Summary: (a) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 ----S. 540—Scope; timing; “may” (discretion) vs “shall” (duty)—Essentiality test—Fair-trial limits—Held: An application under S.540 Cr.P.C. is maintainable at any stage, even at the final-arguments threshold, but only where the proposed evidence is essential for a just decision and its reception does not undermine the accused’s fair-trial guarantees under Art. 10-A of the Constitution—Section 540 cannot be deployed to stage “evidentiary ambushes” or to fill lacunae after closure of evidence; the trial court must guard against misuse and avoid placing the prosecution in an advantageous position over the defence. (b) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 & Cr.P.C. ----Arts. 34, 37–43, 38 & 39; Cr.P.C., S.164—Confession: nature, voluntariness, and admissibility—Confession to a journalist while the accused is in police custody, not recorded before a Magistrate under S.164 Cr.P.C., is inadmissible by virtue of Arts.38–39 QSO—Articles 37–43 embody safeguards against coerced or untrustworthy confessions; voluntariness is the controlling criterion—A media interview recorded during custody and later uploaded online cannot be treated as a voluntary judicial confession nor as essential evidence for S.540 purposes. (c) Constitution of Pakistan (1973) ----Arts. 10-A, 13(b) & 14(2)—Right to fair trial; protection against self-incrimination; prohibition on torture—Courts must apply confession rules to minimise risk of wrongful conviction; attempts to introduce custodial “confessions” outside S.164 safeguards offend Art.10-A and the nemo tenetur principle under Art.13(b); Art.14(2) reinforces exclusion of statements tainted by coercive environments. (d) Trial management & adverse inference ----Closure of evidence; adverse presumption—The trial process is not a “game of surprise”; certainty after closure must be respected—Where a party withholds available adverse material, courts may draw an adverse inference (Art.129, Ill.(g), QSO), but cannot re-open evidence under S.540 to repair prosecutorial omissions absent genuine essentiality consistent with fair-trial rights. (e) Media interviews / social-media dissemination ----Public broadcast irrelevant to admissibility—A confession’s publication on YouTube or other platforms does not convert an otherwise inadmissible custodial statement into admissible evidence—Such material neither satisfies S.164 Cr.P.C. nor the voluntariness standard; permitting its late introduction would compromise trial sanctity and due process. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Azam v. Muhammad Iqbal PLD 1984 SC 95 • Painda Gul v. The State 1987 SCMR 886 • Mehrzad Khan v. The State PLD 1991 SC 430 • Ghulam Ali v. Pakistan 1993 SCMR 540 • The State v. Muhammad Yaqoob 2001 SCMR 308 • Muhammad Murad Abro v. The State 2004 SCMR 966 • Shahbaz Masih v. The State 2007 SCMR 1631 • Ansar Mehmood v. Abdul Khaliq 2011 SCMR 713 • Nawabzada Shah Zain Bugti v. The State PLD 2013 SC 160 • Sajid Mehmood v. The State 2022 SCMR 1882 • Sh. Muhammad Amjad v. The State PLD 2003 SC 704 • Pakala Narayana Swami v. Emperor AIR 1939 PC 47 (nature of confession) • Sidheshwar Nath v. Emperor AIR 1934 All 351 (confession–admission distinction) • Miranda v. Arizona 384 U.S. 436 (self-incrimination/fair-warning principles) • Ward v. The Queen (1979) 2 SCR 30; Horvath v. The Queen (1979) 2 SCR 376 (voluntariness) (g) Disposition — Petition converted into appeal and allowed—Orders of the Trial Court (04.06.2025) and High Court (12.06.2025) set aside—Prosecution’s application under S.540 Cr.P.C. to summon journalist and introduce the custodial, non-Magisterial “confession” dismissed as inadmissible and non-essential—Trial to proceed to conclusion without the impugned material.

