Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (V of 1898) ----Ss. 249-A & 265-K---Scope and exercise of power of acquittal at any stage of proceedings---Trial Courts possess inherent jurisdiction under Ss. 249-A and 265-K, Cr.P.C. to acquit an accused at any stage of judicial proceedings, whether before or after framing of charge or recording of evidence, provided reasons are recorded and both parties are heard---The phrase “at any stage” covers all stages of the trial and empowers the Court to act when continuation of proceedings would constitute an abuse of process or when the available material is insufficient to warrant conviction---In the present case, substantial evidence was lost due to the 2005 earthquake which destroyed all record, several prosecution witnesses including the complainant had died, and remaining witnesses were untraceable---Under such circumstances, the trial Court rightly exercised its jurisdiction under S. 265-K, Cr.P.C. to prevent purposeless prosecution and wastage of judicial resources---Held, that the power conferred under S. 265-K is designed to preserve the integrity of criminal justice by preventing vexatious trials where conviction is improbable. Cited Cases: • Ammad Yousaf v. The State & another (PLD 2024 SC 273) • Abbas Haider Naqvi & another v. Federation of Pakistan & others (PLD 2022 SC 562) (b) Criminal Law---Principle of double jeopardy / autrefois acquit ----Re-trial of an accused after acquittal---Bar against second prosecution for same offence---Once an accused has been tried and acquitted, whether on merits or on legal technicalities, he cannot be retried for the same offence---Re-trial of an acquitted person would offend the doctrine of autrefois acquit and the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy---The rationale behind this rule is to ensure finality of judicial proceedings and to protect citizens from repeated harassment and abuse of process---Held, that the acquittal of the accused having attained finality, no justification existed for further proceedings---Reliance placed on Sherin Bacha & others v. Namoos Iqbal & others (PLD 1993 SC 247). (c) Administration of justice---Abuse of process---Inherent powers of Court ----Continuing proceedings when conviction is improbable amounts to abuse of process---Courts are under a duty to prevent misuse of the criminal justice system and to safeguard the accused from frivolous and futile prosecutions---Exercise of jurisdiction under S. 265-K, Cr.P.C. is not discretionary but mandatory in exceptional circumstances where the record demonstrates impossibility of conviction---Held, that the findings of the High Court affirming the acquittal were based on sound reasoning and called for no interference. Disposition: ---Petition for leave to appeal dismissed; acquittal maintained. ---No question of public importance was established to justify grant of leave.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure—Acquittal under Section 249-A, Cr.P.C.—Scope and judicial discretion— Section 249-A Cr.P.C. empowers a trial court to acquit an accused at any stage of the proceedings where the charge appears groundless or evidence insufficient to justify continuation of trial. This discretion must be exercised judiciously—not mechanically—but where the prosecution’s material fails to disclose a prima facie case, early termination of proceedings is lawful and proper. In the present matter, the trial court found that evidence did not substantiate allegations of fraud or dishonest inducement under Ss. 419 & 420 Cr.P.C.; hence its order of acquittal was held to be within lawful authority and free from mala fide intent or procedural impropriety. Cited Case: 2012 PCr.LJ 507 (distinguished). (b) Remedy against acquittal—Appeal or revision—Bar of Section 439(5) Cr.P.C.— Under S. 417 Cr.P.C. an appeal lies against an acquittal, whereas S. 439(5) Cr.P.C. expressly bars revision when such appeal is available. A party cannot bypass the appellate remedy by filing a revision petition. The revision filed by the appellant before the Additional Sessions Judge was thus incompetent, and the High Court rightly upheld its dismissal. Cited Cases: 2016 PCr.LJ 1457; 2008 PCr.LJ 1067. (c) Acquittal under Section 249-A versus post-trial acquittal—Presumption of innocence—Extent of appellate scrutiny— An acquittal under Ss. 249-A or 265-K Cr.P.C., though rendered at a preliminary stage, remains a valid exercise of judicial discretion. While such orders do not carry the “double presumption of innocence” attached to full-trial acquittals, interference is still limited to cases of perversity, mala fide intent, or arbitrary exercise of discretion. No such infirmity being shown, the trial court’s order warranted no interference. Cited Cases: 2005 SCMR 1544 (clarified); 2008 PCr.LJ 1067. (d) Principle of procedural discipline—Hierarchy of remedies— Statutory scheme under the Criminal Procedure Code requires adherence to prescribed remedies in their proper sequence. Substituting revision for appeal undermines procedural orderliness and cannot be permitted. Disposition: Appeal dismissed. Trial court’s acquittal under S. 249-A Cr.P.C. and concurrent findings of lower courts affirmed. No order as to costs.

