Summary: Constitution of Pakistan, 1973--- ----Arts. 8, 10A, 175F, 199, 202A & Third Schedule---Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, S. 109-A---Constitution (Twenty-Sixth Amendment) Act, 2024---Constitution (Twenty-Seventh Amendment) Act, 2025---Challenge to vires of statutory provision---Jurisdiction of Constitutional Bench vis-à-vis Regular Bench under erstwhile Art. 202A---Dominant object theory---Ad-interim order suspending operation of law---Maintainability of challenge thereto---Petitioner, after availing 2018 Amnesty Scheme and declaring ownership of foreign company, was issued notice under S.109-A, Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---He challenged both vires of said provision and the notice issued thereunder before Sindh High Court, which initially granted ad-interim restraint against passing of any final adverse order---Later, Constitutional Bench of High Court recalled said interim order on ground that courts ought not suspend operation of law, particularly in revenue matters---Before Federal Constitutional Court, principal question was whether Constitutional Bench, under erstwhile Art. 202A, possessed jurisdiction to entertain matter whose dominant relief was declaration that impugned law was ultra vires---Held, challenge to vires of statute, in substance, sought relief under Art.199(1)(a)(ii), namely declaration that law was “without lawful authority” and “of no legal effect”, and not merely a direction under Art.199(1)(a)(i) or enforcement of fundamental rights simpliciter---Under pre-27th Amendment regime, such matter did not fall within exclusive jurisdiction of Constitutional Bench---Only forum competent to grant final relief could competently grant interim relief; therefore, Constitutional Bench lacked jurisdiction from the outset and its order recalling the earlier ad-interim order was without jurisdiction---Court further held that ad-interim order which had effect of suspending operation of law could validly be brought in challenge before this Court, as until law is finally declared ultra vires it must ordinarily continue to operate---However, in view of subsequent constitutional amendment, exclusive writ jurisdiction now vests in Constitutional Benches and similar matters would henceforth lie before such Benches---Matter was remanded to Sindh High Court for fresh decision by competent Bench in accordance with law. Kh. Muhammad Fazil v. Mumtaz Munnawar Khan Niazi (deceased) through legal heirs (2024 SCMR 1059); Attock Cement case (2024 SHC 1302); Benazir Bhutto v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1988 SC 416); Rahim Shah v. Chief Election Commissioner (PLD 1973 SC 24); Federation of Pakistan v. Aitzaz Ahsan (PLD 1989 SC 61); Marbury v. Madison (5 U.S. 137 (1803)) rel. (a) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973---Art. 202A (as it stood before Twenty-Seventh Amendment)---Jurisdiction of Constitutional Benches of High Courts---Scope--- Under erstwhile Art.202A, Constitutional Benches were not vested with entire writ jurisdiction under Art.199 but only with limited classes of matters specified therein---Therefore, question whether matter was to be heard by Constitutional Bench or Regular Bench had to be determined by reference to true nature of relief claimed. (b) Constitutional jurisdiction---Dominant object theory---Application--- For determining proper forum under former Art.202A, Court must examine pleadings, prayer clause and ultimate effect of relief sought so as to ascertain dominant or substantive relief, while treating merely consequential relief as ancillary---Such exercise is judicial in nature and not dependent upon drafting alone. (c) Challenge to vires of statute---Nature of relief--- Where petitioner assails validity of statutory provision and seeks declaration that same is contrary to Constitution, dominant relief is one under Art.199(1)(a)(ii), namely that impugned law is “without lawful authority” and “of no legal effect”---Such relief is, in substance, in nature of certiorari / declaratory judicial review, even if consequential directions are also sought. (d) High Courts---Power of judicial review---Inherent constitutional authority--- Power of High Court to strike down law ultra vires Constitution is inherent in constitutional scheme and flows from its role as guardian of Constitution, read with judicial oath and constitutional supremacy---Such authority is not negated merely because relief of declaration is not textually set out in identical terms in every clause of Art.199. (e) Interim relief---Competence of forum--- Interim relief may only be granted by forum competent to render final decision on lis---Consequently, where Constitutional Bench lacked jurisdiction to decide vires challenge under former Art.202A, it also lacked competence to pass or recall interim orders in relation thereto. (f) Ad-interim order suspending operation of law---Propriety and challenge