Summary: (a) Criminal procedure—Recall and re-examination of witnesses—Scope of Section 540, Cr.P.C.—Object of provision—Court’s duty to ensure that no material evidence is excluded merely on procedural grounds—Judicial power under Section 540, Cr.P.C. is unfettered and may be exercised suo motu or upon application at any stage of the trial where it serves the ends of justice—Courts are not passive arbiters but are duty-bound to facilitate complete fact-finding—Principle reaffirmed in *Ishtiaq Ahmed Mirza v. The State* (PLD 2019 SC 675) and *Qazi Laique Ahmed v. Chairman NAB* (W.P. No. 2929-P/2019, PHC). (b) Fair trial—Constitutional guarantee—Article 4(19), Azad Jammu & Kashmir Interim Constitution, 1974—Fair trial is a constitutional right encompassing opportunity of confrontation and cross-examination—Recall of prosecution witnesses to confront them with newly surfaced video material does not offend procedural law if directed to ensure truth and completeness of record—Earlier dismissal of a similar application does not bar the trial court from exercising powers under Section 540, Cr.P.C. (c) Court witnesses—Discretion of trial court—Power to summon or recall witnesses lies primarily with the trial court—High Court, in revisional jurisdiction, rightly refrained from substituting its own view where discretion was exercised judicially and in good faith—Order summoning the witnesses as court witnesses and allowing cross-examination to both sides serves constitutional fairness. (d) Admissibility of electronic evidence—USB or video footage—Admissibility and probative value to be determined by trial court in accordance with *PLD 2019 SC 675* and Article 164, Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984—Questions of authenticity or origin to be assessed during evidence stage, not at revisional stage. (e) Principle—Purpose of criminal trial is discovery of truth in accordance with law, not conviction through procedural formalism—Judicial discretion must advance substantive justice rather than obstruct it by rigid adherence to technicality. Disposition: Revision petition and Crim. Misc. dismissed—High Court’s order dated 15-01-2025 upheld—Trial court directed to conclude proceedings expeditiously in accordance with law.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) – S. 540— Summoning of Court Witness—Scope and limitations—Cited eyewitness given up by prosecution—Accused seeking his summoning as Court Witness—Refusal by trial court—Legality.Petitioner/accused sought summoning of Abdul Hayee, a cited eyewitness in the FIR, as a Court Witness under S.540 Cr.P.C., after he was given up by prosecution. Trial Court dismissed the application, observing that two eyewitnesses had already deposed and that Abdul Hayee's testimony was not essential for just decision of the case. Held, S.540 Cr.P.C. empowers the Court to summon any witness if his evidence appears essential, but this power is not to be exercised to aid either party or to delay proceedings—Where other eyewitnesses to the same occurrence have already testified and the witness sought is not an injured or uniquely placed individual, his summoning is not essential. The Court found no exceptional circumstances warranting interference—Petition dismissed.Citations:Saif Khan v. The State (2008 SCMR 849)Mazhar Ali v. The State (2005 SCMR 523)(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) – Ss. 265-F & 540— Right of defence to summon witnesses—Prosecution prerogative in selecting witnesses—Role of trial court—Inquisitorial nature of trial.Held, prosecution is not bound to produce all listed witnesses and may give up any if sufficient evidence is otherwise led—Accused may summon unproduced witnesses in defence—Trial Court has an inquisitorial role only to the extent of ensuring a just decision; it is not required to undertake an independent inquiry or supplement gaps in evidence where the accused has avenues under law to produce a witness in defence. Summoning a given-up witness as Court Witness should not be used as a substitute for defence evidence.(c) Court Practice – Judicial Discretion in Summoning Witnesses— Summoning Court Witnesses—Guiding principle—Whether witness is essential to just decision of case.Test for application of S.540 Cr.P.C. is whether the proposed witness’s testimony is indispensable for adjudication of key facts in issue. Where witness forms part of a group of similarly placed eyewitnesses and others in the group have already deposed, there is no legal compulsion to summon the omitted one, unless his position or injury status confers additional evidentiary value. In present case, Abdul Hayee had no greater evidentiary weight than the other two examined eyewitnesses—Trial Court's refusal to summon him upheld.Disposition:Revision petition dismissed; interim relief recalled.----- Quote: ''If prosecution has produced two eyewitnesses and given-up 3rd eyewitness, whose evidence was of same category/nature and not of higher efficacy like injured, then he cannot be summoned as Court Witness; however, accused can produce him as his Defence Witness, if he opts so.''