Summary: The petitioner was working as Constable when he applied for the post of Sub-Inspector and was recommended by the Punjab Public Service Commission and appointment order dated 03.08.2023 was issued which was later on withdrawn through impugned order dated 30.04.2024 on the ground that an F.I.R. has been registered against him (after filing of his application). The petitioner admittedly was acquitted by the Court of competent jurisdiction when his application under Section 249-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 was accepted and in first departmental inquiry, he was also declared innocent but on the strength of the second departmental inquiry with which the petitioner was not associated, the impugned withdrawal order was taken as valid by the department. Held: The respondent-department seems to have fallen in error inasmuch as when the Court of competent jurisdiction, i.e., Magistrate Section 30, has clearly found that necessary material for commission of alleged offence is not made out from the facts of the case in addition to the fact that complainant of the case was also not interested to prosecute the case, therefore, in such an eventuality, the impugned order is without any lawful basis. Moreover, it has been held that the underlying rationale of the policy of the respondent-department to withdraw appointment as Sub-Inspector from a Constable who is found involved in a criminal act?registration of case, seems to maintain discipline in the force by shunning out such candidates who could potentially be troublesome for the discipline. In the instant case, strangely and ironically enough, the petitioner found to be involved in FIR can perform his duties as a Constable, by remaining part of the force but cannot be offered appointment as Sub-Inspector. Thus, the policy, the underlying rationale and the manner in which it has been implemented in the present case create a paradoxical situation and conflicting position of the respondent-department, the answer to which is absent on the part of the respondent-department. The petitioner could be or could not be troublesome both as Constable and as Sub-Inspector. -----Background: The petitioner was initially appointed as a constable in the police force and later applied for the position of Sub-Inspector. He successfully passed the written examination, interview, and medical test. On 03.08.2023, he was recommended by the Punjab Public Service Commission (PPSC) and issued an appointment order. However, during the verification of his antecedents, it was revealed that a criminal case (FIR No. 269/2023) under Section 392 of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) was registered against him. Despite being acquitted of the charges in the criminal case by a competent court, the police department withdrew the petitioner’s appointment on 30.04.2024, based on the FIR. The petitioner challenged the withdrawal, asserting that his acquittal invalidated the department's decision. -----Issues: 1- Whether the withdrawal of the petitioner’s appointment was lawful, given that he was acquitted in the criminal case. -----2- Whether the second departmental inquiry conducted by the respondent-department was justified and conducted in adherence to principles of natural justice. -----3- Whether the respondent-department's policy regarding criminal cases and the withdrawal of appointments is reasonable, considering the petitioner’s fundamental right to livelihood. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --Acquittal and Withdrawal of Appointment: The Court ruled that the petitioner had been acquitted by the Magistrate under Section 249-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.) due to lack of evidence. The Court emphasized that the acquittal decision from a competent court held more weight than the FIR and ruled that the withdrawal of his appointment based on the FIR was legally unjustifiable. --Second Inquiry and Natural Justice: The Court noted that although a second inquiry was conducted by the respondent-department, the department failed to provide any reasonable justification for initiating the second inquiry, which appeared to violate the principles of natural justice. The petitioner was not informed or involved in the second inquiry, undermining his right to a fair process, as guaranteed under Article 10-A of the Constitution of Pakistan. --Policy and Fundamental Rights: The Court observed that the respondent-department’s