thereto--- As a general constitutional principle, until a law is finally declared ultra vires, it should ordinarily continue to operate in normal course---An interim order having effect of suspending operation of law, especially in revenue matters, is therefore open to challenge before this Court and cannot be shielded merely because it is ad-interim in form. (g) Twenty-Seventh Constitutional Amendment---Effect--- After enactment of Constitution (Twenty-Seventh Amendment) Act, 2025, exclusive writ jurisdiction under Art.199 now lies with Constitutional Benches of High Courts, and Regular Benches no longer possess such jurisdiction---Accordingly, a case of like nature would now fall to be heard by Constitutional Bench. (h) Remand---When warranted--- Where impugned order has been passed by a Bench lacking jurisdiction, proper course is to set aside such order and remit matter for fresh adjudication by competent Bench in accordance with law. Petition allowed; impugned order set aside; matter remanded for decision by competent Bench of Sindh High Court in accordance with law.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ---- Art. 199, Art. 10-A, & Art. 2010 --- High Court’s disposal of service-related Constitution Petitions by applying earlier decision mutatis mutandis without affording opportunity of hearing to the Government—Maintainability—Petitioners (Province of Sindh and others) assailed the judgment of the High Court of Sindh, Sukkur Bench, which had disposed of multiple Constitution Petitions by extending the benefit of an earlier order passed in C.P. No.D-1435 of 2023 without hearing the petitioners or allowing them to file comments—Petitioners contended that the recruitment processes were based on different advertisements with distinct terms and conditions issued by various departments across different time periods and could not be treated identically—Supreme Court held that before applying the doctrine of mutatis mutandis, the Court must examine whether the earlier order is factually and legally compatible with the case in hand—Observed that each case must be decided on its own merits and the impugned order, based solely on factual grounds of an earlier decision and devoid of legal enunciation, was not binding under Art. 201 of the Constitution—Violation of due process and fair hearing as envisaged under Art. 10-A was also noted—High Court had failed to appreciate the differences in advertisements, departmental procedures, and lack of codal formalities, and passed the order in a “slipshod” manner. (b) Constitutional Jurisdiction ---- Art. 199---- Limitations of High Court under writ jurisdiction in adjudicating disputed factual controversies in recruitment matters—Held, High Court in constitutional jurisdiction is not mandated to conduct an elaborate inquiry into disputed facts or record evidence—However, a just decision can be reached where admitted or available documents suffice to assess legality of executive actions—Court referred to principle laid down in Special Secretary-II (Law & Order), Home & Tribal Affairs Department v. Fayyaz Dawar (2023 SCMR 1442) and Dr. Sher Afgan Khan Niazi v. Ali S. Habib (2011 SCMR 1813), emphasizing that writ remedy is reserved for situations where illegality of executive action is demonstrable without complex fact-finding—High Court, in the present case, overstepped its bounds by conclusively determining the respondents’ entitlement without examining competing documentary evidence or giving a chance for rebuttal. (c) Service Law ---- Sindh Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion & Transfer) Rules, 1974 ---- R. 5(1) ---- Recommendations of District Recruitment Committee (DRC)—Whether confer vested right of appointment—Held, recommendation or issuance of offer letter by DRC does not in itself create a legally enforceable or vested right in favour of applicants unless codal formalities are completed and recruitment is duly approved by competent authority—Legitimate expectancy cannot override statutory requirements—Contention that appointments were made based on DRC recommendations and subsequently terminated without due process, to be examined by High Court on merits. (d) Latin Legal Maxims ---- Meaning, application, and scope of “mutatis mutandis” ---- Expression “mutatis mutandis”—Scope and applicability—Held, expression denotes “with necessary changes having been made”—Refers to application of a legal rule or judicial decision to a different factual matrix after suitable modifications—Court explained that it is not to be confused with “ceteris paribus” and requires case-by-case evaluation—Relied on definitions from Black’s Law Dictionary, Jowitt’s Dictionary, Oxford Law Dictionary, Bouvier’s Dictionary, Cambridge Dictionary, and Collins Dictionary—Reiterated Pakistani and foreign case law on the term including Muhammad Sharif v. The State (PLD 1999 SC 1063), Vasudev Anant Kulkarni v. Executive Engineer (1995 