Summary: (a) Malicious prosecution--- ---Pre-requisites---Remedy for wrongful implication through false FIRs---Suit for damages---Frivolous litigation discouraged---Award of damages justified ---Un-crossed examination in chief ---No evidentiary value---A suit for damages for malicious prosecution was filed by the respondent against the petitioner which emanated from FIR No.133/2018 lodged under Ss.420/448/506-B, P.P.C.---Suit was decreed for Rs.12 million---Appeal against the decision of Trial Court was dismissed---The legal point for determination in the whole proceedings was as to "whether the test for malicious prosecution was correctly applied by the courts below" ---Held: The Supreme Court has time and again disparaged the tendency of frivolous litigation---Lodging of false FIRs has unfortunately become a norm which can only be curbed by awarding damages in favour of the individual who was wronged---Admittedly an FIR No. 133/2018 was initiated by the appellant under Ss.420/448/506-B, P.P.C.---It was also admitted that the prosecution ended in the favour of respondent---It was evident from perusal of the judgment of the Trial Court in the criminal case that the Trial Court specifically adjudicated that it was a "case of no evidence" and no evidence had been given by the appellant to connect the respondent with the alleged offence---It was also evident from the examination and perusal of the record that the appellant effected appearance in the suit, filed written statement and also filed his affidavit-in-evidence, however, the appellant despite being given repeated chances failed to appear for his deposition and only restricted himself to the cross-examination of the respondent---The argument of the counsel that the appellant was condemned unheard, was unwarranted for the reason that the said appellant participated in the proceedings and subsequently even cross-examined the respondent---The examination in chief filed by the appellant, in the absence of him being subjected to the test of cross-examination, was rightly not considered by the Trial Court and therefore not taken into adjudication---No substantial error or defect could be pointed out in the impugned judgment---The appeal was dismissed, in circumstances. Abdul Khameed v. Muhammad Shabbir PLD 2021 Islamabad 405 ref. (b) Civil Procedure (V of 1908) --- ---S.100---Second Appeal, filing of---Scope---Interference in concurrent findings under S.100, C.P.C.---Re-appraisal of evidence under Second Appeal---Preference to be given to findings of Appellate Court over findings of Trial Court ---Right to file second appeal can be set into motion only when the decision is contrary to law; fails to determine some material issue of law, or there is a substantial error or defect in the procedure provided by the Code or law---In case of inconsistency between findings of Trial Court and Appellate Court the findings of latter must be given preference in the absence of any cogent reason to the contrary---Concurrent findings cannot be interfered with under S.100, C.P.C. unless the lower courts have misread the evidence on record, or may have ignored a material piece of evidence on record through perverse appreciation of evidence---Moreover, re-appraisal of evidence on record by the second Appellate Court is not permissible under S.100, C.P.C. Bahar Shah v. Mansoor Ahmed 2022 SCMR 284 and Faqir Syed Anwaruddin v. Syed Raza Haider and others PLD 2025 SC 31 rel. Kulsoom Khan for Appellant. Abdul Baqi Lone and Sannia Khalique for Respondent. Date of hearing: 26th March, 2025. Judgment Muhammad Jaffer Raza, J.--- The instant IInd Appeal has been filed against the Judgment dated 23.05.2024 ("Impugned Judgment") passed by the Appellate Court in Civil Appeal No. 50/2024 wherein the said appeal was dismissed after modification of Judgment and Decree dated 20.01.2024 in Suit No.944/2020. 2. Brief facts of the case are that Suit No. 944/2020 was filed for the following relief: - "It is accordingly prayed in the interest of justice, equity and good conscience that this Honourable Court may be pleased to decree the above suit of plaintiff for recovery of Rs.12 Million as damages for malicious prosecution in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant." 3. The suit was filed for damages for malicious prosecution emanating from FIR No.133/2018 lodged at P.S. Clifton, Karachi under Sections 420/448/506-B, P.P.C. Thereafter, the learned trial Court passed the Judgment and Decree dated 20.01.2024 decreeing the suit of the Respondent as prayed for Rs.12 million. Thereafter, First Appeal was filed against the said judgment bearing No. 50/2024 and the same was dismissed vide Impugned Judgment dated 23.05.2024. 4. Learned counsel for the Appellant states that both the judgments are legally unsound and are liable to be set aside in Second Appeal. He has argued that the suit for malicious prosecution has been filed with mala fide intent by the Respondent and the trial Court Judgment decreeing the suit as well as Judgment of the Appellate Court modifying the Judgment and decree are liable to be set aside. He has further argued that dispute was primarily of a civil nature and even the reduction of damages to Rs.5 million by the Appellate Court is unwarranted. Further he has argued that test of malicious prosecution as laid down in the judgment of the supreme reported as Muhammad Yousuf v. Abdul Qayyum 1 (sic) and Subedar (Retd.) Fazale Rahim v. Rab Nawaz 2 has not been made out by the Respondent and the suit was liable to be dismissed with exemplary cost. Learned counsel relied upon the following judgments: - i. Rasheeda Begum v. Rauf Subhani 3 ii. Asghar Ali v. Muhammad Asghar 4 iii. Fida Hussain Warraich v. Syed Zarfan Hussain Shah 5 iv. Abdul Rashid v. The State Bank of Pakistan 6 v. Muhammad Nawab Khan v. Bashir Sher 7 5. Conversely, learned counsel for the Respondent has argued that test of malicious prosecution has correctly been laid down in paragraph number 19 of the Judgment of the trial court as follows: - "19. Though, the claim of plaintiff remained un-rebutted failed to controvert the same through his evidence yet in order to prove the claim of malicious prosecution, the heavy burden lies upon the shoulders of the plaintiff. In order to maintain suit for malicious prosecution, the Superior Courts have set certain guiding and mandatory ingredients. Following are the elements of tests for malicious prosecution. 1. ii. That the plaintiff was prosecuted by the defendant; That the prosecution ended in plaintiff's favour; iii. That the defendant acted without reasonable and probable cause; iv. That the defendant was actuated by malice: v. That the proceedings had interfered with plaintiffs liberty and has also affected their reputation, and vi. That the plaintiff had suffered damages. 20. In the light of above set principles now it is to be seen whether the case of the plaintiff comes within the above parameters. The record transpired that defendant lodged FIR No. 133/2018 under sections 420/448/506-B, P.P.C. against the plaintiff. The plaintiff was arrested and subsequently released on bail vide order dated 11-06-2018. The plaintiff then faced a protracted trial before the Judicial Magistrate-XXII, Karachi South. After framing of charge, the prosecution examined 06 witnesses including complainant of the case i.e. defendant Abdul Khalique. Subsequently, after statement of accused/plaintiff and hearing of parties, the trial Court acquitted the plaintiff under section 245(i) Cr. P.C vide judgment dated 02-12-2019. In the order of acquittal certain observations were recorded and it is relevant to reproduce the same which are as under:- 'It is clear from the above that the prosecution has failed to adduce evidence against the present accused as alleged. This is case of no evidence. In criminal trial the burden to prove the charge is always lies on the prosecution to prove the case beyond any shadow of doubt, but prosecution has failed to prove its case against the present accused. Point Nos. 1 and 2 is consequently answered is negative.' Point No. 03. In the light of above discussion, keeping in view the facts and circumstances, the accused person is acquitted from the case/charge under section 245(i) Cr.P.C) as no evidence has come on record to connect him with the offence. Accused namely Imran Hyder son of Meer Muhammad Khan is present on bail, his bail bond stands cancelled and surety is discharged from his liability.' " 6. It was also argued by learned counsel that the judgment of the trial Court is legally sound and the Respondent remained incarcerated for over five (05) days due to lodging of false FIR against the Respondent. He has further stated that FIR was lodged on 05.06.2018 and the Respondent was acquitted of the charge in criminal case No.2500/2018 on 02.12.2019, after having faced the rigors of prosecution for approximately eighteen months. Thereafter, an acquittal Appeal No. 31/2021 was filed which was also dismissed. He has further argued that grounds taken by the Appellant in the instant appeal were not taken earlier in First Appeal No. 50/2024 and in this regard has referred to the memo. of appeal which was filed before the learned Appellate Court. He has contended that the circumstances of the Appellant and his financial limitations to comply with the judgment and decree of the Court cannot be a ground for reversal of the Impugned Judgment. He has lastly argued that there are concurrent findings of the Courts below and the scope of Section 100, C.P.C. is limited. The Court, it was argued, can only set aside concurrent findings in very exceptional circumstances, which are absent in the present case. 7. The points for determination as required under Order XLI Rule 31 are set out as follows: - i. Whether the test for malicious prosecution was correctly applied by the courts below? ii. Whether the Impugned Judgment suffers from substantial error or defect? 