Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---- ----Ss. 405 & 406---Criminal breach of trust---Ingredients---Property transaction---Mortgage agreement---Mere use of word “Amanat” in FIR---Effect---Complainant alleged that petitioner, being property dealer, showed him a house for mortgage owned by co-accused and, along with co-accused, received Rs.700,000 as advance out of total mortgage amount of Rs.1,200,000, but neither delivered possession nor returned amount---Supreme Court held that amount was paid in connection with a property/mortgage deal and a written agreement of mortgage had also been executed between parties---Dispute, at most, related to specific performance of mortgage agreement or recovery of amount and was of civil nature---Ingredients of S.405, PPC punishable under S.406, PPC were not attracted because neither any trust was created nor was it specified in what manner such trust was to be discharged---Mere mention of word “Amanat” in FIR would not attract S.406, PPC if ingredients of offence were otherwise absent. Cited Cases: • Miraj Khan v. Gul Ahmad and 03 others 2000 SCMR 122 • Muhammad Ali and another v. Assistant Commissioner, Narowal and another 1987 SCMR 795 • Shaukat Ali Sagar v. Station House Officer, Police Station Batala Colony, Faisalabad and 5 others 2006 PCrLJ 1900 • Abdul Razzaq v. The State 1977 PCrLJ 52 • Umair Aslam v. Station House Officer and 7 others 2014 PCrLJ 1305 (b) Criminal proceedings---- ----Civil dispute converted into criminal offence---Abuse of process---Property/mortgage agreement---Complainant had paid Rs.700,000 as advance under written mortgage agreement while Rs.500,000 remained outstanding---Parties disputed which side failed to perform its obligations under agreement---Supreme Court held that proper forum for determination of such dispute was civil Court, where it could be decided which party failed to specifically perform his part of agreement---Machinery of criminal law had been mala fidely set into motion to blackmail and pressurize petitioner and co-accused by converting civil dispute into criminal offence---Such criminal proceedings amounted to abuse of process of law. (c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---- ----S. 406---Contractual liability---Pledged property / commercial transaction / property deal---Criminal breach of trust not made out---Where dispute arises from contractual liability or performance of agreement, criminal proceedings under S.406, PPC are not attracted merely because money or property was delivered under transaction---In analogous cases relating to pledged jewellery, cinema canteen contract, and property sale transaction, FIRs under Ss.406/420, PPC were quashed because disputes were contractual/civil in nature and proper remedy lay before civil Court---Same principle applied to mortgage/property deal between parties in present case. Cited Cases: • Abdul Razzaq v. The State 1977 PCrLJ 52 • Muhammad Ali and another v. Assistant Commissioner, Narowal and another 1987 SCMR 795 • Umair Aslam v. Station House Officer and 7 others 2014 PCrLJ 1305 (d) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----S. 249-A---Application before Trial Court---Not mandatory where no probability of conviction---Quashment of FIR---State contended that petitioner should first approach Trial Court through application under S.249-A, Cr.P.C.---Supreme Court held that where facts show no probability of conviction, directing accused to first approach Trial Court under S.249-A, Cr.P.C. would itself amount to sheer abuse of process of law and Court---FIR could be quashed in such circumstances without requiring accused to exhaust remedy under S.249-A, Cr.P.C. Cited Case: • Miraj Khan v. Gul Ahmad and 03 others 2000 SCMR 122 (e) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----S. 561-A---Quashment of FIR---Civil nature of dispute---Scope---Where allegations in FIR, even if accepted, disclosed only a civil dispute regarding recovery of amount or specific performance of agreement and no ingredients of criminal breach of trust were made out, continuation of criminal proceedings would be abuse of process---In such circumstances, High Court’s inherent power to quash FIR under S.561-A, Cr.P.C. could be invoked, and Supreme Court could approve/undertake quashment to prevent misuse of criminal process. (f) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Art. 187---Complete justice---Petition seeking pre-arrest bail converted into appeal for quashment of FIR---Petitioner had approached Supreme Court for pre-arrest bail, but upon examination of record Supreme Court found that no criminal offence was made out against accused---There was no bar in converting petition into proceedings for quashment of FIR where continuation of criminal case would be abuse of process---Supreme Court exercised power under Art.187 of Constitution to do complete justice, converted petition into appeal, allowed same and quashed FIR. Cited Case: • The State through D.G., ANF Rawalpindi v. Muhammad Saleem Khan 2011 SCMR 863 (g) Criminal law---- ----Property dealer---Role of intermediary---Criminal liability under S.406, PPC---Petitioner was property dealer who introduced complainant to owner of house for mortgage transaction---There was no allegation that co-accused was not owner of house or that transaction was fake from inception---Written mortgage agreement existed between parties---Dispute regarding non-delivery of possession/non-return of advance was to be resolved through civil remedies and did not constitute criminal breach of trust against petitioner merely because he participated in property deal. Disposition: Criminal Petition No.10-L of 2026 was converted into appeal and allowed; order dated 06.01.2026 passed by Lahore High Court and order dated 09.12.2025 passed by Additional Sessions Judge, Lahore were set aside; FIR No.3299 dated 17.10.2025 registered under S.406, PPC at Police Station Islampura, District Lahore was quashed.

