Summary: (a) Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991----Talb-i-Ishhad---Proof of notices---Attesting witnesses---Burden of proof---Unsuccessful pre-emptors' suit for possession through pre-emption of land measuring 30 kanals and 2 marlas, sold through mutation No.590 dated 05.12.1995 for Rs.195,000, was decreed by the Trial Court and the decree was upheld by the First Appellate Court, but the High Court in revisional jurisdiction under S. 115, C.P.C. reversed the concurrent findings and dismissed the suit---Sole question was whether the appellants' predecessor established, through legally sufficient evidence, performance of the Talabs prescribed by the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991---High Court concluded that the plaintiff had failed to prove the second Talab, namely Talb-i-Ishhad---Appellants' case was that Talb-i-Ishhad was performed by sending notices produced as Exh.P-4, Exh.P-5 and Exh.P-6, bearing attestation of two witnesses, Ghulam Nabi and Muhammad Arif---Once the respondents-defendants denied the notices, the burden lay upon the appellants-plaintiffs to establish their execution and dispatch in accordance with law by producing the attesting witnesses---Evidentiary significance of that requirement was emphasised in Muhammad Abaidullah and another v. Ijaz Ahmed and another---Appellants produced only Muhammad Arif (P.W.3) and withheld the other attesting witness, without offering any explanation for his non-production, and the record disclosed no attempt to establish his unavailability or to produce legally admissible secondary evidence---Notices, having been specifically denied, could not be treated as proved merely because they were placed on the record---In the absence of satisfactory proof of their execution and dispatch in the manner required by law, the appellants failed to discharge the burden resting upon them---No infirmity was found in the High Court's conclusion that Talb-i-Ishhad had not been proved---Failure to establish Talb-i-Ishhad is sufficient to defeat the claim. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Abaidullah and another v. Ijaz Ahmed and another 2015 SCMR 394 (b) Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991----S. 32---Talb-i-Muwathibat---Promptitude---Knowledge of sale---Public notice---Sale in favour of the respondents was effected through mutation No.590 dated 05.12.1995, whereas the appellants' predecessor claimed to have made the first Talab on 10.01.1996 at 10:00 a.m., more than four weeks after the date of the sale mutation---Section 32 of the Act provides the relevant framework concerning public notice of a sale and the consequences flowing from the statutory procedure prescribed therein---Appellants' predecessor pleaded that the competent authority had failed to issue the public notice contemplated by that provision---Held, that a pleading is not proof---It was incumbent upon him to establish the factual basis for his assertion that the statutory consequence concerning knowledge of the sale could not operate against him---Record disclosed no satisfactory evidence establishing the alleged non-compliance or otherwise rebutting the consequence prescribed by law---A pre-emptor cannot indefinitely postpone the commencement of the period for exercising his right merely by asserting a later date of knowledge---Where the statute attributes knowledge of a sale upon fulfilment of the prescribed conditions, a party seeking to avoid that consequence must establish the factual and legal basis for doing so---Essence of Talb-i-Muwathibat is the prompt and unequivocal manifestation of an intention to exercise the right of pre-emption upon acquiring legally relevant knowledge of the sale---It is not an empty formality that may be performed at any time convenient to the claimant---Its purpose is to ensure that the pre-emptor acts with the promptitude demanded by the statute---A belated assertion of the right, unsupported by evidence sufficient to displace the statutory consequence concerning knowledge, cannot extend the period prescribed by law or revive a right that has not been exercised in the manner required by the Act---Principle finds support in Bilal Ahmad and another v. Abdul Majeed---Appellants' predecessor failed to establish a legally sustainable basis for treating the declaration allegedly made on 10.01.1996 as a timely performance of Talb-i-Muwathibat---Claim therefore suffered from an additional defect independent of the failure to prove Talb-i-Ishhad. Cited Cases: • Bilal Ahmad and another v. Abdul Majeed 2020 SCMR 445 (c) Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991----Talabs---Essential statutory conditions---Failure fatal---Appellants failed to establish performance of either Talb-i-Muwathibat or Talb-i-Ishhad in accordance with the requirements of the Act---These are not dispensable procedural formalities; they are essential statutory conditions for the exercise of the right of pre-emption---Failure to prove the requisite Talabs is fatal to the claim, irrespective of the merits of the asserted superior right of pre-emption---No ground to interfere with the judgment of the High Court. Disposition: Appeal dismissed; no order as to costs. (C.A. No.288-L of 2015, Supreme Court of Pakistan, judgment of Shahid Waheed, J., Lahore, 13.10.2026; Jamal Khan Mandokhail, Shahid Waheed and Irfan Saadat Khan, JJ. Approved for Reporting.)