policy of withdrawing the appointment due to a criminal case, despite the petitioner’s acquittal and continued service as a constable, created a contradictory and unjust situation. The Court stated that the withdrawal of the Sub-Inspector appointment, after the petitioner had earned it through merit, violated his fundamental right to livelihood, which is protected under the Constitution. The petition was allowed, the withdrawal order was set aside, and the respondent-department was directed to proceed with the petitioner’s appointment as Sub-Inspector in accordance with the law. -----Citations/Precedents: Section 249-A, Cr.P.C. (Acquittal based on insufficient evidence) Pakistan Penal Code, Section 392 (Robbery) Constitution of Pakistan, Article 10-A (Right to a fair trial and principles of natural justice) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Sections on departmental inquiry and acquittal)

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.), 1898 (AJ&K) ----S. 249-A---Acquittal before conclusion of trial---Scope---Benefit of doubt---Principles---Misapplication of law---Trial court allowed application under S. 249-A Cr.P.C. and acquitted accused-appellants on the ground of benefit of doubt without recording full prosecution evidence---Held, S. 249-A Cr.P.C. empowers the trial court to acquit an accused at any stage only when the charge is groundless or there is no probability of conviction, based strictly on existing record and evidence---Trial court extended the benefit of doubt, which is a post-trial concept, applicable only upon full evaluation of prosecution evidence---Such premature application of doubt is contrary to the spirit and letter of S. 249-A Cr.P.C.---High Court rightly set aside the acquittal and remanded the case for trial afresh---Supreme Court (AJ&K) held that the trial court had misapplied the law, and that the High Court had appropriately exercised its jurisdiction in restoring the prosecution’s opportunity to prove its case. **(b) Criminal trial---Premature acquittal---Benefit of doubt v. groundless charge---Distinction---Acquittal under S. 249-A Cr.P.C. must be based on manifest absence of prosecutable material, not on inferences that require full trial---Trial court erroneously substituted its assessment of doubt for legal threshold of "no probability of conviction" under S. 249-A Cr.P.C. **(c) Judicial discretion---Exercise of discretion must conform to statutory limits---Misuse of acquittal power by trial courts without recording full evidence undermines prosecution’s right to fair adjudication and disrupts judicial efficiency. Disposition: Appeal dismissed. Judgment of High Court upheld. Trial court directed to conclude trial within one month.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Art. 199---Constitutional jurisdiction---Maintainability---Alternative remedy---Petitions under Art. 199 for quashment of FIRs and orders under S. 249-A, Cr.P.C.—Scope---Where statutory remedy of revision existed and no constitutional right was infringed, extraordinary jurisdiction could not be invoked merely to circumvent the regular criminal process—However, Court examined legality as petitions were consolidated and involved identical legal questions. (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ----Ss. 561-A, 249-A & 403—Quashment of FIRs—Double jeopardy—Dishonoured cheques issued on different dates---Distinct transactions---Held, each dishonour arising from separate cheque constitutes a separate cause of action and distinct offence; multiple FIRs, each based on an independently dishonoured cheque, do not attract the bar of S. 403, Cr.P.C. or Art. 13 of the Constitution---Petitioner’s plea that subsequent FIRs were hit by double jeopardy was misconceived—No illegality in dismissal of S. 249-A applications by trial and revisional courts. Cited Cases: • *Saira Fatima v. The State* (2024 P Cr.LJ 1289) • *State v. Saeed Khan* (2021 P Cr.LJ 608) (c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ----S. 234—Joinder of charges—Dishonour of cheques within twelve months—Discretion of trial court---Where several offences of the same kind are alleged within one year, trial court may, on request, join them in a single trial to prevent multiplicity of proceedings. (d) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ----Ss. 503 & 539-B—Recording of complainant’s statement through local commission---Legality---Where complainant’s physical appearance before court was impracticable due to health or security concerns, trial court may appoint an advocate-commissioner to record evidence at residence—No prejudice caused to accused if attendance is already dispensed with—Order modifying mode of recording evidence held lawful and within discretion of trial court. (e) Penal Code (XLV of 1860) ----S. 489-F—Dishonoured cheque—Successive prosecutions---Separate FIRs for distinct cheques dishonoured on different dates do not offend double jeopardy principles; each dishonour gives rise to a fresh and independent offence. (f) Criminal Justice—Quashment proceedings ----Jurisdiction under S. 561-A Cr.P.C.