Summary: Bail denied ---- (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)----Ss. 496, 497, 498 & 154---Pre-arrest bail---Foreign offence---Registration of FIR in Pakistan---Double jeopardy---Scope---Petitioner, accused of embezzling funds while employed in Oman, sought pre-arrest bail in Pakistan---FIR alleged that petitioner received cash, a diamond ring, and a bank card from complainant in Muscat, Oman, and instead of fulfilling assigned duties, transferred Omani Riyals into his and his wife’s bank accounts in Pakistan, then absconded---Petitioner argued that registration of FIR in Pakistan amounted to double jeopardy, since complaint had already been lodged in Oman---Held, registration of FIR in Pakistan not barred under S. 188, Cr.P.C., where a Pakistani citizen commits offence abroad---Criminal courts in Pakistan can try such persons if found within the country---Section 403 Cr.P.C. protection (against double jeopardy) only applies where accused has been tried and convicted or acquitted by competent court---No such trial or acquittal/conviction occurred in Oman, thus protection of S. 403 not attracted---Petitioner's objection regarding double jeopardy rejected.(b) Pakistan Penal Code (XLV of 1860)----Ss. 406, 408 & 405---Criminal breach of trust by servant---Misappropriation---Transfer of embezzled funds---Scope---Petitioner, employed as a driver in complainant’s company in Oman, was entrusted with significant cash, jewelry, and bank card---Instead of performing his duty, petitioner misappropriated the entrusted assets and transferred equivalent amount into his and his wife's bank accounts in Pakistan---Held, entrustment and subsequent dishonest misappropriation satisfied ingredients of criminal breach of trust under Ss. 405 & 408, PPC---Petitioner failed to dislodge prima facie evidence of his involvement or establish mala fide on part of complainant---Grant of pre-arrest bail held not justified.(c) Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2010----S. 3---Proceeds of crime---Offence committed abroad---Transfer of criminal proceeds into Pakistani accounts---Scope---Held, petitioner’s act of transferring embezzled funds from Oman into his and his wife's bank accounts in Pakistan, knowing it was illicit wealth, attracted provisions of Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2010---Investigating Officer directed to examine applicability of AMLA provisions for further legal action.(d) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)----Ss. 498 & 497---Pre-arrest bail---Extraordinary relief---Scope---Held, bail before arrest is an extraordinary concession granted only in cases of mala fide or false implication---Where strong prima facie evidence connects accused with offence, and no enmity or ulterior motive is established, bail cannot be granted---Petitioner’s plea of victimization held baseless---Ad-interim bail withdrawn.Disposition: Petition dismissed; ad-interim pre-arrest bail withdrawn.Cited Cases:• Dr. Imran murder case, Islamabad High Court (2022 PCr.LJ 1511)• 2011 YLR 2882• Section 403 Cr.P.C. interpreted in light of foreign prosecution protectionsCited Legislation:• Pakistan Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 405, 406, 408• Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss. 3, 154, 188, 403, 496–498• Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2010, S. 3