8. Both the points are intertwined and will be dealt with collectively. 9. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. It is evident from perusal of the record that admittedly an FIR No. 133/2018 was initiated by the Appellant under Sections 420/448/506-B, P.P.C. It is also admitted that the prosecution ended in the favour of Respondent. The relevant excerpt of the acquittal order passed by the trial Court has already been reproduced above as part of the judgement passed in the civil suit. 10. It is evident from perusal of the judgment of the trial Court in the criminal case, that the learned trial Court specifically adjudicated that it was a "case of no evidence" and no evidence has been given by the Appellant to connect the Respondent with the alleged offence. It is also evident from the examination and perusal of the record that the Appellant effected appearance in the suit, filed written statement and also filed his affidavit-in-evidence, however, the Appellant despite being given repeated chances failed to appear for his deposition and only restricted himself to the cross-examination of the Respondent. The argument of the learned counsel that the Appellant was condemned unheard, are unwarranted for the reason that the said Appellant participated in the proceedings and subsequently even cross-examined the Respondent. The examination in chief filed by the Appellant, in the absence of him being subjected to the test of cross-examination, was correctly not considered by the trial Court and therefore not taken into adjudication. 11. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has time and again disparaged the tendency of frivolous litigation. Lodging of false FIRs has unfortunately become a norm which can only be curbed by awarding damages in favour of the individual who was wronged. This tendency was observed by the Islamabad High Court in the case of Abdul Khameed v. Muhammad Shabbir 8 in the following words:- "14. The rational for conferring equitable jurisdiction upon courts is rooted in the maxim "Ubi jus, ibi remedium" (where there is a right, there is a remedy). As is evident from the principles settled in relation to malicious prosecution damages are imposed on the one who abuses the process of law and to produce consequences for another and settle past scores. Subjecting a person to malicious prosecution can interfere with the right to liberty guaranteed under Article 9, the right to dignity under Article 14 and the right to be treated in accordance with law guaranteed under Article 4 of the Constitution. Such prosecution inflicts financial hardship, litigation cost, mental anguish as well as loss of reputation on the person who is on its receiving ends having been falsely implicated in a matter. 15. In any just society such loss cannot be allowed to lie where it falls. A person who is the immediate cause of inflicting such loss and hardship on a fellow citizen ought to be held accountable for his actions. While the plaintiffs in a suit for malicious prosecution cannot recover on the basis of humiliation suffered at the hands of police or prison authorities or inmates, but he has a right to be compensated by the person whose false accusation resulted in him being incarcerated and made him suffer the debasing experience that comes along. The judgments mentioned above have held that even where no damages are quantified by the plaintiff a court has discretionary jurisdiction to grant damages for loss of liberty, dignity and mental anguish that is reasonably proportionate to what the plaintiff can be presumed to have suffered. 16. There can be no objective standards for estimating such injuries but an inference can be drawn that someone who has been subjected to malicious prosecution has suffered loss of time, litigation expenses, mental suffering due to being subjected to legal challenge that can produce penal consequences for him and in the case of being arrested and put behind bars, loss of his right to liberty and dignity and consequent reputational harm. The superior courts have upheld imposition of damages in case of malicious prosecution on the basis the rule of thumb which aims to quantify damages such that they are reasonably proportionate to the loss suffered. 17. The loss of a person's liberty and dignity cannot be measured in money terms. But our Constitution - in fact all human rights charters - guarantee such rights. The Constitution has established the judicature and mandated it to act as a guardian of fundamental rights. And it is an obligation of the courts to ensure that irrespective of a person's station in the society and prevalent social and economic inequality, the principle of legal equality between citizens is upheld and no one is allowed to wield the law as a weapon to settle scores with another by abusing legal processes. The courts of law therefore cannot be nonchalant when seized of a matter involving malicious prosecution of one citizen at the hands of another." (Emphasis added) 12. It is trite law that right to file Second Appeal provided under section 100 of C.P.C., can be set into motion only when the decision is contrary to law; fails to determine some material issue of law, and substantial error or defect in the procedure provided by the Code or law. The principles governing the scope of Section 100, C.P.C. have been expounded by the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of Bahar Shah v. Mansoor Ahmed 9 in the following words: - "10. Now we would like to pay attention to the niceties of a right to file Second Appeal provided under section 100 of C.P.C, which can be set into motion only when the decision is contrary to law; failure to determine some material issue of law, and substantial error or defect in the procedure provided by the Code or law. In the case of Madan Gopal v. Maran Bepari (PLD 1969 SC 617), this Court held that if the finding of fact reached by the first Appellate Court is at variance with that of Trial Court, such a finding by the lower Appellate Court will be immune from interference in second appeal only if it is found to be substantiated by evidence on the record and is supported by logical reasoning, duly taking note of the reasons adduced by the first Appellate Court. In another case reported as Amjad Ikram v. Mst. Asiya Kausar (2015 SCMR 1), this Court held that in case of inconsistency between the trial Court and the Appellate Court, the findings of the latter must be given preference in the absence of any cogent reason to the contrary. 11. The first Appellate Court thoroughly evaluated and mull over the evidence adduced by the parties and reached to a just and proper conclusion that the appellants failed to prove and justify their defence pleas and judgment of Trial Court was not based on correct exposition of law and facts, whereas the learned High Court in second appeal has also gauged and assessed the overall evidence perfectly and rightly maintained the judgment of first Appellate Court." 13. More recently the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of Faqir Syed Anwaruddin v. Syed Raza Haider and others 10 held as under:- "It is settled law that concurrent findings are not interfered with under section 100 of the C.P.C. unless the lower courts have misread the evidence on record, or may have ignored a material piece of evidence on record through perverse appreciation of evidence. It is also settled law that reappraisal of evidence on record by the second appellate court is not permissible while exercising jurisdiction under section 100 of the C.P.C. The High Court had rightly dismissed the regular second appeals filed by the defendants on the touchstone of the aforementioned principles." 14. The learned counsel has been unable to show any substantial error or defect in the Impugned Judgment. He has conceded during the course of arguments, that the Respondent has been acquitted in the FIR lodged by the Appellant and only seeks a reduction of damages awarded on the basis of his financial constraints. It is noted that the learned Appellate Court has already reduced the quantum of damages awarded considerably, and such reduction has not been impugned by the Respondent. Therefore, I see reason to reduce the quantum of damages further as the learned counsel was unable to show any substantial error or defect in the Impugned Judgment. 15. Reliance placed by the learned counsel on Rasheeda Begum (surpa) does not advance his cause. The said judgment pertained to a suit for possession and the learned court dismissed the second appeal on the grounds which have already been discussed hereinabove. 16. The reliance of the learned counsel for the Appellant on the cases of Muhamad Nawab Khan (supra), Abdur Rashid (supra), Fida Hussain Warraich (supra), Asghar Ali (supra), Muhammad Yousuf (supra), Fazale Rahim (supra) does not advance the case of the Appellant. All the judgements above, repeatedly laid down the test for malicious prosecution and the test as laid down by the learned trial court was in consonance with the test laid down in the above noted judgments. 17. For the aforesaid reasons, instant Second Appeal merits no consideration and is dismissed with no order as to cost. Impugned Judgment and decree dated 23.05.2024 is upheld. UN/A-34/Sindh Appeal dismissed.

