––No extension beyond 180 days permissible under law–––In present case, show cause notices were issued on 30.06.2000 and 12.12.2001, whereas orders-in-original were passed on 02.02.2001 and 20.04.2002 respectively–––Both orders made beyond statutory period–––Held, orders-in-original were barred by limitation and had no legal effect–––Provisions of S.36(3) being mandatory, non-compliance rendered proceedings void ab initio–––Larger Bench judgment in Wak Limited Multan Road, Lahore v. Collector Central Excise and Sales Tax, Lahore (2025 SCMR 1280) applied. (b) Central Excises Act, 1944 ----S. 33(3)–––Adjudication proceedings–––Time limit of 45 days for deciding matter after issuance of show cause notice–––Order passed beyond prescribed period–––Validity–––Held, order-in-original passed after expiry of statutory period was time-barred and without jurisdiction–––Observance of limitation is mandatory to ensure certainty and fairness in fiscal adjudication. (c) Fiscal statutes–––Mandatory nature of limitation provisions ----Interpretation–––Timeframes in taxing statutes must be strictly construed–––Non-compliance with statutory timelines deprives the authority of jurisdiction to act–––Corrigenda issued after expiry of limitation could not revive jurisdiction or cure the lapse–––Held, consequence of failure to pass order within prescribed period is nullity of entire proceedings–––Subsequent proceedings and demands, being consequential, also stood annulled. Cited Case: • Wak Limited Multan Road, Lahore v. Collector Central Excise and Sales Tax, Lahore (2025 SCMR 1280). Disposition: Appeals allowed–––Impugned judgments of the Lahore High Court set aside–––Orders-in-original declared time-barred and without lawful authority.

Summary: (a) Customs Act, 1969— —Ss. 32, 80, 81 & 179—Jurisdiction—Recovery of short-levied taxes—Scope— Customs authorities retain jurisdiction, within five-year limitation, to recover sales tax and advance income tax at the import stage, even where discovered after clearance of goods due to wrongly granted exemption. Insertion of “taxes” in S.32 by Finance Act, 2014 and “including recovery” in S.6(1) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 by Finance Act, 2015, coupled with omission of S.11 Sales Tax Act by Finance Act, 2024, show legislative intent to vest post-clearance recovery jurisdiction in Customs. Sections 80 and 81 envisage assessment not concluded at clearance stage; S.179 provides adjudicatory machinery. (b) Sales Tax Act, 1990— —S. 6(1)—Collection and recovery at import stage—Extent— Import-stage sales tax is charged, paid, enforced and recovered in the same manner and time as customs duty. With omission of general recovery jurisdiction of Inland Revenue (earlier S.11), S.6(1) now stands as sole operative provision, incorporating Customs Act machinery for collection and recovery of sales tax at import. (c) Income Tax Ordinance, 2001— —S. 148(5) & (6)—Advance income tax at import stage— Sub-sections (5) and (6) synchronize collection of advance income tax with customs duty, borrowing Customs Act provisions “so far as they relate to collection”. Scheme envisages that Customs may recover unpaid advance tax discovered through post-clearance audit. (d) Fiscal statutes—Amendments—Retrospective application— Amendments by Finance Acts 2012, 2014 and 2015 to Customs Act and Sales Tax Act are procedural; they regulate forum and machinery for collection but do not create new liabilities. Being procedural, they apply retrospectively unless expressly excluded. (e) Constitutional law— —Art. 199—High Court jurisdiction— Sindh High Court erred in holding Customs lacked jurisdiction to recover import-stage sales tax and income tax post clearance; impugned judgments set aside. Dissent (Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui, J.) (f) Customs Act, 1969—Sales Tax Act, 1990—Income Tax Ordinance, 2001—Jurisdiction— Held, Customs’ jurisdiction limited to import stage only. Post-clearance recovery of sales tax or income tax lies exclusively with Inland Revenue authorities under respective statutes. Amendments inserting “taxes” (Customs Act) or “including recovery” (Sales Tax Act) do not confer adjudicatory powers to Customs absent express conferment. Import-stage jurisdiction ends once goods are cleared under S.80 of Customs Act; subsequent proceedings must be by Inland Revenue. Civil Petitions dismissed. Cited Cases Gulistan Textile Mills v. Federation of Pakistan 2019 PTD 393 (Lahore High Court) (distinguished) Banwari Lal v. Mahesh AIR 1918 PC 188 Siddique Khan v. Abdul Shakur Khan PLD 1984 SC 289 Other jurisprudence on court-fees and jurisdiction referred for analogy. ----Disposition: By majority (Afridi, C.J. and Shakeel Ahmad, J.)—Petitions converted into appeals—Allowed—Sindh High Court judgments/orders set aside—Customs authorities declared competent to recover short-levied sales tax and advance income tax post-clearance. Dissent (Siddiqui, J.)—Leave refused—Customs jurisdiction confined to import stage; post-clearance recovery lies with Inland Revenue.