—Parameters—Only exercisable where continuation of proceedings is manifestly illegal, oppressive, or amounts to abuse of process—Mere existence of multiple FIRs for separate transactions or pendency of trial does not justify quashment. Disposition --- All petitions dismissed. Orders dated 20-07-2022 (refusing acquittal under S. 249-A), 15-10-2022 (revisional order), 10-06-2023 (appointment of local commission), and 26-08-2023 (revisional confirmation) upheld. Trial court directed to ensure police security during recording of complainant’s statement at his residence. No order as to costs.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898): ----Ss. 561-A, 249-A & 265-K---Quashment of FIR---Scope and limitations---Availability of alternate remedy---Effect. The petitioner sought quashment of an FIR registered against him, claiming that it was without lawful authority and jurisdiction. The High Court, however, held that quashing an FIR under its constitutional jurisdiction should not be exercised routinely, especially when alternate remedies under Ss. 249-A and 265-K, Cr.P.C., were available. The court reiterated that once an FIR is registered, a challan is submitted, and cognizance is taken by the trial court, the matter should be decided by the trial court itself. An accused who claims innocence or wrongful implication has the remedy to seek premature acquittal under S. 265-K, Cr.P.C., rather than approaching the High Court for quashment of proceedings. (b) Constitutional Jurisdiction of High Court: ----Art. 199 of the Constitution---Quashment of FIR under constitutional jurisdiction---Judicial review of investigation---Principles. The High Court emphasized that constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 should not be exercised to quash an FIR where alternate remedies exist under the ordinary criminal procedure. The petitioner had directly approached the High Court without first availing the remedy before the trial court. The court held that such an approach was not appreciated, as judicial review in criminal matters is limited to cases where extraordinary circumstances exist. The accused should instead challenge the proceedings before the trial court under the relevant provisions of Cr.P.C. (c) Quashment of Criminal Proceedings: ----Judicial reluctance in interfering with pending trials---Role of trial court in assessing guilt or innocence. The court held that determining the guilt or innocence of an accused is the exclusive domain of the trial court, which examines the entire evidence. The High Court does not act as a substitute for the trial court in deciding criminal liability. Once cognizance has been taken, the accused must contest the case on its merits before the trial court. The general legal principle is that a criminal case should not be quashed in a routine manner, and courts should avoid interfering with the investigative and judicial process unless compelling circumstances necessitate intervention. (d) Abuse of Legal Process: ----Misuse of constitutional jurisdiction to evade trial---Legal consequences. The High Court noted that the petitioner initially obtained an ad-interim bail but subsequently failed to appear before the court for extended periods, which indicated an attempt to evade trial. The court reiterated that constitutional remedies should not be exploited as a substitute for trial procedures, and mere allegations of unlawful registration of FIR do not justify bypassing statutory remedies. The proper course of action for an accused seeking relief from prosecution is to approach the trial court under S. 265-K, Cr.P.C., rather than seeking quashment of an FIR under Article 199. ----Disposition: Petition dismissed as misconceived. Petitioner directed to avail remedy before the trial court under S. 265-K, Cr.P.C.