Summary: Background: The petitioners sought pre-arrest bail in a case filed under FIR No. 238/2023, dated 17.05.2023, under Section 406 of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC). The complainant alleged that 5 to 6 years ago, the petitioners had obtained three cows and one he-buffalo worth Rs. 5,50,000/- under a share agreement but misappropriated the animals and failed to deliver the complainant's share. The petitioners argued that the allegations were mala fide and that no incriminating evidence linked them to the alleged crime. -----Issues: 1- Whether the delay in filing the FIR raises concerns about the veracity of the allegations against the petitioners. -----2- Whether the elements of criminal breach of trust under Section 406 PPC are fulfilled. -----3- Whether the petitioners' actions constitute a breach of contract rather than a criminal offense. -----4- Whether there is any mala fide or ulterior motive behind the complaint. ------Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court noted that the alleged crime occurred 5 to 6 years prior to the registration of the FIR, with no satisfactory explanation for the delay. This raised doubts about the false implication of the petitioners. The court found that Section 406 PPC was not applicable as the complainant admitted that the animals were given to the petitioners under a business agreement, not an entrustment of property. The petitioners' failure to return the complainant's share was deemed a breach of a business agreement rather than a criminal breach of trust. No Evidence of Criminal Entrustment: Based on the evidentiary material, the court concluded that the complainant's claims did not amount to criminal entrustment. Broken business promises do not qualify as criminal offenses under Section 406 PPC. While the petitioners failed to prove mala fide conclusively, the court inferred from the case's facts and circumstances that ulterior motives could not be ruled out. The petitioners, being non-convicts who had already joined the investigation, were granted confirmation of pre-arrest bail. The court found no justification for their imprisonment, as the offense under Section 406 PPC does not fall under the prohibitory clause of Section 497 Cr.P.C. The petition for pre-arrest bail was allowed, and the interim pre-arrest bail granted on 20.10.2023 was confirmed, subject to fresh bail bonds. ------Citations/Precedents: Shakeel Ahmad vs. The State and another (2012 MLD 1492) Tahir Hussain v. The State and other (2020 YLR 576) Khair Muhammad and another vs. The State through PG Punjab and another (2021 SCMR 130) Shahid Imran versus The State and others (2011 SCMR 1614) Shahzada Qaiser Arfat alias Qaiser vs. The State and another (PLD 2021 SC 708) Meeran Bux v. The State and another (PLD 1989 SC 347) Khair Muhammad and another Vs. The State through P.G.Punjab and another (2021 SCMR 130) Sajid Hussain alias Joji Vs. The State (PLD 2021 SC 898) -----Quote: ''Ingredients of Section 405 PPC are not made out. Pre-Arrest Bail is Allowed''

Summary: (Scope of Section 561 A Cr.P.C. Grounds for Quashment of FIR. Justification for imposition of costs under Order 28, Rule 3 of the Supreme Court Rules 1980, where petitions are vexatious and frivolous)The Supreme Court analyzed the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash an FIR and concluded that the High Court did have the authority to review the registration of the FIR and investigation under Article 199 of the Constitution. However, the Supreme Court emphasized that a High Court's power to quash a judicial proceeding under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) does not extend to FIR registration or investigation proceedings of the police department. The Supreme Court further examined the allegations made in the FIR and found that they did not establish the essential elements of the offenses of criminal breach of trust and criminal misconduct under the PPC and PCA. Therefore, the Court affirmed the High Court's decision to quash the FIR, stating that the FIA officers had acted without lawful authority in registering the FIR and conducting the investigation. The Supreme Court also highlighted the importance of discouraging frivolous and vexatious litigation, emphasizing that such cases waste the Court's time and impede the timely delivery of justice. As a result, the Court dismissed the present petition, declined leave to appeal, and imposed costs of Rs. 100,000 on the petitioner, to be paid by the officer who registered the FIR.

Summary: ''a breach of an agreement to sell, constitutes a criminal breach of trust under Section 405 of the Pakistan Penal Code, punishable under Section 406 PPC. Furthermore, the Court clarified that civil and criminal remedies can both be pursued simultaneously in such cases.'' ----- BackgroundIn the Supreme Court of Pakistan's appellate jurisdiction, the case was presided over by Mr. Justice Ijaz Ul Ahsan and Mr. Justice Sayyed Mazahar Ali Akbar Naqvi. The civil petition number 3130 of 2020 challenged the judgment dated October 1, 2020, from the Islamabad High Court, which had quashed FIR No. 163 dated April 28, 2020. This FIR was registered against the respondents under Sections 406/448 of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) at the Police Station Lohi Bher, Islamabad. The dispute originated from a property transaction where Muhammad Ali, the petitioner, entered into an agreement with respondent No. 1, Samina Qasim Tarar, for the purchase of a house in Bahria Town, Rawalpindi. The petitioner claimed that after partially fulfilling the payment terms and taking possession of part of the house, the respondents sold the property to another buyer.-----Issues:The validity of the Islamabad High Court's decision to quash the FIR, interpreting the matter as a civil dispute rather than a criminal case.The application of the elements constituting criminal breach of trust under Section 405 PPC in the context of the property transaction between the petitioner and the respondents.-----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The Supreme Court overturned the Islamabad High Court's decision, reinstating the FIR. The Court emphasized that the High Court failed to assess the FIR and the sale agreement's contents, which indicated a potential criminal breach of trust by the respondents. It was highlighted that the trial court should determine whether the facts constituted an "entrustment" of property and subsequent misappropriation, which are critical elements of criminal breach of trust. The Supreme Court directed the prosecution to promptly submit the charge sheet to the Trial Court, which was instructed to proceed according to law.-----Key Points:Section 405 PPC: Defines criminal breach of trust, outlining the essential elements required to establish such an offence, including the entrustment of property and its dishonest misappropriation or conversion.-Legal Principle on the Coexistence of Civil and Criminal Proceedings: The judgment implicitly relies on the established principle that civil liabilities do not preclude criminal proceedings in cases where an act constitutes both a civil wrong and a criminal offence.-Inherent Powers of the High Court: The judgment refers to the principle that the High Court's inherent powers should be used judiciously to determine if the continuance of a criminal proceeding constitutes an abuse of the process of law, especially in cases where a civil remedy might also be applicable.

