Summary: (a) Contract Act (IX of 1872)--- ----Ss. 211 & 215---Attorney and principal---Fiduciary obligation---Transfer of principal’s property by attorney in favour of his own sons---Validity---Attorney, acting under registered general power of attorney, transferred principal’s inherited property in favour of his own sons through registered sale deed and mutation---Principal subsequently revoked power of attorney and sought cancellation of sale deed and mutation on ground of misuse of authority, fraud and absence of consent---Held, that attorney stands in fiduciary relationship with principal and cannot validly transfer principal’s property in favour of himself or his close relatives without prior permission, approval and consent of principal after full disclosure of material circumstances---Transfer in favour of sons of attorney, without proof of express consent of principal, was legally unsustainable. Cited Cases: • Fida Muhammad v. Pir Muhammad Khan PLD 1985 SC 341 • Maqsood Ahmad v. Salman Ali PLD 2003 SC 31 • Jamil Akhtar v. Las Baba PLD 2003 SC 494 • Muhammad Ashraf v. Muhammad Malik PLD 2008 SC 389 • Allah Bakhsh v. Muhammad Riaz PLD 2025 SC 63 (b) Power of attorney--- ----General power of attorney---Authority to alienate immovable property---Scope---General power of attorney does not, merely by reason of being described as “general”, automatically include authority to sell or alienate property of principal---Such authority must be contained in a clear and specific clause, and even then Court must examine whether principal’s knowledge, intention and consent are clearly established---Held, that implied authority to alienate property is not readily deducible from vague or general words, particularly where principal alleges fraud or misrepresentation. Cited Case: • Fida Muhammad v. Pir Muhammad Khan PLD 1985 SC 341 (c) Power of attorney--- ----Attorney purchasing or transferring property for his own benefit or for benefit of close relatives---Special permission of principal---Requirement---Attorney transferred suit property in favour of his own sons---Held, that where attorney intends to deal with principal’s property for his own benefit or in favour of close fiduciary relations, he must obtain special permission/prior approval of principal---Failure to obtain such consent entitles principal to repudiate transaction---Burden lies heavily upon attorney and beneficiaries to establish valid consent and lawful authority. Cited Cases: • Maqsood Ahmad v. Salman Ali PLD 2003 SC 31 • Jamil Akhtar v. Las Baba PLD 2003 SC 494 • Muhammad Ashraf v. Muhammad Malik PLD 2008 SC 389 • Allah Bakhsh v. Muhammad Riaz PLD 2025 SC 63 (d) Sale by attorney--- ----Transfer in favour of attorney’s sons---Absence of express written consent---Effect---No cogent or reliable evidence was produced to prove that principal had granted express consent or prior approval for transfer of suit property in favour of attorney’s sons---Held, that in absence of such consent, transaction was hit by settled principles governing fiduciary obligations of attorney and could not be sustained. (e) Sale transaction--- ----Payment through cheque---Proof of sale consideration---Evidentiary value---Attorney/brother relied upon alleged cheque payment in favour of principal/sister to support sale transaction---Held, that payment through cheque, by itself, was not conclusive proof of valid sale transaction, particularly where no agreement to sell or independent corroborative evidence existed to show lawful bargain---Mere production of payment, without proof of underlying transaction and principal’s informed consent, did not satisfy legal standard required to validate alienation of immovable property. (f) Fraud and misuse of authority--- ----Power of attorney executed due to close familial relationship---Subsequent sale in favour of attorney’s sons---Material alteration in written statement regarding consideration---Effect---Principal had executed power of attorney in favour of appellant due to close familial relations for management of suit property---Attorney later transferred property in favour of his sons---Appellants initially pleaded purchase for valuable consideration, but later materially altered alleged sale consideration in amended written statement without explanation---Held, that surrounding circumstances, fiduciary relationship, absence of proven consent and inconsistency regarding consideration supported conclusion that authority had been misused and transaction was not legally sustainable. (g) Civil suit--- ----Cancellation of sale deed and mutation---Attorney’s unauthorized transfer---Trial Court decree restored by High Court---Supreme Court refusal to interfere---Trial Court decreed suit for cancellation; appellate Court reversed; High Court restored Trial Court decree---Supreme Court held that core question was whether attorney could validly transfer principal’s property to his own sons without express written consent and whether such consent had been proved---No reliable evidence of prior approval or express consent having been produced, High Court rightly restored decree of Trial Court---Appeal was dismissed. Disposition: Appeal was dismissed. Supreme Court upheld High Court judgment dated 06.10.2025 whereby decree of Trial Court cancelling the impugned sale deed and mutation was restored. No order as to costs.

