Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----Ss. 233, 235 & 239---Separate charges for distinct offences---Joint trial---Same transaction---General rule and exceptions---Held, that S.233, Cr.P.C. embodies the general rule that every distinct offence shall carry a separate charge and every such charge shall be tried separately---Such rule is, however, subject to the exceptions contained in Ss.234, 235, 236 and 239, Cr.P.C.---Section 235 permits one accused to be charged and tried in one trial for multiple offences where the offences arise from one series of acts so connected together as to form the same transaction---Section 239(d), Cr.P.C. extends the principle to joint trial of several accused for different offences committed in the course of the same transaction---Provisions of Ss.235 and 239 are enabling and discretionary, not mandatory, because the legislature used the expression “may”---Mere legal possibility of joinder does not create a legal duty to consolidate trials. Cited Cases: • MD. Mosaddar Hoque and another v. The State PLD 1958 SC 131 • Shahadat Khan and another v. Home Secretary PLD 1969 SC 158 • Nadir Shah v. The State 1980 SCMR 402 (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----Ss. 235 & 239---Expression “same transaction”---Tests for determination---Continuity of action---Community of purpose or design---Causal connection---Held, that the expression “transaction” is not defined in the Code and it is for the Court to determine whether a given set of facts constitutes the “same transaction”---Tests include proximity of time and place, community of purpose or design, continuity of action and causal connection---Proximity of time and place alone is insufficient; the essential elements are community of purpose or design and continuity of action---Where offences are separable in nature, purpose and motive, they cannot automatically be treated as forming the same transaction---In the present matter, allegations relating to physical occurrence and allegations relating to later dissemination of the event were separable; former could relate to sexual gratification while the latter could relate to humiliation, degradation or blackmail---Same transaction was therefore not established. Cited Cases: • MD. Mosaddar Hoque and another v. The State PLD 1958 SC 131 • Emperor v. Datto Hanmant Shahapurkar ILR 30 Bom 49 • Babulal Chaukhani v. King Emperor 65 IA 158 • Emperor v. Sejmal Poonamchand ILR 51 Bom 310 • Ata Muhammad Khan Alvi v. Crown PLD 1950 Lahore 288 (c) Anti-Rape (Investigation and Trial) Act (XXXI of 2021)---- ----Ss. 9 & 16(4)---Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act (XL of 2016), Ss.29 & 30---Special statutes---Separate investigative and trial mechanisms---Joint trial of scheduled and non-scheduled offences---Scope of S.16(4) of Anti-Rape Act---Held, that the Anti-Rape Act and PECA are special statutes with distinct investigative and procedural regimes---Scheduled sexual offences under the Anti-Rape Act are to be investigated by Special Sexual Offences Investigation Units, whereas offences under PECA are investigated by the notified cybercrime investigation agency---Section 16(4) of the Anti-Rape Act, 2021, which provides that the Special Court “may also try” connected non-scheduled offences, is an enabling provision and must be read narrowly so as not to displace the forum and procedure contemplated by PECA---Consolidation across separate statutory regimes may raise issues of jurisdictional enlargement not expressly conferred by law. (d) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Art.175(2)---Jurisdiction of courts---Special courts---Joint trial across statutory regimes---Held, that in view of Art.175(2) of the Constitution, Courts must avoid any impression of enlarging jurisdiction beyond what is expressly conferred by law---Where legislature has created separate court structures for distinct categories of offences, consolidation of proceedings across different regimes is not to be ordered mechanically---Court must exercise caution before requiring a trial court to assume jurisdiction not clearly conferred by the relevant statute. (e) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----Ss. 173, 233, 235 & 239---Separate FIRs under different statutory regimes---Separate investigations and challans---Charges framed and evidence partly recorded---Consolidation after commencement of trial---Held, that where separate FIRs were registered under two different statutory regimes, separate investigations were undertaken by distinct agencies, separate reports under S.173, Cr.P.C. were submitted, separate charges had been framed and prosecution evidence had partly been recorded, formal consolidation at such advanced stage would require alteration of charges and restructuring of proceedings---Consolidation after commencement of evidence is an exception rather than the norm---Discretion under Ss.235 and 239, Cr.P.C. is to be exercised judiciously and not mechanically. (f) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----Ss. 235 & 239---Joint trial---Apprehension of conflicting judgments---Same Court conducting both trials---Held, that apprehension of conflicting judgments did not arise in the peculiar facts where both matters stood entrusted to the same Court---Possibility of inconsistency is substantially minimized when the same judicial forum evaluates the evidence---Simultaneous continuation of separate trials before the same Court sufficiently safeguards coherence in proceedings without disturbing the procedural structure already in place. (g) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Arts.10-A & 14---Qanun-e-Shahadat Order (10 of 1984), Arts.131 & 143 to 148---Cross-examination---Right of accused---Protection of witness dignity---Role of trial Judge---Held, that the right of an accused to cross-examine a complainant or witness exists, but it is neither unlimited nor unbridled---Trial Judge must balance the right of cross-examination with the right of fair trial and human dignity guaranteed under Arts.10-A and 14 of the Constitution---Questions which are irrelevant, indecent, without reasonable grounds, or intended to insult or annoy the witness must not be permitted---Prolonged cross-examination designed to exhaust the witness or manipulate error amounts to misuse of such right---Presiding Judge must not remain a silent spectator and should intervene where cross-examination is abused. (h) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Arts.9, 10-A & 14---Witness protection and dignity---Witness box---No requirement that witness must remain standing---Provision of seating arrangements---Held, that there is no legal requirement under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, or Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 that a witness must remain standing while giving evidence---Compelling a witness, particularly in sexual offence cases, to remain standing for prolonged periods during testimony imposes unnecessary physical and psychological burden and may impair clarity and composure of evidence---Allowing a witness to remain seated does not diminish the sanctity of oath or dignity of judicial proceedings; rather, it promotes fairness, composure and orderly administration of justice---Witnesses assist the administration of justice and must be treated with dignity, security and respect. (i) Witness protection statutes---- ----Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Act, 2017---Sindh Witness Protection Act, 2013---Balochistan Witness Protection Act, 2016---Punjab Witness Protection Act, 2018---Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Witness Protection Act, 2021---Protection of witnesses and complainants---Constitutional duty of State---Held, that protection of witnesses and complainants is grounded in Arts.9, 10-A and 14 of the Constitution and reinforced by federal and provincial witness protection laws---State is under a constitutional obligation to ensure that witnesses and victims are protected from intimidation, coercion, humiliation and undue hardship so that testimony may be rendered freely and judicial proceedings may proceed in accordance with law. (j) Administration of justice---- ----Witness seating arrangements---Directions to subordinate courts, Special Courts and Tribunals---Held, that all District and Sessions Judges, courts subordinate to them, Administrative Judges of Special Courts and Tribunals in Pakistan were directed to ensure that appropriate seating arrangements are mandatorily provided to persons in the witness box, whether by chair, seat or bench---Registrar of Supreme Court was directed to circulate the judgment to the Chief Justices of all High Courts for implementation and compliance in all courts where evidence is recorded, including civil courts, criminal courts, special courts and tribunals. (k) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Art.185(3)---Leave to appeal---Consolidation of trials---Discretion exercised by Courts below---Interference by Supreme Court---Held, that the impugned order did not suffer from any jurisdictional defect, illegality or perversity warranting interference under Art.185(3) of the Constitution---Question raised related essentially to exercise of judicial discretion by Courts below and did not call for intervention in absence of injustice. Disposition: Leave to appeal was refused and Criminal Petition No.1160 of 2025 was dismissed; directions were issued for mandatory seating arrangements for witnesses in courts and for circulation of the judgment to all High Courts for implementation.