Summary: ------Quote: Though CDR can tell about receiving a call by or making a call from a SIM at a particular time in the territorial area/range of a cellular tower which area usually comprises of sizeable magnitude but CDR cannot tell exact point/locale of availability of the SIM in said area, hence not helpful to determine exact point of presence of user of the SIM in geographical/territorial area of range of the tower. Though CDR can tell about receiving a call by or making a call from a SIM at a particular time in the territorial area/range of a cellular tower which area usually comprises of sizeable magnitude but CDR cannot tell exact point/locale of availability of the SIM in said area, hence not helpful to determine exact point of presence of user of the SIM in geographical/territorial area of range of the tower. -----Background: The appellant challenged the dismissal of an application filed under Section 540 Cr.P.C. by the trial court, seeking the production of Call Data Record (CDR) of a key witness (PW-4) in a criminal case involving narcotics. The application aimed to establish the witness's location during the relevant time. The trial court rejected the application on 20.09.2024, reasoning that the prosecution evidence and the accused's statement under Section 342 Cr.P.C. had already concluded, and summoning the CDR would amount to introducing new evidence at a belated stage. -----Issues: 1- Is Call Data Record (CDR) sufficient to determine the location or presence of a person without corroborating forensic evidence? -----2- Can additional evidence, such as CDR, be introduced after the conclusion of prosecution evidence and the accused’s statement under Section 342 Cr.P.C.? -----3- Did the trial court err in dismissing the application for summoning CDR? -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The appellate court dismissed the appeal in limine, upholding the trial court’s decision to reject the application for summoning CDR. --Limited Evidentiary Value of CDR: CDR provides information about calls, such as timestamps and the general territorial range of the cellular tower. However, it does not establish the precise location of the user or confirm their identity without forensic analysis or corroborating end-to-end voice recordings. --Forensic Evidence Requirements: The court emphasized that forensic analysis of voice recordings is necessary to authenticate CDR data. Without such analysis, the CDR cannot conclusively prove a person's presence at a specific location. --Timing of Application: The application was filed after the prosecution evidence had concluded and the accused's statement under Section 342 Cr.P.C. had been recorded. Courts generally disallow the introduction of new evidence at this stage unless it is indispensable for justice. --Legal Precedents: The court referred to established case law, which dictates that CDR alone, without corroborating forensic analysis, is insufficient as conclusive evidence. Appellate Stage Standards: Additional evidence at the appellate stage is permissible only when deemed absolutely necessary by the court for the just resolution of the case. In this instance, the court determined that the CDR did not meet this threshold. The appeal was dismissed as the CDR lacked sufficient evidentiary value without forensic corroboration, and its production was not necessary for the just resolution of the case. -----Citations/Precedents: 2016 SCMR 274 – Azeem Khan and Another vs. Mujahid Khan and Others 2021 SCMR 873 – The State through P.G. Sindh and Others vs. Ahmed Omar Sheikh and Others PLD 2019 Supreme Court 675 – Ishtiaq Ahmed Mirza and 2 Others vs. Federation of Pakistan and Others 2021 SCMR 522 – Mian Khalid Perviz vs. The State through Special Prosecutor ANF and Another PLD 1976 SC 452 – Muhammad Sharif vs. Muhammad Javed Alias Jeda Tedi and Others PLD 2024 Lahore 522 – Mst. Saima Noreen vs. The State and Another These precedents highlight the limitations of CDR as evidence and the procedural and evidentiary requirements for introducing it at trial or appellate stages.