Summary: (a) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---- ----Specific performance---Oral agreement to sell immovable property---Strict proof required---Respondents/plaintiffs sought specific performance on basis of alleged oral agreement dated 28.05.1992, allegedly arising out of reconciliation after acquittal in a murder case, whereby petitioner/defendant was said to have agreed to transfer 32 kanals of land to them---Supreme Court held that an oral agreement intended to bind parties may be valid and enforceable, but it must be proved through clearest and most satisfactory evidence---Basic ingredients of valid contract, including offer, acceptance, lawful consideration, mutuality of obligation, competency of parties and consensus ad idem, must be established through unimpeachable evidence. Cited Cases: • Hafiz Qari Abdul Fateh through LRs v. Ms. Urooj Fatima and others 2024 SCMR 1709 • Maqbool Ahmad v. Suleman Ali PLD 2003 SC 31 (b) Contract Act (IX of 1872)---- ----S. 2(h)---Agreement---Oral agreement for sale of immovable property---Onus of proof---Supreme Court held that person seeking decree of specific performance on basis of oral agreement must prove that mutual agreement and consensus existed between parties regarding terms of contract---Oral agreement must satisfy legal requirements of an enforceable agreement under Contract Act, 1872---Respondents failed to prove essential elements of alleged bargain with requisite clarity and certainty. (c) Specific performance---- ----Oral agreement to sell---Pleadings---Date, time, place, witnesses, consideration and terms---Sine qua non---Supreme Court held that party claiming existence of oral agreement must clearly specify date, time, place and names of witnesses in pleadings, along with exact terms and conditions, consideration, subject matter and detail of striking of bargain---Such requirements are sine qua non for proving oral agreement to sell---Suits based on oral sale agreements are more susceptible to dishonest improvements in evidence and pleadings; therefore Courts must strictly insist upon foundational details at earliest stage. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Riaz and others v. Mst. Badshah Begum and others 2021 SCMR 605 • Moiz Abbas v. Mrs. Latifa and others 2019 SCMR 74 • Saddaruddin through LRs v. Sultan Khan through LRs and others 2021 SCMR 642 • Sheikh Akhtar Aziz v. Mst. Shabnam Begum and others 2019 SCMR 524 • Muhammad Nawaz through LRs v. Haji Muhammad Baran Khan through LRs 2013 SCMR 1300 (d) Pleadings and evidence---- ----Evidence beyond pleadings---Impermissible improvement---Oral agreement and alleged reconciliation committee/Jirga---Respondents’ plaint did not disclose with precision date, time and place of alleged oral agreement, exact terms and conditions, settled consideration, or names of witnesses before whom bargain was struck---Plea of reconciliation committee/Jirga was also not supported by necessary particulars in pleadings---Supreme Court held that attempt to supplement foundational deficiencies through oral testimony amounted to impermissible improvement beyond pleadings and could not be looked into---Parties must lead evidence in consonance with pleadings, and no evidence can be considered in support of a plea not properly taken. Cited Cases: • Saddaruddin through LRs v. Sultan Khan through LRs and others 2021 SCMR 642 • Sardar Muhammad Naseem Khan v. Returning Officer, PP-12 and others 2015 SCMR 1698 • Binyameen and others v. Chaudhry Hakim and another 1996 SCMR 336 (e) Specific performance---- ----Sale of immovable property---Requirements for enforcement---Transaction with title holder, offer, acceptance, competency, consideration and delivery of possession---Supreme Court reiterated that to enforce sale of immovable property, vendee must establish that transaction was made with title holder, offer was made and accepted, parties were competent, consensus ad idem existed, valid consideration was settled, and transaction was accompanied by delivery of possession---Respondents failed to satisfy such strict standard of proof in respect of alleged oral agreement. Cited Case: • Muhammad Yaqoob v. Mst. Sardaran Bibi and others PLD 2020 SC 338 (f) Specific performance---- ----Alleged possession and subsequent ownership mutation---Effect---Respondents alleged that possession had been delivered and petitioner became bound to transfer property after securing ownership rights through Mutation No.1314 dated 14.10.2016---Supreme Court held that mere assertions regarding possession or subsequent title could not substitute proof of valid oral agreement---Mere prolonged possession, even coupled with title documents, does