Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973----Art. 175F(1)(c)---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)----S. 491---Leave to appeal against dismissal of habeas corpus petition for recovery of alleged detenue/daughter---Scope---Petitioner/father sought recovery of his daughter on the plea that she was a Christian minor and had been taken into unlawful custody by respondent, who claimed to be her husband---Courts below dismissed the petition on the basis of the girl’s voluntary statement under S.164, Cr.P.C. and her assertion that she had contracted marriage of her free will---Federal Constitutional Court held that where the alleged detenue had repeatedly appeared before competent fora and unequivocally stated that no abduction had taken place and that she had married voluntarily, her custody with the person claiming to be her husband could not, in summary proceedings under S.491, Cr.P.C., be termed illegal or unlawful---Question whether Nikahnama was forged, or whether investigation required transfer, pertained to criminal process and could not by itself justify habeas corpus relief---Leave was refused and petition was dismissed. (b) Muslim Personal Law---Marriage between Muslim male and Christian female---Validity---Petitioner contended that his Christian daughter could not lawfully marry a Muslim male---Held, contention was misconceived and contrary to settled principles of Islamic law---A Muslim male may validly contract marriage with a Christian woman, being from Ahl al-Kitab---Such principle stood recognized in earlier Supreme Court authorities and classical juristic exposition---Court held that objection to marriage merely on the basis of difference of religion was without substance. Cited Cases: Mrs. Marina Jatoi v. Nuruddin K. Jatoi and others PLD 1967 SC 580. Mst. Zainab Bibi and others v. Mst. Bilqis Bibi and others PLD 1981 SC 56. (c) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973----Art. 189---Federal Constitutional Court---Precedential value of judgments of Supreme Court of Pakistan after establishment of Federal Constitutional Court---Held, judgments of the former Supreme Court of Pakistan do not bind the Federal Constitutional Court as a matter of absolute precedent under the restructured constitutional hierarchy, but continue to carry great persuasive value where they are based on sound reasoning, are consistent with constitutional text and structure, and do not offend fundamental rights or evolved constitutional values---Doctrine of stare decisis was not abrogated but recalibrated in light of constitutional supremacy---Departure from earlier Supreme Court precedent must be express, reasoned and principled, and may be justified where such precedent is manifestly inconsistent with the Constitution, undermines fundamental rights, reflects judicial overreach, becomes incompatible with evolved constitutional values and democratic norms, or where any other compelling reason advances the cause of justice. (d) Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961)----S.1(2)---Marriage---Conversion to Islam---Effect---Though marriage of a Muslim male with a Christian female is permissible in principle, solemnization and registration under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance is confined to Muslim citizens---Respondent’s stance was that the girl had embraced Islam before marriage---Affidavit appended with Nikahnama and subsequent certificate issued by a religious institution were produced to show conversion---Held, faith is a personal matter; once a person openly professes adherence to Islam, ordinarily no roving inquiry into the sincerity or motive of conversion is warranted in such proceedings---No specific ritual is indispensable beyond declaration and profession of belief---Where girl herself acknowledged correctness of Nikahnama and declared conversion, Court would not undertake deeper inquiry into genuineness of conversion in summary jurisdiction---Marriage was, prima facie, validly solemnized under the Ordinance. Cited Cases: Mst. Zarina and another v. The State PLD 1988 FSC 105. Tariq Masih v. The State 2004 PCr.LJ 622. (e) Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929---Child marriage---Effect on validity of marriage---Petitioner asserted that alleged detenue was about twelve years of age and, therefore, incapable of contracting valid marriage---Held, the Act of 1929 restrains and criminalizes solemnization of child marriage, but does not expressly render such marriage void or voidable---In absence of explicit statutory language invalidating the marriage, its legal status remains unaffected---Where legislature intends to override settled personal law, it must do so in clear and unequivocal terms; such intention cannot be inferred from silence---Therefore, even assuming minority, marriage would not automatically become void merely because it was contracted in contravention of the Act of 1929. Cited Cases: Mushtaq Ahmad v. Mirza Muhammad Amin and another PLD 1962 W.P. Karachi 442. Mst. Bakhshi v. Bashir Ahmad and another PLD 1970 SC 323. Mauj Ali v. Syed Safdar Hussain Shah and another 1970 SCMR 437. Nasreen Bibi v. Station House Officer and others 2024 PCr.LJ 2058. Muhammad Khalid v. Magistrate 1st Class and others PLD 2021 Lahore 21. Muhammad Azam v. The State and another 2018 PCr.LJ Note 175. Muhammad Safeer v. Additional Sessions Judge (West) Islamabad PLD 2018 Islamabad 385. Allah Nawaz v. Station House Officer PLD 2013 Lahore 243. Allah Bakhsh v. Safdar and others 2006 YLR 2936. Ghulam Qadir v. The Judge Family Court, Murree 1988 CLC 113. Ghulam Hussain v. Nawaz Ali and another 1975 PCr.LJ 1049. (f) Evidence---Age of