Summary: Constitution of Pakistan, 1973--- ----Art. 175E(5) & Federal Legislative List, Entry 49---Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Sales Tax on Services Act, 2022, Sch. 2, Serial No. 14---Provincial sales tax on services---Construction services---Challenge to vires---Tax on services vis-à-vis tax on goods---Scope of provincial taxing power after Eighteenth Amendment--- Petitioners challenged vires of Serial No. 14 of Schedule 2 to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Sales Tax on Services Act, 2022 on ground that levy described as tax on “Construction Services” in substance included goods component of construction contracts, which, according to petitioners, could only be taxed by Federation under Entry 49 of Federal Legislative List---Federal Constitutional Court held that impugned provision, when read harmoniously with Entry 49, imposed tax only on services and not on goods---After Eighteenth Amendment, power to levy tax on services vested exclusively in Provinces, while Federation retained competence over taxes on sales and purchases of goods except sales tax on services---Impugned entry was confined to construction and allied services and was not inconsistent with Constitution---Even learned counsel for petitioners conceded that Serial No. 14 was confined to services and did not extend to goods---Accordingly, no ground was made out to strike down impugned law as ultra vires. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Sales Tax on Services Act, 2022--- ----Levy on entire contractual consideration---Inclusion of goods component---Double taxation concern---Adjustment mechanism---Need for bifurcation--- Court, however, observed that grievance of petitioners substantially related not to vires of law but to manner of its implementation, as show-cause notices had demanded tax on entire contractual consideration for period from July 2021 to April 2022, including value of goods utilized in performance of contracts---Court noted that statute itself allowed claim of adjustments, including refunds, regarding tax paid under other laws on goods or taxable services used in provision of taxable services, and Memorandum of Understanding between FBR and KPRA also envisaged cross-adjustment to avoid double taxation---Matter was thus governed by existing law and administrative arrangement and did not warrant constitutional invalidation of impugned provision---Court nevertheless emphasized that KPRA should devise clearer mechanism, rules or Standard Operating Procedures requiring bifurcation of contractual consideration into service component and goods component so that only service portion is subjected to provincial sales tax and unnecessary hardship to taxpayers is avoided. Constitution of Pakistan, 1973--- ----Art. 175E(5)---Federal Constitutional Court---Jurisdiction---Tax reference involving vires of law--- Though tax references were not expressly enumerated within ordinary appellate jurisdiction of Federal Constitutional Court, challenge in present case involved substantial question of constitutional interpretation, namely vires of provincial law---Court held that Art. 175E(5) empowered it, on its own motion or otherwise, to call for record of “any case” from “any court” where substantial question of law as to interpretation of Constitution arose---Such power was unqualified and wide enough to include tax references and other proceedings even where express jurisdiction might not otherwise be specifically mentioned---Since vires of legislation inherently raised substantial constitutional question, Federal Constitutional Court was competent to adjudicate matter and, under present constitutional scheme, is sole apex forum for determining vires of legislation. (a) Provincial sales tax on services---Construction services---Constitutional validity--- After the Eighteenth Amendment, Provinces possess exclusive competence to levy tax on services, while Federation retains competence to tax goods under Entry 49 of Federal Legislative List, except sales tax on services---Serial No. 14 of Schedule 2 to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Sales Tax on Services Act, 2022, being confined to “Construction Services” and allied services, was intra vires the Constitution. (b) Vires challenge---Harmonious construction of constitutional and statutory provisions--- Where constitutional entry and impugned statutory provision can be read harmoniously without contradiction, constitutional invalidation is not warranted---Impugned law did not trench upon federal taxing domain over goods merely because construction contracts may involve use of goods in course of service delivery. (c) Levy on whole contract amount---Goods and services mixed in construction contracts---Effect--- If tax is demanded on entire contractual consideration, inclusive of both service charges and cost of goods utilized in execution of contract, such grievance pertains to application and assessment mechanism rather than constitutional validity of charging provision itself---Province may tax service component only and not goods component. (d) Double taxation concern---Statutory adjustment and refund mechanism--- Where statute provides for adjustment or refund of tax paid under other laws on goods or taxable services used in provision of taxable service, and there exists inter-agency arrangement for cross-adjustment, apprehended double taxation is addressable within framework of law and does not by itself render charging provision unconstitutional. (e) Revenue administration---Need for bifurcation of contractual consideration--- Revenue authority should streamline process by first requiring taxpayer to identify and segregate portion of contractual consideration attributable to services and portion attributable to goods, so that provincial sales tax is levied strictly on services while goods component remains governed by federal sales tax regime---Formulation of rules or Standard Operating Procedures to this effect was recommended. (f) Federal Constitutional Court---Jurisdiction over tax reference involving vires of law--- Even though tax references are not expressly listed in ordinary heads of jurisdiction, Art. 175E(5) authorizes Federal Constitutional Court to call for and adjudicate “any case” from “any court” if it involves substantial question of law as to interpretation of Constitution---Challenge to vires of legislation inherently raises such question and therefore falls within jurisdiction of said Court. (g) Present constitutional scheme---Forum for striking down legislation--- Under present constitutional arrangement, authority to adjudicate upon vires of legislation and to strike down laws on constitutional grounds vests in Federal Constitutional Court, and not in Supreme Court, wherever substantial question of constitutional interpretation is involved. Leave refused; petitions dismissed; impugned judgment affirmed.

