Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---- ----S. 302(b)---Qatl-i-amd---Life imprisonment---Leave to appeal---Petitioner was convicted under S.302(b), PPC and sentenced to imprisonment for life for committing qatl-i-amd of deceased Muhammad Abbass, with compensation of Rs.500,000 under S.544-A, Cr.P.C. and benefit of S.382-B, Cr.P.C.---High Court maintained conviction and sentence---Supreme Court, on reappraisal of evidence, found ocular account unimpeachable, consistent and corroborated by medical evidence and forensic recovery---Impugned judgment was well reasoned and required no interference---Leave to appeal was refused and petition was dismissed. (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----S. 154---Delay in registration of FIR---Delay attributable to police and not informant---Effect---Occurrence took place at 10:20 p.m. on 10.08.2017, while FIR was formally registered at 4:30 p.m. on 11.08.2017---Roznamcha entry showed that informant had reported matter to police within thirty minutes with same version against petitioner---Delay was caused by police and not by informant---Victim or prosecution could not be made to suffer due to omission, inefficiency or neglect of police officials over which complainant/victim had no control---While considering delay, Court must examine whether delay is attributable to informant in reporting crime, and not delay caused by failure of police to discharge statutory duty of promptly registering FIR. (c) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984---- ----Art. 21---Previous or subsequent conduct---Prompt conduct of informant---Relevance---Conduct of party or person in relation to fact in issue is relevant under Art.21---Informant’s conduct in immediately approaching police and reporting incident within thirty minutes was relevant and showed promptitude---Formal delay in FIR registration was therefore not fatal where contemporaneous Roznamcha entry supported prompt reporting by informant. (d) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----S. 154---Registration of FIR---Mandatory duty of police---Police cannot delay or refuse registration once information of cognizable offence is received---Registration of case under S.154, Cr.P.C. cannot be refused or delayed where information regarding commission of cognizable offence has been given to or received by Officer Incharge of Police Station---Police officer cannot assume role of adjudicator, Magistrate or Court by first conducting inquiry into credibility of information before recording it---FIR is primary step to set criminal law in motion and enable investigation according to Cr.P.C.---Police are not legally justified in waiting for heirs of deceased to complete funeral rites before registering FIR. Cited Cases: • Seeta Ram v. The State Jail Petition No.51 of 2023 • Muhammad Bashir v. Station House Officer, Okara and others PLD 2007 SC 539 • Syed Qambar Ali Shah v. Province of Sindh and others 2024 SCMR 1123 (e) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----Ss. 154 & 162---Inquiry before FIR---Effect---Investigation or inquiry to find correctness or otherwise of information before registration of FIR would be hit by S.162, Cr.P.C.---Police may commence investigation on credible information or knowledge of cognizable offence from any source and need not wait for formal complainant to appear---Where police have reason to believe cognizable offence has been committed, they must take initiative, investigate and preserve evidence without delay. (f) Criminal trial---- ----Ocular account---Related witnesses---Evidentiary value---Eyewitnesses gave consistent and unimpeachable account on material particulars---Lengthy cross-examination failed to discredit them---Accused and deceased were related to each other, therefore question of mistaken identity or false implication did not arise---Related witnesses are not to be discarded merely because of relationship if their testimony is confidence-inspiring and supported by other evidence---Conviction could safely be maintained on such evidence. (g) Criminal trial---- ----Medical evidence---Harmony with ocular account---Firearm injuries---Medical evidence showed injuries were caused by firearm from distance of about two to three feet, which was consistent with statements of eyewitnesses---Duration between injuries and post-mortem also corroborated prosecution testimony---No material contradiction existed between ocular and medical evidence. (h) Criminal trial---- ----Recovery of weapon---Positive forensic report---Corroborative value---Recovery of 9mm pistol was effected from accused and forensic report confirmed use of weapon in commission of offence---Such recovery, read with ocular and medical evidence, further corroborated prosecution case. (i) Criminal trial---- ----Minor contradictions---Effect---Minor contradictions not going to root of prosecution case do not justify discarding otherwise reliable evidence---Natural course of conduct, passage of time, exaggeration due to anxiety for justice and human fallibility may result in minor discrepancies---Where contradictions are not vital, whole prosecution evidence cannot be discarded. Cited Case: • Sher Afzal v. The State 2024 SCMR 894 (j) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----Ss. 4(h), 154 & 200---“Complainant” and “informant”---Distinction---Use of terms interchangeably deprecated---“Complaint” under S.4(h), Cr.P.C. means allegation made orally or in writing to Magistrate with view to his taking action under Code and does not include police report---Proceedings under S.200, Cr.P.C. give status of complainant to person who files complaint before Magistrate---Person who furnishes information to police for registration of FIR under S.154, Cr.P.C. is only an informant---FIR is not complaint within meaning of S.4(h), Cr.P.C.; it is information recorded by police under S.154, Cr.P.C.---State is prosecutor/complainant in prosecutions initiated on basis of FIR---Terminological confusion is not mere semantic lapse but may blur well-defined procedural distinctions. Cited Cases: • Ganesha v. Sharanappa and another Criminal Appeal No.1948 of 2013 • Wajid Khan v. The State 2020 PCrLJ 454 (k) Police proceedings---- ----Use of words “Faryaadi” and “Muddai”---Legality---Use discontinued---Terms “Faryaadi” in Sindh and “Muddai” in other federating units for person furnishing information to police were not supported by statutory scheme of Cr.P.C.