Summary: (a) National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 (NAO) --- Ss. 12, 13 & 17 --- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 --- S. 516-A --- Freezing of property --- Scope of freezing order --- Interim custody of vehicle on superdari --- Maintainability of application under S. 516-A, Cr.P.C. during pendency of NAB Reference --- Applicability of Cr.P.C. in NAB proceedings. A freezing order under section 12(b)(iii) of NAO 1999, which prohibits the transfer of property, does not amount to seizure or possession by the NAB. Therefore, a vehicle subject to such an order can be released on superdari under section 516-A, Cr.P.C., provided no inconsistency arises between NAO and Cr.P.C. provisions. In the present case, the freezing order only restricted the transfer of the vehicle and did not bar interim custody. The petitioner, while accepting the freezing order without objection, retained the right to seek superdari. The Court held that section 516-A Cr.P.C. applies mutatis mutandis to NAB proceedings under section 17 of the NAO 1999 and that the denial of interim custody was legally misconceived. Cited Cases: Muhammad Iqbal Chaudhry v. Secretary Ministry of Industries (PLD 2004 SC 413) Muhammad Amin Muhammad Bashir Ltd. v. Govt. of Pakistan (2015 SCMR 630) Amanullah Khan v. Federal Government of Pakistan (PLD 1990 SC 1092) Khalid Humayun v. NAB (PLD 2017 SC 194) Abid Hasan v. PIAC (2005 SCMR 25) (b) Freezing Order --- Interpretation --- Typographical error in freezing order --- Correction by trial court --- Discretion of courts to consider substance over form. The Freezing Order referred to the impounded vehicle as “Toyota Vezel” whereas the correct make was “Honda Vezel.” The Supreme Court directed the trial court to treat the superdari order as applicable to the vehicle identified by registration, chassis, and engine numbers, irrespective of the typographical error in the original order. Substance must prevail over clerical error to avoid unjust deprivation of property. (c) Constitutional law --- Arts. 23 & 24 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 --- Right to property --- Interim deprivation of property --- Judicial discretion to grant superdari must be exercised fairly and reasonably. Articles 23 and 24 of the Constitution protect the right to acquire, hold, and dispose of property, and prohibit deprivation without due process of law. Courts, when dealing with applications for superdari, must consider the constitutional safeguards against arbitrary deprivation of property. Discretion under section 516-A Cr.P.C. must be exercised fairly, and reasons must be recorded to justify withholding or granting interim custody. (d) Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 --- S. 516-A --- Superdari --- Judicial responsibility --- Standard for granting custody of seized property --- Requirement of ownership proof and solvent surety. An application under section 516-A Cr.P.C. must be decided based on clear ownership documents such as registration certificates or purchase invoices. Interim custody should be granted subject to furnishing personal bond and solvent surety equivalent to market value. Courts must record specific reasons while granting or denying interim custody and must ensure the vehicle is produced whenever required during trial. (e) Accountability Court --- Discretion --- Exercise of jurisdiction --- Requirement of speaking order --- Duty to apply judicial mind. The Accountability Court failed to examine the exact scope of the Freezing Order and summarily dismissed the application for superdari without analyzing the relevant statutory provisions or the facts specific to the petitioner. The Supreme Court observed that slipshod or perfunctory dismissal of interlocutory applications violates the obligation to provide reasoned, lawful, and structured decisions, especially in matters involving fundamental rights. Disposition: Appeal allowed; Orders of Accountability Court and High Court set aside. Application under S. 516-A, Cr.P.C. for custody of vehicle on superdari allowed subject to personal bond and solvent surety equivalent to market value, and undertaking to produce the vehicle before court as required. Trial court directed to mark caution against vehicle’s transfer.