Summary: Constitution of Pakistan, 1973—Arts. 10A, 40, 184(3) & 175E(4)—Criminal Procedure Code, 1898—S. 4(1)(l)—Mutual Legal Assistance (Criminal Matters) Act, 2020—Ss. 2(1)(c), 4 & 7—Suo motu proceedings—Murder of journalist abroad—Independent and transparent investigation—Judicial supervision of investigation—Limits of constitutional jurisdiction—The Federal Constitutional Court, while dealing with the suo motu case regarding the murder of journalist Arshad Sharif in Kenya, held that although the State is under an obligation to ensure a fair, independent and transparent investigation, the constitutional courts cannot continuously supervise, monitor, or control the conduct and manner of investigation merely by keeping proceedings pending. The Court observed that Article 10A guarantees not only a fair trial but also an investigation free from undue pressure and interference, and such protection begins from the inception of the investigative process. However, the statutory sphere of investigation belongs to the police and investigating agencies, and judicial assumption of ongoing supervisory control would be prejudicial to fairness, inconsistent with settled jurisprudence, and beyond the proper constitutional role of the Court. Since no objection had been raised to the findings of the fact-finding process or the Special Joint Investigation Team, and the real concern related only to the pace of progress in a matter involving a foreign sovereign state, no justification existed for continued judicial monitoring. Criminal law—Investigation—Functions of judiciary and police—Non-overlapping spheres—Relying on Ajmeel Khan v. Abdur Rahim (PLD 2009 SC 102), the Court reiterated that the functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary but not overlapping, and that the conduct and manner of investigation normally cannot be scrutinized in constitutional jurisdiction. It further relied on Malik Shoukat Ali Dogar v. Ghulam Qasim Khakwani (PLD 1994 SC 281) for the principle that continued court control over investigation is prejudicial to the accused and detrimental to fairness of procedure. Referring also to S. 4(1)(l), Cr.P.C., the Court held that investigation means proceedings for collection of evidence conducted by a police officer or other authorized person, and does not contemplate continuous supervision by courts. The Court noted that judicial intervention in investigation is confined to exceptional situations, such as habeas corpus matters, mala fide investigation, or cases of jurisdictional excess, as recognized in Fahad Ahmed Gulzar v. ASI/IO Saeed Mahroof (2025 PCrLJ 1140). Accordingly, the request of the deceased’s family to keep the suo motu proceedings pending for ongoing oversight of the investigation was declined. Constitutional law—Foreign affairs—Article 40—International forums—Judicial restraint—The Court further held that it could not issue directions requiring the Federal Government to raise the matter at international forums, because such a course would intrude into the domains of foreign policy and diplomatic engagement, which constitutionally belong to the Federal Government and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Article 40, though reflective of constitutional aspirations to foster goodwill and friendly relations among nations, did not justify judicial management of foreign relations. The Court noted that the Supreme Court had earlier accepted the position that mutual legal assistance and diplomatic channels should first be allowed to run their course, with recourse to international forums to be considered only if the need subsequently arose. The matter was therefore left to the good sense and discretion of the Federal Government. Mutual Legal Assistance—Cross-border criminal investigation—Pakistan and Kenya—Statutory framework in both states—The Court observed that both Pakistan and Kenya have enacted legal regimes governing mutual legal assistance in criminal matters. In Pakistan, the Mutual Legal Assistance (Criminal Matters) Act, 2020 establishes the Secretary, Ministry of Interior, as the central authority empowered to make requests for assistance in criminal investigations and proceedings; while in Kenya, the Mutual Legal Assistance Act, 2011 vests corresponding authority in the Office of the Attorney General. A request for mutual legal assistance had been made by Pakistan to Kenya on 22.02.2023, accepted by Kenya, and the agreement was signed on 10.12.2024. In addition, the record showed constitution of the SJIT, diplomatic contacts by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, communication between the Prime Minister of Pakistan and the President of Kenya, examination of the Kenyan case file, engagement with the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions of Kenya, contact with the pathologist who conducted the post-mortem, and issuance of black warrants against the alleged perpetrators. In these circumstances, the Court held that the matter was actively proceeding through lawful investigative and diplomatic channels in both sovereign states and did not warrant judicial interference. Case references—Ajmeel Khan v. Abdur Rahim (PLD 2009 SC 102); Malik Shoukat Ali Dogar v. Ghulam Qasim Khakwani (PLD 1994 SC 281); Fahad Ahmed Gulzar v. ASI/IO Saeed Mahroof (2025 PCrLJ 1140). The Court also referred to the earlier orders passed by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in the same proceedings dated 13.02.2023 and 17.03.2023, particularly regarding the impermissibility of judicial supervision over investigation and the propriety of allowing mutual legal assistance and diplomatic processes to continue. Suo motu action disposed of—Pending applications disposed of—The Federal Constitutional Court held that, in light of the steps already taken by the Federal Government and the legal frameworks operating in Pakistan and Kenya, no further judicial intervention was required. The suo motu proceedings were accordingly disposed of, with observation that if the legal heirs of Arshad Sharif had any specific grievance, they could approach the court of competent jurisdiction.