Summary: (a) Supreme Court Rules, 2025----O. XXIV, R. 8, proviso---Surrender of convict before the Court---Entertainment of petition, application or appeal without surrender before police or jail authorities---Proviso to R. 8 of O. XXIV provides that unless surrender is first made before the Court to an order of imprisonment, the petition shall not be entertained---Held, that if a convict surrenders before the Court, the Court may entertain his petition, application or appeal without his surrender before the police or jail authorities---Under the amended Supreme Court Rules, 2025, it is for the Court to decide whether the surrender of the petitioner, applicant or appellant before the Court is sufficient, or whether he has to be sent to jail in compliance of the orders or judgments of his imprisonment---In future, such petitions, applications or appeals filed by convicts against their convictions shall be numbered and directly placed before the Court. (b) Practice and procedure----Office objection---Numbering and fixation of convicts' petitions---Office directed to number the main petition and fix it before the Court---On the request or noting of the petitioner or appellant, their Advocate-on-Record or their counsel in such like cases, the office shall fix the case before the Court on the same day or on any date noted by the petitioner or appellant, their counsel or Advocate-on-Record, along with office objection or objections, if any. (c) Protective bail----Surrender before Supreme Court---Counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellant wanted to surrender before the Court and sought protective pre-arrest bail to enable him to approach the Court---Held, that the appellant was granted protective bail till 15.10.2026 to enable him to approach the Court---He shall not be arrested till the said date. Disposition: Criminal Miscellaneous Appeal allowed; office objection dated 18.11.2025 overruled; office directed to number the main petition and fix it before the Court on 15.10.2026; appellant granted protective bail till 15.10.2026 and shall not be arrested till that date; matter adjourned to 15.10.2026. (Crl.M.Appeal No.38 of 2025, Supreme Court of Pakistan, order dated 13.10.2026; Malik Shahzad Ahmad Khan and Shakeel Ahmad, JJ.)

Summary: (a) Occupational Groups and Services (Probation, Training and Seniority) Rules, 1990----Rr. 6 & 7---Civil Servants Act, 1973----S. 8(4)---Seniority of CSS officers in Pakistan Railways---Longstanding departmental practice of determining seniority on CSS examination merit---Retrospective application of R. 7 to officers who had completed probation and earned regular promotions---Impermissibility---Petitioners and respondents joined the Railways Department on qualifying the Central Superior Services examination (28th to 37th Common Training Program) and, after completing probation, became permanent employees---Department had for decades determined entry rankings on CSS examination merit---Federal Service Tribunal directed the department to frame fresh seniority lists strictly in accordance with the 1990 Rules, thereby seeking retrospective application of R. 7---Held, that R. 7 of the 1990 Rules applies exclusively to officers during active probation at initial entry into BS-17---Officers who had successfully completed their probationary periods years ago and attained regular career promotions to higher grades were no longer probationers---1990 Rules cannot operate retrospectively to alter past and closed transactions, destroy accrued civil rights, or strip civil servants of regular career promotions earned in BS-18, BS-19 and BS-20, which remain protected under S. 8(4) of the Civil Servants Act, 1973---Existing seniority cannot be dismantled, recalculated or disturbed under the garb of enforcing the 1990 Rules---If the department desires to enforce R. 7 in the future, it may do so only prospectively for fresh induction at initial entry, and that too upon giving sufficient prior notice of its intent to change the procedure for determining the order of merit at the time of induction---Where an entry-level practice based on CSS examination merit has operated over decades, retrospective enforcement of R. 7 is impermissible. Cited Cases: • Rana Obaid Ullah Anwar CPLA No.686 of 2024, etc, dated 30.09.2024 • Chairman, Federal Board of Revenue, Islamabad v. Naureen Ahmed Tarar 2020 SCMR 90 --------- (b) Constitution of Pakistan----Art. 212(3)---Seniority---Legitimate expectation---Administrative finality---Decades-old departmental practice of assigning entry rankings on CSS examination merit generated a