---Such terms wrongly portray citizen as supplicant or seeker of favour rather than rights-bearing person invoking protection of law---Citizen approaches police as matter of right, not mercy or charity---Police officers are public servants paid from public funds and are bound to serve citizens---Use of such terminology was legally misconceived, constitutionally impermissible and inconsistent with Articles 4, 9, 10-A and 14 of the Constitution---Use of terms “Faryaadi” and “Muddai” in police proceedings was directed to be discontinued. (l) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Arts. 4, 9, 10-A & 14---Citizen-centric policing---Dignity and lawful treatment---Police duty to register cognizable offence---Any practice treating citizen reporting cognizable offence as supplicant offends constitutional guarantees of lawful treatment, access to justice, fair treatment, dignity and protection of life, liberty and security---Terminology used by courts and public institutions shapes procedural understanding, institutional behaviour and lived experience of constitutional rights---Language of public authorities must reflect legislative intent, constitutional values and procedural clarity---Institutional practices perpetuating unconstitutional hierarchies undermine rights-based application of criminal law. (m) Police proceedings---- ----Address to Station House Officer---Expression “Bakhidmat Janaab SHO” discouraged---Phrase “Bakhidmat Janaab SHO” has no legal sanction and implies subordinate tone inconsistent with citizen-centric policing---It is not citizen who is at service of SHO; rather SHO is at service of citizen---Simple address “Janaab SHO” was held sufficient. (n) Police Rules, 1934---- ----Form No.24.2(1)---Use of term “complainant”---Need for revision---Police Rules and Form No.24.2(1) use term “complainant” in contexts where “informant” should be used---Such usage is not in consonance with Cr.P.C., which does not recognize complaint to police officer---Several spelling mistakes were also noticed in Police Rules, 1934---Revision of Police Rules was considered necessary so that forms and terminology conform to Cr.P.C. (o) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---- ----S. 201---Delayed registration of FIR by police---Loss or disappearance of evidence---Criminal liability of police officer---Where Officer Incharge of Police Station delays registration of FIR after receiving information of cognizable offence, it shall be presumed that such delay was caused to benefit accused unless police official proves contrary---Burden of proof lies on delinquent police officer---S.201, PPC uses expression “whoever” and creates no exception in favour of public functionaries or police officials---Police officer delaying or refusing FIR registration, thereby causing concealment, loss or disappearance of evidence, may be proceeded against under S.201, PPC like any private citizen---Departmental proceedings do not bar criminal liability. Cited Cases: • Malik Asad Ali v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1996 SC 420 • Muhammad Bashir v. The State PLD 2007 SC 539 • Lal Khan v. The State 2006 SCMR 1841 • The State v. Abdul Khaliq PLD 2011 SC 554 (p) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----S. 190---Power of Magistrate/District and Sessions Judge---Delay in FIR by police---Show-cause notice---Where deliberate delay or inaction by Officer Incharge of Police Station results in concealment, loss or destruction of evidence, District and Sessions Judges and Magistrates taking cognizance under S.190, Cr.P.C. are competent, on their own observation or on application of informant/victim, to call such officer and proceed under S.201, PPC or any other applicable law, if satisfied that delay was caused by police officer---Such action shall be taken after serving show-cause notice to concerned police officer. (q) Police Order, 2002---- ----Art. 155---Delayed FIR registration---Departmental proceedings---Since S.154, Cr.P.C. is mandatory, delayed registration amounts to wilful breach or neglect of law by police officer---Trial Court judges shall refer matter to District Police Officer concerned for initiation of departmental proceedings where police delays FIR registration---Earlier Police Act, 1861 also carried provisions penalizing neglect of duty---Departmental action and criminal prosecution may proceed in their respective fields. (r) Criminal administration of justice---- ----Prompt FIR registration---Forensic evidence---Delay prejudicing investigation---Time is essence in criminal investigation, particularly for preservation of forensic evidence---Delay between commission/reporting of crime and police response increases risk that evidence may be contaminated, destroyed or lost by victim, witnesses or passersby---Delayed FIR registration causes delayed start to investigation and may prejudice merits of case. (s) Supreme Court directions---- ----Prompt registration of FIR---Discontinuance of incorrect terminology---Internal policing---Directions issued---Inspector Generals of Police of all provinces and ICT were directed to ensure prompt FIR registration under S.154, Cr.P.C. where information relates to cognizable offence---If information is initially entered in Roznamcha/daily diary, it shall be treated as part of FIR and incorporated accordingly---IGPs were directed to ensure mechanism of internal policing to curb excess/misuse of powers by police officers---Prosecutor Generals of provinces and ICT were expected to advise police authorities and frame SOPs in accordance with Cr.P.C.