not establish ownership or enforceable sale unless underlying sale agreement is legally proved. (g) Concurrent findings---- ----Specific performance decreed by Trial Court, maintained by Appellate Court and High Court---Concurrent findings contrary to settled law---Interference by Supreme Court---Trial Court, after remand, decreed suit for specific performance; Appellate Court dismissed petitioner’s appeal and High Court dismissed revision---Supreme Court held that Courts below failed to apply strict standard of proof mandated for oral agreements to sell immovable property---Findings suffered from misapplication of settled law and non-reading of material deficiencies in pleadings and proof---Concurrent findings cannot be allowed to stand where demonstrably contrary to principles repeatedly laid down by Supreme Court. Cited Cases: • Habib Ur Rehman and others v. Abdul Karim through LRs and others 2025 SCMR 1262 • United Bank Limited through its President and others v. Jamil Ahmed and others 2024 SCMR 164 / 2024 PLC 50 SC • Muhammad Nawaz alias Nawaza and others v. Member Judicial Board of Revenue and others 2014 SCMR 914 • Abdul Hameed and others v. Khalid and others 2007 SCMR 938 • Mst. Saadat Sultan and others v. Muhammad Zahur Khan and others 2006 SCMR 193 • Muhammad Aslam v. Mst. Ferozi and others PLD 2001 SC 213 • Muhammad Akhtar v. Mst. Manna and 3 others 2001 SCMR 1700 Disposition: Petition was converted into appeal and allowed; judgments and decrees passed by Trial Court, Appellate Court and Lahore High Court were set aside; suit filed by respondents for specific performance of alleged oral agreement stood dismissed; no order as to costs.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199—Writ jurisdiction—Contractual disputes—Scope of interference by High Court—Limitation of writ remedy in purely private contractual matters The Supreme Court reiterated that the High Court, in exercise of constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199, ordinarily refrains from interfering in matters arising purely out of contractual obligations between private parties, particularly where disputed questions of fact require evidence. The impugned judgment of the High Court had ventured into adjudication of a contractually governed employment termination without assessing available alternate remedies or following due evidentiary processes. Cited Case: Pakistan Defence Officers Housing Authority v. Lt. Col. Syed Jawaid Ahmed (2013 SCMR 1707) (b) Service Law—Private contractual employment—Termination simpliciter—Distinction between regular government service and private/contractual appointment—Employee not governed by statutory rules—Remedy lies in civil suit, not writ The appellant's employment was governed exclusively by the terms of a contract, and no statutory rules were shown to apply. The Supreme Court held that the respondent, not being a civil servant or a statutory employee, could not invoke the writ jurisdiction to challenge the termination. Where the relationship is that of master and servant without statutory backing, the remedy lies in ordinary civil proceedings for damages or reinstatement subject to contract terms. Cited Case: Pakistan Red Crescent Society v. Syed Nazir Gillani (PLD 2005 SC 806) (c) High Court Judgment—Error of jurisdiction—Substitution of contractual terms by judicial reasoning—Improper assumption of fact-finding role—High Court exceeded constitutional jurisdiction The Court held that the High Court erred in law by effectively rewriting the employment terms and substituting its own findings over matters contractually agreed upon between the parties. This amounted to judicial overreach and transgression into a domain reserved for trial courts. The writ jurisdiction was exercised in a manner that disrupted the legal sanctity of mutually agreed contracts. Cited Case: Province of Punjab v. Asif Jamil (PLD 2021 SC 741) (d) Contract Act, 1872—Contractual obligations—Termination clause—Binding nature—Courts not to rewrite terms—Freedom of contract upheld The appeal involved the enforcement of a contractually stipulated termination clause. The Supreme Court reiterated that where a contract allows either party to terminate without cause, courts must respect such autonomy unless vitiated by fraud, coercion, or illegality. The High Court had misapplied equitable considerations in disregard of binding contractual terms. Cited Case: Shafique Ahmed Khan v. NESPAK (PLD 2011 SC 610) Disposition: Appeal allowed. Impugned judgment of the High Court set aside. Constitutional petition dismissed. Supreme Court upheld the appellant's right to terminate the respondent in accordance with contract terms.