Summary: Constitution of Pakistan, 1973—Arts. 10A, 40, 184(3) & 175E(4)—Criminal Procedure Code, 1898—S. 4(1)(l)—Mutual Legal Assistance (Criminal Matters) Act, 2020—Ss. 2(1)(c), 4 & 7—Suo motu proceedings—Murder of journalist abroad—Independent and transparent investigation—Judicial supervision of investigation—Limits of constitutional jurisdiction—The Federal Constitutional Court, while dealing with the suo motu case regarding the murder of journalist Arshad Sharif in Kenya, held that although the State is under an obligation to ensure a fair, independent and transparent investigation, the constitutional courts cannot continuously supervise, monitor, or control the conduct and manner of investigation merely by keeping proceedings pending. The Court observed that Article 10A guarantees not only a fair trial but also an investigation free from undue pressure and interference, and such protection begins from the inception of the investigative process. However, the statutory sphere of investigation belongs to the police and investigating agencies, and judicial assumption of ongoing supervisory control would be prejudicial to fairness, inconsistent with settled jurisprudence, and beyond the proper constitutional role of the Court. Since no objection had been raised to the findings of the fact-finding process or the Special Joint Investigation Team, and the real concern related only to the pace of progress in a matter involving a foreign sovereign state, no justification existed for continued judicial monitoring. Criminal law—Investigation—Functions of judiciary and police—Non-overlapping spheres—Relying on Ajmeel Khan v. Abdur Rahim (PLD 2009 SC 102), the Court reiterated that the functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary but not overlapping, and that the conduct and manner of investigation normally cannot be scrutinized in constitutional jurisdiction. It further relied on Malik Shoukat Ali Dogar v. Ghulam Qasim Khakwani (PLD 1994 SC 281) for the principle that continued court control over investigation is prejudicial to the accused and detrimental to fairness of procedure. Referring also to S. 4(1)(l), Cr.P.C., the Court held that investigation means proceedings for collection of evidence conducted by a police officer or other authorized person, and does not contemplate continuous supervision by courts. The Court noted that judicial intervention in investigation is confined to exceptional situations, such as habeas corpus matters, mala fide investigation, or cases of jurisdictional excess, as recognized in Fahad Ahmed Gulzar v. ASI/IO Saeed Mahroof (2025 PCrLJ 1140). Accordingly, the request of the deceased’s family to keep the suo motu proceedings pending for ongoing oversight of the investigation was declined. Constitutional law—Foreign affairs—Article 40—International forums—Judicial restraint—The Court further held that it could not issue directions requiring the Federal Government to raise the matter at international forums, because such a course would intrude into the domains of foreign policy and diplomatic engagement, which constitutionally belong to the Federal Government and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Article 40, though reflective of constitutional aspirations to foster goodwill and friendly relations among nations, did not justify judicial management of foreign relations. The Court noted that the Supreme Court had earlier accepted the position that mutual legal assistance and diplomatic channels should first be allowed to run their course, with recourse to international forums to be considered only if the need subsequently arose. The matter was therefore left to the good sense and discretion of the Federal Government. Mutual Legal Assistance—Cross-border criminal investigation—Pakistan and Kenya—Statutory framework in both states—The Court observed that both Pakistan and Kenya have enacted legal regimes governing mutual legal assistance in criminal matters. In Pakistan, the Mutual Legal Assistance (Criminal Matters) Act, 2020 establishes the Secretary, Ministry of Interior, as the central authority empowered to make requests for assistance in criminal investigations and proceedings; while in Kenya, the Mutual Legal Assistance Act, 2011 vests corresponding authority in the Office of the Attorney General. A request for mutual legal assistance had been made by Pakistan to Kenya on 22.02.2023, accepted by Kenya, and the agreement was signed on 10.12.2024. In addition, the record showed constitution of the SJIT, diplomatic contacts by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, communication between the Prime Minister of Pakistan and the President of Kenya, examination of the Kenyan case file, engagement with the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions of Kenya, contact with the pathologist who conducted the post-mortem, and issuance of black warrants against the alleged perpetrators. In these circumstances, the Court held that the matter was actively proceeding through lawful investigative and diplomatic channels in both sovereign states and did not warrant judicial interference. Case references—Ajmeel Khan v. Abdur Rahim (PLD 2009 SC 102); Malik Shoukat Ali Dogar v. Ghulam Qasim Khakwani (PLD 1994 SC 281); Fahad Ahmed Gulzar v. ASI/IO Saeed Mahroof (2025 PCrLJ 1140). The Court also referred to the earlier orders passed by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in the same proceedings dated 13.02.2023 and 17.03.2023, particularly regarding the impermissibility of judicial supervision over investigation and the propriety of allowing mutual legal assistance and diplomatic processes to continue. Suo motu action disposed of—Pending applications disposed of—The Federal Constitutional Court held that, in light of the steps already taken by the Federal Government and the legal frameworks operating in Pakistan and Kenya, no further judicial intervention was required. The suo motu proceedings were accordingly disposed of, with observation that if the legal heirs of Arshad Sharif had any specific grievance, they could approach the court of competent jurisdiction.