---Police Rules, particularly FIR form, were directed to be brought in line with Cr.P.C. in consultation with relevant departments. (t) Supreme Court directions---- ----Province of Sindh---Delay in FIR registration---Report and disciplinary action---Since delayed FIR registration was noticed to be more prevalent in Sindh, Prosecutor General Sindh was directed to submit report within one month regarding average delay in registration of FIRs in heinous offences during last two years in Sindh---Inspector General of Police Sindh was directed to initiate departmental proceedings against police officers who caused delay in FIR registration in the present case---District and Sessions Judges in Sindh were directed to ensure that in lower courts the complainant/informant is not referred to as “Faryaadi” while calling cases. Disposition: Criminal Petition No.1021 of 2021 was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused; conviction and sentence of petitioner under S.302(b), PPC were maintained; Supreme Court held that delay in formal FIR registration was caused by police and not informant; directions were issued for prompt FIR registration, discontinuance of terms “Faryaadi” and “Muddai”, correction of police terminology/forms, possible criminal and departmental action against police officers causing deliberate delay, and circulation of judgment to High Courts, District Courts, Inspector Generals of Police and Prosecutor Generals of all provinces and ICT.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code, 1898—Sections 154, 22-A & 561-A—Registration of FIR—Duty of police—Upon receipt of information disclosing commission of a cognizable offence, the Station House Officer is under a statutory obligation to reduce the information into writing and register an FIR—Failure to do so constitutes dereliction of statutory duty—Every member of the public may set the criminal law in motion; lodging of FIR not confined to the aggrieved person—Amanullah Khan v. The State (2011 PCr.LJ 774) followed. (b) Ex-Officio Justice of Peace—Refusal to direct registration of FIR on ground of pending civil suit—Held: legally untenable—Civil and criminal liabilities are distinct and may proceed concurrently—Mere pendency of civil proceedings no bar to criminal action—Principle reaffirmed from Zarar Ismail v. Senior Superintendent of Police (2022 SCR 1225). (c) Section 561-A, Cr.P.C.—Scope and object—Inherent jurisdiction of High Court is corrective, plenary, and ex debito justitiae—To be exercised to secure ends of justice and prevent abuse of process—Technical defects or lack of formal authorization cannot defeat exercise of such powers—Abdul Majeed v. Abdul Samad (2024 SCR 803) relied upon. (d) Power of attorney—Authority to initiate criminal proceedings—Technical defect in authorization cannot nullify exercise of inherent jurisdiction when abuse of process is evident—Procedural formalities must yield to substantive justice. (e) Supreme Court’s constitutional jurisdiction—Article 42-A, AJK Interim Constitution, 1974—Where subordinate courts’ orders are manifestly contrary to binding precedent and perpetuate injustice, Supreme Court may intervene to correct illegality and prevent abuse of process. Disposition: Appeal allowed—Orders of High Court (23.04.2025) and Ex-Officio Justice of Peace (30.08.2023) set aside—Station House Officer directed to register FIR and proceed in accordance with law.

Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302 & 34 – Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 497 – Post-arrest bail – Tentative assessment – Prima facie involvement – Confessional statement – Recovery – Independent corroboration Petitioner, implicated in a charge under Sections 302 and 34, P.P.C., was denied post-arrest bail. The Court held that while a co-accused’s confession alone has limited evidentiary value, it can justify denial of bail when independently corroborated. In this case, the petitioner was nominated in the FIR, implicated in a judicial confession of the co-accused (his stepmother), and was linked to the offence through recovery of the alleged murder weapon and blood-stained cloth on his pointation. These recoveries, coupled with specific attribution of role in the confession, established sufficient prima facie material to deny bail at this stage. [Ref: Muhammad Sarfaraz Ansari v. The State (PLD 2021 SC 738)] (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 497(1) & (2) – Bail in offences under prohibitory clause – Scope – Exceptions – Further inquiry – Not attracted The offence under Section 302, P.P.C. attracts the prohibitory clause of S. 497(1), Cr.P.C. The Court reiterated that bail in such cases can only be granted in exceptional circumstances such as minority, infirmity, undue delay not attributable to the accused, or where the case calls for further inquiry under S. 497(2). Upon tentative assessment, none of these exceptions were found applicable. The Court concluded that the petitioner’s case did not merit further inquiry. [Ref: Bakhti Rehman v. The State (2023 SCMR 1068); Muhammad Atif v. The State (2024 SCMR 1071)] (c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 497 – Rule of consistency – Bail granted to co-accused – Distinguishable role – Non-applicability The principle of consistency does not automatically entitle an accused to bail where a co-accused has been granted the same. The Court emphasized that consistency applies only where roles, allegations, and incriminating material are materially identical. In this case, co-accused Jalal Nohri’s role differed significantly from the petitioner, who was not only implicated in the FIR and confession but also faced incriminating recoveries. Hence, rule of consistency was held inapplicable. [Ref: Muhammad Atif v. The State (2024 SCMR 1071)] (d) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 154 – Delay in lodging FIR – Explained – Not fatal Although there was a one-day delay in lodging the FIR, it was held to be satisfactorily explained. The complainant had to travel from his workplace, attend to the post-mortem and burial, and only then approached the police. The Court ruled that in such circumstances, delay alone could not be grounds for bail when other corroborative material existed. (e) Confessional statement of co-accused – Admissibility at bail stage – Corroboration required – Application explained The Court clarified that while a co-accused’s confession is not substantive evidence against another accused at trial, it can be used tentatively at the bail stage when supported by independent corroboration. In this case, recoveries linked to the petitioner, together with his direct implication in the confession and FIR, provided such corroboration. Disposition: Petition dismissed. Leave to appeal refused.