legitimate expectation in favour of civil servants who relied upon it and earned regular career promotions---Seniority is an indispensable matter of institutional confidence, career security and administrative stability---Permitting retrospective dismantling of that practice against civil servants who are no longer on probation would destabilise the entire departmental structure---Tribunal fell into error in overlooking its own line of judgments holding that the 1990 Rules cannot be applied retrospectively to dismantle settled promotional cadres; in failing to abide by the law declared by the Supreme Court recognising the longstanding departmental practice and declining to interfere in settled promotional cadres; in failing to appreciate that R. 7 applies strictly to active probationers at initial entry into BS-17; and in overlooking that a respondent who had entered service, completed probation and attained successive promotions under the same departmental practice sought to overturn that framework at a belated stage solely to obtain a personal advantage---Principle had earlier been affirmed when the Supreme Court dismissed the department's petitions on 14.06.2016 for lack of any substantial question of law under Art. 212(3). (c) Service jurisprudence---Model employer---Duty of public authority and of civil servants---Where an administrative practice has repeatedly been tested and upheld by the courts, a responsible public authority must apply that settled law internally rather than treating each representation as an isolated event---By failing to decide departmental representations in accordance with settled law, the Railways Department encouraged avoidable litigation---A government department must not function as a compulsive litigant, allowing institutional passivity to drag settled controversies back into the courts---Civil servants, as officers of the State holding positions of public trust, bear a duty to act with selflessness, administrative restraint and institutional loyalty---Seeking to overturn an established framework at a belated stage merely because a different rule yields a personal advantage defies that duty---Pursuit of personal ambition must remain subordinate to the duty owed to the State. Disposition: Petitions allowed; judgment dated 19.09.2025 of the Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad in Appeal Nos.1268(R)CS, 1270(R)CS, 1271(R)CS and 1273(R)CS of 2022 set aside; all connected civil miscellaneous applications disposed of. (C.P.L.A. Nos.5035, 5414, 5415, 5416, 5417 and 5755 of 2025, Supreme Court of Pakistan, judgment dated 13.10.2026; Ayesha A. Malik and Naeem Akhter Afghan, JJ. Approved for reporting.)

Summary: (a) Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979----Ss. 10 & 15(2)(ii)---Ejectment---Default in payment of rent---Rent payable in advance---Statutory timeframes---Landlord sought eviction of five tenants principally on grounds of rent default, maintenance-charge default and impairment of the material value and utility of the building---Rent Controller allowed all five ejectment applications on 08.10.2024; Appellate Court on 24.02.2025 maintained findings of rent default and impairment but reversed the maintenance-default finding; High Court by judgments dated 19.06.2026 affirmed findings of rent default and material impairment, dismissed all five constitutional petitions and directed the tenants to vacate within 45 days subject to deposit of rent for that period---Section 10(1) of the Ordinance postulates the time within which rent is to be paid where no date has been fixed by mutual agreement, i.e., not later than the tenth day of the month next following the month for which it is due---Facts concurrently showed that rent was payable in advance---Section 15(2)(ii) provides for an order of ejectment where the tenant has failed to pay or tender the rent due within the periods prescribed therein, and deals with both rent agreed to be paid in advance and a situation when no such agreement is apparent---Failure to pay or validly tender the rent within the time prescribed by law constitutes non-compliance with the statutory obligation to pay rent---Question is not merely whether some payment was eventually made, but whether the rent legally payable was paid or validly tendered within the period prescribed by law---Under S. 10(1), once the tenant is in Court to deposit refused rent, the obligation is to deposit it before the 10th of the following month of its due date, provided it was not payable in advance; in case of advance, it is payable within 15 days of it becoming due---Section 