alleged detenue---Delayed birth documents---Probative value---Petitioner relied on birth certificate and child registration certificate to show that his daughter was born on 07.10.2012---Held, both documents had been procured many years after the alleged date of birth and no satisfactory explanation for such inordinate delay was furnished---Delayed registration of birth, unless supported by independent and reliable material, is susceptible to manipulation and its evidentiary value is diminished---Further, inconsistency in petitioner’s own stance regarding age in the F.I.R., close birth dates shown for the alleged detenue and her next sibling, entry of a different date of birth in the Nikahnama, and the girl’s own denial of minority materially weakened petitioner’s case---In such circumstances, delayed documents could not be treated as sole basis for holding that the girl was minor, particularly when she appeared physically before the Court and seemed to be of more advanced age. (g) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)----S.164---Statement of alleged detenue---Evidentiary significance in habeas corpus proceedings---Girl had recorded statement before Magistrate that nobody abducted her, no zina was committed, and that she had married respondent of her own free will; she had also made a similar statement in proceedings under Ss.22-A & 22-B, Cr.P.C.---Held, such consistent voluntary statements before judicial fora carried significant value in determining whether custody was illegal---Where marriage was acknowledged and free will asserted, summary court was justified in declining to infer unlawful detention. (h) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)----S.491---Summary nature of proceedings---Limitations---Question whether Nikahnama was forged or unregistered, and whether offences were made out in investigation, could not properly be adjudicated in proceedings of interim and summary nature under S.491, Cr.P.C.---Such issues were to be pursued before competent criminal court or through appropriate investigative remedies---Habeas corpus jurisdiction is not designed to conclusively determine complex factual controversies touching upon validity of marriage documents. (i) Res judicata---Constitutional petition for recovery of daughter---Earlier writ petition on same cause having attained finality---Effect---Petitioner had earlier filed writ petition for recovery of same daughter from same alleged custody on same foundational ground, which was dismissed by High Court after considering her statement under S.164, Cr.P.C. and holding that her custody with husband was not illegal or unlawful---Said finding was not challenged before higher forum and, therefore, attained finality---Held, subsequent proceedings on same issue were barred by principle of res judicata, and petitioner could not re-agitate the same question through another round of litigation. Cited Case: Pir Bakhsh v. The Chairman, Allotment Committee PLD 1987 SC 145. (j) Constitutional law---Fundamental rights---Reliance on High Court judgment concerning discriminatory definition of “child”---Relevance---Petitioner relied upon PLD 2025 Lah. 1---Held, said judgment had no application to the controversy in hand, as that case concerned challenge to discriminatory definition of “child” prescribing different minimum ages for males and females with reference to provincial legislation, whereas present case concerned legality of custody and alleged invalidity of marriage in the factual setting of Punjab law. Disposition: Leave to appeal was refused and the petition was dismissed; however, observations made in the judgment were not to prejudice or impede criminal proceedings, if any, before the competent criminal court in accordance with law. ------ "The Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929 merely criminalizes the solemnization of a child marriage but does not expressly declare such a marriage to be void or voidable. The binding force of judicial precedent is not derived from institutional seniority but from the constitutional hierarchy itself. Since, the supremacy of constitutional adjudication now vests in this Court, therefore, all courts, including the Supreme Court of Pakistan, are bound by its pronouncements. However, this Court would ordinarily respect and follow the earlier constitutional jurisprudence evolved by the Supreme Court of Pakistan, unless it is established that the same is manifestly erroneous, inconsistent with the constitutional text or scheme, or incompatible with fundamental rights and contemporary constitutional values. "

Summary: (a) Police Rules, 1934— ----R.13.6(2) & R.13.9—Promotion of constables as Head Constables—Outstanding merit course promotions—Vested rights—Effect of alleged repeal/omission— Police constables were promoted as Head Constables after completing requisite courses and their names were included in Promotion List, but later promotions were withdrawn and they were reverted/demoted under departmental orders on premise of “out of turn/shoulder promotions” pursuant to directions of IGP Sindh in light of Suo Motu Case No.03/2012—Service Tribunal upheld withdrawal without determining whether promotions were in fact covered by R.13.6(2) at the relevant time—Held, Service Tribunal was obligated to verify whether R.13.6(2) was in force when promotions were granted and, if omitted/repealed later, whether such omission could retrospectively disturb vested rights or closed transactions—Without examining service record, requisite courses/examinations, and applicability of rule at time of promotion, promotions could not mechanically be labeled as “out of turn/shoulder”—Impugned judgment