Summary: (a) Malicious prosecution--- ---Pre-requites---Appellant initiated litigation against the respondent on account of illegal allotment of government land (Charagah) and ultimately was declared unsuccessful---Respondent filed a suit for damages for malicious prosecution against the appellant, which was partially decreed by the Trial Court---Validity---Institution of criminal or civil proceeding for an improper purpose and without probable cause is not justifiable---Person who claims for compensation on account of malicious prosecution, must also establish the connection between the reasonable and probable cause and the malice---For the purposes of bringing a claim for malicious prosecution the requirements of "absence of reasonable and probable cause" and "malice" are separate requirements although they may be twined---Every prosecution/ inquiry which ends in a clean chit for the opponent will not per-se entitle the opponent to file a suit for compensation---Existence of malice itself is not sufficient to prove malicious prosecution but should be accompanied by proof of absence of reasonable and probable cause and the malice should be proved affirmatively---Revenue hierarchy from time to time issued notifications that the 'Charagah' lands had expressly been excluded from every grant, thus, any alienation or grant of proprietary rights thereof were not in consonance with the Government policy---District Collector, Mandi Bahauddin, was not competent to allot Charagah's land under the policy without obtaining permission from the Board of Revenue, so, the order for allotment of land to the respondent under Lambardari grant was without lawful authority and was rightly cancelled and it was also very much clear that the appellant had rightly pointed out regarding wrong allotment of land to the respondent under Lambardari grant and his act was without any malice, thus, the appellant filed the appeal with a reasonable and probable cause and the proceedings initiated against the respondent was without any malice---Appeal was allowed, in circumstances. Subedar (Retd) Fazle Rahim v. Rab Nawaz 1999 SCMR 700; Hicks v. Faulkner (1878) 8 QBD 167; Province of West Bangal and others v. S.M. Faruque and others PLD 1959 Dacca 268; Abdul Rasheed v. State Bank of Pakistan PLD 1970 Karachi 344 and Abdul Rauf v. Abdul Razzak and another PLD 1994 SC 476 rel. (b) Malicious prosecution--- ---"Reasonable and probable cause"---Meaning---It means an honest belief in the guilt of the accused based on a full conviction founded upon reasonable grounds of the existence of circumstances, which assuming them to be true would reasonably lead any ordinary prudent man and cautious man placed in the position of the accuser to the conclusion that such person charged was probably guilty of the crime imputed. Hicks v. Faulkner (1878) 8 QBD 167 rel. (c) Malicious prosecution--- ---Word "malice"---Meaning---Malice means the presence of some improper and wrongful motive that is to say, some motive other than desire to bring to justice a person whom the prosecutor honestly believes to be guilty. (d) Malicious prosecution--- ---Word 'malicious prosecution'---Definition stated. Muhammad Yousaf v. Abdul Qayuum PLD 2016 SC 478 and Ghulam Hussain and another v. Muhammad Rafique and 6 others 2015 MLD 1583 rel. (e) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)--- ----Arts. 72, 117 & 120---Document---Proof---Producing document in the statement of counsel---Legality---Respondent brought on record the documents through the statement of his counsel, which had no value in the eye of law because mere exhibition of the same was not required rather the same had to be proved and brought on record either by the parties themselves in their depositions on oath or through any of their witness while appearing in the witness box so as to have them subjected to cross-examination---Submission of such documents through statement of counsel without oath could not be appreciated and could not be considered in evidence. Manzoor Hussain (deceased) through L.Rs., v. Misri Khan PLD 2020 SC 749; Mst. Akhtar Sultana v. Major Retd. Muzaffar Khan Malik through his legal heirs and others PLD 2021 SC 715 and Rustam and others v. Jehangir (Deceased) through L.Rs 2023 SCMR 730 rel. Mushtaq Ahmad Mohal and Amina Rasool for the Appellant. Muhammad Shahid Tasawar Rao for Respondent. Date of hearing: 3rd October, 2024. Judgment Ahmad Nadeem Arshad, J .--- Through this Regular First Appeal, filed under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the appellant called in question the judgment and decree dated 23.01.2023, whereby, the learned trial Court partially decreed the respondent's suit for recovery of damages on the basis of malicious prosecution. 2. The brief but essential facts of this appeal are that the plaintiff (herein after referred to as 'the respondent') instituted a suit on 26.04.2012 for recovery of Rs.53,924,500/- as damages for malicious prosecution against the defendant (herein after referred to as 'the appellant') with the contention that he is lambardar of Chak No.8-Younis-abad Tehsil Malakwal District Mandi Bahauddin; that he belongs to a respectable family having good reputation in the area; that the Government of Punjab allotted him land measuring 12 1/2 acres under the Punjab Government Lambardari Scheme vide order dated 20.03.2009 of District Officer (Revenue) Mandi Bahauddin; that the appellant has political rivalry who without any reason only to tease and blackmail him preferred an appeal before Executive District Officer (Revenue) Mandi Bahauddin for the cancellation of above said allotted land which was dismissed on 24.04.2010 due to non-prosecution; that the said appeal was restored but again dismissed on merits vide order dated 20.07.2010; that the appellant filed a revision petition before Member Board of Revenue Punjab Lahore wherein matter was remanded vide order dated 27.04.2011; that he filed a Review Petition against the said order which was allowed vide order dated 28.09.2011; that the appellant initiated all these proceedings i.e. preferring of appeal as well as revision petitions against the respondent dishonestly, with mala fide intention as well as due to mal-practices; that he has to suffer mental and physical torture and spent a huge amount in shape of engaging counsel to defend the said litigations; that he also suffer loss to his agricultural crops and his reputation was also badly effected in the area, so he is entitled to recover Rs.88,500/- as fee of counsel, travelling expenses Rs.131,000/-, mental retardation and damages to reputation Rs.5,00,00,000/-, loss of crops Rs.37,05,000/- total Rs.53,924,500/- as damages for malicious prosecution. In response, the appellant appeared before the learned trial Court and filed contesting written statement on 13.03.2015 by raising preliminary objections such as the respondent has no cause of action to institute the suit; that he has not come to the Court with clean hands; that the ingredients of defamation are missing, so the suit is liable to be dismissed; that the suit is false and was instituted only to harass and black mail him, so the same is liable to be dismissed with special costs. While replying on facts it was submitted that the land was wrongly allotted to the respondent because the land was reserved for "Charagah" which cannot be allotted to the respondent under Lambardari scheme; that there was no political grudge and he initiated the proceedings with bona fide intention for the welfare of the peoples of the area and to protect the State land. He prayed for dismissal of the suit with cost. 3. Out of divergent pleading of the parties, the learned trial Court vide order dated 08.04.2016 framed following issues. ISSUES: 1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for recovery of Rs.53,924,500/- from defendant as damages for mental agony, defamation and cost of litigation due to malicious prosecutions of defendant/OPP. 2. Whether the plaintiff has no cause of action to file this suit? OPD. 3. Whether the plaintiff has not come to the court with clean hands? OPD. 4. Whether the suit of the plaintiff is false, frivolous and the same is liable to be dismissed? OPD. 5. Relief. The parties were invited to produce their respective evidence. The respondent himself appeared as PW-1 and also got examined Muhammad Zafar as PW-2 and Noor Ahmad as PW-3. The respondent also brought on record 26 documents as Exh.P-1 to Exh.P-24, Exh.P-24/1 and Exh.P-25 including 07 documents as Mark-P.1 to Mark-P.7. In rebuttal the appellant himself appeared as DW-1 and produced only one document as Exh.D-1. Upon conclusion of the trial and after providing opportunity of hearing the learned trial Court partially decreed the suit vide judgment and decree dated 31.05.2016 and awarded Rs.75000/- to the respondent as damages for malicious prosecution. Being aggrieved, the appellant preferred an appeal and this Court vide order dated 02.02.2022 with the concurrence of the parties set aside the judgment and decree dated 31.05.2016 and the matter was remanded to the learned trial Court for its decision afresh. After remand, the learned trial Court, while providing opportunity of hearing partially decreed the suit vide judgment and decree dated 23.01.2023 in the following terms: - "In view of my issue wise findings, the suit of plaintiff is hereby partially decreed and he is held entitled to recover Rs.