Summary: Hamayun Ashraf Awan filed a writ petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, challenging the orders dated 19.05.2021 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge-II, East Islamabad, and the order dated 23.09.2020 passed by the Judicial Magistrate-30, East Islamabad. The petitioner requested that these orders be set aside, the application under section 249-A Cr.P.C filed by respondent No. 1 be rejected, and the case be remanded back to the trial court for a summary trial. ----Issues: 1. Whether the orders passed by the Judicial Magistrate and the Additional Sessions Judge dismissing the case against respondent No. 1 were erroneous and not tenable under the law. ----2. Whether the trial courts failed to apply judicial mind and committed material irregularities in their decisions. ----3. Whether the writ petition against the acquittal order under section 249-A Cr.P.C is maintainable under the law. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court noted that respondent No. 1 filed a complaint against the petitioner at Police Station Bhara Kahu, Islamabad, which led to an investigation. The police concluded that the complaint was baseless and initiated proceedings under section 182 PPC against respondent No. 1. Respondent No. 1 filed an application under section 249-A Cr.P.C, which was accepted by the Judicial Magistrate, leading to his acquittal. The petitioner's criminal revision against this order was dismissed by the Additional Sessions Judge. The court held that since respondent No. 1 was acquitted under section 249-A Cr.P.C, the writ petition against this acquittal order is not maintainable under the law. The court emphasized that section 195(1) Cr.P.C restricts the filing of complaints under sections 172 to 188 of the PPC to public servants only, thereby invalidating any Qalandra filed by a private person. The court observed that there were concurrent findings by both lower courts, and the scope of constitutional petitions is limited to cases of jurisdictional errors or violations of natural justice, none of which were demonstrated by the petitioner. The writ petition was dismissed in limine as the petitioner failed to point out any error of law or jurisdiction. ----Citations/Precedents: Syed Arif Ali Sabri Vs. Abdul Samad through L.Rs. and 2 others (2008 YLR 2309): Established limited scope of constitutional petitions in cases with concurrent findings. Sadruddin Vs. Aslam Madad Ali and others (PLD 2008 Karachi 2005): Reinforced limited interference in concurrent findings. Khuda Baksh Vs. Muhammad Sharif and another (1974 SCMR 279): Supported limited scope for reviewing findings of lower courts. Amjad Khan Vs. Muhammad Irshad (Deceased) through LRs (2020 SCMR 2155): Discussed issuance of writ of certiorari for jurisdictional errors. President All Pakistan Women Association, Peshawar Cantt Vs. Muhammad Akbar Awan and others (2020 SCMR 260): Highlighted supervisory nature of writ jurisdiction. Chief Executive MEPCO and others Vs. Muhammad Fazil and others (2019 SCMR 919): Addressed correction of jurisdictional errors. Chairman, NAB Vs. Muhammad Usman and others (PLD 2018 SC 28): Emphasized principles of natural justice. Shajar Islam Vs. Muhammad Siddique and 2 others (PLD 2007 SC 45): Supported limited review of factual findings by High Courts.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (Cr.P.C.) – Sections 265-D, 249-A, and 265-K – Dismissal of Application: ---- Limited scope for acquittal at intermediary stages The acquittal of an accused under Sections 249-A and 265-K, Cr.P.C. should only be granted if there is no probability of conviction based on the evidence. Courts must exercise extreme caution before granting such acquittals, especially in cases where substantial material evidence exists. (b) Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 – Applicability to Co-Owners: ---- Act not applicable to disputes between co-owners and co-sharers The Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 does not apply in cases where parties are co-owners or co-sharers in the disputed property. Such disputes fall within the purview of civil litigation. (c) Misuse of Legal Proceedings – Multiple Revision Petitions: ---- Filing successive revision petitions on the same grounds is impermissible The filing of successive revision petitions on identical grounds amounts to an abuse of the process of law, especially where earlier petitions have been dismissed. Such actions indicate a deliberate attempt to delay the proceedings. (d) Pending Civil Litigation and Criminal Proceedings: ---- Parallel proceedings under the Illegal Dispossession Act and civil suits Where civil litigation regarding ownership and possession is pending, the initiation of criminal proceedings under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 may be considered redundant. Courts must ensure that criminal law is not used to harass the opposing party. (e) Police Reports and Inquiry Findings: ---- Evidentiary value of police reports in determining illegal dispossession Findings of police inquiries, particularly when corroborated by higher authorities, hold evidentiary value in determining whether the accused engaged in illegal dispossession. Contradictory reports, however, must be scrutinized to avoid miscarriage of justice. (f) Supreme Court Jurisprudence on Section 249-A and 265-K, Cr.P.C: ---- Presumption against acquittal without full trial Supreme Court rulings emphasize that acquittals under Sections 249-A and 265-K should not disrupt the normal course of trial unless there is a clear absence of evidence or probability of conviction. Courts are directed to proceed with full trials to ensure justice. ----Disposition: The criminal revision petition was dismissed for lack of merit. The trial court was directed to conclude the trial within three months and decide the matter expeditiously. Parties were ordered to appear before the trial court by 19.03.2024.