Summary: Criminal Breach of Trust defined under section 405 PPC and punishable under section 406 PPC

Summary: In this order, the court is deciding on the pre-arrest bail applications filed by the petitioners. Tahir Hussain, the petitioner seeks pre-arrest bail, and petitioners Rehmat Ali and Barkat Ali, also seek pre-arrest bail in the same case. The court observed a delay of two years in registering the FIR and notes that no reasonable explanation has been provided for the delay. The court expressed concern about the length of the delay, which raises doubts about the veracity and reliability of the prosecution evidence. The court further discusses the nature of the offense under Section 406 PPC (criminal breach of trust) and notes that there is no evidence to substantiate the allegation that the petitioners committed the offense. The use of the word "Amanat" (trust) in the FIR is mentioned, and the court refers to a legal precedent (Miraj Khan Vs. Gull Ahmad) to support its view that the mere addition of the word "Amanat" does not automatically attract the provisions of Section 405 and Section 406 of the PPC.The court also considers the argument regarding possible recovery of the amount and cites a legal precedent (Shahid Imran v. The State and others) in this regard. Ultimately, the court accepts both petitions and confirms the ad-interim pre-arrest bail granted to the petitioners, subject to certain conditions.

Summary: Background:Hashmat Ullah, the appellant, was involved in a business of selling medicines where investors had invested with the expectation of regular profits.Allegations arose when Hashmat Ullah stopped paying profits to investors and refused to return their invested amounts, leading to dishonored cheques.Reference No. 4 of 2007 was filed against Hashmat Ullah in Accountability Court-II, Balochistan, resulting in his conviction under section 9(a)(x) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999. The conviction included rigorous imprisonment, fines, confiscation of property, and disqualification.---Issues:Whether Hashmat Ullah's actions constituted a criminal breach of trust under section 9(a)(x) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999.Whether the evidence presented by the prosecution established dishonesty and fraud on the part of Hashmat Ullah.---Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The Supreme Court held that the prosecution failed to establish criminal intent or dishonesty on the part of Hashmat Ullah.Section 9(a)(x) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 pertains to criminal breach of trust, which requires an element of entrustment of property, not mere investment or payment of money.The evidence showed that investors had willingly invested in Hashmat Ullah's business, and there was no entrustment of property to him.The appellant had been paying profits to investors initially, indicating no initial dishonest intention.The Court concluded that the case was a civil dispute over alleged breach of agreements rather than a criminal matter.Hashmat Ullah's conviction and sentence were set aside, and he was acquitted of the charge.Since Hashmat Ullah had already served his sentence, no further order regarding his release from custody was necessary.---Citations/Precedents:Shahid Imran v. The State and others (2011 SCMR 1614)Rafiq Haji Usman v. Chairman, NAB and another (2015 SCMR 1575)Section 9(a)(x) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999Section 405, Pakistan Penal Code (PPC)Section 406, Pakistan Penal Code (PPC)---Quote:A perusal of section 9(a)(x) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 shows that the relevant offence is attracted only if the accused person is proved to have committed the offence of criminal breach of trust as defined in section 405, P.P.C. and if there was an entrustment of property involved in the matter.

