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Search Results: Categories: Article 201 (2 found)

Vice Chancellor Shaheed Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto Medical University & others VS Altaf Hussain Somroo

Citation: Pending

Case No: F.C.P.L.A No. 14 of 2025

Judgment Date: 07/01/2026

Jurisdiction: Federal Constitutional Court of Pakistan

Judge: Justice Aamer Farooq

Summary: Constitution of Pakistan, 1973—Arts. 199, 201, 175F(1)(c) & 25A—Judicial review—Constitutional jurisdiction of High Courts—Equitable relief—Compassion and conscience of Judge—Courts as courts of law and not of personal sentiment—The Federal Constitutional Court held that High Courts, while exercising constitutional jurisdiction under Art. 199, are strictly bound to decide cases in accordance with law and cannot grant relief on the basis of compassion, hardship, equity, or personal notions of justice where no legal right or statutory basis exists. The Court emphasized that Pakistan’s constitutional order is founded on rule of law and constitutionalism, under which judges are required to interpret and apply the law rather than substitute it with individual morality or subjective conscience. It was held that the Constitution does not confer upon High Courts any general authority to do “complete justice” or to fill perceived gaps in law through equitable intervention, and that every case must be adjudicated within constitutional and statutory limits. Constitutional jurisdiction—Mandamus—Requirement of pre-existing legal duty and enforceable legal right—No writ can issue in absence of law—The Court held that a writ of mandamus under Art. 199(1)(a)(i) can only issue where the law imposes a duty upon a person or authority and a corresponding legal right exists in favour of the petitioner. In the present case, there was admittedly no law, rule, or regulation permitting a “special/super supplementary examination” for the respondent MBBS student. Therefore, the Sindh High Court acted without lawful authority in directing the University to conduct such examination and in effectively creating, through judicial order, a power and duty not recognized by law. The impugned direction was thus held to be beyond the permissible scope of mandamus and an instance of judicial overreach. Educational institutions—Autonomy in academic matters—Judicial restraint—Special/super supplementary examination—The Federal Constitutional Court reiterated that courts must sparingly interfere in the internal governance, academic structure, and disciplinary affairs of educational institutions, which possess specialized expertise and are entitled to regulate their own examinations and policies in accordance with law. Since the statutes and academic framework governing the medical university did not contemplate or permit a “special/super supplementary examination,” the Sindh High Court could not, under the guise of equitable relief or enforcement of rights, compel the University to hold an examination unknown to law. Judicial intervention in educational matters was held permissible only where the governing rules or policies offend natural justice or transgress statutory or constitutional limits, which was not the case here. Fundamental rights—Art. 25A—Right to education—Limits of enforcement jurisdiction—The Court observed that although Art. 25A recognizes the right to education, the enforcement of a fundamental right under Art. 199(1)(c) does not authorize a High Court to grant disproportionate or legally unsanctioned relief. Even in matters touching upon fundamental rights, the High Court remains confined by law and cannot invent remedies contrary to the statutory framework. The Court further found that the respondent’s plea that the relevant examination schedule was not uploaded on the website lacked substance, particularly when he admittedly appeared in the other supplementary examinations and the record showed that all other students were aware of the timetable. Precedent—Arts. 189 & 201—Binding effect of superior court judgments—Court cannot confine precedential value of its own decision—The Federal Constitutional Court held that once a court delivers a judgment deciding a question of law or laying down a principle of law, such judgment enters the stream of precedent and cannot be insulated by the court itself through a direction that it shall not serve as precedent. Such a course was held to undermine legal certainty, invite arbitrariness, and weaken judicial accountability. The Court emphasized that the doctrine of stare decisis is embedded in the constitutional structure, and that judges remain bound by the principles they pronounce as well as by the precedents of superior courts operating within the relevant constitutional hierarchy. It was further observed that the practice of granting relief in an individual case while disclaiming precedential effect would permit unchecked discretion and destabilize the rule of law. Constitutional structure—Federal Constitutional Court and Supreme Court jurisprudence—Partial disagreement with earlier precedent—The Court observed that while prior jurisprudence of the Supreme Court remains valid unless overruled, the Federal Constitutional Court, within its own constitutional domain, is competent to interpret the law independently. In that context, the Court partially disagreed with the proposition in Director General, National Savings, Islamabad v. Balqees Begum (PLD 2013 SC 174) to the extent it suggested that equity may step in where law has no answer to provide justice, holding instead that even in cases of perceived silence in law, courts must seek answers consistent with constitutional order, legal principle, and precedent rather than resort to free-standing compassion. Case references—The Court referred to and discussed the following authorities: Muhammad Umar Wahid v. University of Health Sciences, Lahore (PLD 2006 SC 300); Dossani Travels Pvt. v. Messers Travels Shop (PLD 2014 SC 1); Director General, National Savings, Islamabad v. Balqees Begum (PLD 2013 SC 174); Riaz Hussain through Legal Representatives v. Chairman Federal Land Commissioner (CPLA Nos. 962, 963 and 964 of 2023); DeShaney v. Winnebago County (489 U.S. 189, 1989); Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization (597 U.S. 215); Khalid Mehmood v. Pakistan, through Ministry of Finance (2025); Muhammad Azam Khan Swati v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2023 Islamabad 184); Prof. Dr. Sheikh Israr Ahmed v. Government of Punjab (2025 PLC (C.S.) 182); Muhammad Azam Khan v. Government of N.W.F.P through Chief Secretary NWFP (1998 SCMR 204); and Khyber Medical University v. Aimal Khan (PLD 2022 SC 92). The Court also cited A.K. Brohi’s Fundamental Law of Pakistan and an academic article by Susan A. Bandes on compassion and rule of law. Appeal accepted—Impugned order set aside—Writ petition dismissed—The petition for leave to appeal was converted into an appeal and allowed. The impugned order of the Sindh High Court directing the holding of a “special/super supplementary examination” was set aside, and the respondent’s constitutional petition stood dismissed.