ACJ 97), Ashok Service Centre v. State of Orissa (1983 2 SCR 363), and R. v. Gauthier ([1977] 1 SCR 441)—Held that High Court erred in applying earlier order blindly without determining its contextual fit with the facts of each petition. (e) Practice and Procedure ---- Remand for decision on merits ---- Remand of petitions for fresh adjudication—Supreme Court converted all Civil Petitions into appeals and set aside the impugned orders—Directed High Court to decide all Constitution Petitions afresh on merits, after affording full opportunity of hearing to both sides—Ordered parties to exchange documents and file necessary pleadings in advance—High Court to consider, inter alia, differences in advertisements, departments, recruitment procedures, and compliance with codal formalities without being influenced by the order passed in CP No.D-1435 of 2023. (f) Constitution of Pakistan ---- Art. 184(3) ---- Effect of absence of legal principle in earlier High Court ruling on its binding nature—Held, the order passed in CP No.D-1435 of 2023 was fact-specific, contained no principle of law or ratio decidendi, and thus could not operate as a binding precedent—Mere administrative convenience or factual similarity does not justify universal application of a past order—Judicial comity under Art. 201 applies only where legal principles have been laid down. (g) Disposition ---- Petitions barred by limitation—Condonation allowed—Delay in certain petitions condoned in view of connected matters being within time. Petition in CPLA No. 182-K/2025 dismissed as not pressed—Province of Sindh had no grievance against order in CP No.D-1435 of 2023 regarding recruitment in Department of Empowerment of Persons with Disabilities. All remaining Civil Petitions converted into appeals, allowed, and remanded to High Court for fresh adjudication in accordance with law. Cited Cases: Special Secretary-II (Law & Order), Govt. of KPK v. Fayyaz Dawar, 2023 SCMR 1442 = 2023 SCP 199 Dr. Sher Afgan Khan Niazi v. Ali S. Habib & others, 2011 SCMR 1813 Muhammad Sharif v. The State, PLD 1999 SC 1063 Vasudev Anant Kulkarni v. Executive Engineer, 1995 ACJ 97 (India) Ashok Service Centre v. State of Orissa, 1983 2 SCR 363 (India) R. v. Gauthier, [1977] 1 SCR 441 (Canada)

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Art. 199(1)(a)(ii)—Jurisdictional limits—High Court’s powers in writ jurisdiction—Concurrent findings of fact—Proper course of action—Scope and limits of judicial review High Court, while exercising Constitutional jurisdiction under Art. 199(1)(a)(ii), cannot act as a Court of facts or substitute its own findings for those of Courts or Tribunals below—In the case at hand, the High Court allowed a writ petition against concurrent judgments of the Family Court and appellate Court that had dismissed a suit for recovery of dower—High Court set aside those judgments and went further to decree the suit itself—Such substitution of findings and issuance of a decree was held to be beyond its jurisdiction—While High Court may interfere where findings are based on misreading or non-reading of material evidence, the proper remedy is remand, not adjudication on merits—Exercise of certiorari does not permit arrogation of trial court powers. Cited Cases: • Azmat Ali v. Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner PLD 1964 SC 260 • Nawaza v. Additional Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner PLD 1970 SC 39 • Shabbir Hussain v. Muhammad Afzal 1972 SCMR 47 • Muhammad Younus Khan v. Government of N.-W.F.P. 1993 SCMR 619 (b) Family Law ----Recovery of dower—Gift deed and tamleeq nama as proof—Standard of proof—Relaxed application of procedural law—Evidentiary standard in family cases Respondent-wife based her claim for recovery of dower not on entries in the nikah nama but on the basis of a gift deed and tamleeq nama allegedly executed by her father-in-law in favour of her husband and by her husband in her favour—Family Court and appellate Court concurrently held that execution of such deeds was not proved—High Court, however, set aside those findings, holding that procedural laws like the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 and CPC are not strictly applicable in family disputes—Testimonies of witnesses and admission by petitioner No.1 were considered sufficient to establish execution—Supreme Court declined to interfere with the High Court’s setting aside of the concurrent judgments but held that decreeing the suit on its own exceeded jurisdiction—Matter remanded to Family Court for decision afresh. Disposition: Leave to appeal granted to the extent of High Court’s act of decreeing the suit—Appeal allowed to that extent—Impugned judgment set aside partially—Case remanded to Family Court for decision afresh—Stay application dismissed as infructuous.