Summary: Constitution of Pakistan, 1973—Arts. 199, 201, 175F(1)(c) & 25A—Judicial review—Constitutional jurisdiction of High Courts—Equitable relief—Compassion and conscience of Judge—Courts as courts of law and not of personal sentiment—The Federal Constitutional Court held that High Courts, while exercising constitutional jurisdiction under Art. 199, are strictly bound to decide cases in accordance with law and cannot grant relief on the basis of compassion, hardship, equity, or personal notions of justice where no legal right or statutory basis exists. The Court emphasized that Pakistan’s constitutional order is founded on rule of law and constitutionalism, under which judges are required to interpret and apply the law rather than substitute it with individual morality or subjective conscience. It was held that the Constitution does not confer upon High Courts any general authority to do “complete justice” or to fill perceived gaps in law through equitable intervention, and that every case must be adjudicated within constitutional and statutory limits. Constitutional jurisdiction—Mandamus—Requirement of pre-existing legal duty and enforceable legal right—No writ can issue in absence of law—The Court held that a writ of mandamus under Art. 199(1)(a)(i) can only issue where the law imposes a duty upon a person or authority and a corresponding legal right exists in favour of the petitioner. In the present case, there was admittedly no law, rule, or regulation permitting a “special/super supplementary examination” for the respondent MBBS student. Therefore, the Sindh High Court acted without lawful authority in directing the University to conduct such examination and in effectively creating, through judicial order, a power and duty not recognized by law. The impugned direction was thus held to be beyond the permissible scope of mandamus and an instance of judicial overreach. Educational institutions—Autonomy in academic matters—Judicial restraint—Special/super supplementary examination—The Federal Constitutional Court reiterated that courts must sparingly interfere in the internal governance, academic structure, and disciplinary affairs of educational institutions, which possess specialized expertise and are entitled to regulate their own examinations and policies in accordance with law. Since the statutes and academic framework governing the medical university did not contemplate or permit a “special/super supplementary examination,” the Sindh High Court could not, under the guise of equitable relief or enforcement of rights, compel the University to hold an examination unknown to law. Judicial intervention in educational matters was held permissible only where the governing rules or policies offend natural justice or transgress statutory or constitutional limits, which was not the case here. Fundamental rights—Art. 25A—Right to education—Limits of enforcement jurisdiction—The Court observed that although Art. 25A recognizes the right to education, the enforcement of a fundamental right under Art. 199(1)(c) does not authorize a High Court to grant disproportionate or legally unsanctioned relief. Even in matters touching upon fundamental rights, the High Court remains confined by law and cannot invent remedies contrary to the statutory framework. The Court further found that the respondent’s plea that the relevant examination schedule was not uploaded on the website lacked substance, particularly when he admittedly appeared in the other supplementary examinations and the record showed that all other students were aware of the timetable. Precedent—Arts. 189 & 201—Binding effect of superior court judgments—Court cannot confine precedential value of its own decision—The Federal Constitutional Court held that once a court delivers a judgment deciding a question of law or laying down a principle of law, such judgment enters the stream of precedent and cannot be insulated by the court itself through a direction that it shall not serve as precedent. Such a course was held to undermine legal certainty, invite arbitrariness, and weaken judicial accountability. The Court emphasized that the doctrine of stare decisis is embedded in the constitutional structure, and that judges remain bound by the principles they pronounce as well as by the precedents of superior courts operating within the relevant constitutional hierarchy. It was further observed that the practice of granting relief in an individual case while disclaiming precedential effect would permit unchecked discretion and destabilize the rule of law. Constitutional structure—Federal Constitutional Court and Supreme Court jurisprudence—Partial disagreement with earlier precedent—The Court observed that while prior jurisprudence of the Supreme Court remains valid unless overruled, the Federal Constitutional Court, within its own constitutional domain, is competent to interpret the law independently. In that context, the Court partially disagreed with the proposition in Director General, National Savings, Islamabad v. Balqees Begum (PLD 2013 SC 174) to the extent it suggested that equity may step in where law has no answer to provide justice, holding instead that even in cases of perceived silence in law, courts must seek answers consistent with constitutional order, legal principle, and precedent rather than resort to free-standing compassion. Case references—The Court referred to and discussed the following authorities: Muhammad Umar Wahid v. University of Health Sciences, Lahore (PLD 2006 SC 300); Dossani Travels Pvt. v. Messers Travels Shop (PLD 2014 SC 1); Director General, National Savings, Islamabad v. Balqees Begum (PLD 2013 SC 174); Riaz Hussain through Legal Representatives v. Chairman Federal Land Commissioner (CPLA Nos. 962, 963 and 964 of 2023); DeShaney v. Winnebago County (489 U.S. 189, 1989); Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization (597 U.S. 215); Khalid Mehmood v. Pakistan, through Ministry of Finance (2025); Muhammad Azam Khan Swati v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2023 Islamabad 184); Prof. Dr. Sheikh Israr Ahmed v. Government of Punjab (2025 PLC (C.S.) 182); Muhammad Azam Khan v. Government of N.W.F.P through Chief Secretary NWFP (1998 SCMR 204); and Khyber Medical University v. Aimal Khan (PLD 2022 SC 92). The Court also cited A.K. Brohi’s Fundamental Law of Pakistan and an academic article by Susan A. Bandes on compassion and rule of law. Appeal accepted—Impugned order set aside—Writ petition dismissed—The petition for leave to appeal was converted into an appeal and allowed. The impugned order of the Sindh High Court directing the holding of a “special/super supplementary examination” was set aside, and the respondent’s constitutional petition stood dismissed.