Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)— Arts. 4, 199 & 212 — Constitutional jurisdiction — Maintainability — Nature of challenge — Disciplinary proceedings against public prosecutors — Scope of writ jurisdiction — Bar of Article 212 — Applicability.Held, where disciplinary action is challenged not on the basis of terms and conditions of service but for being initiated in violation of statutory mandate (Section 10(2) of Punjab Criminal Prosecution Service Act, 2006), constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 is maintainable — Bar under Article 212 is not attracted where a pure question of law regarding lawful authority of respondents is raised.(b) Punjab Criminal Prosecution Service (Constitution, Functions and Powers) Act, 2006— Ss. 5, 6, 9, 10(1), 10(2), 13, 17 & 18 — Prosecutorial structure and independence — Hierarchical command — Disciplinary authority — Prosecutor General as head of service — Role of Appeal Committees — Scope of recommendations — Validity of proceedings initiated without reference by Prosecutor General.Held, the Prosecutor General is the administrative and functional head of the Prosecution Service with exclusive statutory mandate to issue directions and oversee prosecutorial conduct — All prosecutors are bound to follow Code of Conduct and guidelines issued by the Prosecutor General — No disciplinary proceedings can be initiated against a prosecutor without a reference from the Prosecutor General or District Public Prosecutor under Section 10(2) of the Act — Initiation of proceedings by Secretary, Public Prosecution Department, in absence of such reference, held illegal and ultra vires.(c) Criminal Procedure Code (1898)— Ss. 417, 492–495 — Prosecution — Functions and powers of Public Prosecutors — Role in trial and appeals — Distinction between opinion and final authority to appeal — Legal protection to prosecutorial discretion.Held, opinion formed by prosecutors or appeal committees regarding fitness of case for appeal is advisory and not binding on the Government — Absence of mala fide precludes punitive consequences — Prosecutors’ assessments, when made in accordance with issued guidelines, enjoy statutory protection under Section 18(1) of the 2006 Act.(d) Interpretation of Statutes— Delegation of powers — Statutory compliance — Mandatory procedural requirement — Non-compliance — Effect.Held, Section 10(2) of the 2006 Act vests exclusive authority in Prosecutor General or District Public Prosecutor to initiate reference for disciplinary proceedings — Any action taken in contravention is void and without legal effect — Procedural safeguards prescribed in statute cannot be bypassed or substituted.(e) Administrative Law— Ultra vires — Absence of lawful authority — Quashment of disciplinary proceedings.Held, orders passed by Secretary Public Prosecution and inquiry report prepared without statutory authority or proper reference held to be ultra vires, illegal, and void ab initio — Entire proceedings quashed.Disposition:Writ petition allowed.Impugned disciplinary proceedings declared to have been initiated without lawful authority.Orders dated 16.07.2021, 07.10.2021, and 05.04.2022 set aside and quashed.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure—Acquittal under Section 249-A, Cr.P.C.—Scope and judicial discretion— Section 249-A Cr.P.C. empowers a trial court to acquit an accused at any stage of the proceedings where the charge appears groundless or evidence insufficient to justify continuation of trial. This discretion must be exercised judiciously—not mechanically—but where the prosecution’s material fails to disclose a prima facie case, early termination of proceedings is lawful and proper. In the present matter, the trial court found that evidence did not substantiate allegations of fraud or dishonest inducement under Ss. 419 & 420 Cr.P.C.; hence its order of acquittal was held to be within lawful authority and free from mala fide intent or procedural impropriety. Cited Case: 2012 PCr.LJ 507 (distinguished). (b) Remedy against acquittal—Appeal or revision—Bar of Section 439(5) Cr.P.C.