Summary: Constitution of Pakistan, 1973--- ----Arts. 8, 10A, 175F, 199, 202A & Third Schedule---Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, S. 109-A---Constitution (Twenty-Sixth Amendment) Act, 2024---Constitution (Twenty-Seventh Amendment) Act, 2025---Challenge to vires of statutory provision---Jurisdiction of Constitutional Bench vis-à-vis Regular Bench under erstwhile Art. 202A---Dominant object theory---Ad-interim order suspending operation of law---Maintainability of challenge thereto---Petitioner, after availing 2018 Amnesty Scheme and declaring ownership of foreign company, was issued notice under S.109-A, Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---He challenged both vires of said provision and the notice issued thereunder before Sindh High Court, which initially granted ad-interim restraint against passing of any final adverse order---Later, Constitutional Bench of High Court recalled said interim order on ground that courts ought not suspend operation of law, particularly in revenue matters---Before Federal Constitutional Court, principal question was whether Constitutional Bench, under erstwhile Art. 202A, possessed jurisdiction to entertain matter whose dominant relief was declaration that impugned law was ultra vires---Held, challenge to vires of statute, in substance, sought relief under Art.199(1)(a)(ii), namely declaration that law was “without lawful authority” and “of no legal effect”, and not merely a direction under Art.199(1)(a)(i) or enforcement of fundamental rights simpliciter---Under pre-27th Amendment regime, such matter did not fall within exclusive jurisdiction of Constitutional Bench---Only forum competent to grant final relief could competently grant interim relief; therefore, Constitutional Bench lacked jurisdiction from the outset and its order recalling the earlier ad-interim order was without jurisdiction---Court further held that ad-interim order which had effect of suspending operation of law could validly be brought in challenge before this Court, as until law is finally declared ultra vires it must ordinarily continue to operate---However, in view of subsequent constitutional amendment, exclusive writ jurisdiction now vests in Constitutional Benches and similar matters would henceforth lie before such Benches---Matter was remanded to Sindh High Court for fresh decision by competent Bench in accordance with law. Kh. Muhammad Fazil v. Mumtaz Munnawar Khan Niazi (deceased) through legal heirs (2024 SCMR 1059); Attock Cement case (2024 SHC 1302); Benazir Bhutto v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1988 SC 416); Rahim Shah v. Chief Election Commissioner (PLD 1973 SC 24); Federation of Pakistan v. Aitzaz Ahsan (PLD 1989 SC 61); Marbury v. Madison (5 U.S. 137 (1803)) rel. (a) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973---Art. 202A (as it stood before Twenty-Seventh Amendment)---Jurisdiction of Constitutional Benches of High Courts---Scope--- Under erstwhile Art.202A, Constitutional Benches were not vested with entire writ jurisdiction under Art.199 but only with limited classes of matters specified therein---Therefore, question whether matter was to be heard by Constitutional Bench or Regular Bench had to be determined by reference to true nature of relief claimed. (b) Constitutional jurisdiction---Dominant object theory---Application--- For determining proper forum under former Art.202A, Court must examine pleadings, prayer clause and ultimate effect of relief sought so as to ascertain dominant or substantive relief, while treating merely consequential relief as ancillary---Such exercise is judicial in nature and not dependent upon drafting alone. (c) Challenge to vires of statute---Nature of relief--- Where petitioner assails validity of statutory provision and seeks declaration that same is contrary to Constitution, dominant relief is one under Art.199(1)(a)(ii), namely that impugned law is “without lawful authority” and “of no legal effect”---Such relief is, in substance, in nature of certiorari / declaratory judicial review, even if consequential directions are also sought. (d) High Courts---Power of judicial review---Inherent constitutional authority--- Power of High Court to strike down law ultra vires Constitution is inherent in constitutional scheme and flows from its role as guardian of Constitution, read with judicial oath and constitutional supremacy---Such authority is not negated merely because relief of declaration is not textually set out in identical terms in every clause of Art.199. (e) Interim relief---Competence of forum--- Interim relief may only be granted by forum competent to render final decision on lis---Consequently, where Constitutional Bench lacked jurisdiction to decide vires challenge under former Art.202A, it also lacked competence to pass or recall interim orders in relation thereto. (f) Ad-interim order suspending operation of law---Propriety and challenge thereto--- As a general constitutional principle, until a law is finally declared ultra vires, it should ordinarily continue to operate in normal course---An interim order having effect of suspending operation of law, especially in revenue matters, is therefore open to challenge before this Court and cannot be shielded merely because it is ad-interim in form. (g) Twenty-Seventh Constitutional Amendment---Effect--- After enactment of Constitution (Twenty-Seventh Amendment) Act, 2025, exclusive writ jurisdiction under Art.199 now lies with Constitutional Benches of High Courts, and Regular Benches no longer possess such jurisdiction---Accordingly, a case of like nature would now fall to be heard by Constitutional Bench. (h) Remand---When warranted--- Where impugned order has been passed by a Bench lacking jurisdiction, proper course is to set aside such order and remit matter for fresh adjudication by competent Bench in accordance with law. Petition allowed; impugned order set aside; matter remanded for decision by competent Bench of Sindh High Court in accordance with law.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Arts. 212(1)–(3), 10A & 37; Service Tribunals Act, 1973 ----S. 4(1) & (2)---Service matters—Maintainability of writ against order of de-novo inquiry—Scope of Art. 212 vis-à-vis S.4, STA---Held, that an order directing de-novo inquiry is not a “final order” affecting terms and conditions within the contemplation of S.4, STA; no statutory appeal/remedy lies before the Federal Service Tribunal against such interlocutory direction—Where no adequate/expeditious remedy exists, a writ petition before the High Court is maintainable to examine legality of the de-novo order on limited, jurisdictional grounds (e.g., mala fides, coram non judice, abuse of process, violation of law/rules), without embarking upon disputed facts—High Court erred in declining to decide the vires of the de-novo order merely due to perceived precedential conflict; matter remanded to decide the writ on merits within time. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Yar Buttar v. BOG, OPF (1999 SCMR 819) • Fida Hussain v. Chief Secretary KP (2023 SCMR 1109). (b) Civil Servants (Appeal) Rules, 1977 ----r. 2(a), r. 4; E&D Rules, 1973 ----r. 5(iv), r. 6-A (repealed); Civil Servants (Efficiency & Discipline) Rules, 2020 ----rr. 11, 16---Appellate structure and competence—Whether appeal lies to President against de-novo inquiry ordered after “exoneration” by Authorized Officer—Held, that r.4 of the 1977 Rules confines appeal to orders altering conditions of service or imposing/affecting penalties; a direction for de-novo inquiry is not such an order and is therefore not appealable to the President—Authorized Officer assesses proof of charge and makes recommendations; Authority may, in revisional space provided by E&D regime, order de-novo inquiry for recorded reasons, but such order remains interlocutory and open to judicial review on the limited grounds noted above. Cited Cases: • Federation v. Shafqat-ur-Rehman Ranjha (2021 SCMR 153) (distinguished). (c) Interpretation—Precedent—Conflicting co-ordinate Bench decisions—Per incuriam and sub-silentio---Where two three-Member Benches conflict, earlier view binds unless a larger Bench holds otherwise; a later judgment rendered without noticing the earlier binding dictum is per incuriam and does not carry precedential weight—Accordingly, Muhammad Yar Buttar (1999 SCMR 819) prevails over Shafqat-ur-Rehman Ranjha (2021 SCMR 153) to the extent the latter suggests an appeal to the President against a de-novo inquiry order—Courts should refer conflicts to larger Benches to preserve stare decisis and judicial discipline. Cited Authorities: • Salmond, Jurisprudence (on sub-silentio/per incuriam) • Don Basco High School v. A.D., EOBI (PLD 1989 SC 128) (ejusdem generis/“including”). (d) Constitutional and administrative law—Right to fair trial/due process—Art. 10A—Ordering de-novo inquiry—Standards for interference---Competent authority is not bound by inquiry recommendations, yet any de-novo direction must be supported by reasons and conform to the governing rules; High Court may quash such order where shown, on the face of the record, to be without jurisdiction, mala fide, coram non judice, abusive of process or in derogation of due process. Cited Cases: • Khalid Mehmood Wattoo v. Govt. of Punjab (1998 SCMR 2280) • Peer Muhammad v. Govt. of Balochistan (2007 SCMR 54) • Syed Arshad Ali v. PTCL (2008 SCMR 314). Disposition: Petitions converted into civil appeals and disposed of with declarations: (i) order of de-novo inquiry is not a final order under S.4, STA; writ is maintainable on limited grounds—impugned view on maintainability set aside; case remanded to Islamabad High Court to decide W.P. No. 2755/2023 on merits within three months; (ii) Service Appeal No. 32(K)CS/2025 regarding minor penalty to remain pending; if the de-novo order falls, its superstructure collapses (maxim sublato fundamento cadit opus); if upheld, the FST shall decide the appeal on its own merits.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan — Arts. 8(3), 8(5), 10-A, 175 & 268 — Pakistan Army Act (XXXIX of 1952), Ss. 2(1)(d)(i) & (ii), 59(4) — Vires of law — Trial of civilians by military courts — Scope and validity. Majority judgment under Art. 184(3) had declared the impugned provisions of the Army Act unconstitutional; however, upon intra-court appeal, the Supreme Court restored Ss. 2(1)(d)(i) & (ii) and 59(4). Justice Mazhar held that the authority to try persons “not otherwise subject” to the Act is confined to limited offences, namely sedition, abetment of desertion, or espionage under the Official Secrets Act, 1923, having a direct nexus with military affairs. The earlier declaration of invalidity misconstrued Art. 8(5), which merely prevents suspension of fundamental rights during a constitutional emergency and cannot be invoked to annul existing laws protected by Art. 268. Courts-martial, being part of a distinct military-justice system traceable to Entry No. 1, Federal Legislative List, fall outside Art. 175(3) separation-of-powers framework. Held, the Army Act provisions are intra vires and constitutionally sustainable. Cited Cases: F.B. Ali v. The State PLD 1975 SC 506; Benazir Bhutto v. Federation PLD 1988 SC 416; Dr. Mobashir Hasan v. Federation PLD 2010 SC 265; Sui Southern Gas Co. Ltd. v. Federation 2018 SCMR 802; LDA v. Imrana Tiwana 2015 SCMR 1739. (b) Intra-Court Appeal — Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act (2023), S. 5 — Nature and scope. Right of intra-court appeal against orders under Art. 184(3) is a substantive vested right, not a procedural formality. It enables the larger bench to affirm, modify, or vacate the earlier decision and ensures correction of legal or constitutional errors within the Supreme Court’s own jurisdiction. The remedy parallels a letters-patent appeal but is sui generis and integral to the constitutional guarantee of due process under Art. 10-A. Judicial propriety requires that while the Court is one, benches are functional divisions; therefore, ICA proceedings constitute continuation of the original jurisdiction, not an appeal from a subordinate court. (c) Interpretation of statutes — Doctrine of reading down — Presumption of constitutionality. A statute must be preserved if reasonably possible. Courts are bound to lean in favour of validity unless the law is ex facie violative of the Constitution. “Reading down” should be used to sustain functionality, not to destroy legislative intent. Judiciary cannot legislate; its duty is to interpret purposively and uphold Parliament’s objective. Article 8(3) permits special laws governing the armed forces for discipline and proper discharge of duty; therefore, S. 2(1)(d) and S. 59(4) fall within this constitutional exception. Cited Cases: Province of Sindh v. M.Q.M. PLD 2014 SC 531; Delhi Transport Corp. v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress AIR 1991 SC 101; Baz Muhammad Kakar v. Federation PLD 2012 SC 923; Province of E. Pakistan v. Siraj-ul-Haq Patwari PLD 1966 SC 854; Ellahi Cotton Mills v. Federation PLD 1997 SC 582. (d) Fair trial and due process — Art. 10-A — Courts-martial procedure — Right of appeal. Right to fair trial existed in procedural law long before Art. 10-A; its constitutional incorporation reinforced, but did not originate, the guarantee. The Army Act and Cr.P.C. collectively ensure fair-trial safeguards—e.g., S. 112 (rules of evidence identical to criminal courts) and S. 133-B (appeal before a Court of Appeals). Moreover, convicted persons now enjoy an independent statutory appeal to High Courts against convictions, consistent with Art. 10-A. Thus, allegations that military justice inherently denies fair trial are unfounded. (e) Delivery of accused to military authorities — Criminal Procedure Code (1898), S. 549 — Concurrent jurisdiction of civil and military courts. Section 549 Cr.P.C. authorizes transfer of custody to military authorities when the offence is triable by court-martial, but such discretion must be exercised by a reasoned, speaking order ensuring satisfaction that the case genuinely falls within military jurisdiction. Pending writs challenging Anti-Terrorism Court transfer orders are to be decided independently by respective High Courts on their own merits. (f) Doctrine of coordinate bench and judicial discipline — Binding precedent. Justice Mazhar endorsed the principle that co-equal benches cannot overrule each other; departures must be by larger benches. However, unlike the dissent of Afridi J., he viewed the ICA’s broader bench as constitutionally competent to revisit F.B. Ali in light of subsequent constitutional developments (Arts. 10-A & 184(3) practice). Judicial hierarchy requires consistency, but correction within the Supreme Court is permissible under statutory appeal. (g) Rights with responsibilities — Freedom of assembly and national security. Peaceful protest is a constitutional right subject to lawful restrictions. However, violent attacks on defence installations or espionage against the State transcend protected expression and fall within offences triable under the Army Act read with the Official Secrets Act, 1923. National security and fundamental rights must operate in harmony; neither can extinguish the other. (h) Legislative competence — Articles 8, 232–233, 268 & 260 — Existing laws protected. By virtue of Art. 268, all pre-constitutional enactments—including the 1967 amendment introducing