Summary: (On appeal against the order dated 08.03.2024 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Writ Petition No. 1684 of 2024). Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 154---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S. 406---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Criminal breach of trust---Quashing of FIR---Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court---Scope---Allegations against the accused-respondents were that they dishonestly misappropriated an amount of Rs. 40 lac obtained by them from petitioner as loan---Petitioner lodged FIR under S. 406 P.P.C---High Court quashed the said FIR in its writ jurisdiction---Validity---Loan did not qualify as an entrustment---Where entrustment was made a fiduciary relationship arose between the giver and recipient, and the specific property entrusted was expected to be returned in its original form to the giver---However, such elements were absent in a loan where the relationship between the lender and borrower was purely contractual and there was no expectation of return of the same exact property, but rather something of the same value was returned---Even otherwise, there was a gross contradiction in the contents of the FIR, wherein it was first claimed that the amount was given as a loan but then it was alleged that the property was given as a trust---Thus, it appeared that the term 'Amanat' had been employed merely as a tool to attract the application of S. 406 P.P.C. and to secure the registration of FIR against the respondents---Additionally, no documentary evidence was available on the record which proved or showed that the petitioner gave the amount of Rs. 40,00,000/- (rupees forty lac only) to the respondents and the same had been noted by the High Court---Necessary implication of such legal interpretation, factual inconsistencies in FIR and non-availability of any documentary proof was that the offence punishable under S. 406 P.P.C was not made out from the contents of the quashed FIR---Thus, the decision of High Court to quash the FIR was in accordance with law---Consequently, leave to appeal was declined and petition was dismissed accordingly. DG Anti-Corruption, Establishment Lahore v. Muhammad Akram Khan and others PLD 2013 SC 401 and Muhammad Ali v. Samina Qasim Tarar 2022 SCMR 2001 ref. Shahnaz Begum v. High Court of Sindh and Baluchistan PLD 1971 SC 677; The State v. Asif Ali Zardari and another 1994 SCMR 798); Muhammad Khalid Mukhtar v. The State PLD 1997 SC 275; Dr. Sher Afgan Khan Niazi v. Ali S. Habib and others 2011 SCMR 1813; FIA, Director General FIA and others v. Syed Hamid Ali Shah and others PLD 2023 SC 265; Ajmeel Khan v. Abdul Rahim and others PLD 2009 SC 102; The State through Prosecutor General Punjab, Lahore v. Chaudhry Mohammad Khan and others PLD 2025 SC 254; Zahid Jameel v. S.H.O. and 2 others 2008 YLR 2695; Shahid Imran v. The State and others 2011 SCMR 1614; Muhammad Ali v. Samina Qasim Tarar and others 2022 SCMR 2001; Miraj Khan v. Gul Ahmed and 3 others 2000 SCMR 122; Imtiaz Ali v. Bismillah Khan and another 1974 PCr.LJ Note 22 and DG Anti-Corruption, Establishment Lahore v. Muhammad Akram Khan and others PLD 2013 SC 401 rel. Junaid Jabbar Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner (through video link from Lahore). Nemo for Respondents. Assisted by: Mian Johar Imam and Habib, Law Clerk. Date of hearing: 13th May, 2025.

Summary: Acquittal granted --- (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) –– Ss. 4(k), 154, 156(3), 157, 173, 190, 200–204, 265-K, 342 –– Cognizable offence –– Entry in daily diary instead of FIR –– Scope and effect of Magistrate’s power under S.156(3) –– Legality of arrest prior to registration of FIR. Information given by complainant regarding disappearance and suspected abduction of two young men clearly disclosed commission of a cognizable offence, yet the officer incharge did not register an FIR under S.154 Cr.P.C. and only made an entry in the daily diary while seeking “inquiry” under S.156(3) Cr.P.C. –– Held, “such an investigation” in S.156(3) refers to investigation under S.156(1) which presupposes registration of a case under S.154 –– S.156(3) cannot be invoked to order an “inquiry” and Magistrate has no authority to direct such inquiry; to read such power into S.156(3) would amount to adding words not intended by the legislature –– The duty to register and investigate cognizable offences rests exclusively with the officer incharge of the police station; entry in the roznamcha/daily diary does not convert information into a cognizable case nor authorize investigation under Chapter XIV –– An arrest prior to registration of FIR, save in exceptional circumstances expressly covered by Ss.54, 55, 57 or 151 Cr.P.C., is illegal and without lawful authority –– In the present case, the appellants were arrested on the basis of a diary entry before registration of the crime report; such arrest was held illegal and the purported “inquiry” under S.156(3) without an FIR was without lawful sanction, having direct bearing on the reliability of subsequent proceedings including judicial confession. (b) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 –– Arts. 38 & 40 –– Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) –– Ss. 164, 364 –– Judicial confession –– Requirements of voluntariness and safeguards –– Delay and custody in police control –– Evidentiary value. Under Art.38 of the Order of 1984, confession made to or in presence of a police officer is inadmissible; confession in custody is admissible only if recorded by a Magistrate under S.164 Cr.P.C. or where it leads to discovery of a fact within Art.40 –– S.364 Cr.P.C. and Ch.13 of High Court Rules & Orders impose mandatory safeguards: Magistrate must explain to accused that he is not bound to confess, that the confession may be used against him, and must not record the statement unless he has “reasons to believe” it is voluntary, which requires objective satisfaction based on his own observations –– Judicial confession may form basis of conviction if true, voluntary and corroborated, but delay in recording, especially when accused remains in police influence, casts serious doubt on voluntariness and calls for heightened scrutiny –– In the present case, appellants were illegally arrested on 