Summary: Customs Act (IV of 1969)--- ----Ss. 179(3), second proviso & 179(4)---Show Cause Notice, issuance of---Collector, Collectorate of Customs (Adjudication) adjudicate a matter---Limitation---Time-bound proceeding, non-observance of---Effect---In the present case, admittedly, the Show Cause Notice was issued in 2014 (i.e. prior to amendment of Finance Act 2019); proceedings commenced on the basis of the Show Cause Notice before the Collector, Collectorate of Customs (Adjudication), who was under an obligation to decide the case within 120 days (as the law then was)---Such period was subsequently reduced to 90 days via Finance Act 2019---Show Cause Notice was issued on 05.12.2014 leaving the officer to decide the case within a period of 120 days in addition to adjournment sought in terms of 2nd proviso to section 179(3)---As per record (first/title page) the order-in-original was shown to have been passed as on 19th of May 2015, whereas at the end of the said order-in-original it was shown to have been signed on 4th of June, 2015---In counting the prescribed period in terms of section 179(3) (as it then was) a period of 120 days and another period of 30 days of adjournment i.e. 150 days were available to decide the case within the frame of section 179(3)---The order ought to have been passed on or before 4th of May of 2015---However, such order was shown to have been passed either on 4th June, 2015 or on 19th of May, 2015---Surprisingly, record (a letter) showed to have extended a request for extension of time in terms of section 179(4) of the Customs Act, 1969, however, alleged extension was dated 20th of May 2015---The alleged extension was shown to have been passed much after the limit prescribed in terms of section 179(3), i.e. 150 days---Then (if this was done on 20th of May 2015), how an order could have been passed on 19th of May 2015 as disclosed on the title page of the customs order-in- original---Said time-bound proceeding in terms of sections 179(3) and 179(4) was mandatory---Since, in terms of the calculation/computation, the order-in-original was passed much beyond the time limits and even the alleged extension was much beyond the limit prescribed, (as it ought to have been extended, if at all, within the time frame), it left the decision i.e. order-in-original as time barred and consequently the proceedings under the aforesaid show cause notice could not continue any more---Supreme Court set-aside the impugned order of the High Court---Petition was converted into appeal and was allowed accordingly. Collector of Sales Tax, Gujranwala and others v. Super Asia Mohammad Din and others 2017 SCMR 1427; Wak Limited v. Collector Central Excise and Sales Tax 2018 SCMR 1474 and Messers Wak Limited Multan Road, Lahore and others v. Collector Central Excise and Sales Tax, Lahore and others 2025 SCMR 1280 ref. Sh. Zafar ul Islam, Advocate Supreme Court along with Tanveer Ahmad, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner. Izhar ul Haq, Advocate Supreme Court and Ali Hassan Raza, D.C. Customs for Respondents. Date of hearing: 20th August, 2025.