Summary: (a) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), S. 12—Specific performance—Essential prerequisites—Clean hands doctrine—Misstatement in pleadings—Equitable relief rightly denied- Vendee filed suit for specific performance of agreement to sell dated 17.02.2009. He claimed to have paid Rs. 200,000 as part payment; however, no mention of earnest money was made in the agreement to sell. Moreover, during testimony, the vendee contradicted his own pleadings. The Supreme Court held that the vendee had misstated material facts and approached the court without clean hands. Relief of specific performance being discretionary in nature could not be granted in such circumstances. Held: Party seeking equity must come with clean hands; false pleadings disentitle relief. Cited Case: Justice Khurshid Anwar Bhinder v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2010 SC 483) (b) Contract Act (IX of 1872), S. 55—Specific performance—Time as essence of contract—Express stipulation—Failure to perform within agreed time fatal to relief sought Agreement to sell fixed 31.10.2010 as deadline for payment and execution. The vendee failed to pay full consideration within stipulated period despite having over 20 months. The Supreme Court emphasized that the express terms of the agreement, including forfeiture clause and deadline, showed that time was the essence of the contract. Delay rendered vendee disentitled to relief. Held: Where time is expressly stipulated as essence and performance not rendered within such time, suit for specific performance must fail. Cited Cases: • Fazal-ur-Rehman v. Ahmed Saeed Mughal (2004 SCMR 436) • Mussarat Shaukat Ali v. Sofia Khatoon (1994 SCMR 2189) (c) Equity—Contract for sale of immovable property—Commercial character—Escalating property values—Equitable jurisdiction to be exercised cautiously Court noted that the suit property was commercial in nature and real estate prices were constantly escalating. In such cases, courts should exercise equitable jurisdiction for specific performance with caution, particularly where delay in performance would unjustly enrich one party. Held: Equity does not aid a party whose default, delay or misrepresentation would lead to injustice. (d) Civil Procedure—Appellate and revisional jurisdiction—High Court’s interference—Concurrent findings reversed—Proper consideration of law and fact The trial and appellate courts decreed the suit in favour of the vendee. However, the Supreme Court held that both courts below failed to appreciate legal and factual issues regarding misrepresentation and time-bound performance. The High Court correctly reversed the concurrent findings and dismissed the suit. Held: Revisional jurisdiction rightly exercised where lower courts misconstrued law and overlooked material facts. Disposition: Appeal dismissed. Judgments and decrees of trial and appellate courts set aside by High Court were upheld. No order as to costs.

Summary: (a) Contract Act, 1872 ----S. 70—Quantum meruit—Void appointment—Recovery of salary—Petitioner served for 15 years before appointment was found void for failure to meet minimum educational criteria—No allegation of fraud or concealment—Services rendered were accepted and remunerated without objection—Supreme Court held that doctrine of quantum meruit applied—Labor rendered in good faith and accepted by employer over extended period entitled to reasonable compensation—Retrospective recovery of salary impermissible in absence of fraudulent intent. References: Craven-Ellis v. Cannons Ltd (1936) 2 KB 403; Benedetti v. Sawiris [2013] UKSC 50; State of West Bengal v. M/s B.K. Mondal and Sons AIR 1962 SC 779. (b) Administrative Law ----Doctrine of acquiescence—Delayed departmental inquiry—Appointment made in 2003, scrutinized only after 15 years—No timely verification or oversight by department—Supreme Court held that institutional silence and prolonged acceptance of service created bar to retrospective recovery—Department estopped from invoking punitive financial measures for its own negligence—Termination for ineligibility upheld, but financial restitution disallowed. References: Ramsden v. Dyson (1866) LR 1 HL 129; Sardar Ali Khan v. State Bank of Pakistan 2022 SCMR 1454; Market Committee, Multan v. Additional Commissioner (Consolidation), Multan 2023 SCMR 1683. (c) Constitutional Law ----Equity and fairness in public service—Public authority benefiting from 15 years of continuous, satisfactory service cannot unjustly enrich itself by recovering past salary—Employee not shown to have committed fraud or willful misconduct—Supreme Court held that retrospective recovery was disproportionate, inequitable, and legally untenable—Order for recovery set aside, though dismissal for ineligibility remained intact. (d) Service Law ----Irregular appointment—Termination justified—Recovery not justified—Where appointment is found to be void due to non-fulfillment of eligibility criteria, termination of service is legally sustainable—However, Supreme Court clarified that in absence of deceit or malpractice, recovery of salary already paid for duties actually performed violates settled principles of law and equity. References: Shams ur Rehman v. Military Accountant General, Rawalpindi 2020 SCMR 188; Engineer-in-Chief v. Jalaluddin PLD 1992 SC 207. Disposition: Petition converted into appeal and partially allowed—Impugned judgment set aside to the extent of salary recovery—Dismissal from service maintained.