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.PC) ----Ss. 164(2), 364 & 173 --- Confessional/statement under S. 164—Magistrate’s duty to promptly forward to the trial Court—Failure to do so is a procedural irregularity that cannot prejudice the complainant or foreclose recording of the Magistrate’s testimony—Trial Court erred in refusing to examine PW-18 (then SDM who recorded S. 164 statement) solely because the statement was not before the Court prior to S. 242 proceedings—High Court also erred in upholding that refusal. Court directed that an inquiry be initiated into non-compliance with S. 164(2) and recurrence of such lapses by Magistrates; High Court to issue system-level directions and training to ensure timely compliance. (b) Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.PC) ----S. 540 --- Summoning material witness—Scope and duty—Court’s powers under S. 540 are wide and two-fold (“may” and “shall”); if evidence appears essential to a just decision, the Court must summon/examine or re-call the witness even at a late stage—Trial Court ought to have summoned PW-18 notwithstanding earlier procedural orders; adherence to technicalities cannot defeat the quest for truth in a murder trial. (c) Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.PC) ----S. 242 --- Accused’s examination—Where earlier proceedings overlooked an essential prosecution statement, the Trial Court may consider re-recording the S. 242 Cr.PC statement, if necessary to secure the ends of justice. (d) Constitution / Administration of Justice --- ----Right to fair trial (principles reaffirmed) Fair trial is a foundational guarantee; Courts must ensure all relevant evidence is brought on record and that parties receive a meaningful opportunity to examine and cross-examine—Procedural lapses by public functionaries (e.g., delayed forwarding of a S. 164 statement) cannot be visited upon a victim/complainant—Justice must not only be done but be seen to be done. (e) High Court—Inherent Powers ----S. 561-A, Cr.PC --- Inherent jurisdiction—Not contingent on a party’s application; may be exercised suo motu to prevent abuse of process and to secure substantial justice—High Court’s dismissal of revision on the ground that the Trial Court’s order dated 23-06-2023 had attained “finality” reflected non-exercise of the inherent power where intervention was warranted. (f) Practice & Procedure ----Non-communication of order; reconsideration Order dated 23-06-2023 was passed in the complainant’s absence and not communicated; such circumstances furnished cogent grounds for reconsideration rather than rigid adherence to the prior order. Cited Cases: — Disposition: Revision accepted; orders of the High Court (22-04-2024) and District Criminal Court, Haveli/Kahutta (including orders dated 23-06-2023 and 20-12-2023 to the relevant extent) set aside; Trial Court directed to summon and record the statement of PW-18 (Syed Asif Gardezi). Trial Court may also consider re-recording the accused’s S. 242 statement if needed to meet the ends of justice. Copy of the judgment to the learned Chief Justice of the High Court through Registrar for action in terms of paras 8–9 (inquiry and systemic directions).

Summary: Background:This case addresses the powers of the court under Section 540 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC), which allows the court to summon material witnesses or evidence at any stage of any inquiry, trial, or other proceeding if their presence is essential for a just decision of the case. The issue arose due to a confusion between two similarly named individuals, HC Hayat Ullah No. 641 and FC Hayat Khan No. 797. While the prosecution initially dropped HC Hayat Ullah from the witness list, FC Hayat Khan, who was directly involved in carrying parcels containing samples to the Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL), was not examined.----Issues:Whether the trial court's omission to examine FC Hayat Khan affected the fairness of the trial.Whether exercising powers under Section 540 CrPC to summon FC Hayat Khan is necessary for a just decision of the case.---Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The appellate court found that the failure to examine FC Hayat Khan, the carrier of critical forensic evidence, compromised the just decision of the case. The court emphasized the importance of this witness, whose testimony could substantiate the chain of custody and authenticity of the forensic evidence presented. Given the substantial role of this evidence in the case's outcome, the court exercised its powers under Section 540 CrPC to ensure a fair trial by directing the lower court to summon and examine FC Hayat Khan.Consequently, the appellate court allowed the appeal, set aside the impugned judgment, and remitted the case back to the trial court with specific instructions to summon FC Hayat Khan for examination and to allow the defense counsel an opportunity for cross-examination. This decision underscores the judiciary's commitment to ensuring that all material evidence and witnesses are adequately considered to achieve a just verdict.