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) ----O. IX, R. 13---Setting aside ex-parte judgment---Power of attorney---Scope---Appellant filed an application under O. IX, R. 13, CPC for setting aside an ex-parte judgment and decree---Trial Court dismissed the application based on a special oath administered by the attorney of the appellant---Additional District Judge, in appellate jurisdiction, set aside the trial court's decision and remanded the matter for recording of evidence---High Court, in its revisional jurisdiction, reversed the appellate court’s decision and upheld the trial court’s ruling---Supreme Court held that revisional court exceeded its jurisdiction under S.115, CPC by interfering in the well-founded appellate court decision---A power of attorney merely authorizing an attorney to pursue litigation does not empower the attorney to make binding settlements or propose decisions based on special oaths---Held, that the revisional court had erred in misinterpreting the scope of the attorney’s authority, and the judgment of the Additional District Judge was restored accordingly. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Ali v. Muhammad Aslam (PLD 1990 SC 841) (b) Administration of Justice ----Revisional jurisdiction---Scope and limitations---High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by replacing the well-reasoned findings of the Additional District Judge in appellate jurisdiction---Where the appellate court has exercised its jurisdiction properly and in accordance with law, interference by the High Court in revisional jurisdiction is not warranted under S.115, CPC---Revisional powers do not extend to mere substitution of opinion where no jurisdictional defect is found---Supreme Court restored the decision of the appellate court, emphasizing that remanded matters should be taken to their logical conclusion expeditiously. (c) Law of Evidence ----Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 (P.O. 10 of 1984), Art. 163---Oaths Act (X of 1873), Ss. 8 & 9---Decision on special oath---Scope and effect---A case decided on a special oath must be carefully examined to determine whether the authority to propose such an oath was legally conferred---Power of attorney enabling an attorney to "pursue" litigation does not imply the authority to compromise the case or bind the principal to a settlement via a special oath---Held, that the attorney in the present case had exceeded the scope of authority conferred by the power of attorney, rendering the decision based on special oath unsustainable.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) – Section 561-A – Quashment of Criminal Proceedings ---- Scope and Applicability of Section 561-A, Cr.P.C.---Inherent powers of the High Court under Section 561-A, Cr.P.C., are curative in nature and intended to prevent abuse of process or to secure the ends of justice---Inherent powers cannot replace alternate remedies provided under Sections 249-A and 265-K, Cr.P.C., but may be invoked in exceptional cases where a clear abuse of process or injustice is apparent---High Court is obligated to examine and decide quashment petitions on merits, particularly when abuse of process is alleged. (b) Abuse of Process – Doctrine and Judicial Interpretation ---- Definition and Judicial Guidelines---The doctrine of abuse of process encompasses unwarranted or irrational use of legal proceedings, including vexatious litigation, harassment, or mala fide intent---Courts must prevent misuse of judicial mechanisms and safeguard the principles of fair play and justice---Summary dismissal of quashment petitions without addressing substantive grounds raised amounts to a failure of judicial duty. (c) Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 – Section 3 & 5 – Investigation and Cognizance ---- Quashment of Proceedings under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005---Section 3 prohibits illegal occupation, grabbing, or control of immovable property without lawful authority---Section 5 provides the procedure for investigation and cognizance by the trial court---Cognizance by a trial court does not preclude the High Court from exercising its inherent powers under Section 561-A, Cr.P.C., to review the legitimacy and fairness of proceedings initiated under the Act. (d) Quashment Petition – Duty of the High Court ---- Obligation to Examine Merits of Quashment Petitions---High Court must not dismiss quashment petitions summarily without considering the grounds raised, particularly where multiple pending civil suits or ongoing civil disputes are involved---Dismissal solely on the ground that cognizance has been taken by the trial court is insufficient and reflects a failure to exercise judicial discretion properly. ----- Cited Cases: Shahnaz Begum v. Hon'ble Judges of the High Court of Sindh and Balochistan (PLD 1971 SC 677) R. v. Power ([1994] 1 S.C.R. 601) R. v. Scott ([1990] 3 S.C.R. 979) Disposition: Criminal Petition converted into an appeal and allowed. The impugned order of the High Court was set aside, and the matter was remanded back to the High Court for fresh adjudication on merits after issuing notice to all parties. The High Court is directed to address the grounds raised in the quashment petition comprehensively.