Summary: (Against the judgment/decree dated 10.03.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge of High Court of Balochistan, Quetta in Civil Revision No. 583 of 2023). (a) Contract Act (IX of 1872)--- ----Ss. 2(g), 13 & 14---Contract procured under duress and undue influence---Execution of agreement while vendor being in police custody---Legality---Coercion, duress and undue influence, presumption of---Free consent of the vendor being an essential element of a valid contract ---Requirement---Burden of proof---Onus on beneficiary of the transaction to prove that transaction was made without any duress and with free consent of the owner---Scope---Contract procured under duress would be void---The present case was about a house that originally belonged to the respondents' family and was inherited by them through an inheritance mutation in 2001---Years later, some financial dealings between the petitioners and respondents went sour after a failed investment project---During this dispute, the respondents' predecessor was arrested and kept in police custody---While in custody, he was made to sign an agreement that transferred the family/inherited house to the petitioners, and a fresh mutation was recorded in their (petitioners') names---The respondents argued that the agreement was forced and had no legal value since it was signed under duress---The legal question before the Supreme Court was as to "whether the agreement for transfer of property, executed by the respondents' predecessor while in police custody, could be treated as a valid transaction reflecting free consent, or whether it stood vitiated by duress and coercion, rendering the subsequent mutation in favor of the petitioners void"?---Held: Since the respondents' predecessor (vendor) was arrested and was in custody, the complainant of the FIR was obviously in a position to dominate the will of accused, and therefore, the burden was upon the petitioner (vendee) to prove that he had not exerted any influence to strike a bargain/deal---The transaction so made was made on the basis of the agreement which was void---The suit of the respondents was filed within time and the petitioner was under heavy burden to prove that transaction made was without any duress and was made with free consent---No evidence was on record which could support the case of the petitioner and that was the reason the High Court dealt with the question extensively and had held rightly that the transaction made consequent to the agreement in police custody was void---No ground was present warranting interference of the Supreme Court in findings given by the High Court---Civil appeal was dismissed, in circumstances. (b) Contract Act (IX of 1872)--- ----Ss. 2(g), 13 & 14---Contract procured under duress---Agreement executed while vendor being under police custody or detention---Legality and validity---Coercion, duress or undue influence, presumption of---Essentials of a valid contract stated---Offer, acceptance, consideration, legal capacity, and free consent---Contract procured under duress void---Effect---Benefits derived from void contract to be restored---Under the law a transaction or an agreement executed under custody or detention could potentially be considered as having been made under coercion, duress or undue influence, if the free consent is not given or the expressed will was the outcome of such circumstances---A person in custody or detention may be particularly vulnerable to coercion or duress as his freedom or liability to resist is severely limited---A person under the custody of the law enforcement agencies having control over the situation if enters into an agreement against best interest has an option to avoid it hence can be challenged in the court as voidable---A legally binding contract requires several elements i.e. an offer, acceptance of that offer, consideration, the parties having legal capacity to contract but not for an unlawful purpose, surely with a free consent (meeting of the minds or consensus ad idem)---If the consent is procured by coercion, undue influence, fraud, misrepresentation or mistake, the consent is not free---An undue influence is a demonstration of controlling the will of the other party because of the prevailing situation of the main party---While coercion is an act of enforcing a will but the undue influence or duress are the consequence of coercion---A contract procured under duress by one party over the other is void and any benefit received there from must be restored and the loss be made good to such party---Duress in its more extended sense means that the degree of constraint or danger either actually inflicted or threatened which creates sufficient insecurity or an apprehension to overcome the mind and will of a person of ordinary fairness---It does not necessarily imply that the means used should be in themselves unlawful, but includes the use of lawful means in an unlawful manner or for an improper purpose---A duress by imprisonment, both lawful or unlawful, to force the party into executing a contract is illegal---In such circumstances, the contract would be deemed to be void under section 2(g) of the Contract Act, 1872 since it lacked consent as defined under section 13 of the said Act and free consent under section 14 of the Act. Mst. Hamida Begum v. Mst. Murad Begum and others PLD 1975 SC 624; Lahore Stock Exchange Limited v. Pedrick J. Whyte Group (Pakistan) Ltd. and others PLD 1990 SC 48; Dilber Hussain Hashmi and another v. Muslim Commercial Bank, Shahra-e-Iqbal Branch, Quetta 2001 SCMR 265 and Pokcom Limited and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2011 SC 44 rel. Kamran Murtaza, Senior Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rafaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Appellants. Nemo for Respondents. Date of hearing: 8th May, 2025.