suffered from non-application of mind and failure to decide essential factual/legal questions, hence could not be sustained. Cited Cases: Ali Azhar Khan Baloch and others v. Province of Sindh and others 2015 SCMR 456 Contempt proceedings against Chief Secretary Sindh and others 2013 SCMR 1752 (b) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973— ----Arts. 189 & 212—Binding effect of Supreme Court judgments—Role of Service Tribunals as fact-finding fora— Judgments of Supreme Court are binding under Art.189, including deprecation of out of turn/shoulder promotions—Held, notwithstanding binding principles, each service case must be decided on its own facts through independent and judicious appraisal—Service Tribunal, as appellate fact-finding forum constituted under Art.212, must examine service record and determine whether impugned action truly falls within ratio of binding precedents—Mechanical reliance on departmental stance, without factual verification of merit-based promotion and codal formalities, amounts to abdication of statutory duty. (c) Service Tribunal—Appellate jurisdiction—Duty to address factual and legal pleas— ----Scope under Service Tribunal law—Appeal as continuation of proceedings— Service Tribunal has jurisdiction to confirm, set aside, vary or modify departmental orders and must satisfy test of reasonableness and judiciousness—Held, Tribunal is ultimate judicial fact-finding forum for service matters; it must thoroughly examine original and appellate departmental orders and address all factual and legal pleas—Failure to examine crucial questions (whether promotions were merit-based under rules; whether rule was in vogue; whether promotions were improperly termed “out of turn”; and effect of alleged omission) vitiates adjudication—Matter required remand for fresh decision after affording opportunity of hearing and permitting production of relevant qualification/course documents. Cited Cases: Rao Muhammad Rashid and others v. Province of Sindh through Chief Secretary and others 2024 SCMR 1864 = 2024 PLC (C.S.) 1349 Secretary to Government of the Punjab, Law and Parliamentary Affairs Department, Lahore v. Ali Ahmad Khan 2025 SCP 2 = 2025 SCMR 289 = 2025 PLC (C.S.) 549 = 2025 SCLR 25 (d) Police service—Out of turn/shoulder promotions—Distinction from merit-based promotions under rules— ----Uniform application of law—Requirement of record-based determination— Out of turn/shoulder promotions stand condemned in law and may be withdrawn, however, before depriving an employee of promotion already granted, Tribunal/Court must determine on record whether promotion was actually out of turn/without merit or granted pursuant to codal requirements—Held, where employees assert promotion under R.13.6(2) on basis of course merit and completion of prescribed stages, Tribunal must scrutinize relevant service record and dates to determine applicability of precedents; otherwise reversion becomes unsustainable on legal plane. Disposition: Civil Petitions for leave to appeal were converted into appeals and allowed; consolidated judgment dated 29.04.2025 of Sindh Service Tribunal was set aside; matter was remanded to Sindh Service Tribunal to decide service appeals afresh in accordance with law after providing ample opportunity of hearing to parties, preferably within three months; petitioners were permitted to file relevant documents to establish qualification and completion of requisite courses prior to promotion.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan---Arts.189 & 204---Federal Constitutional Court---Contempt of court---Jurisdiction---Contempt of Court Ordinance, 2003 not expressly mentioning Federal Constitutional Court---Effect---Federal Constitutional Court possessed jurisdiction to initiate, entertain and adjudicate contempt proceedings notwithstanding absence of an express reference to it in the Contempt of Court Ordinance, 2003---Such jurisdiction flowed directly from Art.204 of the Constitution, which expressly included the Federal Constitutional Court within the definition of “Court” and conferred power upon it to punish conduct falling within the specified categories of contempt---Contempt jurisdiction was also inherent in the constitutional character of the Court and essential for effective discharge of its judicial functions and enforcement of its judgments and orders. (b) Constitution of Pakistan---Art.204---Doctrine of self-execution---Contempt jurisdiction---Need for ancillary legislation---Article 204 did not merely declare a general principle but expressly identified the principal categories of contempt, including abuse of, interference with or obstruction of judicial process, disobedience of court orders, scandalizing the Court, prejudicing determination of pending proceedings and conduct otherwise constituting contempt under law---Provision, therefore, supplied sufficient substantive content and an enforceable framework for exercise of contempt jurisdiction and was self-executing---No prior or simultaneous legislation was necessary to activate the constitutional power---Where a constitutional provision was complete in itself and laid down a definite rule capable of judicial enforcement, it operated on its own force without statutory assistance. Cited Cases: Davies v. Burke 179 U.S. 399 (1900) Ismat Naureen v. Additional Sessions Judge PLD 1998 Lahore 275 Kaniz Fatima v. Wali Muhammad PLD 1993 SC 901 (c) Constitution of Pakistan---Art.204(4)---Exercise of contempt power---Regulation by law or rules---Use of word “may”---Interpretation---Expression that exercise of contempt power “may be regulated by law and, subject to law, by rules made by the Court” was permissive and