Summary: The primary argument of the petitioners is that due to the exclusions in the Ordinance, 2001 and the exclusivity of the Banking Court in handling offenses covered by the Ordinance, no other authority or court can take action on matters covered by this Ordinance. This section outlined the powers of Banking Courts and states that no court other than a Banking Court shall have jurisdiction over matters covered by the Ordinance, including decisions related to the existence of a finance and the execution of a decree passed by a Banking Court. However, subsection (5) of Section 7 carves out exceptions, allowing financial institutions to seek remedies under other laws and allowing pending proceedings before other courts to continue. The judgment underscores that while the Banking Court has exclusive jurisdiction over offenses mentioned in the Ordinance, 2001, it does not prohibit the initiation of criminal proceedings or the registration of cases under the general law. The judgment further clarifies that Section 20 of the Ordinance, 2001 does not preclude criminal prosecutions under other laws. It points out that the specific words "without prejudice to any other action that may be taken against him under this Ordinance or any other law for the time being in force" in Section 20 emphasized that other actions, including criminal prosecutions under different laws, are not barred. Additionally, the judgment highlighted the distinction between the offenses covered by the Ordinance, 2001 and those under the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC). This judgment clarified that the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 does not prohibit the registration of FIRs or the initiation of criminal proceedings under the general law. It upholds the parallel existence of legal remedies under both the Ordinance and other applicable laws. The document highlighted that the offense defined in Section 405 of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) is distinct from the one outlined in Section 20(a) of the Ordinance, 2001. It emphasizes that individuals have the right to seek remedies under the general law and allege criminal offenses under the PPC without any restrictions imposed by the Ordinance, 2001. The document clarified that if a complaint disclosed an offense under the PPC, the police officer (or FIA) is obligated to register a case. Similarly, if a complaint establishes a scheduled offense, the Special Court (Offences in Banks) can take cognizance of it, even if it overlaps with offenses under the Ordinance, 2001. The text cited legal precedents and provisions such as Section 403 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.), which states that a person cannot be tried again for the same offense after acquittal or conviction. The document concluded that a person can be prosecuted and punished for acts constituting an offense under different enactments, as long as they are distinct pieces of legislation with separate procedures and forums. It highlighted that the intent of the legislature was not to apply the same procedure for offenses under the Ordinance, 2001, as it does for other enactments under the Cr.P.C. Finally, the judgment dismissed the petitions based on the conclusions reached in preceding paragraphs, leaving open the possibility for petitioners to seek remedies according to the outlined procedure in individual cases.

Summary: Bail denied---Background: The petitioners, invoked the jurisdiction of the Islamabad High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, seeking the quashment of FIR No.846/2014. This FIR was registered on 24-11-2014 at Police Station Margalla, Islamabad, following a dispute over an agreement between the petitioners and respondent No.3 for the exchange of properties. The disagreement led to a civil suit filed by respondent No.3, followed by the contested FIR alleging criminal breach of trust under Section 406 of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC). ----Issues: Whether the ingredients of “criminal breach of trust” under Section 405 of the PPC are satisfied in the given case. Whether the High Court can quash the FIR under Article 199 of the Constitution. Whether the dispute is of a civil nature and if criminal proceedings should be halted in favor of civil remedies. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court held that the FIR does not fulfill the necessary ingredients of Section 405 of the PPC, which defines “criminal breach of trust.” The court emphasized the necessity of "entrustment" of property for such an offense, which was not evident in this case. The court noted that the agreements between the parties did not establish an “entrustment” of property. It highlighted that the essence of “criminal breach of trust” involves specific allegations of misappropriation or conversion of entrusted property, which were not present here. The court stressed that quashment of criminal cases under Article 199 is an extraordinary remedy, applicable only in exceptional circumstances. It recognized that ongoing investigations could potentially uncover additional material, thus quashing the FIR at this stage would be premature. The court underscored the availability of alternate remedies, such as Sections 249-A and 265-K of the Cr.P.C., which the petitioners could pursue before the trial court. The court disposed of the petition, advising the petitioners to approach the trial court for available remedies under the law. The court ensured that no prejudice would be caused to the petitioners as their pre-arrest bail had been confirmed. ----Citations/Precedents: Petitioners’ Reliance: Allah Rakhio and others Vs. The State [2001 PCrLJ 551] Shah Fahad and another Vs. The State [2014 YLR 2241] Shaukat Ali Sagar Vs. Station House Officer, Police Station, Batala Colony, Faisalabad, and 5 others [2006 PCrLJ 1900] Shaikh Muhammad Taqi Vs. The State [1991 PCrLJ 963] -----Respondents’ Reliance: Sh. Naveedur Rehman Vs. The State and 2 others [2010 PCrLJ 1340] Seema Fareed & others Vs. The State and another [NLR 2008 Criminal 109] Zulfiqar Mustafa Vs. Station House Officer and 2 others [2010 PCrLJ 590] Shevo Vs. Regional Police Officer, Hyderabad Region, Hyderabad, and 15 others [PLD 2009 Karachi 24] Muhammad Mansha Vs. Station House Officer, Police Station City, Chiniot, District Jhang, and others [PLD 2006 SC 598] Muhammad Yaqoob Vs. Senior Superintendent of Police, Gujranwala, and 2 others [PLD 2000 Lahore 421]