Summary: Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 497 (2)---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 337-U, 337-A (1), 337-L (2), 148 & 149---Injury on teeth, shajja-i-khafifa, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly---Post-arrest bail, grant of---Further inquiry---Injury on lips---Itlaf-i udw to be determined by Trial Court---Allegation against the petitioner/accused was that he inflicted pistol butt blow on mouth of complainant due to which his lip was fractured and one tooth was broken---There was a delay of about six days in reporting the matter to the police without there being any satisfactory explanation---According to contents of FIR, the petitioner inflicted pistol butt blow on mouth of complainant due to which his lip was fractured and one tooth was broken, however, the injuries allegedly attributed to the petitioner had been declared under Ss.337-L(2) & 337-A(i), P.P.C, which were bailable and S.337-U, P.P.C, which carried the punishment of arsh i.e. one-twentieth of the diyat---Whether or not S.337-U, P.P.C would be read with S.334, P.P.C, would be answered by the Trial Court after recording of evidence---Petitioner was not involved in any other case of such like nature---Petitioner was behind bars since his arrest and no more required for the purpose of investigation---No useful purpose would be served by keeping the petitioner behind the bars for an indefinite period---Thus, case of the petitioner called for further inquiry within the ambit of Subsection (2) of S.497, Code of Criminal Procedure---Petitioner was admitted to post arrest bail, in circumstances. Shahid Rafique Mayo for Petitioner. Sh. Muhammad Nouman Siddique, DPG along with Muhammad Sona, ASI with record. Farrukh Mehmood for the Complainant.

Summary: (a) Criminal Law – Conviction Based on Eyewitness and Medical Evidence: ---- Pakistan Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 324, 334, 450, 148, 149 – Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979, S. 18 – Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, Art. 47 Appellant convicted for attempted murder, trespass, grievous hurt, and abduction for forced marriage—Prosecution established case through victim’s direct testimony, corroborated by medical evidence—Gunshot injuries leading to amputation of victim’s arm confirmed by medical report—Eyewitnesses remained consistent under cross-examination—Conviction upheld as evidence was unimpeachable and prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt—Reliance placed on Aqil v. The State (2023 SCMR 831), Muhammad Iqbal v. The State (1996 SCMR 908), Naeem Akhtar v. The State (PLD 2003 SC 396). (b) Admissibility of Transposed Witness Statements in Subsequent Trial: ---- Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 512 – Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, Art. 47 Statements of witnesses recorded in earlier trials of co-accused were transposed in appellant’s trial—Legality of transposition upheld as procedure followed Section 512, Cr.P.C., which allows for preservation of evidence in cases where accused absconds—Statements were admissible as prosecution met conditions of Article 47, Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, ensuring cross-examination rights—Distinguished from Khalid Mehmood alias Khaloo v. The State (2022 SCMR 1148), where transposed statements lacked proper judicial authorization—Reliance placed on Mir Shakeel-ur-Rehman v. Yahya Bakhtiar (PLD 2010 SC 612), Muhammad Siddique v. The State (2018 SCMR 71). (c) Delay in Arrest and Recovery of Weapon – Impact on Case: ---- Pakistan Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 324, 450 – Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 103 Appellant remained absconding for 21 years—Kalashnikov recovered from his possession upon arrest—Recovery served as additional circumstantial evidence, supporting eyewitness and medical testimony—Delayed arrest did not weaken prosecution case as absconding indicated consciousness of guilt—Reliance placed on Rehmat Ali v. The State (1986 SCMR 446). (d) Procedural Irregularities in Medical Report – No Effect on Conviction: ---- Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, Art. 129(g) Minor clerical discrepancies in Medical Legal Certificate (MLC) did not affect credibility of medical evidence—Amputation of victim’s arm confirmed by hospital records—Courts held that such irregularities do not amount to failure of justice—Reliance placed on Faisal Mehmood v. The State (2010 SCMR 1025), Muhammad Ilyas v. The State (2011 SCMR 460). (e) Safe Administration of Justice – No Benefit of Doubt Available: ---- Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 342 – Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, Art. 129(g) Appellant’s conviction based on direct evidence of victim, supported by eyewitness accounts and medical evidence—No contradictions in prosecution’s case to warrant benefit of doubt—Absence of false implication or mala fide motives—Court emphasized that benefit of doubt applies only when substantial uncertainty exists—Reliance placed on Aqil v. The State (2023 SCMR 831), Muhammad Mansha v. The State (2018 SCMR 772). ----Disposition: Appeal dismissed—Conviction and sentences upheld—No legal infirmity in trial court’s judgment—Appellant to serve imposed sentence. ----Cited Cases: Aqil v. The State (2023 SCMR 831) Muhammad Iqbal v. The State (1996 SCMR 908) Naeem Akhtar v. The State (PLD 2003 SC 396) Muhammad Mansha v. The State (2018 SCMR 772) Mir Shakeel-ur-Rehman v. Yahya Bakhtiar (PLD 2010 SC 612) Muhammad Siddique v. The State (2018 SCMR 71) Rehmat Ali v. The State (1986 SCMR 446)