(50,000) as cost of proceedings and Rs.(50,000) as expenses of travelling etc from defendant (in total Rs.1,00,000). Parties will bear their own costs." Being dissatisfied, the appellant preferred instant appeal. 4. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at full length and have also perused the record of the learned trial Court with their able assistance. 5. In order to prove his case, the respondent himself appeared as PW-1 and deposed that he is resident of Chak No.8-Younisabad and belonged to a landlord family and also enjoying good reputation; that he is also lambardar of the said village; that Government of the Punjab allotted him 12 1/2 acres land under Lambardari scheme ; that the appellant has political rivalry with him who without any reason only to tease and harass him preferred an appeal before E.D.O.R for the cancellation of above mentioned land as well as to cause damage his reputation and to cause him monitory loss; that he appeared before the said Court, engaged a lawyer; that said appeal was dismissed due to non-prosecution; that said appeal was restored and again dismissed on merits; that the appellant only to tease and harass him filed a revision petition before Member Board of Revenue Lahore which was also dismissed; that he also filed a review petition through his counsel which was allowed vide order dated 28.09.2011; that due to this dishonest litigation he faced difficulties and remained mentally upset and also spent a huge amount on the litigation. He also described the details of damages faced by him due to this litigation. During cross-examination he admitted that the appellant was also a land-owner. He also admitted that except the appellant another person also moved an application to the effect that the land was wrongly allotted to him. He admitted that writ petition of other objectors is pending before Hon'ble High Court. He also admitted that the possession of the said land was not delivered to him; however, voluntasily said that on 28.05.2014 the possession was given to him. He further admitted that the possession was withdrawn vide order of the DCO dated 04.06.2014. He denied the suggestion that due to said litigation he has not suffered any loss. The respondent also got examined Muhammad Zafar son of Ata Muhammad as PW-2. He also deposed in line with the respondent. During cross-examination he admitted that the respondent has not participated in any election. He further admitted that the appellant is also resident of Chak No.8. He denied the suggestion that the appellant initiated the proceedings against the respondent honestly. He admitted that the possession was withdrawn by the order of D.C.O. Noor Ahmad son of Ghulam Muhammad appeared as PW-3. He also corroborated the statements of PW-1 and PW-2. However, during cross-examination he admitted that the appellant is also gentleman. He showed his ignorance that many other persons also moved application against the respondent which are pending before Hon'ble High Court. 6. In rebuttal, Asghar Ali appellant appeared as DW-1 and deposed that he has no political rivalry against the respondent; that he moved the appeal upon the asking the inhabitants of the locality only for the welfare of the peoples and protection of state land; that due to this litigation the respondent has not suffered any loss; that the land allotted to the respondent is a "Charagah"; that he moved the application against the respondent honestly without any ill will or motive; that one Ghulam Muhammad also initiated proceedings against the respondent. During cross-examination he admitted that the respondent is lambardar of Chak No.8 and Chak Doddan. He admitted that the land measuring 12 1/2 acres was allotted to the respondent but possession was not given. He also deposed that the land in disputed was reserved for common "Charagah". He admitted that he also moved an application for his appointment as lambardar. He further admitted that he has no link with the land allotted to the respondent rather the same is in the welfare of the inhabitants of the area. He denied the suggestion that he has any political rivalry with the respondent. He also denied the suggestion that the respondent faced any loss with regard to his health, crops or reputation due to said litigation. 7. The suit in hand was instituted by the respondent seeking recovery of Rs.53,924,500/- on account of malicious prosecution. In the case of "Muhammad Akram v. Farman Bibi" (PLD 1990 SC 28), the august Supreme Court of Pakistan has laid down certain principles for the grant or refusal of damages on account of malicious prosecution. The first two of these conditions are required for the issue of maintainability whereas the remaining are to be proved for success and the said conditions must exist conjointly. These conditions are as under:- (i) that the plaintiff was prosecuted by the defendant; (ii) that the prosecution ended in plaintiff's favour; (iii) that the defendant acted without reasonable and probable cause; (iv) that the defendant was actuated by malice; (v) that the proceedings had interfered with plaintiff's liberty and had also affected his reputation and finally (vi) that the plaintiff had suffered damage. This precedent has further been reiterated invariably in case of "Niaz and others v. Abdul Sattar and others" (PLD 2006 SC 432). 8. In order to comprehend the concept of malicious prosecution, it would be appropriate to go behind its meaning and definition. The term 'malicious prosecution' is defined in the 11th Edition of Black's Law Dictionary in the following manner: - "The institution of a criminal or civil proceeding for an improper purpose and without probable cause. The tort requires proof of four element's (1) the initiation or continuation of a lawsuit; (2) lack of probable cause for the lawsuits. initiation; (3) malice; and (4) favourable termination of the original lawsuit. A judicial proceeding, instituted by one person against another from wrongful or improper motives, and without probable cause to sustain it. It is usually called a malicious prosecution; and an action for damages for being subjected to such a suit is called an action for malicious prosecution. In strictness, the prosecution might be malicious, that is, brought from lawful motives, although founded on good cause. But it is well established that unless want of probable cause and malice occur no damages are recoverable. However, blameworthy was the prosecutor's motives, he cannot be cast in damages if there was probable cause for the complaint he made. Hence, the term usually imports a causeless as well as an ill intended prosecution. It commonly, but not necessarily, means a prosecution on some charge of crime." In a case reported as "Muhammad Yousaf v. Abdul Qayyum" (PLD 2016 SC 478), the apex Court of the country has defined that "Malicious Prosecution" is a tort which provides redress to those who have been prosecuted "without reasonable cause" and with 'malice'. Malicious prosecution is an action instituted with intention of injuring the other and without probable cause. The Division Bench of this Court in a case "Ghulam Hussain and another v. Muhammad Rafique and 06 others" (2015 MLD 1583) while interpreting "Malicious Prosecution" observed that "Malicious Prosecution" is the malicious institution of unsuccessful criminal proceedings against another without reasonable or probable cause. This tort balances competing principles, namely freedom that every person should have in bringing criminals to justice and the need for restraining false accusations against innocent persons. Malicious prosecution is an abuse of the process of the court by wrongfully setting the law in motion on a criminal charge. No doubt every person in the society has a right to set in motion Governmental and Judicial machinery for protection of his rights, but such person should not infringe the corresponding rights of others by instituting improper legal proceedings in order to harass them by unjustifiable litigation. Meaning thereby the institution of a criminal or civil proceeding for an improper purpose and without probable cause is not justifiable. 