----Citations/Precedents:Section 540 CrPC - Empowers the court to summon any person as a witness, or to examine any person in attendance though not summoned as a witness, or to recall and re-examine any person already examined if his evidence appears to be essential to the just decision of the case.Relevant Apex Court decisions - Establish that the courts have a duty to prevent injustice by ensuring that all crucial evidence is examined during the trial.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure—Re-examination of Witness—Scope and Limitations —Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (V of 1898), S. 540 The petitioner sought the recall of a prosecution witness, Dr. Yasin, for the purpose of verifying an Istaswabia Report, which was previously referenced in the testimony of another prosecution witness, Dr. Ilyas. The trial court accepted the application, citing the necessity of Dr. Yasin’s testimony for a just decision. However, the High Court overturned this order, holding the recall unjustified. The Supreme Court observed that Section 540 of the Cr.P.C. empowers courts to summon, recall, or re-examine any witness if their evidence is essential for a just decision, and this power must be exercised judiciously. In criminal proceedings, courts must prioritize justice over procedural technicalities, ensuring all relevant evidence is brought on record. The re-examination of a witness cannot be used to fill gaps in the prosecution’s case but can clarify ambiguities or inconsistencies in testimony. The trial court's decision to summon Dr. Yasin was found to be aligned with the legal principles laid out in Section 540, Cr.P.C., and the High Court’s reversal of this decision was held erroneous. Cited Cases: Mst. Zubaida v. The State [1990 SCMR 895] Syed Maqbool Khaliq and another v. The State [2004 MLD 1099] Munir Ahmed and 07 others v. Kaleem Abbasi and 03 others [2013 MLD 888] Disposition: Revision petition accepted, impugned judgment of the High Court set aside, and trial court's order reinstated.

Summary: ''If after grant of ad-interim pre-arrest bail in a case, accused has been arrested and confined in jail in another case then his petition for pre-arrest bail will not be dismissed due to non-prosecution rather same will be decided after procuring his attendance.'' ---- Context of the Petitions: The petitions were filed by Niazi after he was granted ad-interim pre-arrest bail in multiple cases but later convicted and sentenced in a separate case ("District Election Commissioner, Islamabad vs. Imran Khan Niazi"). Due to his imprisonment, Niazi could not appear before the Anti-Terrorism Court on scheduled dates. His absence led to the dismissal of his applications for exemption from personal attendance and pre-arrest bail by the Special Judge, Anti-Terrorism Court.Petitioner?s Arguments: Niazi's counsel argued that his absence was not intentional but due to his imprisonment in another case. They contended that the Anti-Terrorism Court should have procured Niazi's attendance to decide the pre-arrest bail applications on merits, citing various precedents like ?SHAZAIB and others vs. The STATE? (PLD 2021 Supreme Court 886) and ?FARHAN MASOOD KHAN vs. STATE etc.? (PLJ 2021 Cr.C. (Lahore) 550).Prosecution?s Stance: The Prosecutor General, supported by the Additional Prosecutor General, maintained that since Niazi was convicted and imprisoned in another case, his applications for exemption from personal attendance and pre-arrest bail were rightly dismissed according to law. They referred to similar cases, including ?MUHAMMAD UMAR FAROOQ SALEEM vs. The STATE and another? (2022 P Cr. L J 1525).Court's Analysis and Decision: The Court noted that Niazi's inability to appear before the Anti-Terrorism Court was due to circumstances beyond his control. It held that the Anti-Terrorism Court erred in dismissing the applications for exemption from personal attendance and pre-arrest bail without considering the explained and satisfactory nature of Niazi's absence. The Court emphasized that rights of an accused to fair proceedings and due process are enshrined under Articles 4 and 10-A of the Constitution of Pakistan.Outcome: The Lahore High Court set aside the impugned orders dated 11.08.2023. It directed that the applications for pre-arrest bail be deemed pending before the Special Judge, Anti-Terrorism Court No.III, Lahore. The Court ordered that Niazi's personal attendance be obtained through video-link considering his safety and the applications for pre-arrest bail be decided on merits by 06.02.2024.