17.02.2016 and their judicial confessions recorded on 23.02.2016, six days later; there were material contradictions between the Magistrate and investigating officer regarding custody and handing over of the accused after recording of confession –– Confessions were not corroborated by independent evidence and even conflicted with prosecution’s own narrative –– Held, in such circumstances, the alleged judicial confessions were surrounded by serious doubts regarding voluntariness and safety, and could not be relied upon as a basis for conviction. (c) Criminal trial –– Evidence –– Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) report –– Chain of custody –– Delay in dispatch –– Recovery of incriminating articles –– Effect. Prosecution relied on recovery at instance of appellant of a Kalashnikov rifle, blood-stained axe, churri (knife), a portion of blood-stained chitae (mat) and blood-stained stones, as well as positive FSL reports –– Evidence showed that alleged recoveries were made earlier but ballistic and serological exhibits were dispatched to FSL almost four weeks after the occurrence, impairing sanctity of chain of custody –– Firearm and spent crime-empties were sent together, further compromising evidentiary integrity –– Medical evidence indicated injuries that would cause profuse bleeding, yet there was no evidence of extensive blood at the alleged crime scene, nor was it the prosecution case that blood had been washed to remove traces –– Investigating officer did not corroborate complainant’s assertion that personal effects of the deceased were recovered during a joint police/Chitral Scouts raid on accused’s house –– Held, in view of unexplained delays, contradictions, scant physical traces in a case involving decapitation and dismemberment, and compromised chain of custody, reliance on FSL reports and alleged recoveries to sustain a capital conviction was unsafe. (d) Criminal trial –– Circumstantial evidence –– Standard of proof –– Absence of “last seen” and direct ocular account –– Benefit of doubt. Entire case rested on circumstantial evidence: there was no direct ocular testimony placing the appellants in the company or proximity of the deceased at the relevant time, nor any credible “last seen” evidence beyond generalized statements regarding crossing of a bridge –– Human remains in two sacks were not recovered at the instance of the appellants –– Crucial evidence regarding movement of the victims across a bridge controlled by Chitral Scouts, with a maintained register and temporary retention of identity cards, was not properly collected –– Prosecution witnesses contradicted each other on material particulars, including search and recovery –– In such circumstances of illegal arrest, doubtful confessional statements, compromised recoveries, weak forensic support and incomplete investigation, the prosecution failed to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt –– Held, appellants were entitled to benefit of doubt, capital convictions under Ss.302(b) and 34 PPC, as well as convictions under Ss.201 and 15(AA) PPC, could not be sustained; acquittal was warranted. (e) Criminal justice system –– Investigation and prosecution –– Judicial censure. The case was described by the Supreme Court as a classic illustration of the abysmal state of the criminal justice system, reflecting lack of integrity, competence and professionalism in investigation and prosecution, and inability of investigation officers to discharge statutory duties –– Failure to promptly register FIR, resort to an impermissible “inquiry” under S.156(3) Cr.P.C., illegal arrest, poor collection and preservation of physical and forensic evidence, and contradictions in prosecution case collectively undermined the search for truth and risked miscarriage of justice in a double-murder case involving decapitation and dismemberment of two young men –– Court reiterated that Cr.P.C. structure, including judicial supervision of police powers, exists to protect both accused and victims from abuse of coercive authority, and disregard of these safeguards vitiates the worth of resulting evidence. (f) Result. Criminal Petition No.1674 of 2021 was converted into appeal and allowed; convictions and sentences recorded by trial court on 08.01.2020 and upheld by High Court on 09.06.2021 were set aside and appellants, Said-ur-Rehman and Noor Rehmat, were acquitted by extending benefit of doubt and ordered to be released if not required in any other case –– Criminal Petitions Nos.135-P and 136-P of 2021 filed by complainant against acquittal of co-accused were dismissed.

Summary: Acquittal granted ---- (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 154—Registration of FIR—Mandatory duty of officer in charge of police station—Entry of cognizable offence in daily diary instead of FIR register—Consequences—Delayed registration after prior investigation—Effect on fairness of investigation Information regarding the cognizable offence was received promptly by the SHO and entered in the Daily Diary, but the formal FIR was delayed for almost two days. The Supreme Court held that the registration of an FIR is a mandatory statutory duty under S. 154 Cr.P.C., and the officer in charge of a police station has no authority to delay or refuse its registration upon receipt of such information. Investigation steps taken prior to formal registration of the FIR—including post-mortem, evidence collection, and scene inspection—were deemed irregular and capable of being misused to manipulate or fabricate evidence. Entry in a daily diary is not a substitute for proper FIR registration and enables evasion of the external Magisterial check required by law. Cited Cases: • Mst. Sughran Bibi v. The State PLD 2018 SC 595 • Muhammad Bashir v. SHO Okara PLD 2007 SC 539 • Syed Qambar Ali Shah v. Province of Sindh 2024 SCMR 1123 • Mst. Asia Bibi v. The State PLD 2019 SC 64 (b) Criminal trial—Delay in FIR—Appellant not nominated initially—No explanation for delayed implication—Possibility of false implication not ruled out—Evidence not confidence-inspiring The Court observed that while initial information was provided by a witness (PW-2) on the day of the incident, the appellant was not nominated until two days later when the formal FIR was registered. The complainant (PW-1) was not present at the time