Summary: Acquittal granted --- (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860) ----Ss. 302(b), 334, 333 & 34—Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss. 342, 382-B—Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 10-A—Model Criminal Trial Court—Conviction for qatl-i-amd and itlaf-e-udw—Scope on appeal. On the same prosecution evidence on which co-accused Juman and Zulfiqar had already been acquitted by the trial court, the appellants were convicted under Ss. 302(b)/34, P.P.C. and S. 334, P.P.C. (read with S. 333) with sentences of life imprisonment and payment of diyat/compensation, along with benefit of S. 382-B, Cr.P.C. In appeal, the High Court reassessed the entire record and found the prosecution had failed to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt; convictions were set aside to safeguard the right to fair trial under Art. 10-A of the Constitution. (b) Criminal trial ----Delay in FIR—Effect—Inference under the circumstances. The FIR was lodged with a delay of one day. In view of the surrounding facts, such delay assumed significance and could be attributed to consultation/deliberation; thus caution in appraisal of evidence was warranted. Reliance was placed on Mehmood Ahmed and others v. The State (1995 SCMR 127). (c) Criminal trial ----Ocular account—Material contradictions—Interested/chance witnesses not examined—Adverse inference. Prosecution witnesses gave inconsistent versions about who fired at the deceased, the parts of body hit, and the manner of injuries to the injured witnesses; some independent witnesses were given up. In terms of Art. 129(g), QSO, adverse inference was drawn that the withheld witnesses would not have supported the prosecution. When direct evidence is disbelieved to the extent of one accused assigned an effective role, the same witnesses cannot, without independent corroboration, sustain conviction of others assigned a similar role. Reliance was placed on Sardar Bibi v. Munir Ahmed (2017 SCMR 344) and Muhammad Jamil v. Muhammad Akram (2009 SCMR 120). (d) Evidence ----Recovery and forensics—Transparency in dispatch—Exclusive possession—Weight. Weapons allegedly recovered on appellants’ pointation were dispatched to the FSL together with empties secured from the scene, instead of separately, undermining transparency; one weapon was recovered from an open place (jungle) and not from exclusive possession; delayed recovery further reduced probative value. Casings tallying with a weapon dispatched after the arrest lost significance. Reliance was placed on Asad Rehmat v. The State (2019 SCMR 1156). (e) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 ----Art. 39—Confession to police—Inadmissibility—Effect. Alleged admissions made before the Investigating Officer were inadmissible under Art. 39, QSO, and could not be used as substantive evidence against the appellants. (f) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ----S. 225—Misjoinder/prejudice—Conviction without charge—Illegality. The appellants were convicted under S. 334, P.P.C. though they had never been charged for that offence. Such conviction, having misled the defence and occasioned failure of justice, was contrary to S. 225, Cr.P.C. and violative of the right to fair trial under Art. 10-A of the Constitution. (g) Criminal trial ----Benefit of doubt—Principles restated. Even a single circumstance creating reasonable doubt in a prudent mind entitles the accused to acquittal as of right, not as a matter of concession. Multiple infirmities—material contradictions, doubtful ocular account, unsafe recoveries/forensics, inadmissible confessions, and parity with acquitted co-accused—compelled extension of benefit of doubt. Reliance was placed on Muhammad Mansha v. The State (2018 SCMR 772). (h) Distinguishing prosecution precedents—Rationale. Cases cited for the State/complainant were distinguishable: in Muhammad Bashir (2023 SCMR 190) FIR was prompt; in Sheeraz Khan (2010 SCMR 1772) evidence was consistent; in Anwar Shamim (2010 SCMR 1791) the issue turned on relationship of witnesses rather than contradictions present here. (g) Disposition— Appeal allowed; convictions and sentences under Ss. 302(b), 334 and 34, P.P.C. set aside; appellants acquitted and directed to be released forthwith if not required in any other case. Cited Cases: • Mehmood Ahmed v. The State 1995 SCMR 127 • Sardar Bibi v. Munir Ahmed 2017 SCMR 344 • Asad Rehmat v. The State 2019 SCMR 1156 • Muhammad Jamil v. Muhammad Akram 2009 SCMR 120 • Muhammad Mansha v. The State 2018 SCMR 772 • Muhammad Bashir v. The State 2023 SCMR 190 (dist.) • Sheeraz Khan v. The State 2010 SCMR 1772 (dist.) • Anwar Shamim v. The State 2010 SCMR 1791 (dist.).