Summary: (Superdari of truck after acquittal) --- Background:Muhammad Akram was involved in a case where he, along with two others, was accused of transporting 65 maunds of ground poppy concealed under Khiskhas bags in a Hyundai Shehzore mini-truck (Registration No. LWC-8370). The police intercepted the truck on 30.08.2007, and while the driver Shakeel Ahmad was apprehended, Akram and another accomplice managed to flee. They were later tried and convicted under section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 (CNSA) and sentenced to life imprisonment along with a fine. The trial court also ordered the confiscation of the truck. The appellants were acquitted by the Lahore High Court on 21.11.2012, but the court did not address the confiscation of the truck.---Issues:Whether the application for the restoration of the confiscated truck filed by Muhammad Akram was maintainable.Whether the acquittal of the appellant entitles him to reclaim the confiscated truck.----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The Lahore High Court found that the application for the restoration of the truck was maintainable and that the appellant was entitled to reclaim his vehicle.---Application for Restoration:The court held that although the application was dismissed by the Additional Sessions Judge for being non-maintainable, it was indeed maintainable under section 520 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.). The court clarified that even if the trial court becomes functus officio, higher courts can still entertain applications regarding the disposal of property under section 520 Cr.P.C.----Entitlement to Reclaim the Truck:The court emphasized that since Muhammad Akram and his co-accused were acquitted, there were no legal grounds to deny the restoration of the truck. The acquittal was unconditional and not merely based on the benefit of the doubt, thus entitling the appellant to all the reliefs consequent to his acquittal, including the return of the confiscated property.----Citations/Precedents:Central Cooperative Bank Ltd., Sargodha vs. Ahmad Bakhsh (PLD 1970 SC 343)Ghulam Akbar vs. The State and others [PLD 1958 (W.P.) Lahore 212]Ahmad Bakhsh vs. The State and another [PLD 1966 (W.P.) Lahore 918]Sardara vs. Boota (PLD 1950 Lahore 97)Jalal Khan alias Jalley Khan vs. The State and another (PLD 1975 Lahore 45)Manzoor Hussain Jatoi vs. The State (1997 P.Cr.LJ 500)----Summary:The Lahore High Court concluded that the application for the restoration of the truck filed by Muhammad Akram was indeed maintainable under section 520 Cr.P.C., even after the trial court's judgment. The court ordered the release and restoration of the Hyundai Shehzore mini-truck to Muhammad Akram, considering that his acquittal was unconditional and there was no evidence linking him to the offense after his acquittal. This decision was based on legal precedents that ensure the right to reclaim property following an acquittal, emphasizing the judicial principles of fair and just disposal of property involved in criminal proceedings.

Summary: Background: Al-Baraka Bank (Pvt.) Ltd. filed an appeal seeking the release (superdari) of a vehicle seized by the Anti-Narcotics Force (ANF) in a narcotics case involving Mohammad Usman, who defaulted on a Musharakah Agreement with the bank. The vehicle, registered in Mohammad Usman’s name, was being held as case property in an ongoing trial. -----Issues: 1- Can a vehicle seized under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 (CNSA) be released on superdari before being presented as case property in court? -----2- Does a financial institution with a lien on a vehicle, such as under a Musharakah Agreement, qualify as the "owner" eligible for superdari during a criminal trial? -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --Release on Superdari: The court found that under CNSA provisions, a vehicle cannot be released on superdari before being presented as evidence. Preserving the vehicle’s condition is crucial to the administration of justice, and releasing it prematurely could compromise its evidentiary value. --Bank’s Ownership Claim: The court held that the bank, as a lienholder rather than a registered owner, does not qualify as the "innocent owner" eligible for superdari. The purpose of repossession under a financial agreement is typically to enable sale for debt recovery, which is incompatible with the vehicle's legal status as case property during trial. The appeal was dismissed, upholding the trial court’s decision to retain the vehicle as case property pending trial. -----Citations/Precedents: Niazullah v. The State (2002 PCr.LJ 97) Abdul Hamid v. The State (2002 PCr.LJ 666) State v. Rashid (PLD 2003 Peshawar 87) Abdul Salam v. The State (2003 SCMR 246) Allah Ditta v. The State (2010 SCMR 1181) Amjad Ali Khan v. The State and others (PLD 2020 SC 299)