— Under S. 417 Cr.P.C. an appeal lies against an acquittal, whereas S. 439(5) Cr.P.C. expressly bars revision when such appeal is available. A party cannot bypass the appellate remedy by filing a revision petition. The revision filed by the appellant before the Additional Sessions Judge was thus incompetent, and the High Court rightly upheld its dismissal. Cited Cases: 2016 PCr.LJ 1457; 2008 PCr.LJ 1067. (c) Acquittal under Section 249-A versus post-trial acquittal—Presumption of innocence—Extent of appellate scrutiny— An acquittal under Ss. 249-A or 265-K Cr.P.C., though rendered at a preliminary stage, remains a valid exercise of judicial discretion. While such orders do not carry the “double presumption of innocence” attached to full-trial acquittals, interference is still limited to cases of perversity, mala fide intent, or arbitrary exercise of discretion. No such infirmity being shown, the trial court’s order warranted no interference. Cited Cases: 2005 SCMR 1544 (clarified); 2008 PCr.LJ 1067. (d) Principle of procedural discipline—Hierarchy of remedies— Statutory scheme under the Criminal Procedure Code requires adherence to prescribed remedies in their proper sequence. Substituting revision for appeal undermines procedural orderliness and cannot be permitted. Disposition: Appeal dismissed. Trial court’s acquittal under S. 249-A Cr.P.C. and concurrent findings of lower courts affirmed. No order as to costs.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898): ----S. 417(1), (2), (2-A), (3)—Limitation for filing appeal against acquittal—Appeal by State—Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, S. 48(1); Limitation Act, 1908, Art. 157—Scope—Trial Court acquitted accused under Ss. 32 & 9(c), CNSA, 1997—High Court dismissed State’s appeal solely on grounds of limitation—Held, under S. 417(1), Cr.P.C., no express limitation period is prescribed for appeal by State—Therefore, limitation governed by Art. 157 of Limitation Act, 1908, which provides six-month period for appeals from orders of acquittal—Judgment of High Court was contrary to settled law laid down in The State v. Khalid Hussain Rathore—Dismissal based on incorrect interpretation of limitation provisions—Impugned judgment set aside—Case remanded for decision on merits. (b) Limitation Act, 1908: ----Art. 157—Appeal against acquittal by State—Applicability—Held, appeals by complainants or aggrieved persons under S. 417(2) & (2-A), Cr.P.C. are subject to specific limitations (60 and 30 days respectively), whereas no express limitation applies to appeals by the State under S. 417(1)—Hence, such appeals are governed by Art. 157 of the Limitation Act prescribing six months—Consistent jurisprudence affirms applicability of Limitation Act to criminal proceedings under Cr.P.C. (c) Practice and Procedure: ----Remand—Error of law—Where appeal dismissed on erroneous application of limitation provisions, without adjudicating merits, remand is proper remedy—Held, appeal should be considered on merits rather than being dismissed on misconceived procedural ground. Case remanded.

Summary: Acquittal granted----(a) Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005:—-Ss. 3, 4 & 5—Illegal dispossession—Appeal against acquittal—Improper appreciation of evidence—Scope—Where the trial court fails to adequately consider material evidence and relevant documents presented by the complainant, including property ownership documents and government records, acquittal findings cannot be sustained—Acquittal mainly based on the absence of specific date/time of dispossession and general admission regarding long-standing possession by accused is insufficient in law to discard title documents and oral evidence—Trial court’s failure to discuss official witness testimony and key documentary exhibits amounts to misreading and non-reading of evidence—Held, the trial court did not appreciate the material evidence, and findings were not based on sound judicial reasoning.Disposition: Impugned judgment set aside; case remanded for fresh decision on merits after permitting both parties to produce additional evidence.Cited Case: Gulshan Bibi v. Muhammad Sadiq (PLD 2016 SC 769)(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898):—-S. 417(2-A)—Appeal against acquittal—Principles—Presumption of innocence—Scope—Although an acquitted accused enjoys double presumption of innocence, such benefit is subject to proper judicial application of mind by the trial court—Acquittal must be based on full appreciation of evidence and reasoned analysis—Where trial court omits discussion of key exhibits and witness testimony, presumption of correctness of its findings is weakened.(c) Evidence:—-Appreciation of evidence—Ownership documents—Weight—Permanent transfer orders (PTO), revenue entries (Deh Form-II), and death certificates of the original owner are material and relevant evidence to establish title and unauthorized dispossession—Trial court must analyze such documents before granting acquittal in possession-related disputes under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005.----Disposition:Appeal allowed. Acquittal set aside. Case remanded to trial court (5th Additional Sessions Judge, Larkana) for fresh adjudication on merits after allowing further evidence and cross-examination.