Muhammad Jawad Hamid v. Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif and others

Citation: PLD 2018 Lahore 836, PLD 2018 Lahore High Court 836, PLD 2018 LHR 836

Case No: Writ Petition No.9027 of 2017

Judgment Date: 05-07-2018

Jurisdiction: Lahore High Court

Judge: Justice Muhammad Qasim Khan, Justice Aalia Neelum, Justice Sardar Ahmed Naeem

Summary: a) Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997)---- ----S. 31---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss.203 & 265-K---Finality of orders---Orders passed by Anti-Terrorism Court not appealable but final in nature---Scope---Finality clause under S.31, ATA, 1997 does not cover every order passed by Anti-Terrorism Court---Certain orders, though not appealable under S.25, ATA, 1997, are final in nature and can be examined through revisional jurisdiction of High Court. Such orders include: (i) discharge of an accused; (ii) remand of an accused; (iii) dismissal of private complaint under S.203, Cr.P.C.; (iv) summoning or non-summoning of accused in private complaint; (v) summoning or non-summoning of private witness; (vi) summoning or non-summoning of document or other thing; and (vii) rejection of application under S.265-K, Cr.P.C. (b) Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997)---- ----S. 31---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss.435 & 439---Revision against order of Anti-Terrorism Court---Maintainability---High Court has revisional jurisdiction over orders of Anti-Terrorism Court where order is not appealable under ATA but affects rights of parties and attains finality in respect of such issue---Anti-Terrorism Court is a criminal court subordinate/inferior to High Court for purposes of revisional jurisdiction under Cr.P.C., except to extent expressly barred by special law. (c) Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997)---- ----S. 21-D---Bail orders passed by Anti-Terrorism Court---Revision---Bar---Special restriction imposed by S.21-D, ATA, 1997 excludes revisional remedy in bail matters to the extent provided therein---High Court’s revisional jurisdiction remains available for other non-appealable final orders of Anti-Terrorism Court under Ss.435 and 439, Cr.P.C. (d) Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997)---- ----Ss. 25, 31 & 32---Appeal, finality and application of Cr.P.C.---Interpretation---S.25 provides appeal against final judgment/order/sentence of Anti-Terrorism Court---S.31 gives finality to judgment/order/sentence of Anti-Terrorism Court subject to result of appeal under the Act---S.32 applies Cr.P.C. to proceedings before Anti-Terrorism Court so far as not inconsistent with ATA---Combined effect is that Cr.P.C. revisional provisions continue to apply to orders not falling within appeal mechanism and not expressly excluded by ATA. (e) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Arts. 175, 199 & 203---Anti-Terrorism Court---Status---Subordinate/inferior Court---Judicial framework under Constitution---Courts recognized by Constitution include Supreme Court, High Courts, Federal Shariat Court and such other courts as may be established by law---Anti-Terrorism Court, being created by statute, falls within category of courts established by law and remains subject to supervisory/revisional control of High Court unless expressly excluded by law. (f) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Art. 199---Constitutional petition against interim/order of Anti-Terrorism Court---Maintainability---Where an efficacious remedy of criminal revision is available against non-appealable final/interlocutory order of Anti-Terrorism Court, constitutional petition under Art.199 is not maintainable---Writ petition challenging non-summoning/summoning order passed by Anti-Terrorism Court was converted into criminal revision. (g) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----Ss.435 & 439---High Court’s power of revision---Inferior criminal courts---Anti-Terrorism Court---High Court may call for and examine record of any inferior criminal court to satisfy itself as to correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order---Anti-Terrorism Court, though not subordinate to Sessions Court, is inferior/subordinate to High Court for revisional purposes. (h) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----S.6---Classes of criminal courts---Courts created under special law---Effect---Cr.P.C. recognizes that, besides High Courts and