S. 2(1)(d)—stand preserved until repealed by Parliament. Art. 8(5) cannot retrospectively invalidate these laws. The phrase “relating to members of the Armed Forces” in Art. 8(3)(a) must be construed broadly to cover statutes having any logical or operational connection with the armed forces’ discipline or defence of Pakistan. (i) Doctrine of ultra vires — Judicial review — Limits of judicial power. “Ultra vires” means beyond authority. While courts may strike down enactments lacking legislative competence, they must not question legislative wisdom. Judicial review aims to preserve constitutionality, not destroy it. The impugned Army Act provisions were found neither arbitrary nor discriminatory; the burden to prove otherwise lay on the challengers and was not discharged. Disposition: Appeals allowed. Impugned judgment dated 23 October 2023 was set aside. Sub-clauses (i) & (ii) of clause (d) of S. 2(1) and S. 59(4) of the Pakistan Army Act, 1952 were restored. Civilians accused in the 9–10 May 2023 incidents shall be tried by competent criminal or special courts; individual transfer orders to military custody shall be adjudicated by High Courts on merits. Limitation for appeal before High Courts shall run from the date of notification of amendments under the Army Act.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan — Arts. 4, 8, 9, 10-A, 175(3), 184(3), 199 & 245 — Pakistan Army Act (XXXIX of 1952), Ss. 2(1)(d)(i), (ii), 59(4) — Jurisdiction of military courts to try civilians — Constitutionality and scope. Civilians cannot be subjected to trial by court-martial under the Army Act, 1952. The constitutional framework vests judicial power exclusively in the ordinary judiciary established under Art. 175(3). Military courts are not part of the judicial hierarchy; their purpose is limited to maintaining discipline within the Armed Forces. Any attempt to extend such jurisdiction to persons who are not members of the Armed Forces violates Arts. 4, 9, and 10-A, depriving them of the guarantee of fair trial and due process. The power of Parliament under Art. 8(3)(a) to legislate “in relation to members of the Armed Forces” cannot be stretched to include civilians. Sub-clauses (i) & (ii) of S. 2(1)(d) and S. 59(4) of the Pakistan Army Act were therefore declared unconstitutional, of no legal effect, and struck down. Cited Cases: F.B. Ali v. The State PLD 1975 SC 506; Sheikh Liaqat Hussain v. Federation PLD 1999 SC 504; District Bar Association Rawalpindi v. Federation PLD 2015 SC 401; Khan Asfandyar Wali v. Federation PLD 2001 SC 607; LDA v. Imrana Tiwana 2015 SCMR 1739. (b) Article 10-A — Fair trial and due process — Scope and application to all judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings. The right to a fair trial is a fundamental right available to “every person.” Military courts, functioning under executive control, do not provide independence, openness, or procedural safeguards inherent to Art. 10-A. Proceedings before courts-martial are held in secrecy; accused persons are denied open access to counsel, independent judges, and appeal to civilian courts. Such forums are incompatible with the constitutional mandate of a fair, public, and impartial hearing. Therefore, trials of civilians before military courts offend Art. 10-A and are void. (c) Constitutional structure — Separation of powers and independence of judiciary — Arts. 175(3) & 245 — Military justice vis-à-vis civilian courts. Judicial power is vested exclusively in courts established under Chapter 2 of Part VII. Military courts derive authority from executive control and are thus not courts of law within the meaning of Art. 175. The Armed Forces Act must operate under civilian supremacy; Art. 245 ensures assistance to civil power but does not authorize parallel judicial structures. Hence, exercise of criminal jurisdiction over civilians by military authorities amounts to a usurpation of judicial power, contrary to constitutional design. (d) Constitutional interpretation — Fundamental rights and supremacy of Constitution — Arts. 8 & 9. Fundamental rights form the foundation of constitutional democracy. Where statutory provisions infringe or restrict those rights, they are void to the extent of inconsistency. Article 8(5) cannot be used to justify continuation of an unconstitutional law. The Pakistan Army Act, being a pre-Constitution law, stands subject to constitutional limitations; it cannot override or curtail basic rights protected under the 1973 Constitution. (e) Civilian offences and military discipline — Scope of “persons subject to the Act.” Only those civilians who voluntarily accept service obligations or are directly connected to the Armed Forces in an employment or contractual capacity may fall within limited disciplinary control. The expression “persons not otherwise subject to the Act” cannot include ordinary citizens, protestors, or persons accused of general offences under the Pakistan Penal Code. The constitutional principle of equality before law requires all such persons to be tried by ordinary criminal courts. (f) Cr.P.C., 1898 — S. 549 — Delivery of accused to military authorities — Judicial control and legality. Section 549 Cr.P.C. empowers the Magistrate to deliver an accused to the military authorities only if the offence is exclusively triable by court-martial. The provision does not authorize indiscriminate transfers of civilian cases. Civilian courts retain primary jurisdiction over all ordinary offences; military custody without judicial sanction is unlawful. (g) Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023 — Ss. 2–5 — Validity and legislative competence. The Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023 was enacted under the legislative competence conferred by Entry No. 55, Federal Legislative List (jurisdiction and powers of the Supreme Court). The Act does not abridge judicial independence; rather, it provides a procedural mechanism to regulate benches and intra-court appeals within the Supreme Court. Section 5, granting a right of appeal from orders under Art. 184(3), is consistent with the constitutional guarantee of access to justice. The Act is valid, intra vires, and constitutionally sustainable. Cited Cases: Pakistan Lawyers Forum v. Federation PLD 2005 SC 719; Wukala Mahaz Barai Tahafuz Dastoor v. Federation PLD 1998 SC 1263; Sindh High Court Bar Assn. v. Federation PLD 2009 SC 879; Al-Jehad Trust PLD 1996 SC 324. (h) Maintainability of petitions under Art. 184(3) — Locus standi and public importance. Petitions challenging the trial of civilians by military courts involved enforcement of fundamental rights of citizens and raised questions of public importance under Art. 184(3). They were therefore maintainable. Judicial review remains available against executive or legislative acts violating the Constitution. (i) Remedy and implementation — Pending civilian cases under military custody. All civilians facing trial before military courts pursuant to notifications issued after the events of May 9–10, 2023, shall be transferred to the respective anti-terrorism or ordinary criminal courts having jurisdiction. Evidence collected by military authorities may be used before those courts subject to law and due process. Detention beyond legal remand or without judicial order shall stand quashed. Disposition: Appeals dismissed. Majority judgment of 23 October 2023 declaring Sections 2(1)(d)(i) & (ii) and 59(4) of the Pakistan Army Act, 1952 ultra vires the Constitution was affirmed. All civilians accused of offences arising from the May 2023 incidents are to be tried by ordinary criminal courts. The Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023 upheld as constitutional and intra vires.