Summary: (a) Contract Act, 1872 —- Ss. 2(g), 13, 14 — Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(2)(d) Contract executed under police custody — Validity — Free consent — Burden of proof — Legal consequence — Agreement dated 04.12.2015 executed by Altaf Hussain, predecessor of respondents No.1 to 6, while in police custody in connection with FIR No.161/2015 — Held, transaction was executed under circumstances of duress and lacked free consent, rendering the agreement void under S. 2(g) of the Contract Act, 1872 — Under Ss. 13 and 14 of the Act, consent must be free and not induced by coercion, undue influence, fraud, misrepresentation or mistake — Agreement was executed while Altaf Hussain was under arrest, in physical custody of law enforcement, and prior to his grant of post-arrest bail — Burden lay on the appellants to prove that transaction was entered into voluntarily, which they failed to discharge — No evidence produced to show that consideration was paid or benefit received by respondents — Held, where an agreement is executed in custody and there is dominance of will, such consent is presumed vitiated. Cited Cases: • Mst. Hamida Begum v. Mst. Murad Begum (PLD 1975 SC 624) • Pakcom Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2011 SC 44) • Pak Gulf Construction Co. v. MCB, Quetta Branch (2001 SCMR 265) (b) Evidence Law — Coercion — Undue Influence — Legal burden — Contractual presumption Presumption against voluntariness — Agreement by accused while in custody — Evidentiary threshold — Held, a person in police custody is presumed to be in a vulnerable state and particularly susceptible to coercion or undue influence — Where a contract is executed under such circumstances, courts must scrutinize the existence of free consent and consensus ad idem — Unless the party relying on the document proves that the transaction was fair, informed, and voluntary, such contracts are presumed invalid — No material produced by the appellants to prove that transaction was not influenced by duress or coercion — Agreement dated 04.12.2015 was therefore rightly held void. (c) Agency — Termination on death — General Power of Attorney — Posthumous execution — Legal validity Termination of agency on death — Effect of acts performed after death of principal — General Power of Attorney in favour of respondents No.1 to 6 stood terminated upon the death of Salma Sultana on 13.01.1999 — Mutation No.926 and all subsequent transactions based on agency post-death were void ab initio — Held, any action taken under terminated authority has no legal effect — High Court rightly restored Mutation No.428 and cancelled void mutation based on invalid agreement. Statutory Reference: Agency under general principles of the Contract Act and civil jurisprudence is extinguished upon death of principal. (d) Civil Procedure — Challenge to mutation — Delay — Legal consequence Timing of challenge — Mutation challenged within limitation — Delay not fatal — Appellant contended that challenge to Mutation No.926 was delayed and hence invalid — Held, suit was filed within prescribed limitation period — Delay in filing not sufficient to cure an inherently void transaction — Mere lapse of time does not validate a void agreement — Trial and appellate courts rightly found agreement void; High Court lawfully reversed lower findings based on legal scrutiny and evidentiary evaluation. (e) Constitution of Pakistan — Art. 185(2)(d) Appeal to Supreme Court — Scope of interference in concurrent factual findings — Standard of review — Held, where High Court judgment is based on correct legal principles and appreciation of evidence, Supreme Court does not interfere under Art. 185(2)(d) — Findings of High Court that agreement was void due to duress and agency had terminated were supported by record — Civil appeal dismissed. Final Disposition: Appeal dismissed. Judgment of High Court upheld. Agreement dated 04.12.2015 declared void and Mutation No.926 set aside; original Mutation No.428 restored.