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 ----Art. 199—Scope of constitutional jurisdiction—High Court’s revisional powers limited to correcting jurisdictional or procedural irregularities—High Court cannot act as a second appellate forum or reappraise factual findings of lower courts—*M. Hammad Hassan v. Mst. Isma Bukhari* (2023 SCMR 1434) followed—Once appeal decided on facts, High Court should refrain from substituting its findings to preserve finality and prevent multiplicity of litigation. (b) West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 ----S. 5 & Schedule—Jurisdiction—Matters of dower and dowry articles fall within exclusive jurisdiction of Family Courts—Jurisdiction determined by *subject matter*, not by person entitled to sue—Right to sue survives upon death of spouse; legal heirs may pursue claim—*Khan Assadullah Khan v. Sheikh Islam-ud-Din* (PLD 1978 Lah. 711) and *Muhammad Azam v. Muhammad Iqbal* (PLD 1984 SC 95) referred. (c) Family Law—Right to sue after death of spouse ----Where wife dies during pendency of suit for recovery of dower and dowry articles, her legal heirs (e.g., mother) may continue proceedings as plaintiffs in representative capacity—Family Court rightly proceeded to adjudicate and decree matter—Claim survives as part of deceased’s estate. (d) Dower and dowry articles—Evaluation of evidence ----Trial Court decreed both dower (Rs.10,000) and dowry items (including 87.2 gms gold); Appellate Court, upon reappraisal, set aside decree only to extent of gold ornaments—No illegality or perversity found—Appellate findings upheld as based on proper appraisal. (e) Constitutional petition—Maintainability ----Where both trial and appellate courts have concurrently adjudicated on facts, invoking constitutional jurisdiction amounts to misuse of Art.199—Petition dismissed as devoid of merit and barred by settled judicial principle of finality of findings. (f) Disposition --- Petition dismissed. Findings of Appellate Court dated 24-08-2022 upheld; no interference warranted. No order as to costs.

Summary: Background: Rashid Baig and others (petitioners) filed a petition under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan, seeking leave to appeal against the Lahore High Court's order dated January 30, 2018. The High Court had dismissed their writ petition (W.P. No. 40075/2015), which challenged the dismissal of their applications by the trial court to summon revenue officers as witnesses. The petitioners had also unsuccessfully challenged the trial court's decision in a revision petition before the revisional court. -----Issues: 1. Whether the trial court's dismissal of the applications to summon revenue officers as witnesses was justified. 2. Whether the petitioners could challenge the interim orders of the trial court through revisional or constitutional jurisdiction. 3. Whether the High Court correctly exercised its constitutional jurisdiction in dismissing the writ petition. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, upholding the High Court's decision. The Court provided the following reasoning: ----Interim Orders: The Supreme Court emphasized that challenging interim orders during the pendency of a suit should be approached cautiously. Interim orders can be reviewed at the final appeal stage. The first appellate court, as a court of fact and law, can scrutinize all interim orders issued during the trial. ---Jurisdiction of the High Court: The High Court's constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 is limited to cases where the order challenged is without jurisdiction. The Court held that the orders in question were within the discretion of the trial and revisional courts, thus within their jurisdiction. ----Delay in Proceedings: The Court noted significant delays caused by the petitioners' actions, including multiple adjournments and applications to stay proceedings. The Court criticized such delays as an abuse of the legal process. ---Conclusion: The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and refused to grant leave to appeal. The Court upheld the decisions of the lower courts, emphasizing that they had acted within their jurisdiction. The Court highlighted the importance of addressing interim orders at the final appeal stage and criticized the petitioners for causing undue delays in the proceedings. The petitioners' actions were seen as an abuse of the legal process, and the Court reinforced the proper procedural approach for challenging interim orders within the judicial system. ----Citations: Order XX Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980: Discusses the impact of filing a petition for leave to appeal on the execution of the decree or order appealed against.