enabling rather than mandatory or restrictive---Provision allowed Parliament or the Court to structure and regulate the manner in which contempt jurisdiction was exercised but did not make such regulation a condition precedent to existence or exercise of the power---Absence of legislation could neither suspend nor extinguish the jurisdiction directly conferred by Art.204---Federal Constitutional Court had, in any event, adopted the Supreme Court Rules, 2025, and Order XXIX thereof regulated contempt proceedings before it. Cited Cases: Province of Punjab v. Murree Brewery Company Limited 2021 SCMR 305 Ghazanfar Amin v. Province of Punjab W.P. No.7027 of 2022 (d) Constitution of Pakistan---Arts.189 & 204---Contempt of court---Inherent powers of superior courts---Judicial independence and enforcement of judgments---Power to punish for contempt was an integral and indispensable incident of judicial authority---Without power to enforce judgments, orders and writs, courts would be reduced to bodies issuing merely advisory declarations---Contempt jurisdiction protected orderly judicial proceedings, administration of justice, independence of the judiciary and public confidence in the judicial system---Disobedience of orders of the Federal Constitutional Court attracted its constitutional contempt jurisdiction independently of any statutory enactment---Such power, though essential, was to be exercised sparingly, with wisdom and restraint, and only in serious cases; courts were not to be unduly sensitive or overzealous in discovering new varieties of contempt. Cited Cases: Zafar Ali Shah v. General Pervez Musharraf PLD 2000 SC 869 Marbury v. Madison 5 U.S. 137 (1803) Ex Parte Robinson 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505 (1874) Gompers v. Buck’s Stove & Range Company 221 U.S. 418 Muhammad Samiullah v. The State PLD 1963 SC 237 Shamdasani v. King-Emperor LR 1945 AC 264 (e) Constitution of Pakistan---Art.204---Contempt proceedings against court staff---Failure to list case despite order of adjournment---Effect---Record disclosed that no contempt proceedings were pending against the Registrar of the Supreme Court or any other person---Mere failure to list a matter in accordance with an order adjourning it to a particular period did not necessarily constitute contempt, as cases might not be listed due to administrative reasons---Contempt proceedings against court staff were ordinarily inappropriate in such circumstances and administrative or disciplinary action constituted the proper remedy. Cited Case: Sardar Tahir Sabir v. The State Criminal Appeal No.263 of 2024 (f) Constitution of Pakistan---Art.199---Contractual appointment---Termination in accordance with terms of contract---Show-cause notice and departmental inquiry---Requirement---Petitioner was appointed for a fixed period on contract and his contractual appointment was terminated by the competent authority after consultation with the Chief Justice of the Lahore High Court---Where a contractual appointment was brought to an end in accordance with its terms, issuance of a show-cause notice or initiation of formal departmental inquiry was not legally mandatory and a constitutional petition under Art.199 was not maintainable merely to enforce the contractual tenure. Cited Case: Prof. Dr. Qazi Tahir Uddin v. Secretary, Pakistan Medical Commission 2022 PLC (C.S.) 805 (g) Constitution of Pakistan---Art.199---Contractual appointment---Due process---Record established that Lahore High Court had issued notice to the petitioner concerning non-disposal of cases, the petitioner had submitted his reply, the matter was subsequently referred to the Provincial Department, opinion of the Advocate-General’s Office was obtained and consultation with the Chief Justice of the Lahore High Court was undertaken before issuance of the termination notification---Contention that no notice, inquiry or due process had been afforded was, therefore, contrary to the record and without merit. (h) Constitution of Pakistan---Art.175F---Appellate jurisdiction of Federal Constitutional Court---Petition for leave to appeal against order under Art.199---Scope---Federal Constitutional Court had jurisdiction to hear appeals from judgments, decrees, final orders or sentences of a High Court in the circumstances prescribed by Art.175F, including an order passed under Art.199 where leave to appeal was granted---Leave was ordinarily granted where a question of law requiring determination arose---Court would not generally interfere with findings of fact in leave jurisdiction---No substantial legal question or ground warranting appellate interference was established by the petitioner. Cited Cases: Ghulam Rasool v. Government of Balochistan PLD 2002 SC 381 Muhammad Shamim Ali v. Mst. Asma Begum 2024 SCMR 1642 (i) Administration of justice---Recusal of Judge---Direct communications addressed to Bench after reservation of judgment---Propriety---Petitioner addressed letters through the Registrar’s office seeking recusal of a member of the Bench after judgment had been reserved---Such conduct amounted to an improper attempt to directly approach the Judge and was wholly inappropriate---Language used in the communications was disrespectful and bordered upon contempt---Court, in its discretion, refrained from initiating contempt proceedings but cautioned the petitioner that repetition of similar conduct could invite action for contempt of court. Disposition---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave was refused---All pending applications were disposed of---Petitioner was cautioned against addressing further improper or disrespectful communications directly to members of the Bench.