9. The person who claimed for compensation on account of malicious prosecution must also establish the connection between the reasonable and probable cause and the malice. For the purposes of bringing a claim for malicious prosecution the requirements of "absence of reasonable and probable cause" and 'malice' were separate requirements although they may be entwined. The proof of absence of 'reasonable and probable cause' must co-exist alongside 'malice'. It is commonplace that in order to succeed in an action for malicious prosecution the plaintiff must prove both that the defendant was activated by malice and that he had no reasonable and probable cause for prosecution. It is also by now a settled law that every prosecution/ inquiry which ends in the clearing of opponent will not per-se entitle the opponent to file a suit for compensation. Successful proceedings initiated under this law required that the original proceedings must have been malicious and without cause. In a case titled "Subedar (Retd) Fazle Rahim v. Rab Nawaz" (1999 SCMR 700) the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under:- "Mere fact that prosecution instituted by the defendant against the plaintiff ultimately failed cannot expose the former to the charge of malicious prosecution unless it is proved by the plaintiff that the prosecution was instituted without any reasonable and probable cause and it was due to malicious intention of the defendant and not with a mere intention of carrying the law into effect." 10. "Reasonable and Probable cause" means an honest belief in the guilt of the accused based on a full conviction founded upon reasonable grounds, of the existence of circumstances, which assuming them to be true, would reasonably lead any ordinary prudent man and cautious man placed in the position of the accuser to the conclusion that such person charged was probably guilty of the crime imputed. As laid down in Hicks v. Faulkner (1878) 8 QBD 167 and there must be: -- (i) An honest belief of the accuser in the guilt of the accused; (ii) Such belief must be based on an honest conviction of the existence of the circumstances which led the accuser; (iii) Such secondly mentioned belief as to existence of the circumstances must be based upon reasonable grounds that is such grounds, as would lead any fairly cautious man in the defendant's situation to belief so; (iv) The circumstances so believed and relied on by the accused must be such as amount to a reasonable ground for belief in the guilt of the accused. The element of probable and reasonable cause has been defined in case titled "Province of West Bangal and others v. S.M. Faruque and others" (PLD 1959 Dacca 268) in the following words:- "The law on the subject is well-settled. It is stated in Clerk and Lindsel on Torts, 9th Edition, p.662, that an individual should not be harassed by legal proceedings improperly instituted against him. It is the right of every one to put the law in motion if he does so with the honest intention of protecting his own or public interest. But it is an abuse of that right to proceed maliciously and without reasonable and probable cause for anticipating success. Hence, the question is: What is meant by "reasonable and probable cause". "Reasonable and probable cause" means a genuine belief based on reasonable grounds that the proceedings are justified." 11. The term 'malice' has been elaborated and defined in the authoritative judgment report as "Abdul Rasheed v. State Bank of Pakistan" (PLD 1970 Karachi 344). The operative Para No.7 is relevant and for ready reference is reproduced hereunder: - "7. The term "malice", in a prosecution of the nature which is before me, has been held not to be spite or hatred against an individual but the 'malus animus' and as denoting the working of improper and indirect motives. The proper motive for a prosecution is the desire to secure the ends of justice. It should, therefore, be shown that the prosecution was not actuated by this desire but by his personal feelings-See Mitchell v. Jenkins ((1833) 5 B & Ad 588); Pike v. Waldrum ((1352) 1 Lloyd's Rep.431) and Stevens v. Midland Counties Ry. ((1854) 10 Ex.352). Further, malice should be proved by the plaintiff affirmatively:- Abrath v. N.A.Ry. ((1886) 11 A.C.247). Malice may sometime be inferred from absence of reasonable and probable cause, but this rule has no general application and there may be cases where it would be appropriate not to infer malice from unreasonableness. Further, if reasonable and probable cause is proved, the question of malice becomes irrelevant, and also defects of want of reasonable and probable cause cannot be supplied by evidence of malice-See Turner v. Ambler ((1847) 10 Q B 352); Mitchell v. Jenkins; Brown v. Hawkes ((1891) 2 Q B 718) and Herniman v. Smith ((1938) A.C 305). It would be proper here to quote the following observations of Denning. L.J. (as he then was) in Tempest v. Snowden ((1952) 1 K B 130) "Even though a prosecutor is actuated by the most express malice, nevertheless he is not liable so long as there was reasonable and probable cause for the prosecution." The same rule has been applied by the courts in India and Pakistan. Several decisions on this point were brought to my notice by Mr. Fazeel. The first case on this point is the decision of the High Court, Lahore in Abdul Shakoor v. Lipton & CO. (AIR 1924 Lah.1) where it was held that in suits for malicious prosecution, proof of the existence of malice itself is not sufficient but should be accompanied by proof of absence of reasonable and probable cause. The Lahore High Court reiterated this view in Nur Khan v. Jiwandas (AIR 1927 Lah. 120) and Gobind Ram v. Kaju Ram ( Air 1939 Lah. 504). The same view prevailed with the High Court of Madras in V.t. Srinivasa Thathachariar v. P. Thiruvenkatachariar (AIR 1932 Mad 601). This view also found approval of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Balbhaddar Singh v. Badri Sah (AIR 1926 PC 46) and in Raja Braid Sunder Deb and others v. Bamdeb Das and others (AIR 1944 PC 1) in which last case it was further observed that malice cannot be inferred from the anger of the persecutor." In other words "Malice" means the presence of some improper and wrongful motive that is to say, some motive other than desire to bring to justice a person whom the prosecutor honestly believes to be guilty. 12. The existence of malicious itself is not sufficient to prove malicious prosecution but should be accompanied by proof of absence of reasonable and probable cause and the malice should be proved affirmatively. In a case titled "Abdul Rauf v. Abdul Razzak and another" (PLD 1994 SC 476) it was held as under: - "It is necessary that the malice should be proved affirmatively". 13. In the instant case admittedly the appellant preferred an appeal against the respondent contending therein that the land measuring 12 1/2 acres allotted to the respondent under Lambardari grant is a wrong allotment because the same land is reserved for "Charagah" and not available for any permanent allotment. Though his appeal as well as revision petition were dismissed but vide order dated 02.06.2014 passed by the District Collector, Mandi Bahauddin the land allotted to the respondent under Lambardari Scheme was cancelled on the ground that the land in dispute was not included in any scheduled land, so the land being a 'Charagah' was not liable to be allotted to any person. It was further mentioned in the said order that the possession given to the lambardar was also illegal, so the District Collector directed the Assistant Collector, Malakwal to obtained vacant possession of the land which was vacated/released and in this regard Rapt No. 374 dated 05.06.2014 was entered in the register of Rapt Roznamcha Waqiati. 