Summary: Background:In the Lahore High Court, Bahawalpur Bench, two related writ petitions, No. 2916 of 2006 and No. 7305 of 2019, were filed against the Federation of Pakistan by the heirs of the late Ameer of Bahawalpur, Sir Sadiq Muhammad Khan Abbasi. The petitioners challenged the vires of the notification No. SRO-436(I)2006, which distributed specific lands (Shikargah) among 23 legal heirs based on the recommendations of an implementation committee. The petitions raised questions of law and facts concerning the distribution of properties left by the Ameer of Bahawalpur post-1947, the Indian Independence Act, and subsequent legal and administrative actions regarding the estate.-----Issues:The legality of the distribution of the Shikargah land among the 23 legal heirs as per Notification No. SRO-436(I)2006.The adherence of the distribution process to the principles of justice, Sharia law, and previous Supreme Court judgments.The jurisdiction of the court in matters decided by the Federal Government under the Acceding State (Property) Order, 1961.-----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The Lahore High Court, dismissed both writ petitions. The court found that the distribution of properties was conducted in accordance with the recommendations of the implementation committee, established legal precedents, and Sharia law. It was emphasized that the Federal Government had the ultimate authority to decide on matters related to the devolution and distribution of the Ameer of Bahawalpur's properties, as stipulated by the Acceding State (Property) Order, 1961. The court also noted that it lacked jurisdiction to question orders made by the Central Government under this order.----Citations/Precedents:Indian Independence Act, 1947Acceding State (Properties) Order, 1961Devolution and Distribution of Property (Ameer of Bahawalpur) Order, 1969Supreme Court judgment in "Govt. of Pakistan V. Brig. His Highness Nawab Muhammad Abbas Khan Abbasi and others" (PLD 1982 SC 367)Supreme Court judgment in "Brig. H.H. Nawab Muhammad Abbas Khan Abbasi, Ameer of Bahawalpur V. Govt. of Pakistan and others" (PLD 1984 SC 67)Supreme Court judgment in "Prince A. M. Abbasi and another V. Federal Government through Secretary and 24 others" (PLD 2002 Supreme Court 170)Lahore High Court judgment in "Brig. His Highness Nawab Muhammad Abbas Khan Abbasi, Ameer of Bahawalpur. V. Government of Pakistan, through the Joint Secretary, Ministry of States and Frontier Regions, Rawalpindi and 23 others" (PLD 1978 Lahore 1166)Supreme Court judgment in "Sahibzada Muhammad Usman Khan Abbasi, etc. V. Islamic Republic of Pakistan through Secretary M/O KANA and SAFRON, Islamabad, etc." (2020)

Summary: Issues:Whether the High Court had jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition filed by the respondent under Article 212(1) of the Constitution of Pakistan, given that matters relating to civil servants typically fall under the purview of Service Tribunals.Whether the respondent's promotion to a selection post (BPS-19) could be considered based solely on seniority, ignoring merit.----Judgment:The Supreme Court held that the High Court's judgment could not be sustained because the post in question was a selection post, requiring consideration of merit rather than mere seniority.The Court also noted that Article 212 of the Constitution ousts the jurisdiction of High Courts and Civil Courts in matters relating to the terms and conditions of civil servants, making the bar in the Constitution absolute.The petition was converted into an appeal and allowed, overturning the High Court's decision.----Principle:This judgment reaffirms the principle that promotions to selection posts within the civil service must be based on merit rather than seniority alone. It also underscores the constitutional provision that matters relating to the terms and conditions of civil servants are exclusively within the domain of Service Tribunals, thereby limiting the jurisdiction of High Courts in such matters.