Summary: a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Arts. 189 & 190---Binding effect of Supreme Court decisions---Finality of litigation---Reopening of concluded matter by subordinate authority---Declarant’s landholding determined; excess land resumed; matter travelled through appeal, revision, writ petition and ultimately Supreme Court---Supreme Court order dated 06.12.1986 affirming resumption attained finality---Subsequent de novo revision before Chairman, Federal Land Commission, entertained after twenty-four years without disclosure of earlier Supreme Court litigation---Held, subordinate authority could not reopen or re-adjudicate issue conclusively decided by Supreme Court; acceptance of revision and passing order dated 07.02.2011 was in clear violation of Art.189, as Supreme Court decision on question of law/principle bound all courts/authorities and could not be disregarded---Art.190 obligated executive and judicial authorities to act in aid of binding judgments; failure to respect finality undermined rule of law and uniform application of legal principles. (b) Administration of justice ----Res judicata---Concealment and abuse of process---Principle that once a matter is finally adjudicated by competent forum it cannot be reopened through successive proceedings---Revision filed without disclosing prior round of litigation up to Supreme Court amounted to concealment and an attempt to circumvent finality---Held, allowing such reopening would set a dangerous precedent and erode confidence in the legal system; finality could not be disturbed by subordinate fora after lapse of decades. (c) Constitutional jurisdiction ----Delay and laches in writ proceedings---Effect where impugned action is void ab initio---Writ petitions filed by private respondents after lapse of eight to ten years against order dated 07.02.2011---Plea of laches raised by petitioner---Held, even if delay existed, High Court could still entertain petitions on merits where impugned order was void ab initio for want of jurisdiction and for violating Art.189---No limitation ran against void order; consequently, laches did not bar judicial correction of an order passed without lawful authority. (d) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) ----S.12(2)---Setting aside orders obtained through misrepresentation/fraud---Withdrawal of writ petition on compromise---Multiple petitioners---Writ petition dismissed as withdrawn on counsel’s statement of out-of-court compromise---Applicants asserted unauthorized withdrawal without consent of all petitioners; some petitioners never compromised and one petitioner had died prior to purported settlement---Held, counsel’s withdrawal on compromise without authority and without consent of all concerned constituted misrepresentation; High Court rightly entertained and accepted applications under S.12(2) to set aside orders dismissing writ as withdrawn on compromise. (e) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) and Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Act, 1973 ----O.III, R.4, CPC---S.22(3), Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Act---Wakalatnama---Scope of counsel’s authority---Wakalatnama recognized as instrument authorizing advocate to appear/act for party---Held, such authority did not, by itself, confer power to compromise or settle dispute without express consent of client; counsel could enter compromise only where specifically empowered or instructed; unilateral compromise/withdrawal without client consent not protected by mere filing of wakalatnama. (f) Appellate practice ----Interference in leave jurisdiction---Findings of fact by High Court---Scope---Federal Constitutional Court (in leave stage) not to reassess factual conclusions unless findings shown to be manifestly against evidence, patently improbable leading to miscarriage of justice, based on misapplication of principles of appreciation of evidence, or physically impossible---Petitioner failed to point out any legal, procedural or jurisdictional flaw in impugned judgment; Division Bench reasoning supported by record; leave not warranted. Disposition: Leave to appeal refused; C.P.L.A. Nos. 962, 963 and 964 of 2023 dismissed. (Order dated 02.12.2025)