Summary: (a) Arbitration Act (X of 1940)--- ----Ss. 15, 16 & 17---Powers of Court---Making award Rule of Court---Scope---While making award Rule of the Court, the Court is not supposed to act in a mechanical manner, like a post office and put its seal on it---Court has to look into the award and if it finds patent illegality on the face of the award, it can remit the award or any of the matters to arbitrator for reconsideration or set aside the same. (b) Arbitration Act (X of 1940)--- ----S. 17---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Arbitration---Rule of Court, assailing of---Extraneous remarks by Arbitrators in Award---Petitioner was aggrieved of not including in Rule of the Court, the escalation amount calculated by Arbitrators---Validity---Erroneous interpretation of law and/or clauses of contract made by Arbitrators could be set aside by Referee Court---Referee Court had rightly concluded that escalation was part of contract and provisions of Pakistan Engineering Council guidelines had been wrongly applied to the contract, therefore Arbitrators' interpretation in such regard was validly set aside---Regardless of correct interpretation of relevant clause of contract and legal position in that regard orders passed by Referee Court had never been challenged and was duly implemented---Such orders attained finality and were binding on Arbitrators who were bound to follow the same---Arbitrators went way beyond the terms of reference as well as their powers and jurisdiction by sitting as a Court of Appeal on Referee Court's orders and any such remarks given by them were extraneous to the Terms of Reference and should have been discarded by Referee Court---Calculations finally made by Arbitrators had to have been made Rule of the Court---Order of Referee Court as well as Lower Appellate Court to the extent of issue pertaining to escalation cost were not sustainable in the eye of law and the same were set aside to that extent---High Court discarded remarks made by Arbitrators regarding non-admissibility of escalation---High Court made calculations with respect to escalation cost as Rule of the Court---Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly. Sh. Muhammad Saleem v. Saadat Enterprises 2009 CLD 390; Messrs Jaffar Bros. Ltd. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan and others PLD 1978 Kar. 585; Pakistan v. Ms. Rajastan Alloy and Steel (Pvt.) Ltd. 2002 CLD 61; Syed Tariq Farooq v. Nasruddin and another PLD 1980 Quetta 1; Gerry's International (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Aerofloat Russian International Airlines 2018 SCMR 662; Karachi Dock Labour Board v. Ms. Quality Builders Ltd. PLD 2016 SC 121; Pakistan v. Ms. QMR Expert Consultants PLD 1980 SC 800; State Bank of Pakistan v. Khyber Zaman and others 2004 SCMR 1426; Societe Generale De Surveillance S.A. v. Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Finance Revenue Division, Islamabad 2002 SCMR 1694 and Director Housing, A.G's Branch, Rawalpindi v. M/s. Makhdum Consultants Engineers and Architects 1997 SCMR 988 ref. Zahid Idrees Mufti for Petitioner. Wajahat Hussain Shah, Assistant Advocate General for Respondents. Date of hearing: 16th April, 2025.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----Ss. 100 & 101—Second Appeal—Scope and jurisdiction—Concurrent findings—Substitution of equitable discretion by High Court—ImpermissibilitySecond Appeal under Section 100 CPC lies only on limited grounds, including decision contrary to law or containing substantial procedural defects affecting the merits of the case. The Supreme Court reiterated that High Court, in exercise of Second Appellate jurisdiction, cannot substitute its own view merely on equitable considerations, particularly when the First Appellate Court had reversed the Trial Court's decree by applying discretion judiciously and in accordance with law. In the instant case, the High Court interfered with the First Appellate Court's findings without establishing any substantial question of law, thereby exceeding the permissible scope under Sections 100 and 101 CPC. Supreme Court held that such interference amounted to sitting as a Court of First Appeal—Impugned order of High Court set aside—Judgment of First Appellate Court restored.Cited Cases:• District Council Sialkot v. Nazir Ahmed Khan 2001 SCMR 1641• Mir Abdullah v. Muhammad Ali 1977 SCMR 280(b) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)—S. 12—Specific performance of contract—Discretionary relief—Readiness and willingness—Delay in deposit of consideration—Effect—Doctrine of equityRelief of specific performance is discretionary and dependent upon consistent readiness and willingness of the plaintiff to perform contractual obligations. In the present