Summary: Background: In this case, the petitioner, a police constable, was convicted by the trial court for causing injuries to two individuals during an altercation that occurred on 02.05.2010. The petitioner, along with his brothers, allegedly opened fire, resulting in severe injuries to the victims. The injuries led to the amputation of one victim's leg and a fracture of another. The trial court sentenced the petitioner to multiple terms of imprisonment under Sections 324, 337-F(v), 334, 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) and Article 155-C of the Police Order, 2002. Upon appeal, the conviction was upheld, leading the petitioner to file a revision petition. -----Issues: 1- Whether the injuries caused by the petitioner were intentional or accidental during a grappling incident. 2- Whether the conviction under Section 324 PPC for attempted murder was valid given the facts of the case. 3- Whether the petitioner’s conviction and sentence under Sections 334 and 337-F(v) PPC were legally sustainable. 4- Whether the dismissal from police service following the conviction was appropriate under the applicable rules. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: Conviction and Injuries: The court found discrepancies in the prosecution's case, with conflicting witness testimonies and the medical evidence showing that the injuries were caused at close range, indicating an accidental firing during a scuffle rather than an intentional act. The court ruled that the injuries were caused by mistake (khata), not with intent to kill. As a result, the conviction under Section 337-F(v) PPC was set aside, and the petitioner was convicted under Section 337-I PPC (punishment for causing hurt by mistake), with the petitioner ordered to pay Daman of Rs. 100,000 to one of the victims. Attempted Murder (Section 324 PPC): The court held that there was no evidence of intent to commit murder, a requisite element for conviction under Section 324 PPC. Therefore, the conviction and sentence under this section were set aside. Conviction under Section 334 PPC: The court ruled that, although the injuries resulted in amputation, since they were caused by mistake, the appropriate conviction was under Section 337-I PPC. The court set aside the conviction under Section 334 PPC and sentenced the petitioner to pay Arsh of Rs. 547,408 to the other injured victim. Conviction under Article 155-C of Police Order, 2002: The court found that the necessary sanction for prosecuting the petitioner under this section was missing, and as a result, the conviction under Article 155-C was set aside. Dismissal from Police Service: While no reinstatement order was passed, the court noted that since the petitioner’s sentence was reduced to compensatory penalties (Arsh and Daman), his dismissal from police service may not have been mandatory. The court referred to the relevant police rules, which allow discretion in determining whether dismissal is appropriate for such offenses, and emphasized that dismissal is not automatic in all cases of conviction. ----Citations/Precedents: Ali Ahmad vs The State (PLD 2020 Supreme Court 201) – Emphasized that when the prosecution fails to prove its case, the statement of the accused under Section 342 Cr.P.C. must be considered in its entirety. Muhammad Mumtaz vs Mst. Parveen Akhtar (1985 CLC 415) – Clarified that a debt does not become extinct if barred by limitation and can still be paid voluntarily.