Summary: Background: The petitioner applied for the superdari (custody) of a Toyota Corolla vehicle that had been taken into custody by the police under Section 550 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.) as it was suspected to be stolen property. The petitioner claimed to be the legitimate owner, having purchased the vehicle from a Colonel in the Pakistan Army. However, the police reported that the vehicle appeared to be tampered with, particularly the chassis and engine numbers, prompting the Magistrate to deny the superdari. The petitioner’s revision before the Additional Sessions Judge was also dismissed. The petitioner then approached the High Court under Section 561-A of the Cr.P.C., seeking custody of the vehicle. ----Issues: 1- Whether the petitioner was entitled to the custody (superdari) of the vehicle despite allegations of tampering with the chassis and engine numbers. 2- Whether the previous orders of the Magistrate and Additional Sessions Judge, denying the petitioner’s request for superdari, were lawful. 3- Whether a vehicle with tampered identification numbers can be handed over on superdari in the absence of a counter claimant. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: Tampering Allegations: The Punjab Forensic Science Agency (PFSA) report confirmed that both the chassis and engine numbers of the vehicle were tampered with and could not be restored to their original state. Given the tampered state of the vehicle, the court held that allowing the petitioner to retain custody of the vehicle would be contrary to law. Lack of Bona Fide Purchase: The court noted that the petitioner failed to exercise due diligence when purchasing the vehicle. As the vehicle was found to have tampered identification numbers, the petitioner was not considered a bona fide purchaser and, therefore, was not entitled to superdari. Instead, the petitioner could pursue legal remedies, such as seeking damages from the seller. Judicial Precedents: The court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa vs. Sarfraz Khan (2020 SCMR 1410), which held that vehicles with tampered chassis numbers cannot be handed over to any party, even if the owner has registration documents. The court also cited Ch. Maqbool Ahmad vs. Customs, Federal Excise, and Sales Tax, Appellate Tribunal (2009 SCMR 226) to further support its decision that tampered vehicles cannot be returned on superdari. The petition was dismissed, upholding the orders of the Magistrate and Additional Sessions Judge. The petitioner was not granted custody of the vehicle due to its tampered condition. ----Citations/Precedents: Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa vs. Sarfraz Khan and another (2020 SCMR 1410) Ch. Maqbool Ahmad vs. Customs, Federal Excise, and Sales Tax, Appellate Tribunal (2009 SCMR 226) Muhammad Zada vs. The State (2021 YLR 1415) Sultan Muhammad vs. Collector Customs and another (2015 PTD 570)

Summary: Background: This case concerns the custody dispute over a Toyota Corolla GLI car, registered under a particular engine and chassis number. The car was seized by police under Section 550 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.) from the son of the respondent on allegations of unauthorized possession. Both the petitioner and respondent filed separate applications seeking custody (superdari) of the car before a Judicial Magistrate. The Magistrate granted the car’s custody to the respondent, dismissing the petitioner's request. This decision was later upheld by the Additional Sessions Judge. The petitioner challenged these decisions, claiming ownership based on registration records with the Motor Registering Authority (MRA) and alleging that the respondent unlawfully retained possession. -----Issues: 1- Does the petitioner have a rightful claim to the car as its registered owner, justifying custody? -----2- Was the respondent’s claim to ownership based on the transfer deed and possession credible? -----3- Can the MRA adjudicate disputes over vehicle ownership under the Motor Vehicles Ordinance, 1965? -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court held that the petitioner, as the registered owner, had a stronger claim to the car. The Magistrate’s previous ruling, favoring the respondent’s custody, was overturned. The court determined that: --The MRA records confirmed the petitioner as the car’s legal owner. The respondent's claim, based on an open transfer deed, was invalid as it did not meet legal standards for transfer under the Motor Vehicles Ordinance and the Punjab Motor Vehicles Rules, 1969. --The MRA lacks jurisdiction to resolve ownership disputes, which fall under civil court jurisdiction. Expert opinions from the Fingerprint Bureau, invoked to verify document authenticity, were deemed inconclusive for determining ownership in this context. The petition was accepted, directing the Area Magistrate to return the car to the petitioner, contingent upon the provision of a surety bond. -----Citations/Precedents: Hassan Muhammad v. Nazar Hussain and others (2005 SCMR 1063) Akhtar Hussain v. Station House Officer and others (2007 PCr.LJ 1552) Amjad Ali Khan v. The State and others (PLD 2020 SC 299) Mst. Shaheen Begum v. SHO (ACLC) and others (2005 MLD 176) Syed Ali Nawaz Gardezi v. Lt.-Col. Muhammad Yusuf (PLD 1963 SC 51) Mst. Saadat Sultan and others v. Muhammad Zahur Khan and others (2006 SCMR 193) Muhammad Ishaque Qureshi v. Sajid Ali Khan and another (2016 SCMR 192) Wajeeh-ul-Hassan v. The State (2019 SCMR 1994) Muhammad Samiullah v. The State (2022 SCMR 998)

Summary: Background:In the case before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, Muhammad Akhtar Ali, the petitioner, contested the decisions of lower courts regarding the possession of a Toyota car, model 2013, with registration no. AZM-722. The petitioner lodged an FIR for an offense under section 406 PPC, claiming that he handed over his car to a car dealer, Haji Azhar Habib, for sale. Habib allegedly sold the car to Rana Abdul Jabbar but failed to transfer the proceeds or return the car to the petitioner. Both the petitioner and the alleged buyer filed applications for superdari (temporary custody) of the car. The magistrate granted superdari to the alleged buyer, a decision later upheld by higher courts.---Issues:The primary issue in this case was determining the rightful temporary custody of the vehicle amidst allegations of non-payment and fraudulent transfer claims.---Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The Supreme Court, after reviewing documents from the Sindh Motor Vehicle Registration Authority confirming the petitioner as the registered owner and finding no transfer application in the name of respondent No.4, overturned the lower courts' decisions. The Court held that without a valid transfer deed executed by the registered owner, any sale by the dealer was prima facie of no consequence for transferring ownership. Therefore, the petitioner was entitled to temporary custody of the vehicle. The Court converted the petition into an appeal and allowed it, subjecting the return of the vehicle to the petitioner to his furnishing surety bonds worth Rs. 2,000,000.---Citations/Precedents:Section 406 of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) concerning criminal breach of trust.Principles regarding superdari (temporary custody) under Pakistani law.Precedent regarding the significance of registered ownership and valid transfer deeds in property transfer disputes.