Summary: Acquittal upheld ---Background: The case involves allegations of forgery and land grabbing by the accused respondents. The complainant alleged that the accused, in collusion, forged allotment chits and engaged in fraudulent activities to acquire and sell state-owned land. ----Issues: 1. Competence of the appeal filed before the High Court. 2. Determination of the limitation period for filing the appeal. 3. Application of section 249-A of the Criminal Procedure Code regarding the trial court's power to acquit. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court found the appeal filed before the High Court to be competent, as the Additional Advocate-General, classified as a public prosecutor under the AJ&K Law Officers (Terms & Conditions) Act, 2014, possessed the requisite competence. Appeals against acquittal orders filed by the State are governed by a six-month limitation period under Article 157 of the Limitation Act, 1908, as clarified by relevant case law. The court upheld the trial court's decision to acquit the accused respondents, as it found no evidence indicating their involvement in the alleged offenses. The trial court's power to acquit an accused at any stage under section 249-A of the Criminal Procedure Code was deemed applicable in this case. ----Citations/Precedents: Rustam Khan’s case (supra) Mohammad Ibrahim vs. Goppi Lal AIR 1957 (Madras) 300 AIR 1975 (Andra Pradesh) 406 AIR 1958 (Andra Pradesh) 230 AIR 1957 (Allahabad) 500 The State vs. Syed Ali Baqar Naqvi and others

Summary: Against order of acquittal under section 249-A, Cr.P.C. criminal revision under section 439, Cr.P.C. is not competent. Similarly, writ petition against order of acquittal is also not competent in the light of section 417(2), Cr.P.C. --- The petitioner, Hajra Javaid Makhdoom, initiated the petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, seeking redress, specifically requesting a retrial and criminal revision in a case involving the respondent, Muhammad Tehmas Nasir.The petitioner's grievance revolved around a private complaint filed under section 6(5) of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, alleging that the respondent had contracted a second marriage without her consent. Subsequently, the Judicial Magistrate in Sargodha summoned the respondent to face trial under section 6(5) of the Ordinance. However, during the proceedings, the respondent submitted an application under section 249-A, Cr.P.C., contending that the petitioner's complaint was baseless and driven by ulterior motives.The magistrate accepted the respondent's application, leading the petitioner to file a criminal revision. This revision was later dismissed by the Additional Sessions Judge. The petitioner, dissatisfied with both decisions, filed the present writ petition, urging the Lahore High Court to refer the case back to the Judicial Magistrate for retrial and the criminal revision back to the Additional Sessions Judge.In the judgment dated December 19, 2023, Judge Muhammad Tariq Nadeem meticulously examined the legal aspects raised in the petition. The judge acknowledged the petitioner's contention that against an order of acquittal under section 249-A, Cr.P.C., a criminal revision was competent, citing "The State through Advocate-General, Sindh High Court of Karachi v. Raja Abdul Rehman" (2005 SCMR 1544) as a precedent.However, Judge Nadeem went on to analyze the relevant legal provisions, emphasizing section 417(2), Cr.P.C., which stipulates that an appeal lies against an order of acquittal. The judge observed that the petitioner had not satisfactorily addressed whether the order of acquittal under section 249-A, Cr.P.C., was amenable to criminal revision or could be challenged through a petition for special leave to appeal under section 417(2), Cr.P.C.The judgment delved into the interplay between sections 439, 439-A, and 417(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code, clarifying that while an appeal could be filed against an order of acquittal, no proceedings by way of revision could be entertained if an appeal was available. Additionally, the judgment underscored the distinction between criminal appeals and revisions, highlighting that a revision against an order of acquittal was not competent under section 439(4)(a), Cr.P.C.Judge Nadeem concluded that the criminal revision before the court of the Additional Sessions Judge was not competent, as the order of acquittal could only be challenged through the remedy provided in section 417(2), Cr.P.C. The judge dismissed the writ petition, asserting that a constitutional petition was not maintainable when a specific alternate remedy of appeal against acquittal existed.