of occurrence, yet became the primary witness implicating the appellant. This raised strong suspicion of afterthought, consultation, and fabrication. Testimonies of both key eyewitnesses lacked consistency and credibility, and the possibility of false implication after deliberation could not be ruled out. (c) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order (X of 1984), Arts. 37, 38, 40 & 91—Judicial confession—Safeguards under Cr.P.C. Ss. 164, 364 and High Court Rules—Failure to ensure voluntariness—Confession recorded after prolonged police custody—Statement retracted—Confession found inadmissible and unreliable The appellant's confessional statement was recorded seven days after arrest while in continued custody of the investigating officer. The Court held that judicial confessions must be made voluntarily and in an environment free from police influence. Safeguards—including removal of handcuffs, absence of police presence, and informing the accused of legal consequences—were either inadequately observed or entirely lacking. The Magistrate’s failure to comply with mandatory provisions under Ss. 164 and 364 Cr.P.C. and the High Court Rules rendered the confession doubtful. Retracted confessions can be relied upon only if corroborated by independent and confidence-inspiring evidence, which was absent in the present case. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Ismail v. The State 2017 SCMR 898 • Majeed v. The State 2010 SCMR 55 • Arabistan v. The State 1992 SCMR 754 • Fazal Wadood v. The State 2006 SCMR 1911 • Muhammad Bilal v. The State 2021 SCMR 1039 (d) Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S. 302(b)—Murder—Recovery of weapon—Spent bullets sent for forensic after arrest—Recovery from public area—Prosecution evidence not confidence-inspiring—Motive not proved—Benefit of doubt extended The recovery of the crime weapon from a publicly accessible area near a hospital wall was held not to be believable, particularly when the bullets were sent for forensic analysis after the arrest of the accused. No motive was proved, and it appeared implausible that an assailant would conceal a weapon in such an open location. The prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and the conviction was not sustainable in light of material discrepancies and lack of trustworthy evidence. (e) Criminal Justice System—Systemic abuse—Refusal or delay in FIR registration—Violation of Cr.P.C.—Effect on due process and public confidence—Directions issued to police and prosecution authorities The Supreme Court noted with concern the widespread and recurring practice in Sindh of failing to register FIRs promptly, thereby enabling manipulation of evidence and denial of timely justice. Such practice, it held, erodes public trust and is symptomatic of a system captured by the privileged at the expense of the marginalized. The Court directed all Inspectors General of Police and Prosecutors General of the Provinces and ICT to ensure strict compliance with S. 154 Cr.P.C. and to establish SOPs safeguarding against such dereliction. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Nawaz v. The State 2024 SCMR 1731 • Sardar Bibi v. Munir Ahmed 2017 SCMR 344 • Nasrullah v. The State 1996 SCMR 1926 • The State v. Ahmed Omar Sheikh 2021 SCMR 873 Disposition: Appeal allowed. Conviction and sentence set aside. Appellant acquitted of all charges under S. 302(b), P.P.C. and S. 506(2), Cr.P.C. and ordered to be released if not required in any other case.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ---- Ss. 154, 156(3), 157, 164 & 173 ---- Scope and legality of pre-FIR inquiry under Section 156(3) ---- Confessional statements recorded during unlawful inquiry ---- Admissibility and evidentiary value The Supreme Court held that the purported “inquiry” initiated under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. before the registration of FIR was ultra vires the scheme of the Code. A Magistrate is not empowered under Section 156(3) to authorize an “inquiry”; such provision only permits ordering an investigation into a cognizable offence after registration under Section 154 Cr.P.C. The arrests, interrogations, and recovery of the body in the present case all occurred during an illegal “inquiry,” thereby circumventing mandatory safeguards under Sections 154–157 Cr.P.C. This violation undermined the voluntariness of the confessional statements recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C., which were made after prolonged police custody. The Court held that such confessions, recorded in the backdrop of procedural illegality and custodial pressure, could not be treated as voluntary. (b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860) ---- Ss. 365-A, 302(b), 34 ---- Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 ---- S. 7(a) ---- Kidnapping for ransom and murder of minor --- Conflicting confessional statements --- Benefit of doubt Appellants were convicted and sentenced to death for kidnapping and murder of a minor. The Court found that their confessional statements were mutually contradictory, exculpatory in parts, retracted later, and lacked corroboration. One accused attributed the crime to the other, and vice versa. In absence of independent evidence, such confessions could not sustain conviction. The DNA report was inconclusive; identification of the decomposed body was based merely on clothing. There was no proof of ransom demand, and the testimonies of key prosecution witnesses were inconsistent. The prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. Appellants were acquitted by extending the benefit of doubt. (c) Evidence Act (I of 1872) [Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984] ---- Art. 43 (now Art. 164), Art. 22 ---- Judicial confession --- Evidentiary threshold --- Principles reiterated A retracted judicial confession must be voluntary, truthful, and confidence-inspiring to be relied upon without corroboration. The Court reiterated that confessions must be read as a whole and cannot be accepted in parts. Where exculpatory elements exist and there is no independent corroboration, the confession loses its probative value. The delay in recording the confessions after prolonged custody also raised suspicion regarding their voluntariness. (d) Criminal justice system ---- Abuse of coercive powers by police ---- Misuse of ‘madd’ entry and unauthorized inquiries ---- Directions issued to ensure compliance with Cr.P.C. The Court noted with concern the practice in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa of entering mere information as a ‘madd’ and then initiating inquiries under Section 156(3) without registering an FIR. It was emphasized that such unauthorized proceedings erode constitutional safeguards and result in miscarriage of justice. Directions were issued to the Prosecutor General and IGP to ensure strict adherence to the statutory framework under Cr.P.C. and to educate magistrates and police officers accordingly. Disposition: Appeals allowed; convictions set aside; appellants acquitted. Cited Cases: • Mst. Sughran Bibi v. The State (PLD 2018 SC 595) • Mohammad Ramzan v. The State (PLJ 1979 SC 302) • Tariq Mehmood v. The State (2002 SCMR 1493) • Javed Iqbal v. The State (2023 SCMR 139) • Majeed v. The State (2010 SCMR 55) • Muhammad Parvez v. The State (2007 SCMR 670) • Indian cases: Gopal Das Sindhi, Suresh Chand Jain, Sakiri Vasu Cited Provisions: • Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 365-A, 302(b), 34 • Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, S. 7(a) • Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, Ss. 2(f), 2(k), 2(l), 154, 156(3), 157, 164, 173 • Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, Arts. 22, 43 (now 164)

Summary: Bail denied ---- (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)----Ss. 496, 497, 498 & 154---Pre-arrest bail---Foreign offence---Registration of FIR in Pakistan---Double jeopardy---Scope---Petitioner, accused of embezzling funds while employed in Oman, sought pre-arrest bail in Pakistan---FIR alleged that petitioner received cash, a diamond ring, and a bank card from complainant in Muscat, Oman, and instead of fulfilling assigned duties, transferred Omani Riyals into his and his wife’s bank accounts in Pakistan, then absconded---Petitioner argued that registration of FIR in Pakistan amounted to double jeopardy, since complaint had already been lodged in Oman---Held, registration of FIR in Pakistan not barred under S. 188, Cr.P.C., where a Pakistani citizen commits offence abroad---Criminal courts in Pakistan can try such persons if found within the country---Section 403 Cr.P.C. protection (against double jeopardy) only applies where accused has been tried and convicted or acquitted by competent court---No such trial or acquittal/conviction occurred in Oman, thus protection of S. 403 not attracted---Petitioner's objection regarding double jeopardy rejected.(b) Pakistan Penal Code (XLV of 1860)----Ss. 406, 408 & 405---Criminal breach of trust by servant---Misappropriation---Transfer of embezzled funds---Scope---Petitioner, employed as a driver in complainant’s company in Oman, was entrusted with significant cash, jewelry, and bank card---Instead of performing his duty, petitioner misappropriated the entrusted assets and transferred equivalent amount into his and his wife's bank accounts in Pakistan---Held, entrustment and subsequent dishonest misappropriation satisfied ingredients of criminal breach of trust under Ss. 405 & 408, PPC---Petitioner failed to dislodge prima facie evidence of his involvement or establish mala fide on part of complainant---Grant of pre-arrest bail held not justified.(c) Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2010----S. 3---Proceeds of crime---Offence committed abroad---Transfer of criminal proceeds into Pakistani accounts---Scope---Held, petitioner’s act of transferring embezzled funds from Oman into his and his wife's bank accounts in Pakistan, knowing it was illicit wealth, attracted provisions of Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2010---Investigating Officer directed to examine applicability of AMLA provisions for further legal action.(d) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)----Ss. 498 & 497---Pre-arrest bail---Extraordinary relief---Scope---Held, bail before arrest is an extraordinary concession granted only in cases of mala fide or false implication---Where strong prima facie evidence connects accused with offence, and no enmity or ulterior motive is established, bail cannot be granted---Petitioner’s plea of victimization held baseless---Ad-interim bail withdrawn.Disposition: Petition dismissed; ad-interim pre-arrest bail withdrawn.Cited Cases:• Dr. Imran murder case, Islamabad High Court (2022 PCr.LJ 1511)• 2011 YLR 2882• Section 403 Cr.P.C. interpreted in light of foreign prosecution protectionsCited Legislation:• Pakistan Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 405, 406, 408• Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss. 3, 154, 188, 403, 496–498• Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2010, S. 3

Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860) ----Ss. 302(b), 393 & 34—Juvenile Justice System Act (XXII of 2018), S.16—Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S.382-B—Conviction and sentence—Appellant convicted under Ss.302(b)/34 and 393/34, P.P.C.—Benefit of S.16, Juvenile Justice System Act extended—Appeal against conviction—Scope. The appellant was convicted by the Model Criminal Trial Court for committing murder and attempted robbery and sentenced to life imprisonment and five years’ simple imprisonment respectively, with the benefit of S.382-B, Cr.P.C. The trial court declined to impose the death penalty due to the appellant’s minority at the time of commission of offence under S.16 of the Juvenile Justice System Act, 2018. (b) Criminal trial ----Delay in lodging of FIR—Effect—Reasonable explanation. The FIR was lodged with a delay of one day after the incident. The delay was satisfactorily explained by the prosecution, as the complainant’s priority was to save the life of the injured who was moved between hospitals and later taken for burial after death. The FIR having been lodged against unknown persons further ruled out the possibility of false implication. However, since the police station was only three kilometres away from the scene, the Court observed that some caution was required in evaluating the prosecution evidence. (c) Criminal trial ----Appreciation of evidence—Identification parade—Defective identification proceedings—Non-mention of description (huliya)—Evidentiary value. The prosecution’s case rested on the identification of the appellant by two eye-witnesses. The Court found the identification evidence unreliable because (i) the eye-witnesses failed to mention any description of the accused in their statements under S.161, Cr.P.C.; (ii) identification parades were conducted with serious procedural irregularities; (iii) witnesses had no prior acquaintance with the accused; and (iv) the same dummies were reused in a second parade. Reliance was placed on *Javed Khan alias Bacha v. The State* (2017 SCMR 524), *Hakeem v. The State* (2017 SCMR 1546), and *Mian Sohail Ahmed v. The State* (2019 SCMR 956), wherein the Supreme Court emphasized strict compliance with identification rules and early description of the assailant. (d) Criminal trial ----Eye-witnesses—Interested or chance witnesses—Credibility—Contradictions and dishonest improvements—Effect. The first eye-witness was a relative of the deceased but had no prior enmity with the accused; however, his testimony contained material contradictions and dishonest improvements between his statement under S.161, Cr.P.C., and deposition before the trial court. The second eye-witness was a chance witness who did not witness the shooting and only saw three persons fleeing on a motorcycle at speed, without noting their appearance, clothing, or vehicle details. His ability to identify the accused was held impossible. Both testimonies were declared unreliable. (e) Evidence—Recovery and forensic proof—Absence of corroboration—Inadmissibility of confession before police—Scope. No recovery of any robbed property or weapon was made from the accused; the forensic report did not link the recovered empty cartridge with any weapon attributed to him. The alleged confession made before the police was held inadmissible under Art.39 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, especially as the appellant was not produced before a Magistrate for recording a judicial confession. (f) Evidence—CCTV footage and USB—Evidentiary value. CCTV footage allegedly recovered from a house near the crime scene failed to show the occurrence or identify the culprits. The photographs extracted from the USB merely depicted three persons on a motorcycle and could have been taken anywhere. In absence of proof of continuity of custody or authenticity, the footage carried no probative value. (g) Criminal trial ----Benefit of doubt—Principles. Wherever there is a single reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of an accused, the benefit thereof must go to him, not as a matter of grace but as a matter of right. The Court found multiple infirmities in the prosecution’s case, including defective identification, lack of recovery, and absence of corroboration, and therefore extended the benefit of doubt to the appellant. (h) Disposition— Appeal allowed. Conviction and sentence set aside. Appellant acquitted of all charges under Ss.302(b), 393, and 34, P.P.C., and ordered to be released forthwith if not required in any other case. Cited Cases: • *Ghulam Akbar v. The State* 2007 YLR 1506 • *Javed Khan alias Bacha v. The State* 2017 SCMR 524 • *Hakeem v. The State* 2017 SCMR 1546 • *Ishtiaq Ahmed Mirza v. Federation of Pakistan* PLD 2019 SC 675 • *Aijaz Nawaz alias Baba v. The State* 2019 PCr.LJ 1775 • *Ansar v. The State* 2023 SCMR 929 • *Atta Khan v. The State* 2024 PCr.LJ 1448.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Arts. 15, 20 & 199 Fundamental rights—Freedom of movement and religion—Petitioners argued that offloading passengers from an international flight and registering FIR No. 215/2024 violated their constitutional rights under Arts. 15 and 20 of the Constitution. Held, that fundamental rights are not absolute and may be lawfully restricted under specific circumstances, such as national security, public safety, or public interest. Restrictions on international travel are permissible to ensure compliance with immigration laws and international obligations, provided they are proportionate and non-discriminatory. (b) Prevention of Trafficking in Persons Act, 2018 (PTPA) ----Ss. 3, 4, & 5---Trafficking in persons—Elements of coercion, fraud, or exploitation—Case involved allegations of sending individuals abroad under the guise of Umrah visas for organized begging. Held, that allegations, including financial exploitation and control over victims, prima facie satisfied the elements of trafficking under Ss. 3 and 4 of the PTPA. However, determination of whether trafficking occurred required further investigation and factual determination at trial. (c) Emigration Ordinance, 1979 ----S. 22(b)---Unauthorized emigration and exploitation—Petitioners allegedly charged individuals for fake Umrah visas without hotel bookings or return tickets. Held, that while initial facts did not conclusively justify invoking S. 22(b), the Investigating Officer could incorporate the provision if further evidence emerged during investigation. (d) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ----Ss. 154 & 561-A---Quashing of FIR—Principles—FIR can be quashed only where it unequivocally fails to establish an offence or reflects clear misuse of legal authority. Supreme Court precedents emphasize that quashing an FIR during investigation disrupts the criminal justice process and should only be exercised in extraordinary circumstances. In the present case, the allegations in FIR No. 215/2024 constituted a prima facie case, and there were no grounds for quashing. (e) Vagrancy Laws ----Punjab Vagrancy Ordinance, 1958 & Punjab Destitute and Neglected Children Act, 2004—Organized beggary—Definitions and remedies—While beggary alone does not fall under the PTPA unless it involves coercion or exploitation, it may constitute an offence under the Vagrancy Ordinance or other laws addressing organized begging. Cited Cases: • Pakistan Muslim League (N) v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2007 SC 642) • Bashir Ahmad v. Zafar-ul-Islam (PLD 2004 SC 298) • Ajmeel Khan v. Abdur Rahim (PLD 2009 SC 102) • The State v. Chaudhry Muhammad Khan (2024 SC decision) ------ Disposition: Petition for quashing FIR No. 215/2024 dismissed. Held, that the investigation must proceed, and the trial court shall address the applicability of the PTPA or vagrancy laws based on evidence.