14. It is also pertinent to mention here that the respondent assailed the order of District Collector dated 02.06.2014 in Constitutional Petition bearing No.17614 of 2014 titled "Muhammad Asghar v. District Collector Mandi Bahauddin etc." In the said case it was reported that the department has already resumed the state land on 02.06.2014 and entire proceedings under Sections 32 and 34 of the Colonization of Government Lands Act, 1912 have been completed and since 02.06.2014 the possession of the suit land is with the Government, therefore, the said Constitutional Petition was dismissed being not maintainable vide order of this Court dated 07.04.2017. 15. It is pertinent to mention here that from perusal of different Notifications issued by the Revenue hierarchy from time to time it is obvious that the 'Charagah' lands have expressly been excluded from every grant, hence, its any alienation or grant of proprietary rights thereof are not inconsonance with the policy. Moreover, it is also an admitted fact that the 'Charagah' land cannot be converted into state land for its onward allotment against any sort of claim and shall not be used for any other purpose except with the prior permission of the Board of Revenue. Change of character of the 'Charagah' land was subservient to the manifestly described wider scope of public purpose. Admittedly the Charagah land was allotted to the respondent under Notification dated 17.01.2006 and 22.10.2007 against Lambardari Grants without changing its status and describing the public purposes. From perusal of notification dated 17.01.2006 shows that against Lambardari Grants the Colony Department has shown its willing to grant the state land on lease free of charge in the colony Districts in the Punjab along with other incentives, whereas, 'Charagah Land' does not fall under the state land amenable to any allotment under the above said notification rather the same is beyond the jurisdiction of the subordinate hierarchy of Board of Revenue. Moreover, under Temporary Cultivation Lease Scheme and other Schemes, the 'Charagah' land is expressly excluded from every grant of allotment, so the order for allotment of 'Charagah' land passed by the District Officer (Revenue) Mandi Bahauddin was illegal and against the polices and also against the intention of the legislators who have formulated 'Charagah' policy for the welfare of the public-at-large as well as the residents of the village. As the District Collector Mandi Bahauddin was not competent to allot Charagah's land under the policy without obtaining permission from the Board of Revenue, so, the order for allotment of land to the respondent under Lambardari grant is without lawful authority and was rightly cancelled and it is also very much clear that the appellant has rightly pointed out regarding wrong allotment of land to the respondent under Lambardari grant and his act was without any malice. In these circumstances, the appellant filed the appeal with a reasonable and probable cause and the proceedings initiated against the respondent is without any malice. 16. Moreover, the respondent failed to produce on record any medical prescription showing that he suffered any mental or physical torture due to above said litigation. He has also failed to bring on record any documents showing that he has spent a huge amount upon the litigation as expenses and that his reputation was damaged badly. Moreover, the respondent has not brought on record any proof with regard to his previous political rivalry with the appellant. Rather he himself knowingly got allotted the land of Charagah under the Lambardari scheme in connivance with the revenue officials. 17. It is matter of record that on 27.05.2016 learned counsel for the respondent got recorded his statement without oath and exhibited documents i.e. Exh.P-1 to Exh.P-25 as well as seven documents as Mark-P-1 to Mark-P.7. The respondent brought on record the documents through the statement of his learned counsel, which has no value in the eye of law because mere exhibition of the same is not required rather the same has to be proved and brought on record either by the parties themselves in their depositions on oath or through any of their witness while appearing in the witness box so as to have been subject to cross-examination. Submission of such documents through statement of learned counsel without oath cannot be appreciated and cannot be considered in evidence. Reliance is placed on "Manzoor Hussain (deceased) through L.Rs., v. Misri Khan" (PLD 2020 SC 749) and "Mst. Akhtar Sultana v. Major Retd. Muzaffar Khan Malik through his legal heirs and others" (PLD 2021 SC 715), wherein it has been held that:- "35. Keeping in view the factual position as to the absence of the requisite certificate on the said certificate on the said certified copies of the foreign documents and their production in evidence in statement of the counsel without providing an opportunity to the respondents to test their authenticity, it would be safe to conclude that the alleged certified copies of the foreign document tendered in evidence did not cross the legal threshold of "admissibility" and "proof", as mandated under clause (5) of Article 89 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat....." Further reliance in this regard can safely be placed on judgment reported as "Rustam and others v. Jehangir (Deceased) through L.Rs." (2023 SCMR 730), wherein it has been held as under: - "As regards the other two documents i.e. mutation No.1836 (Exh.D-9) and mutation No.1837 (Exh.D-8), it is suffice to say that according to principle settled by this court in the cases reported as Mst. Hameeda Begum and others v. Mst. Irshad Begum and others (2007 SCMR 996), Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Defence and another v. Jaffar Khan and others (PLD 2010 SC 604) and Province of the Punjab through Collector, Sheikhupura and others v. Syed Ghazanfar Ali Shah and others (2017 SCMR 172) the document should be produced in the evidence by the party itself and a fair opportunity should be given to the opposite party to cross-examination the same, as such, the said two documents produced by the defendants counsel in his statement could not be taken into consideration." 18. It is evident from scanning the whole record of the case that basic ingredients to establish and prove a case for recovery of an amount as damages for malicious prosecution are not established in the instant case, and in absence of said ingredients the suit of the respondent cannot be decreed in his favour as in the instant case the matter with regard to wrong allotment under the Lambardari scheme was pointed out by the appellant which was duly proved and as a consequence the allotment of the respondent under the said scheme was cancelled as the land was not reserved for allotment rather the same was reserved/declared as 'Charagah' which was not available for allotment. 19. Since, the act of the appellant is proved as without any malice, so the respondent is not entitled to any damages on the basis of malicious prosecution because the prosecution was not based on malice rather the same was based on true facts. The revenue hierarchy also initiated proceedings against the delinquents officials involved in the said allotment in the name of the respondent. 20. In the light o