Summary: [Scope of the expression ?hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal? as used in the fourth proviso to Section 497(1) CrPC] The Supreme Court's main task is to determine whether an accused person can be considered a hardened, desperate, or dangerous criminal under the fourth proviso to Section 497(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC). The court explains that the phrase "hardened, desperate, or dangerous criminal" does not require a previous criminal record of convictions. Instead, the court must assess the character of the accused based on the facts and circumstances of the case. The gravity and severity of the alleged act can be sufficient to attract the fourth proviso even if the accused does not have a previous criminal record.In the present case, the Supreme Court concludes that the nature and manner of the offense, which involved cutting someone's nose, and the role attributed to the petitioner, make him a dangerous and harmful individual for society. As a result, he falls within the scope of a "hardened, desperate, or dangerous criminal," and the court declines to interfere with the impugned order denying bail.The Supreme Court dismisses the petition, but it directs the trial court to expedite the proceedings and conclude the trial as quickly as possible.

Summary: [Scope of the expression ?hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal? as used in the fourth proviso to Section 497(1) CrPC] The Supreme Court's main task is to determine whether an accused person can be considered a hardened, desperate, or dangerous criminal under the fourth proviso to Section 497(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC). The court explains that the phrase "hardened, desperate, or dangerous criminal" does not require a previous criminal record of convictions. Instead, the court must assess the character of the accused based on the facts and circumstances of the case. The gravity and severity of the alleged act can be sufficient to attract the fourth proviso even if the accused does not have a previous criminal record.In the present case, the Supreme Court concludes that the nature and manner of the offense, which involved cutting someone's nose, and the role attributed to the petitioner, make him a dangerous and harmful individual for society. As a result, he falls within the scope of a "hardened, desperate, or dangerous criminal," and the court declines to interfere with the impugned order denying bail.The Supreme Court dismisses the petition, but it directs the trial court to expedite the proceedings and conclude the trial as quickly as possible.

Summary: [Scope of the expression ?hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal? as used in the fourth proviso to Section 497(1) CrPC] The Supreme Court's main task is to determine whether an accused person can be considered a hardened, desperate, or dangerous criminal under the fourth proviso to Section 497(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC). The court explains that the phrase "hardened, desperate, or dangerous criminal" does not require a previous criminal record of convictions. Instead, the court must assess the character of the accused based on the facts and circumstances of the case. The gravity and severity of the alleged act can be sufficient to attract the fourth proviso even if the accused does not have a previous criminal record.In the present case, the Supreme Court concludes that the nature and manner of the offense, which involved cutting someone's nose, and the role attributed to the petitioner, make him a dangerous and harmful individual for society. As a result, he falls within the scope of a "hardened, desperate, or dangerous criminal," and the court declines to interfere with the impugned order denying bail.The Supreme Court dismisses the petition, but it directs the trial court to expedite the proceedings and conclude the trial as quickly as possible.

Summary: [The grant of statutory bail in a matter relating to heinous crime under the Juvenile Justice System Act, 2018 as well as the concept of juvenile justice system] The allegation against the petitioner was that he and his co-accused fired at the brother of the complainant, resulting in his death. The petitioner, who was determined to be a juvenile by the trial court, applied for post-arrest bail based on the ground of delay in the conclusion of the trial. The trial court and the High Court dismissed his applications, but before the Supreme Court, the petitioner pressed only the ground of delay. The main question before the Supreme Court was whether Section 6(5) of the Juvenile Justice System Act, 2018 was applicable to a case involving a juvenile accused of a "heinous offence." The offence of Qatl-i-amad in the present case was considered a "heinous offense" as defined in the Act. Section 6(5) of the Act provides that a juvenile who has been detained for a continuous period exceeding six months without the trial being completed shall be released on bail if the delay is not attributable to the juvenile or any other person acting on his behalf. The court examined the provisions of the Act and concluded that Section 6(5) applied solely to cases involving "heinous offenses," regardless of the age of the juvenile. The trial court's decision to deny the benefit of Section 6(5) to the petitioner by categorising the offence as "heinous" was deemed legally incorrect. The court held that the period of delay in the trial is to be counted from the date of the juvenile's arrest, not from the date of determination of age by the court. The court emphasised the rehabilitative and restorative nature of the juvenile justice system, which aims to protect the best interests of the child and fulfil their rights and needs. It referred to constitutional provisions and international obligations, including the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, to support the special measures for the protection and rehabilitation of juveniles in conflict with the law. In light of these considerations, the court held that the trial court and the High Court had erred in not allowing the benefit of Section 6(5) to the petitioner. The delay in the trial was not caused by the petitioner or any person acting on his behalf. Therefore, the court allowed the appeal, converted the petition into an appeal, and directed the release of the petitioner on bail.