Summary: Background: The petitioner faced trial for an alleged offense under Section 376 of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) in connection with FIR No. 321, registered on July 5, 2021, at Police Station Qadir Pur Raan, District Multan. The case was initiated following allegations that the petitioner had committed rape, leading to the pregnancy and birth of a child, who subsequently passed away. After the initial investigation and submission of evidence, the prosecution sought to introduce additional forensic reports and recall a key witness for re-examination, which the petitioner challenged. -----Issues: 1- Whether the trial court erred by allowing the prosecution to submit a supplementary forensic report and re-examine the lady doctor (PW.8). 2- Whether these actions amounted to filling the lacunas in the prosecution’s case, which had been exposed during cross-examination. 3- Whether the prosecution's delay in submitting the forensic reports and seeking re-examination undermined the fairness of the trial. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: Trial Court's Discretion (Section 540 Cr.P.C.): The court emphasized that Section 540 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.) gives trial courts the power to summon, recall, and re-examine witnesses at any stage of the trial if their evidence is deemed essential for a just decision. However, the court noted that this power should not be used to fill gaps or correct deficiencies in the prosecution's case caused by negligence or inefficiency. The High Court found that the prosecution’s request to introduce a supplementary forensic report and re-examine the lady doctor was an attempt to fill lacunas. The prosecution sought these actions in response to issues raised by the defense during cross-examination, which the court viewed as an improper use of Section 540 Cr.P.C. The court expressed concern over the significant delay in submitting the supplementary forensic report, particularly given that the first report explicitly mentioned the need to recover evidence within 15 days. The supplementary report, requested more than a year after the first, raised doubts about its legitimacy. The court reiterated the principle that a trial judge must act as a neutral arbiter, ensuring fairness without actively assisting either side. Allowing the prosecution to submit the supplementary report and recall the witness would give the prosecution an unfair advantage, compromising the impartiality of the trial process. The High Court set aside the trial court’s decision, ruling that the actions of the prosecution amounted to filling the gaps in their case. The applications for recalling the witness and introducing the supplementary report were dismissed. -----Citations/Precedents: Shah Jahan and another v. Raheem Shah and others (2022 SCMR 352) Muhammad Afzal v. The State (2001 PCr.LJ 72) Muhammad Khan v. The State (2003 PCr.LJ 1178) Abdul Khalid v. Ansar Mehmood (2009 YLR 486) Mian Manzoor Ahmed Watto v. The State (2002 YLR 2362) Liaquat Ali and others v. The State (2000 SCMR 1455) Dildar vs. The State through Pakistan Narcotics Control Board, Quetta (PLD 2001 Supreme Court 384) Qaisar Javed Khan v. The State through Prosecutor General Punjab, Lahore and another (PLD 2020 Supreme Court 57) ----Quote: Section 540 of CrPC ----- re-examination and recalling of a witness ----- Submission of second report of PFSA. The prosecution cannot be allowed to fill in the lacuna ----- under section 540 Cr.P.C. Second PFSA report

Summary: The appellant, Sajid Mehmood, along with three co-accused, was tried for the murder of Azeem Ahmed. The trial court acquitted the co-accused but convicted Sajid Mehmood and sentenced him to death. The High Court maintained the conviction but changed the sentence to life imprisonment. The appellant filed a jail petition, which was granted by the Supreme Court, leading to the current appeal. The prosecution presented witnesses who testified about the incident. The witnesses remained consistent in their statements, and their testimony was found to be reliable and credible by the court. The medical evidence also supported the prosecution's version of events. The defense argued that there were contradictions and discrepancies in the witnesses' statements and questioned the absence of a statement from one witness mentioned in the FIR. However, the court found these arguments unpersuasive. The court stated that the relationship between the complainant and the deceased (brothers) did not automatically discredit their testimony unless evidence of previous enmity or ill will was established. In this case, there was no such evidence. The court emphasized that minor discrepancies and conflicts in evidence should not overshadow the overall credibility of the prosecution's case. Regarding the absence of a statement from a witness mentioned in the FIR, the court explained that Section 265-F of the Code of Criminal Procedure allows the court to summon witnesses who are likely to be acquainted with the facts of the case, even if their statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C. were not recorded. The court cited Section 540 of the Cr.P.C., which grants the court the power to summon or examine witnesses as necessary for the just decision of the case. In this case, although the witness's statement was not recorded, he was named in the FIR and was familiar with the facts of the case, justifying his examination in court. After considering the arguments and evidence, the court upheld the appellant's conviction and dismissed the appeal.