Summary: Against order of acquittal under section 249-A, Cr.P.C. criminal revision under section 439, Cr.P.C. is not competent. Similarly, writ petition against order of acquittal is also not competent in the light of section 417(2), Cr.P.C. --- The petitioner, Hajra Javaid Makhdoom, initiated the petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, seeking redress, specifically requesting a retrial and criminal revision in a case involving the respondent, Muhammad Tehmas Nasir.The petitioner's grievance revolved around a private complaint filed under section 6(5) of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, alleging that the respondent had contracted a second marriage without her consent. Subsequently, the Judicial Magistrate in Sargodha summoned the respondent to face trial under section 6(5) of the Ordinance. However, during the proceedings, the respondent submitted an application under section 249-A, Cr.P.C., contending that the petitioner's complaint was baseless and driven by ulterior motives.The magistrate accepted the respondent's application, leading the petitioner to file a criminal revision. This revision was later dismissed by the Additional Sessions Judge. The petitioner, dissatisfied with both decisions, filed the present writ petition, urging the Lahore High Court to refer the case back to the Judicial Magistrate for retrial and the criminal revision back to the Additional Sessions Judge.In the judgment dated December 19, 2023, Judge Muhammad Tariq Nadeem meticulously examined the legal aspects raised in the petition. The judge acknowledged the petitioner's contention that against an order of acquittal under section 249-A, Cr.P.C., a criminal revision was competent, citing "The State through Advocate-General, Sindh High Court of Karachi v. Raja Abdul Rehman" (2005 SCMR 1544) as a precedent.However, Judge Nadeem went on to analyze the relevant legal provisions, emphasizing section 417(2), Cr.P.C., which stipulates that an appeal lies against an order of acquittal. The judge observed that the petitioner had not satisfactorily addressed whether the order of acquittal under section 249-A, Cr.P.C., was amenable to criminal revision or could be challenged through a petition for special leave to appeal under section 417(2), Cr.P.C.The judgment delved into the interplay between sections 439, 439-A, and 417(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code, clarifying that while an appeal could be filed against an order of acquittal, no proceedings by way of revision could be entertained if an appeal was available. Additionally, the judgment underscored the distinction between criminal appeals and revisions, highlighting that a revision against an order of acquittal was not competent under section 439(4)(a), Cr.P.C.Judge Nadeem concluded that the criminal revision before the court of the Additional Sessions Judge was not competent, as the order of acquittal could only be challenged through the remedy provided in section 417(2), Cr.P.C. The judge dismissed the writ petition, asserting that a constitutional petition was not maintainable when a specific alternate remedy of appeal against acquittal existed.

Summary: Acquittal granted----(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860) –----S. 489-F---Dishonoring of cheques---Burden of proof---Essential ingredients---For an offense under Section 489-F, P.P.C., the prosecution must establish that the cheque was issued dishonestly for the repayment of a loan or fulfillment of an obligation---Appellant-complainant claimed that he sold metallic yarn to the respondent, against which the latter issued seven cheques, all of which were dishonored upon presentation---However, the appellant failed to produce any documentary evidence proving the supply of goods or any underlying business transaction---Investigating officer admitted that no such documents were handed over to him during the inquiry---In the absence of evidence substantiating a financial obligation, no offense under Section 489-F, P.P.C. was made out.(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) –----S. 417(2)---Appeal against acquittal---Presumption of double innocence---Appellant challenged the trial court's acquittal of the accused under Section 417(2), Cr.P.C., arguing misreading of evidence---However, acquittal judgments carry a presumption of double innocence, and such findings can only be reversed if found unreasonable, perverse, or manifestly erroneous---Trial court’s conclusion, based on lack of evidence proving the alleged obligation, was held to be reasonable and warranted no interference.Cited Case: Muhammad Shafi v. Muhammad Raza 2008 SCMR 329(c) Criminal Law-------Benefit of doubt---Principle---Conviction requires guilt to be established beyond a reasonable doubt---Where even the slightest doubt arises in favor of the accused, benefit must be extended to him---Respondent’s version, that the cheques were issued in advance for future business transactions and fraudulently presented without delivery of goods, was not effectively disproved by the prosecution---Trial court rightly acquitted the respondents based on insufficiency of evidence.(d) Appellate Review-------Scope of interference in acquittal orders---An acquittal order cannot be set aside merely because another view is possible---Interference is warranted only if the findings are arbitrary, perverse, or based on a misreading of evidence leading to a miscarriage of justice---High Court found no illegality or infirmity in the trial court's reasoning, rendering the acquittal immune from interference.----Disposition: Criminal acquittal appeal dismissed; trial court’s decision upheld.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898): ----Ss. 342, 417 & 103 Acquittal Appeal—Principles governing interference with acquittal—Standard of evidence—Delay in lodging FIR—Benefit of doubt—Role of accused—Mere presence insufficient for conviction—Appeal against acquittal dismissed. The appellant challenged the judgment of the Trial Court acquitting the respondent (Babal son of Abdul Lateef) in a case registered under Sections 302, 396, and 397, PPC. The FIR was lodged with a delay of five hours without plausible explanation, raising doubts about the prosecution's version. Despite the complainant and eyewitnesses claiming to have identified the accused at the scene and allegedly chasing them to their residence, no immediate report was made to the police. The prosecution failed to assign any specific role to the respondent during the incident, and no evidence established his active participation. It is a settled principle of law that mere presence at the scene of an incident without an overt act is insufficient to warrant conviction. Furthermore, any doubt in the prosecution's case must benefit the accused. The Trial Court had rightly extended the benefit of doubt to the respondent, and appellate courts must exercise restraint in overturning acquittal unless a gross misreading of evidence is evident, which was not the case here. ----Cited Cases: Muhammad Rafique v. The State (2014 SCMR 1698) Mst. Jallan v. Muhammad Riaz and others (PLD 2003 SC 644) Muhammad Zafar and another v. Rustam Ali and others (2014 SCMR 1639) Mst. Anwar Begum v. Akhtar Hussain alias Kaka and 2 others (2017 SCMR 1710) Muhammad Usman and 2 others v. The State (1992 SCMR 498) The State v. Muhammad Sharif and others (1995 SCMR 635) Disposition: Appeal dismissed. Judgment of acquittal upheld.