Summary: Bail granted --- (a) National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 ----S. 17; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, Ss. 497 & 498 Bailability after amendments—Applicability of Cr.P.C. to NAO trials—Held, following wholesale amendments to NAO, offences under NAO are now bailable; by virtue of S.17 NAO the Cr.P.C. applies mutatis mutandis to NAO proceedings—Consequently, post-arrest and pre-arrest bail are to be governed by Ss. 497 and 498 Cr.P.C., to be first sought before the Trial Court and thereafter before appellate fora—Direct resort to constitutional jurisdiction for bail in NAO matters is no longer the necessary route. (b) Constitution of Pakistan ----Arts. 4, 9 & 10-A Fair trial and due process—Delay in conclusion of criminal trials—Prolonged pre-trial detention—Held, “delay” is antithetical to fair trial and due process; inordinate, unexplained delay for no fault of accused attracts constitutional protections to life, liberty, and fair trial—Earlier jurisprudence condemned day-to-day-trial mandates being ignored in NAO matters and recognized release where statutory timelines are frustrated; principle reaffirmed. Chairman NAB v. Nasrullah (PLD 2022 SC 497) relied upon. (c) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 ----S. 497, third proviso—Statutory bail as of right Nature of relief and pre-conditions—Held, statutory bail on ground of delay is not discretionary; once the limbs of the third proviso are satisfied, bail follows as of right unless the delay is attributable to the accused or persons acting on their behalf, or the excepted categories (hardened/dangerous criminals, prior convicts for death/life offences, terrorism) apply—Period thresholds: exceeding one year for non-capital offences; two years for capital—Accrual of right cannot be defeated on considerations outside the provisos. Muhammad Usman v. The State (2024 SCMR 28) followed. (d) Criminal procedure—Assessment of delay on facts ----S. 497, third proviso—NAO references—Case management Applicants incarcerated about 18 months; no delay attributable to them—Reference filed 18-07-2023; charge framed 15-08-2023; three witnesses partly examined—Supplementary reference filed 17-01-2024; amended charge 21-02-2024 necessitating re-recording—There are 43 accused and 208 witnesses; with separate cross-examinations, practical completion within near time is implausible—Direction to conclude within six months would be ineffectual given stage of proceedings—Keeping accused incarcerated further would risk constitutional violation; statutory right to bail triggered. (e) Bail—Heinousness of offence—White-collar crime ----S. 497 Cr.P.C. Heinousness not a standalone ground to refuse statutory bail—Legislative scheme even permits statutory bail in capital offences upon delay; NAO maximum sentence (14 years) does not alter the statutory entitlement—Purpose of bail is to secure attendance at trial; where evidence is predominantly documentary and investigation is complete, risk of tampering is minimal—Speculative fears of absconsion cannot defeat a crystallized statutory right; adequate surety and conditions can mitigate flight risk. Dr. Asim Hussain v. The State (2017 PCr.LJ 631), State (ANF) v. Muhammad Asim Khan (2022 YLR Note 64 Sindh), Hasnain Mustafa v. The State (2019 SCMR 1914) referred. (f) Practice and procedure—NAO prosecutions ----Case structuring and delay Court observed NAB’s practice of arraying numerous accused and voluminous witness lists renders trials “never-ending”; emphasized prosecutorial case-management: include only most responsible persons, rely on strongest documentary proof, and minimize witnesses to ensure effective, expeditious trials. (g) Application of third-proviso limbs on record ----S. 497 Cr.P.C. (i) Offences not punishable with death—Satisfied. (ii) Continuous detention exceeding one year with trial unconcluded, and no delay attributable to accused—Satisfied. (iii) Not previously convicted for death/life offences; not hardened/dangerous; not terrorism accused—Satisfied. Result: entitlement to bail as of right. Cited cases: • Chairman NAB v. Nasrullah PLD 2022 SC 497 • Muhammad Usman v. The State 2024 SCMR 28 • Shahid Umar v. Chairman NAB 2019 PCr.LJ 370 • Dr. Asim Hussain v. The State 2017 PCr.LJ 631 • State (ANF) v. Muhammad Asim Khan 2022 YLR Note 64 (Sindh) • Hasnain Mustafa v. The State 2019 SCMR 1914 (g) Disposition — Applications allowed—Post-arrest bail granted to Mukhtiar Ali Chandio, Tabish Ali Shah Hussaini, Saood-ul-Haq and Muhammad Adnan Rasheed under S. 497 (third proviso) Cr.P.C., subject to furnishing solvent surety of Rs. 1,500,000 each with PR bonds in the like amount to the satisfaction of the Additional Registrar—Ministry of Interior directed to place applicants’ names on the ECL and ensure immediate compliance—No comment on merits; Trial Court to proceed strictly in accordance with law.

Summary: Acquittal granted --- (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860) ----Ss. 302(b), 334, 333 & 34—Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss. 342, 382-B—Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 10-A—Model Criminal Trial Court—Conviction for qatl-i-amd and itlaf-e-udw—Scope on appeal. On the same prosecution evidence on which co-accused Juman and Zulfiqar had already been acquitted by the trial court, the appellants were convicted under Ss. 302(b)/34, P.P.C. and S. 334, P.P.C. (read with S. 333) with sentences of life imprisonment and payment of diyat/compensation, along with benefit of S. 382-B, Cr.P.C. In appeal, the High Court reassessed the entire record and found the prosecution had failed to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt; convictions were set aside to safeguard the right to fair trial under Art. 10-A of the Constitution. (b) Criminal trial ----Delay in FIR—Effect—Inference under the circumstances. The FIR was lodged with a delay of one day. In view of the surrounding facts, such delay assumed significance and could be attributed to consultation/deliberation; thus caution in appraisal of evidence was warranted. Reliance was placed on Mehmood Ahmed and others v. The State (1995 SCMR 127). (c) Criminal trial ----Ocular account—Material contradictions—Interested/chance witnesses not examined—Adverse inference. Prosecution witnesses gave inconsistent versions about who fired at the deceased, the parts of body hit, and the manner of injuries to the injured witnesses; some independent witnesses were given up. In terms of Art. 129(g), QSO, adverse inference was drawn that the withheld witnesses would not have supported the prosecution. When direct evidence is disbelieved to the extent of one accused assigned an effective role, the same witnesses cannot, without independent corroboration, sustain conviction of others assigned a similar role. Reliance was placed on Sardar Bibi v. Munir Ahmed (2017 SCMR 344) and Muhammad Jamil v. Muhammad Akram (2009 SCMR 120). (d) Evidence ----Recovery and forensics—Transparency in dispatch—Exclusive possession—Weight. Weapons allegedly recovered on appellants’ pointation were dispatched to the FSL together with empties secured from the scene, instead of separately, undermining transparency; one weapon was recovered from an open place (jungle) and not from exclusive possession; delayed recovery further reduced probative value. Casings tallying with a weapon dispatched after the arrest lost significance. Reliance was placed on Asad Rehmat v. The State (2019 SCMR 1156). (e) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 ----Art. 39—Confession to police—Inadmissibility—Effect. Alleged admissions made before the Investigating Officer were inadmissible under Art. 39, QSO, and could not be used as substantive evidence against the appellants. (f) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ----S. 225—Misjoinder/prejudice—Conviction without charge—Illegality. The appellants were convicted under S. 334, P.P.C. though they had never