courts constituted under Cr.P.C., there may be other criminal courts constituted under other laws---Such courts remain subject to revisional control of High Court unless revisional jurisdiction is expressly or impliedly excluded. (i) Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997)---- ----Private complaint---Order summoning some accused and refusing to summon others---Remedy---Petitioner filed private complaint before Anti-Terrorism Court and challenged order whereby some proposed accused were not summoned/deleted from array of accused---Such order was not appealable under ATA but was revisable before High Court---Constitutional petition was not proper remedy. (j) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----S.203---Dismissal of private complaint by Anti-Terrorism Court---Revision---Order dismissing private complaint under S.203, Cr.P.C. by Anti-Terrorism Court is not appealable under ATA but is final in nature qua complainant’s grievance---High Court can examine such order in revisional jurisdiction. (k) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----S.265-K---Application for acquittal---Rejection by Anti-Terrorism Court---Revision---Rejection of application under S.265-K, Cr.P.C. is not appealable under S.25, ATA, 1997, but such order is final in nature for purposes of that application and may be assailed through criminal revision before High Court. (l) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Art. 201---Judgment per incuriam---Effect---Decision rendered by a subsequent Bench of equal strength in ignorance of a statute, binding precedent of Supreme Court, or previous decision of equal strength of same Court on same issue, is per incuriam and has no precedential value. (m) Judicial precedent---- ----Short order of High Court/Supreme Court---Precedential value---Distinction---Short orders are of two kinds: first, those deciding a question of law in clear and operative terms; second, those merely admitting a case, fixing a matter, or making procedural/ad interim arrangements---Short order falling in first category has precedential value, while short order falling in second category has none. (n) Judicial discipline---- ----Coordinate Bench---Conflicting decisions---Reference to larger Bench---Where a Bench of equal strength disagrees with earlier decision of coordinate Bench, proper course is to refer matter to a larger Bench rather than deciding contrary to earlier view---Failure to follow this course creates uncertainty, undermines judicial comity and may render later contrary decision per incuriam. (o) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Arts. 175 & 203---Access to justice---Independence of judiciary---Subordination of special courts---Tribunal or special court exercising judicial power must fit within constitutional judicial hierarchy and remain under supervisory control of High Court, unless Constitution or valid law provides otherwise---Special criminal court cannot be treated as wholly outside High Court’s revisional/supervisory structure merely because it is established under special statute. (p) Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997)---- ----Purpose of special law---Speedy trial---Effect on revisional jurisdiction---Mere fact that ATA was enacted for speedy trial does not, by itself, exclude revisional jurisdiction of High Court---Exclusion of such jurisdiction must be express or necessarily implied from statute---No such general exclusion exists except where ATA specifically restricts remedy. (q) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----Ss.435, 436 & 439---Writ petition converted into criminal revision---Proper procedural course---Where petitioner had invoked Art.199 against non-summoning order of Anti-Terrorism Court but High Court found revision to be proper remedy, writ petition was ordered to be converted into criminal revision and numbered accordingly. Disposition: Full Bench held that Anti-Terrorism Court is a subordinate/inferior criminal court to High Court for purposes of revisional jurisdiction; High Court can entertain criminal revision under Ss.435, 436 and 439, Cr.P.C. against non-appealable orders of Anti-Terrorism Court, except bail matters restricted by S.21-D, ATA, 1997. Constitutional petition under Art.199 was held not maintainable where revision was competent, and writ petition was directed to be converted into criminal revision.

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