Summary: Acquittal granted-----Background: The appellant filed a criminal appeal under Section 417 of the Cr.P.C. against the judgment passed by the Magistrate 1st Class, Bahawalpur, which acquitted the respondent in a case registered under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC). The allegation against the respondent was that he borrowed Rs. 1,500,000 from the complainant on 29.12.2011, issuing a cheque for repayment, which was dishonored upon presentation. The prosecution produced multiple witnesses, but the trial court acquitted the respondent. -----Issues: 1- Whether the respondent issued the cheque dishonestly for the repayment of a loan or to fulfill an obligation. 2- Whether the prosecution successfully proved the essential elements of Section 489-F PPC, particularly the existence of a loan or obligation. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court upheld the trial court’s acquittal of the respondent, stating that the prosecution failed to prove the existence of dishonesty or an obligation. The complainant did not produce the loan agreement as evidence, nor did they bring key witnesses, such as one of the signatories to the alleged loan agreement. The court also noted that the prosecution did not establish the exact circumstances under which the cheque was issued. The court reaffirmed that for an offence under Section 489-F PPC, it must be proven that the cheque was issued dishonestly, for the repayment of a loan or to fulfill an obligation, which was not proven in this case. The appeal was dismissed, and the acquittal was upheld. -----Citations/Precedents: Shah Jehan Khetran vs. Sh. Mureed Hussain and others (2005 SCMR 306) Naseeb Gul vs. Amir Jan and another (2013 P.Cr.L.J. 175) Maj. (Rtd.) Javed Inayat Khan Kiyani vs. The State (PLD 2006 Lahore 752) Shaikh Muhammad Aamir and another vs. Government of Sindh (PLD 2013 Sindh 488) Jalaluddin vs. Dileep and another (2018 YLR 697) Madawa through President vs. I.G.P. and others (PLD 2013 Lahore 442) Muhammad Saleem vs. The State (2011 P.Cr.L.J 428) Mehmood Khan vs. Sohail Khan and another (2017 P.Cr.L.J. 1305) Usman Ali vs. ASJ/JOP and others (2016 P.Cr.L.J. 323) Muhammad Ayub vs. Rana Abdul Rehman and another (2006 YLR 1852) Malik Safdar Ali vs. Syed Khalid Ali and others (PLD 2012 Sindh 464) Rashid Ahmed vs. Muhammad Masood and another (2020 P.Cr.L.J 1126) Muhammad Iqbal vs. Station House Officer and others (2009 CLD 1149) Muzaffar Ahmad vs. The State and others (2021 P.Cr.L.J. 1393) Muhammad Saleem vs. Muhammad Azan and another (2011 SCMR 474) Haji Amanullah vs. Munir Ahmed and others (2010 SCMR 222) Nawazul Haq Chowhan vs. The State and others (2003 SCMR 1597) Muhammad Azam and others vs. The State (2009 SCMR 1232)

Summary: Section(s) of law; Section 417 Cr.P.C1. The Principle that a retracted confession, if corroborated by independent and reliable evidence, can be made basis for conviction on capital elaborated and explained.

Summary: Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----Ss. 345, 417 & 561-A---Compromise of case---Jurisdiction of High Court---Petitioners assailed final disposal of a matter on the basis of compromise---Petitioners claimed to be Wali and legal heirs of deceased but for reasons known to deceased party and notables, they were neither made party to the compromise nor any thing was brought on record regarding all surviving legal heirs of the deceased---Contention of petitioners was that their mother was illiterate lady who was not properly represented in the compromise as well as before Trial Court and petitioners were minors, who were unaware about the fact of the murder of their late father and acceptance of the compromise, which was only arrived at between the widow of deceased and respondent---Validity---As per photocopies of CNICs of petitioners issued by NADRA authorities petitioners were minors at the time of filing of petition---There was nothing on record to show the circumstances, which compelled widow of deceased and respondents not to disclose their names at the time of compromise---Such fact also escaped from the notice of Trial Court---It was not possible for High Court to re-open the case on merits in exercise of power conferred under S. 561-A, Cr.P.C., that too, after lapse of more than ten (10) years---Petitioners were at liberty to avail remedy under S. 417, Cr.P.C. by following the law with legal exceptions---Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances. Ghulam Farid alias Farida v. the State PLD 2006 SC 53 rel.