Summary: Background: The petitioner filed a Criminal Revision Petition against the trial court's decision, which rejected his application for the release of a vehicle (Coach bearing registration No. FDS-05) on superdari (temporary custody) under Section 516-A of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.). The vehicle had been impounded in connection with an accident case, where the petitioner was accused of causing the death of the complainant’s son due to rash and negligent driving. The petitioner claimed ownership of the vehicle and requested its release on the grounds that he possessed the original return file as proof of ownership. -----Issues: 1- Whether the petitioner can be considered the legal owner of the vehicle and entitled to its release on superdari. -----2- Whether possession of the original return file is sufficient to prove ownership under the Motor Vehicles Ordinance, 1965. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court held that the petitioner could not be considered the legal owner of the vehicle because it was not registered in his name, but in the name of another person, Asmatullah. Under the Motor Vehicles Ordinance, 1965, the term “owner” is defined as the person in whose name the vehicle is registered, or a transferee duly registered under Section 32 of the Ordinance. Since the petitioner failed to transfer the ownership of the vehicle to his name within the required 30 days after purchase, he could not be recognized as the legal owner. The court further ruled that mere possession of the original return file does not transfer ownership of the vehicle. The petitioner’s failure to register the vehicle in his name meant he had no legal standing to claim it on superdari. The trial court correctly rejected the petitioner’s application for the release of the vehicle, and there was no basis for the High Court to interfere with that decision. The court cited the Amjad Ali Khan v. The State and others (PLD 2020 Supreme Court 299) case, which emphasized that ownership of a vehicle must be established through proper registration under the Motor Vehicles Ordinance. An open transfer letter or return file does not transfer ownership. -----Citations/Precedents: Amjad Ali Khan v. The State and others (PLD 2020 Supreme Court 299) – Mere possession of an open transfer letter or return file is insufficient to claim ownership of a vehicle; legal ownership must be proven through registration under the Motor Vehicles Ordinance.

Summary: Superdari means the interim custody of seized property to a person entitled to its possession in lieu of furnishing a surety bond by the order of the Court for its production whenever necessary. An open transfer letter is not a valid document of title and it does not transfer ownership of a vehicle in terms of the Provincial Motor Vehicles Ordinance, 1965 and Superdari order should be passed in favour of a person entitled to its possession or from whom it was recovered unless there are strong reasons against it.

Summary: Tampered motor vehicles---The judgment discusses various aspects of the case, including the forensic examination of the vehicle, discrepancies in the documentation, and the legal arguments presented. The court seems to have analyzed the evidence and found that the petitioner failed to provide sufficient evidence to support their claim that the vehicle was lawfully acquired. The court also appears to have considered the relevance of the forensic report that indicated the tampering of the chassis number. Ultimately, the court concluded that the evidence presented by the petitioner was insufficient to prove the legality of the vehicle's acquisition and usage, especially in light of the tampered chassis details. The judgment answers specific legal questions raised in the case and ends with a decision in favor of the Department and against the Respondent, dismissing the Petition.

Summary: A raid was conducted, and the respondent was found in possession of foreign currency from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. A case was registered against the respondent under the Foreign Exchange Regulations Act, 1947. The petitioner claims that the High Court did not consider the fact that exchanging currency without approval is prohibited under the Act. The court notes that the respondent did not seek permission or produce any documents related to the foreign currency exchange, which is required by law. The court also highlights the importance of regulating foreign currency exchange for the economic and financial interests of the state. The court mentions that an amendment to the Act has increased the punishment for contravening its provisions. Considering the gravity of the matter and the national interest involved, the court determines that the High Court's order is not sustainable. The court also notes that the issue of returning the Pakistani currency was not challenged before them. However, under Article 187 of the Constitution of Pakistan, the court has the power to issue any order or direction necessary for doing complete justice. Therefore, the court sets aside the High Court's order and retains the authority to pass appropriate orders in the interest of justice.