Summary: [The grant of statutory bail in a matter relating to heinous crime under the Juvenile Justice System Act, 2018 as well as the concept of juvenile justice system] The allegation against the petitioner was that he and his co-accused fired at the brother of the complainant, resulting in his death. The petitioner, who was determined to be a juvenile by the trial court, applied for post-arrest bail based on the ground of delay in the conclusion of the trial. The trial court and the High Court dismissed his applications, but before the Supreme Court, the petitioner pressed only the ground of delay. The main question before the Supreme Court was whether Section 6(5) of the Juvenile Justice System Act, 2018 was applicable to a case involving a juvenile accused of a "heinous offence." The offence of Qatl-i-amad in the present case was considered a "heinous offense" as defined in the Act. Section 6(5) of the Act provides that a juvenile who has been detained for a continuous period exceeding six months without the trial being completed shall be released on bail if the delay is not attributable to the juvenile or any other person acting on his behalf. The court examined the provisions of the Act and concluded that Section 6(5) applied solely to cases involving "heinous offenses," regardless of the age of the juvenile. The trial court's decision to deny the benefit of Section 6(5) to the petitioner by categorising the offence as "heinous" was deemed legally incorrect. The court held that the period of delay in the trial is to be counted from the date of the juvenile's arrest, not from the date of determination of age by the court. The court emphasised the rehabilitative and restorative nature of the juvenile justice system, which aims to protect the best interests of the child and fulfil their rights and needs. It referred to constitutional provisions and international obligations, including the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, to support the special measures for the protection and rehabilitation of juveniles in conflict with the law. In light of these considerations, the court held that the trial court and the High Court had erred in not allowing the benefit of Section 6(5) to the petitioner. The delay in the trial was not caused by the petitioner or any person acting on his behalf. Therefore, the court allowed the appeal, converted the petition into an appeal, and directed the release of the petitioner on bail.

Summary: [The grant of statutory bail in a matter relating to heinous crime under the Juvenile Justice System Act, 2018 as well as the concept of juvenile justice system] The allegation against the petitioner was that he and his co-accused fired at the brother of the complainant, resulting in his death. The petitioner, who was determined to be a juvenile by the trial court, applied for post-arrest bail based on the ground of delay in the conclusion of the trial. The trial court and the High Court dismissed his applications, but before the Supreme Court, the petitioner pressed only the ground of delay. The main question before the Supreme Court was whether Section 6(5) of the Juvenile Justice System Act, 2018 was applicable to a case involving a juvenile accused of a "heinous offence." The offence of Qatl-i-amad in the present case was considered a "heinous offense" as defined in the Act. Section 6(5) of the Act provides that a juvenile who has been detained for a continuous period exceeding six months without the trial being completed shall be released on bail if the delay is not attributable to the juvenile or any other person acting on his behalf. The court examined the provisions of the Act and concluded that Section 6(5) applied solely to cases involving "heinous offenses," regardless of the age of the juvenile. The trial court's decision to deny the benefit of Section 6(5) to the petitioner by categorising the offence as "heinous" was deemed legally incorrect. The court held that the period of delay in the trial is to be counted from the date of the juvenile's arrest, not from the date of determination of age by the court. The court emphasised the rehabilitative and restorative nature of the juvenile justice system, which aims to protect the best interests of the child and fulfil their rights and needs. It referred to constitutional provisions and international obligations, including the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, to support the special measures for the protection and rehabilitation of juveniles in conflict with the law. In light of these considerations, the court held that the trial court and the High Court had erred in not allowing the benefit of Section 6(5) to the petitioner. The delay in the trial was not caused by the petitioner or any person acting on his behalf. Therefore, the court allowed the appeal, converted the petition into an appeal, and directed the release of the petitioner on bail.