case, the plaintiff/respondent failed to deposit balance consideration during prolonged litigation spanning seven years, and only upon the trial court's directive was such payment ordered. Supreme Court held that failure to deposit consideration during pendency showed lack of bona fides and disentitled the respondent from equitable relief. Additionally, the Court noted that market value of plots had appreciated considerably during the intervening years, which, coupled with retention of unpaid amount by plaintiff, militated against the grant of specific performance. Trial Court’s adjustment of consideration for three out of four plots, excluding one deceased defendant, was deemed speculative and unsupported by record—First Appellate Court rightly exercised discretion in refusing specific performance.(c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----S. 96—First Appeal—Findings on facts—Sanctity and weight—When immune from interferenceFindings of fact by the First Appellate Court, when based on proper appraisal of evidence and supported by record, are not liable to be disturbed in Second Appeal under Section 100 CPC. Supreme Court observed that while the High Court may disagree with the findings, it cannot replace its own view unless the findings are perverse, contrary to law, or cause miscarriage of justice. In the absence of such circumstances, appellate findings must prevail even if divergent from those of the trial Court. High Court’s action of substituting its view amounted to reappreciation of facts, beyond the lawful scope of Section 100 CPC—Principle of finality in litigation reaffirmed.

Summary: Specific Relief Act, 1877 (I of 1877)----S. 12---Specific performance---Non-deposit of balance sale consideration---Misrepresentation by vendor---Effect---Scope of court’s discretion---Petitioner’s suit for specific performance was dismissed for failure to deposit balance sale consideration despite court orders---Agreement to sell was executed solely by respondent No.1, who falsely claimed to act on behalf of his wife (respondent No.2), the co-owner---Trial Court and Appellate Court dismissed the suit for non-compliance with deposit orders---Held, where a vendor misrepresents his authority to sell co-owned property and pending litigation obstructs title transfer, court must evaluate circumstances before directing deposit of sale consideration---Requirement to deposit must not be applied mechanically---In present case, petitioner’s reluctance to deposit was justified due to third-party litigation, ex parte conduct of vendor, and misrepresentation regarding co-owner’s consent---Failure to deposit in such context does not warrant dismissal of suit---Trial Court's direction failed to adhere to binding precedent requiring two clear opportunities with specific penal consequences---Impugned orders found violative of fair trial principles.Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (V of 1908)----S. 115---Revisional jurisdiction---Erroneous dismissal of suit---Non-adherence to binding precedent---Interference by revisional court---Held, trial and appellate courts failed to comply with the procedural safeguards laid down in PLD 2022 Lahore 372 (Irfan Rasheed case), which mandates two distinct opportunities for deposit of balance consideration with specific penal warning---Appellate Court further erred in dismissing the appeal in limine without appreciating petitioner’s contentions or factual complexities---Revisional jurisdiction rightly exercised to remedy procedural miscarriage and ensure substantial justice.Contract---Reciprocal obligations and fair trial----Doctrine of reciprocal performance---Fraud and misrepresentation---Judicial approach in specific performance cases---Court emphasized that where one party fails to perform or creates legal impediments (such as absence of authority or litigation), the other party’s obligation to perform (including deposit) may be deferred---Reliance placed on principle “fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant” (fraud and justice never dwell together)---Held, doctrine of fairness requires judicial discretion to be exercised equitably---Petitioner was not afforded fair opportunity to comply under modified directions.Key Precedents Discussed:Hamood Mehmood v. Mst. Shabana Ishaque (2017 SCMR 2022)Muhammad Asif Awan v. Dawood Khan (2021 SCMR 1270)Meer Gul v. Raja Zafar Mahmood (2024 SCMR 1496)Irfan Rasheed v. Muhammad Muazim (PLD 2022 Lahore 372)Muhammad Jahan Zaib Khan v. Muhammad Rafique Khan (2021 PLC (CS) 1435)Disposition:Petition allowed; orders of Trial Court and Appellate Court set aside; suit restored with direction to petitioner to deposit balance consideration within one month, failing which dismissal shall stand reinstated.