Summary: Ss. 2 & 3—Criminal Law Amendment (Special Court) Act, 1976 (XVII of 1976), S. 4—Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 6 & 199—Trial for high treason—Judgment of Special Court—Territorial jurisdiction of Lahore High Court—Scope The respondent, a former Chief of Army Staff, was convicted and sentenced to death by the Special Court. The Lahore High Court, through its impugned judgment, allowed a writ petition filed before it and set aside the judgment of the Special Court. The High Court, among other findings, held that initiating proceedings against the respondent for high treason was ultra vires, unlawful, coram non judice, and beyond the constitutional mandate. -------- Legality—The primary grievance raised and the relief sought in the respondent’s writ petition related to acts and proceedings conducted by the Special Court in Islamabad. Under Article 199(1)(a)(ii) of the Constitution, only the Islamabad High Court had territorial jurisdiction over such matters. The Lahore High Court assumed jurisdiction not vested in it, violating the constitutional framework. Despite Supreme Court directives to continue the trial, the Lahore High Court exercised writ jurisdiction under Article 199 to set aside the proceedings of the Special Court, including its final judgment. Lahore High Court Bar Association v. General (Retd.) Pervez Musharraf 2019 SCMR 1029 ref. The acts and proceedings undertaken by the Special Court in Islamabad could only be challenged before the Islamabad High Court. The respondent, instead of pursuing his grievance before the appropriate forum, filed a petition in the Lahore High Court, which entertained the matter without jurisdiction. Government of Pakistan v. Special Court PLD 2020 Isl. 82 ref. --------Art. 199—Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. II, R. 2—Territorial jurisdiction of a High Court—Scope The primary object of the petition, i.e., the main grievance and ultimate relief sought, determines the territorial jurisdiction of the High Courts. If the relief pertains to an act or proceeding within the jurisdiction of a particular High Court, no other High Court can assume jurisdiction. Splitting claims and seeking relief from multiple High Courts regarding the same cause of action is prohibited under Order II, Rule 2, C.P.C. Relief regarding federal actions and acts pursuant to such actions must be sought in one petition and adjudicated by the High Court having territorial jurisdiction over both. --------Sandalbar Enterprises v. Central Board of Revenue PLD 1997 SC 334; Amin Textile Mills v. Federation of Pakistan 1998 SCMR 2389; Sethi and Sethi v. Federation of Pakistan 2012 PTD 1869 and Province of Punjab v. Shehzad Anjum 2024 SCMR 766 ref. --------High Treason (Punishment) Act, 1973 (LXVIII of 1973), S. 2—Criminal Law Amendment (Special Court) Act, 1976 (XVII of 1976), S. 12(3)—Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 6 & 199—Trial for high treason—Maintainability of writ petition—Availability of alternate remedy The High Court’s writ jurisdiction cannot be invoked where an adequate, alternate remedy exists under the law. Section 12(3) of the Criminal Law Amendment (Special Court) Act, 1976, provides an appeal mechanism to the Supreme Court against a Special Court’s judgment. The respondent bypassed this remedy and sought relief under writ jurisdiction, which is impermissible under the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies. A party must utilize the remedies provided under the relevant law before invoking writ jurisdiction. --------Imran Khattak v. Sofia Waqar Khattak 2014 SCMR 122; Tariq Transport Company v. Sarghodha-Bhera Bus Service PLD 1958 SC (Pak.) 437; Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax/Wealth Tax v. Punjab Beverage Company 2008 SCMR 308 ref. --------S. 9—Trial in absentia—Lahore High Court declared Section 9 ultra vires the Constitution—Legality Section 9 of the Criminal Law Amendment (Special Court) Act, 1976, allows the trial of an accused in absentia under specific circumstances, such as willful absence or behavior impeding justice. The Lahore High Court declared Section 9 unconstitutional, stating that trials in absentia are impermissible. However, the respondent was not "aggrieved" under Article 199(1)(a) or (c) of the Constitution and had not challenged the entire provision of Section 9. The High Court’s declaration lacked reasoning and was legally unjustified. --------Lahore High Court Bar Association v. General (Retd.) Pervez Musharraf 2019 SCMR 1029 ref. --------S. 3—Constitution and reconstitution of Special Court—Applicability of Mustafa Impex judgment The Lahore High Court invalidated the Federal Government’s actions, including the filing of a complaint and constitution of the Special Court, relying on the Mustafa Impex judgment (PLD 2016 SC 808). However, the principle in Mustafa Impex is not retroactive and applies only from the date of its pronouncement. The constitution and reconstitution of the Special Court predated this judgment and complied with the legal framework. Actions taken after Mustafa Impex also adhered to its principles. Thus, the High Court’s findings were contrary to the law. --------PMDC v. Muhammad Fahad Malik, 2018 SCMR 1956 ref.