Summary: Essentials of (a) Tort—Malicious Prosecution—Civil damages claim after criminal acquittal—Essential elements— Respondents instituted a suit for damages alleging malicious prosecution after Respondent No.1 was acquitted in a criminal case lodged by Appellant—Court reiterated that to succeed in a claim of malicious prosecution, plaintiff must prove: (i) prosecution by defendant; (ii) absence of reasonable and probable cause; (iii) malice; (iv) termination of proceedings in plaintiff’s favour; and (v) damage suffered—Held, mere benefit of doubt acquittal does not preclude civil claim for malicious prosecution—Initiation of prosecution after full settlement, lack of CCTV evidence, and no bank records supported inference of malice—Suit rightly decreed by learned Single Judge. (b) Evidence Act, 1872 ----Adverse inference—Failure to produce crucial documentary evidence— Appellant alleged fraudulent withdrawal of Rs.785,000/- by Respondent No.1 but failed to produce bank statements or CCTV footage—Admitted in cross-examination that partial restitution was received and acknowledged in affidavit—Held, such omissions and admissions seriously undermined the credibility of the prosecution case and reinforced inference of lack of probable cause. **(c) Criminal Law—Acquittal—Honourable vs. simpliciter acquittal— Court held that all acquittals, whether on merit or benefit of doubt, are honourable—No legal distinction exists between types of acquittal in context of malicious prosecution—Relying on Dr. Muhammad Islam v. Govt. of NWFP, 2006 SCMR 1455, court emphasized that failure to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt confers right to sue for wrongful prosecution. Disposition: Appeal dismissed—Judgment and decree awarding Rs.3 million in general damages for malicious prosecution, along with 10% markup and suit costs, upheld—Appellant ordered to pay Rs.35,000/- in costs to Respondents within 20 days. Cited Authorities / Precedents: • Dr. Muhammad Islam v. Government of NWFP (2006 SCMR 1455) • Faraz Naveed v. DPO Gujrat (PLD 2022 SC 553) • Suit No. 434/2019; FIR No. 56/2011 • Elements of Malicious Prosecution: See para 10 of judgment

Summary: Background: This High Court Appeal challenges the judgment and decree dated 7.11.2022 and 16.1.2023, respectively, by a learned Single Judge in a suit for damages. The respondents (plaintiffs in the original suit) initiated the suit alleging malicious prosecution by the appellant (defendant in the original suit), which led to significant financial and reputational damage. ----Issues: 1- Whether the appellant's actions constituted malicious prosecution against the respondent. 2- Whether the respondent's acquittal, attributed to the benefit of the doubt rather than an honourable acquittal, precludes a claim of malicious prosecution. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: ---Malicious Prosecution Elements: The court reiterated that for a successful claim of malicious prosecution, the plaintiff must demonstrate: The prosecution by the defendant. Initiation with malice and not to further justice. Lack of reasonable and probable cause. Prosecution ended in favour of the person proceeded against. Damage was suffered due to the prosecution. ---Malice and Lack of Probable Cause: The court emphasized the necessity of proving both malice and the absence of reasonable and probable cause. Malice can be inferred from circumstantial evidence and implies ill will or improper motives. ---Honourable Acquittal vs. Simpliciter Acquittal: The court held that all acquittals, including those based on the benefit of the doubt, are considered honourable. The appellant’s argument that the acquittal was not honourable was rejected. ---Evidence and Admissions: The court found significant indicators of malicious intent, noting that the appellant pursued criminal proceedings despite a full and final settlement and failed to provide substantial evidence against the respondent. The delay in lodging the FIR was also highlighted as concerning. The court upheld the Single Judge’s judgment, finding that the initiation of criminal proceedings by the appellant was driven by malice. The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay costs to the respondents. -----Citations/Precedents: 2012 CLD 6 [SC] (Abdul Majeed Khan v. Tawseen Abdul Haleem) PLD 1990 SC 28 (Muhammad Akram v. Farman Bi) PLD 1994 SC 476 (Abdul Rauf v. Abdul Razaq) PLD 2006 SC 432 (Niaz v. Abdul Sattar) PLD 2016 SC 478 (Muhammad Yousaf v. Abdul Qayyum) 2019 MLD 337 (Rehana Jadoon v. Arab Khan) 1998 SCMR 1993 (Dr. Muhammad Islam v. Government of NWFP) 2022 SCMR 1770 (Faraz Naveed v. District Police Officer Gujrat)

Summary: (a) Tort—Malicious Prosecution—Essential elements—Acquittal on benefit of doubt—Effect— Plaintiff (appellant) claimed damages of Rs. 59 million alleging malicious prosecution by ex-wife (respondent No.1), following his acquittal in a private criminal complaint. Held, to sustain a claim for malicious prosecution, plaintiff must prove: (i) malice; (ii) lack of reasonable and probable cause; (iii) prosecution on criminal charge; (iv) termination in plaintiff’s favour; (v) interference with liberty or reputation; and (vi) resultant damages—Acquittal based on benefit of doubt does not establish falsity or malice—Court found that complaint was not declared false and was based on allegations relating to misrepresentation in marriage—No evidence of malice or improper motive produced—Ingredients of malicious prosecution not established. (b) Evidence Act, 1872—Standard of proof in malicious prosecution suits—Failure to testify personally—Consequences— Plaintiff did not enter the witness box; instead, his attorney and one other witness testified without producing documentary evidence—Held, failure of plaintiff to personally appear and lead direct evidence weakens the claim—Cross-examination exposed material contradictions—No cogent proof of damage, reputational loss, or special injury provided. (c) Damages—General vs. Special—Requirement of strict proof— General damages require proof of direct and proximate consequences; special damages require concrete evidence of actual loss—In this case, both were unsubstantiated—Held, in absence of proven malicious intent and causative damage, claim for both general and special damages fails—Trial court rightly dismissed the suit. -----Disposition: Appeal Dismissed—Trial court’s decree upheld—No interference warranted as no illegality or misreading of evidence found—Claim for damages for malicious prosecution held unfounded—No order as to costs. Cited Authorities / Precedents: PLD 2016 SC 478 (Muhammad Yousaf v. Abdul Qayyum) PLD 2002 SC 1060 (Mumtaz Ali Shah case) 1999 SCMR 734 (UBL v. Raja Ghulam Hussain) AIR 1944 PC 1 (Raja Braja Sunder Deb v. Bamdeb Das) 1999 SCMR 700 (Subedar (R) Fazale Rahim v. Rab Nawaz) 2012 CLD 6 PLD 1994 SC 476 (Abdul Rauf v. Abdul Razzak)

Summary: Background: The appellant filed a Regular First Appeal challenging the judgment and decree dated 22.06.2022, issued by the Civil Judge 1st Class, Phalia. The initial suit sought recovery of Rs. 59,000,000 in damages for malicious prosecution following the appellant's acquittal from a private complaint lodged by the respondent. The appellant claimed various damages due to business losses, mental agony, defamation, and miscellaneous expenses. The trial court dismissed the suit, leading to this appeal. ----Issues: 1- Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for recovery of damages as claimed. 2- Whether the plaintiff approached the court with clean hands. 3- Whether the suit is false and frivolous and should be dismissed with costs. Relief. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court held that the appellant failed to establish the necessary ingredients for a claim of malicious prosecution. The appellant did not provide sufficient evidence to prove that the prosecution was initiated with malice or without reasonable and probable cause. Furthermore, the court noted that mere acquittal in a criminal case does not automatically substantiate a claim for malicious prosecution. The trial court's dismissal of the suit was upheld, and the appeal was dismissed with no order as to costs. ----Citations/Precedents: Mumtaz Ali Shah vs. Chairman, Pakistan Telecommunication Company Ltd., H.Q., Islamabad and 6 others (PLD 2002 SC 1060) Muhammad Yousaf vs. Abdul Qayyum (PLD 2016 SC 478) Raja Braja Sunder Deb vs. Bamdeb Das (AIR 1944 PC 1) Abdul Rasheed vs. State Bank of Pakistan and another (PLD 1970 Karachi 344) United Bank Limited and 5 others vs. Raja Ghulam Hussain and 4 others (1999 SCMR 734) Abdul Majeed Khan vs. Tawseen Abdul Haleem and others (2012 CLD 6) Subedar (Retd.) Fazale Rahim vs. Rab Nawaz (1999 SCMR 700) Abdul Rauf vs. Abdul Razzak and another (PLD 1994 SC 476)

Summary: Section(s) of law; Section 96 CPC.1. The jurisprudence of malicious prosecution in recent case law is further contributed to from the perspective of the basic law laid down in the case of Muhammad Akram v. Mst. Farman Bireported as PLD 1990 Supreme Court 28.