been charged for that offence. Such conviction, having misled the defence and occasioned failure of justice, was contrary to S. 225, Cr.P.C. and violative of the right to fair trial under Art. 10-A of the Constitution. (g) Criminal trial ----Benefit of doubt—Principles restated. Even a single circumstance creating reasonable doubt in a prudent mind entitles the accused to acquittal as of right, not as a matter of concession. Multiple infirmities—material contradictions, doubtful ocular account, unsafe recoveries/forensics, inadmissible confessions, and parity with acquitted co-accused—compelled extension of benefit of doubt. Reliance was placed on Muhammad Mansha v. The State (2018 SCMR 772). (h) Distinguishing prosecution precedents—Rationale. Cases cited for the State/complainant were distinguishable: in Muhammad Bashir (2023 SCMR 190) FIR was prompt; in Sheeraz Khan (2010 SCMR 1772) evidence was consistent; in Anwar Shamim (2010 SCMR 1791) the issue turned on relationship of witnesses rather than contradictions present here. (g) Disposition— Appeal allowed; convictions and sentences under Ss. 302(b), 334 and 34, P.P.C. set aside; appellants acquitted and directed to be released forthwith if not required in any other case. Cited Cases: • Mehmood Ahmed v. The State 1995 SCMR 127 • Sardar Bibi v. Munir Ahmed 2017 SCMR 344 • Asad Rehmat v. The State 2019 SCMR 1156 • Muhammad Jamil v. Muhammad Akram 2009 SCMR 120 • Muhammad Mansha v. The State 2018 SCMR 772 • Muhammad Bashir v. The State 2023 SCMR 190 (dist.) • Sheeraz Khan v. The State 2010 SCMR 1772 (dist.) • Anwar Shamim v. The State 2010 SCMR 1791 (dist.).

Summary: Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Arts. 9, 10A, 14, 25 & 37(d)--- Incarcerated prisoners---Fundamental rights--- Release of inmates from the prisons on the basis of 'probation'---Duty of care owed by the State and its functionaries towards incarcerated prisoners explained. It is an undeniable fact that living conditions and the treatment of prisoners in overcrowded and inadequately equipped prisons profoundly affects the constitutionally guaranteed rights. Most of the victims of a non-functional criminal justice system are those who belong to economically and socially marginalized sections of the society. They do not have the means to access the courts nor has the State fulfilled its constitutional obligation to ensure inexpensive and expeditious justice contemplated under Article 37(d) of the Constitution. The prisoner, whether convicted or non-convicted, has no choice but to place reliance for his right to life and other needs, such as medical attention, solely on the authorities holding him/her in custody. This reliance gives rise to a duty of care on the part of the State and its functionaries. The Constitution guarantees the right to life under Article 9. In the context of a prisoner, it is implicit in Article 9 that it is the duty of the State to ensure that every person incarcerated including those who are convicted for an offence and undergoing sentence, are treated in a manner that does not expose the latter to harm and that humane treatment is extended so long as the incarceration lasts. The prisoner is thus entirely dependent on the State and is at its mercy for the purposes of safeguarding the right to life. The State, therefore, owes a duty of care to every prisoner, regardless of the nature of offence for which the latter has been incarcerated. It is only liberty and the right of free movement that has been curtailed and definitely not the constitutional rights to life and to betreated with respect, having regard to the fundamental rights of inviolability of the dignity of man guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution. Moreover, it becomes a duty of the functionaries to ensure that no prisoner is unjustifiably deprived of the right to liberty even if it is on the basis of being released on probation. It is a right of every eligible prisoner to be considered for the purposes of enjoying liberty on the basis of probation. The neglect of the executive authorities to perform their obligations and duties imposed by law and to give effect to the enforced laws, particularly relating to the inmates of prisons amounts to a breach of the duty of care that is owed to the incarcerated prisoner. This breach of a fiduciary duty could expose the concerned authorities and the State to be sued by the inmates of the overcrowded prisons for damages. Neglect or refusal to effectively enforce the enacted laws relating to release of a prisoner on the basis of probation is violative of the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution, inter alia, under Articles 9, 10-A, 14 and 25. The respective Chief Executives' of the Federal Government and the provinces are directed to ensure that the enacted laws relating to release of a prisoner on the basis of probation are effectively implemented and made functional. The Federal and Provincial Governments, as the case may be, shall ensure that the prisoners who are eligible under the enacted laws for availing the benefit of being released on probation are identified and their cases are processed expeditiously. ------ (a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Arts. 9, 10-A, 14, 25 & 37(d)---Prisoners---Release on probation---Fundamental rights---Duty of care of State and prison authorities---Scope---Proceedings arose out of reports sought by Supreme Court regarding implementation of laws relating to release of prisoners on probation---Reports revealed grave prison conditions, overcrowding and non-functional enforcement of probation laws---Held, that a prisoner, whether convicted or under trial, remains entitled to constitutional protection of life, dignity and fair treatment---Incarceration curtails only liberty and freedom of movement and not the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution---Because prisoners are wholly dependent upon the State for protection of life, health and humane treatment, such dependence gives rise to a duty of care on the part of the State and its functionaries---Failure to ensure humane treatment and lawful consideration of eligible prisoners for probation amounts to infringement of constitutional guarantees, particularly where weak and marginalized prisoners suffer due to a dysfunctional criminal justice system---State was bound to ensure inexpensive and expeditious justice in terms of Art.37(d) of the Constitution and could not permit prison conditions or administrative neglect to defeat rights guaranteed under Arts.9, 10-A, 14 and 25 of the Constitution. (b) Constitution of Pakistan ----Arts. 9 & 14---Right to life and dignity of prisoners---Prisoner’s dependence on State---Extent of protection---Held, that in the case of a prisoner, the right to life under Art.9 of the Constitution includes the State’s obligation to ensure that every incarcerated person is treated in a manner which does not expose him to harm and that humane treatment is extended throughout the period of incarceration---A prisoner is entirely dependent on the State and remains at its mercy for safeguarding life and dignity---Therefore, the State owes a duty of care to every prisoner regardless of the nature of the offence for which he has been incarcerated---What stands curtailed is only liberty and free movement, and not the constitutional right to be treated with respect consistent with the inviolability of dignity of man guaranteed by Art.14 of the Constitution---Functionaries of the State are also under obligation to ensure that no prisoner is unjustifiably deprived of liberty, including where release on probation is lawfully available. (c) Constitution of Pakistan ----Arts. 9, 10-A, 14 & 25---Probation laws---Non-enforcement---Effect---Right of eligible prisoner to be considered for probation---Held, that the benefit of release on probation is of pivotal importance in the context of unjustified deprivation of liberty and every eligible prisoner has