----- The case pertains to the legality of the Lahore High Court's decision that annulled proceedings and conviction of General (Retd.) Pervez Musharraf by a Special Court for high treason under Article 6 of the Constitution. The Lahore High Court's judgment was challenged on grounds of lack of territorial jurisdiction and its misapplication of the law, especially with respect to precedents set by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court had jurisdiction and acted within the bounds of constitutional and legal principles. ------- Issues: ------- 1) Did the Lahore High Court have territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition against the acts and proceedings of the Islamabad-based Special Court? ------- 2) Was the exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 199 justified in the presence of an alternate adequate remedy of appeal? ------- 3) Did the Lahore High Court violate precedents and directions of the Supreme Court in setting aside the Special Court's proceedings? ------- 4) Was the Lahore High Court correct in declaring Section 9 of the Special Court Act ultra vires the Constitution? ------- 5) Did the High Court exceed its jurisdiction by deciding on the merits of the high treason charges? ------- Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: Lack of Jurisdiction: The Supreme Court held that the Lahore High Court lacked territorial jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution. The acts and proceedings of the Special Court, located in Islamabad, fell exclusively within the territorial jurisdiction of the Islamabad High Court. ------- Alternate Remedy: The High Court’s exercise of writ jurisdiction was unwarranted as the respondent had an adequate remedy of appeal under Section 12(3) of the Special Court Act, which was ultimately availed. ------- Violation of Precedents: The Supreme Court noted the Lahore High Court’s disregard for binding precedents, including prior Supreme Court judgments, undermined judicial propriety. ------- Section 9 of the Special Court Act: The declaration of the entire Section 9 as ultra vires was unwarranted and lacked justification. The Supreme Court reaffirmed its earlier decision in Lahore High Court Bar Association validating trials in absentia under certain conditions. ------- Merits of the Case: The Lahore High Court improperly delved into the substantive issue of whether General Musharraf committed high treason, usurping the jurisdiction of the Special Court and appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. ------- Outcome: The Supreme Court set aside the Lahore High Court’s judgment, holding it unconstitutional and without jurisdiction. The petitions were converted into appeals and allowed. ------- Citations/Precedents: Sindh High Court Bar Association v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2009 SC 879): Declared the Proclamation of Emergency Order, PCO, and Oath Order of 2007 unconstitutional. Nadeem Ahmed v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2010 SC 1165): Reaffirmed the invalidity of actions taken under the PCO. Moulvi Iqbal Haider v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2013 SC 507): Directed inquiry and trial under Article 6 for high treason. Abdul Hameed Dogar v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2016 SC 607): Limited the Special Court’s authority to associate suspects. Lahore High Court Bar Association v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2019 SC 645): Validated trial in absentia under Section 9 of the Special Court Act. Mustafa Impex v. Government of Pakistan (PLD 2016 SC 808): Mandated Federal Cabinet approval for actions by the Prime Minister. PMDC v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2018 SC 189): Limited retrospective application of Mustafa Impex. Sandalbar Enterprises (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Central Board of Revenue (1997 SCMR 1131): Defined territorial jurisdiction of High Courts. Amin Textile Mills Ltd. v. Central Board of Revenue (1992 SCMR 1652): Emphasized dominant relief determining territorial jurisdiction. Sethi and Sethi v. Collector of Customs (1985 CLC 324): Addressed relief-seeking in territorial jurisdiction. Articles 189 and 190 of the Constitution: Establish binding authority of Supreme Court judgments on all judicial and executive authorities.