Summary: Background: The respondents filed a suit for malicious prosecution against the petitioners in 2017. During the pendency of the suit, on 09.01.2019, the respondents' counsel, Ch. Hasnain Sadiq Sahi, Advocate, along with one of the plaintiffs, recorded a statement withdrawing the suit, and the trial court passed an order regarding the withdrawal on 10.01.2019. However, 30 days later, the respondents filed an application for the restoration of the suit, which was dismissed by the trial court on 04.03.2019. The respondents then filed a revision petition, which was partially allowed by the Additional District Judge on 26.02.2020. The petitioners subsequently filed this constitutional petition challenging the order of the revisional court. -----Issues: 1- Whether the withdrawal of the suit by the respondents' counsel and one of the plaintiffs was lawful and binding. -----2- Whether the restoration of the suit by the respondents after withdrawal was valid. -----3- Whether the revisional court properly applied the law in partially allowing the respondents' revision petition. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court held that the respondents' counsel was lawfully appointed and fully authorized to act on behalf of the respondents, as evidenced by the Wakalatnama (power of attorney). The counsel's authority extended to the withdrawal of the suit, and the respondents had delegated this power to him, along with one of the plaintiffs who also consented to the withdrawal. Under Order III, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, a duly appointed counsel holds the authority to act as an agent for his clients unless there are specific restrictions in the power of attorney, which were not present in this case. Therefore, the withdrawal of the suit by the counsel was binding on the respondents. The court cited Fateh Khan v. Manzoor (PLD 1993 Lahore 76), holding that the delegation of authority to an advocate under Wakalatnama includes the power to withdraw or compromise the case. The respondents' claim of fraud or misrepresentation was not established, and thus the withdrawal was lawful. The revisional court's partial allowance of the respondents' application for restoration of the suit was found to be an error in law. The revisional court misinterpreted the legal principles regarding the authority of counsel and the binding nature of their actions. Consequently, the constitutional petition was allowed, and the impugned order of the revisional court dated 26.02.2020 was set aside. The trial court’s order dated 04.03.2019, dismissing the restoration application, was restored. -----Citations/Precedents: Fateh Khan v. Manzoor (PLD 1993 Lahore 76) Noor Muhammad v. Muhammad Siddique (1994 SCMR 1248) Hassan Akhtar v. Azhar Hameed (PLD 2010 Supreme Court 657) Afzal v. Abdul Ghani (2005 SCMR 946)

Summary: Background: The petitioner filed a civil revision petition against the respondent seeking damages for malicious prosecution. The case stemmed from an incident on 09.05.2001, when a cross-firing between rival groups led to the death of the petitioner’s nephew and injuries to his mother. The petitioner had charged the respondent, along with others, in an FIR, resulting in the respondent's arrest and subsequent trial. The respondent was acquitted after asserting his innocence through an alibi. The respondent then filed a suit for damages, claiming that the false accusations had caused him mental, financial, and reputational harm. The trial court awarded damages of Rs. 8,00,000, later reduced to Rs. 5,00,000 on appeal. ---- Issues: 1) Was the petitioner’s prosecution of the respondent malicious and without reasonable or probable cause? --2) Did the lower courts err in awarding damages to the respondent based on malicious prosecution? ---3) Was the respondent able to prove that the prosecution caused him financial, reputational, and mental damage due to malice on the petitioner’s part? ---- Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court set aside the judgments of the lower courts and ruled in favor of the petitioner. It held that mere acquittal in a criminal case does not automatically entitle the respondent to damages for malicious prosecution. The court found that the petitioner had no malicious intent or ill-will toward the respondent, as he had charged both rival parties involved in the incident, not just the respondent. The court emphasized that for a claim of malicious prosecution to succeed, the claimant must prove that the prosecution was initiated with malice and without reasonable cause, which the respondent failed to do. Additionally, the investigation and trial did not demonstrate that the petitioner acted out of malice or personal grudge, as the charges were made based on an incident involving casualties and injuries. As a result, the court dismissed the respondent's claim for damages and restored the petitioner’s position. --- Citations/Precedents: Subedar (R) Fazale Rahim Vs Rab Nawaz (1999 SCMR 700) Abdul Rasheed v. Jameel Ahmed (1970 Karachi 311) Muhammad Yousaf v. Abdul Qawum (2016 SC 478) ----- [Damages and Frivolous Litigation] Held:I). The law for damages is enacted with the sole purpose to discourage the Frivolous litigation, as it is the only tool which could curb the menace. Malicious prosecution, on one hand, is an abuse of the process of court by wrongfully setting the law in motion on a criminal charge, whereas, on the other, it increases the agonies of all concerned, which must be curbed at the earliest and the one, who engages the courts of law with malice in mind, must be punished for his sinister designs, that too, by Compensating the one who was wronged. If the like activities are left unchecked, the same would yield to drastic results and ultimately, would tarnish the image and integrity of the courts of law.II). This is surprising that the learned trial court as well as the court of appeal were highly swayed with the observations rendered by the learned trial court at the time when the accused was acquitted of the charges and the plea of alibi claimed. As both the trials i.e. the one before the court of Additional Sessions Judge in the criminal case and the other, before the court of learned Civil Judge, were to proceed independently within their respective limits, so the influence gathered from the judgment of acquittal rendered in favour of the plaintiff / respondent should have not been the sole determining factor, rather the courts were under obligation to equally assess the damage caused to the complainant / petitioner which they did not and as such, fell into an error that cannot be rectified.III). It is not the rule of thumb that every case, which ends in acquittal would ipso facto entitle the acquitted accused to sue for damages, as in that eventuality, the damage caused would be beyond repair and the criminal justice system would come to a halt. As by doing so, the aggrieved person would suffer at the hands of the incompetent investigation and the people would lose the courage to register their claims and the same would in turn lead to a chaos. Under all circumstances, the burden is and would be on the person, claiming damages, to prove that the charge against him was theoutcome of malice and mala fide and that the sole purpose was to tranish his character and damage his reputation.(Civil Revision Allowed) --- Quote: ''who engages the courts of law with malice in mind, must be punished for his sinister designs, that too, by compensating the one who was wronged. If the like activities are left unchecked, the same would yield to drastic results and ultimately, would tarnish the image and integrity of the courts of law''

Summary: (a) Limitation Act, 1908 ----Arts. 23 & 24----Limitation in composite suits involving claims for defamation/libel and malicious prosecution—Principle of distinct causes of action—Held, that where a suit combines multiple causes of action, each claim must be tested against its specific limitation provision; the Court is required to apply separate limitation periods to separable claims rather than mechanically applying one to the entire suit—For compensation relating to libel/defamation, Art.24 applies, while for malicious prosecution, Art.23 governs—Judicial duty demands identification of dominant cause of action and conscious application of the appropriate article to each head of claim to prevent denial of substantive rights—Trial Court rightly treated the suit as within time. (b) Limitation Act, 1908 ----Art. 24----Defamation/libel—Computation of limitation period—Held, that the cause of action accrued upon publication of the alleged defamatory statement in the petitioner’s plaint dated 08.10.2021, which accused respondents of links with a banned organization—The petitioner’s earlier suit was dismissed for non-prosecution on 11.10.2022; the respondents served a legal notice dated 07.11.2022 demanding apology/damages and instituted the present suit on 28.11.2022—The sequence shows filing within one year from the cessation of cause of action—Suit not barred by limitation. (c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) ----O. VII, R. 11----Rejection of plaint—Scope—Held, that where limitation is a mixed question of law and fact, summary rejection of plaint under O.VII, R.11 is not warranted—Trial Court correctly determined the preliminary issue after hearing parties and examining chronology of events—No material irregularity found. (d) Administration of justice----Application of limitation law—Judicial obligation—Held, that principles of natural justice and due process require active judicial application of relevant limitation provisions rather than mechanical dismissal—Courts must ensure that limitation is applied fairly, particularly in composite claims where distinct statutory periods apply to different causes of action—Failure to do so may unjustly extinguish valid claims. Disposition: Civil revision dismissed; order of Trial Court dated 25.10.2023 upheld; respondents’ suit held within limitation; no illegality or jurisdictional defect found.