a right to be considered for such release in accordance with law---Neglect or refusal by executive authorities to perform duties imposed by enacted probation laws and to give effect thereto, especially in relation to prison inmates, amounts to breach of the duty of care owed by the State and its functionaries---Such neglect is violative of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Arts.9, 10-A, 14 and 25 of the Constitution---Failure to enforce probation laws effectively may also amount to breach of fiduciary duty, exposing the concerned authorities and the State to claims for damages by inmates of overcrowded prisons. (d) Administration of justice and prison administration ----Overcrowded prisons---Marginalized prisoners---Need for effective implementation of probation regime---Held, that overcrowded and inadequately equipped prisons seriously impair constitutionally protected rights and most victims of the non-functional criminal justice system belong to economically and socially marginalized classes who are least able to access courts---Prisons exist as institutions for reformation and social rehabilitation, and the failure of governments to operationalize probation laws defeats that purpose---Accordingly, the respective Chief Executives of the Federal Government and Provincial Governments were directed to ensure that enacted laws relating to release of prisoners on probation are effectively implemented and made functional and that all prisoners eligible under such laws are identified and their cases processed expeditiously. Disposition: Proceedings were disposed of by declaring that neglect or refusal to effectively enforce enacted laws relating to release of prisoners on probation is violative of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 9, 10-A, 14 and 25 of the Constitution; the Federal and Provincial Chief Executives were directed to ensure effective implementation of probation laws and expeditious processing of all eligible prisoners’ cases. Raja Azmat Ali v. Abu Malik Naseem and another, 2023 SCMR 1867, decided on 23.05.2023.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 ----Art. 184(3)---Art. 175E(4)---Art. 10A---Art. 90---Art. 40---Suo motu proceedings---Transfer to Federal Constitutional Court---Scope of original jurisdiction Murder of Pakistani journalist abroad---Suo motu taken by Supreme Court under Art.184(3)---Matter transferred after Constitution (Twenty-Seventh Amendment) Act, 2025---Held, proceedings concerned ensuring fair, independent and transparent investigation; right to fair trial under Art.10A extends to investigation stage and requires collection of evidence holistically, including material supporting defence as well as prosecution---However, court’s role is limited and cannot extend to continuous monitoring or supervision of investigation, particularly where no allegation of impropriety in investigation is pressed and the concern relates mainly to pace owing to coordination with another sovereign State. (b) Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 ----S. 4(1)(l)---Definition of “investigation”---Collection of evidence by police officer/authorized person (other than Magistrate)---Judicial restraint Court supervision of investigation---Limits---Held, investigation is a statutory inquisition for collection of evidence by police; continuous court control/supervision not contemplated and generally impermissible---Conduct and manner of investigation not to be scrutinized under constitutional jurisdiction as it amounts to interference and substitution of police function; courts and police perform complementary, not overlapping, roles---Exceptional circumstances for interference confined to limited categories (e.g., habeas corpus, mala fide investigation, lack of jurisdiction/excess of authority) and grievances may be pursued before competent forums. Cited Cases: • Ajmeel Khan v. Abdur Rahim, PLD 2009 SC 102 • Malik Shoukat Ali Dogar v. Ghulam Qasim Khakwani, PLD 1994 SC 281 • Fahad Ahmed Gulzar v. ASI/IO Saeed Mahroof, 2025 PCrLJ 1140 (c) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 ----Art. 10A---Fair trial and due process---Investigation stage---Independence and transparency Fair trial---Commencement from investigation---Held, Art.10A protection begins from inception of investigation, requiring independent investigator and enabling environment free from undue pressure---Nevertheless, court’s continuous oversight may prejudice accused and undermine fairness of procedure; judicial monitoring of investigation therefore disfavoured. (d) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 ----Art. 90---Executive authority of Federation---State’s obligation to protect citizens’ rights---Government measures abroad Federal Government’s role---Diplomatic and investigative steps---Held, Federal Government, acting through executive authority, undertook measures including constitution of Special Joint Investigation Team (SJIT), liaison with foreign authorities, engagement with prosecutorial offices in Kenya and facilitation through Ministry of Foreign Affairs---Court noted no objection by any party to SJIT or fact-finding process/method, and no allegation of impropriety; primary concern related to pace due to need for coordination with another sovereign State. (e) Mutual Legal Assistance (Criminal Matters) Act, 2020 ----Ss. 2(1)(c), 4, 7---Central authority (Secretary, Ministry of Interior)---Request to foreign state---Admissible evidence and cooperation Mutual legal assistance framework in Pakistan---Held, 2020 Act provides statutory mechanism for MLA in criminal matters through designated central authority empowered to make requests to foreign authorities for investigation/proceedings---Request made to Kenya and agreement executed; once MLA process invoked, central authority exercises powers relating to request under the Act, and investigation proceeds within the statutory framework, reducing scope for judicial interference. (f) Kenya Mutual Legal Assistance Act, 2011 ----Ss. 5, 6---Kenyan central authority (Office of Attorney General)---Handling foreign requests Bilateral cooperation---Held, Kenya maintains corresponding statutory framework empowering its central authority to act on MLA requests---Where both States possess legal frameworks and are coordinating under MLA, courts ought not to interfere when law and investigation are taking their due course and sovereign processes are engaged. (g) Constitutional law and foreign policy ----Art. 40---Principles of policy---International forums---Separation of functions Direction to pursue international fora---Held, judicial orders directing State to raise matter in international forums would encroach upon foreign policy domain and interfere with ongoing MLA-based investigative process; handling of foreign relations is for Federal Government/MoFA to determine what is appropriate in international context; issue left to executive’s judgment, with note that recourse could be considered if need arises. (h) Criminal law ----Pakistan Penal Code, 1860---Ss. 302/34---FIR registered in Pakistan for murder abroad---Inter-state coordination Registration of FIR and domestic steps---FIR registered under sections 302/34 PPC at P.S. Ramna, Islamabad as produced before Supreme Court---SJIT constituted to investigate and coordinate with Kenyan counterparts; court noted ongoing diplomatic and legal steps including warrants and MLA cooperation, without making findings on merits of evidence so as not to prejudice any future trial. Disposition: Suo moto proceedings disposed of; all pending applications disposed of; Court declined to keep proceedings pending for continuous supervision/monitoring of investigation and declined to issue directions concerning international fora, noting MLA process and diplomatic coordination underway; legal heirs left at liberty to approach courts/forums of competent jurisdiction in case of specific grievance (Suo Moto Case No. 3 of 2022, heard 14.01.2026).