15(2)(ii) provides a period of sixty days when it becomes due in the absence of agreement---Section 10 has intentionally used the word "paid" before the 10th of the following month of its due date, whereas S. 15 provides a timeframe of sixty days from when it becomes due in absence of rent payable in advance---Both situations are totally different, and the petitioners cannot take advantage of the timeframe provided either under S. 10 or S. 15 for not paying rent in advance---On the basis of evidence, rent was concurrently adjudged as payable in advance---Courts below, after examining the rent schedule, receipts and the evidence of the parties, found that the petitioners had committed default, short payment or delay in payment of rent and that the rent was payable in advance, to which no exception could be taken. Cited Cases: • Zarina Khawaja v. Mahboob Shah PLD 1988 Supreme Court 190 • Shezan Limited v. Abdul Ghaffar 1992 SCMR 2400 • Uzma Construction Co. v. Navid H. Malik 2015 SCMR 642 (b) Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979----Ss. 10 & 15(2)(ii)---Enhanced rent---Short payment---Burden of proof---Once landlord discharges initial burden---Nothing on record to suggest that the petitioners at the relevant time disputed the enhanced rent---Enhanced rent was paid for January 2018 and acknowledged by the parties, whereas for February and March 2018 short payments were made---No contemporaneous record was produced showing that the tenant objected to the enhanced rent, or informed the landlord that it disputed the revised amount otherwise agreed in the agreements---Terms not opposed by the Ordinance would continue to operate, whether of advance rent and/or enhanced rent (not exceeding 10%)---Short payments for February and March 2018 remained unexplained and unpaid---No sufficient basis to displace the concurrent factual finding regarding the rent payable merely on the plea that the enhancement was unilateral---As held in Allah Din v. Habib, once the landlord discharges the initial burden by stating on oath that rent has not been received, the onus shifts to the tenant to affirmatively establish payment or valid tender---Appreciation of evidence, having been concurrently undertaken by the three forums below, cannot be interfered with. Cited Cases: • Allah Din v. Habib PLD 1982 Supreme Court 465 (c) Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979----S. 10---Default occurring during pendency of ejectment proceedings---Subsequent events---Institution of an ejectment application does not suspend the tenant's continuing obligation to pay or tender rent---Tenancy continues until lawfully terminated and rent continues to fall due according to the terms of the tenancy---Mere pendency of ejectment proceedings, or the subsequent filing of an application for deposit under S. 10(3), does not by itself postpone the date on which rent becomes payable under the scheme of S. 10---Law does not require a Rent Controller to shut his eyes to events occurring during the pendency of an ejectment proceeding as per record available---In appropriate cases, subsequent events may be taken into consideration to avoid multiplicity of proceedings, shorten litigation and mould the relief according to the altered circumstances---Subsequent conduct of the tenant in relation to payment of rent may be considered while determining the question of default---These authorities, however, do not dispense with the requirement of establishing the statutory ground of ejectment---If rent subsequently falling due during pendency remains unpaid beyond the period prescribed by the Ordinance, such non-payment constitutes a further statutory default and, if established from the record, may furnish an independent additional ground for ejectment in the pending proceedings---It would be incorrect to hold, as an absolute proposition, that un-pleaded default in payment of rent can never be taken into consideration; it must, however, be made part of the proceeding as required under the law---Even where the default pleaded in the ejectment proceedings is not established, a subsequent default, if duly established and if it satisfies the unfulfilled obligations of the tenant under the Ordinance, may furnish an independent ground for ejectment---In the present case the original default pleaded by the respondents was itself established; the subsequent non-payment was therefore not being made the sole basis of ejectment, but was relevant to demonstrate the petitioners' recorded failure to discharge their statutory obligation to pay rent. Cited Cases: • Mst. Amina Begum and others v. Mehar Ghulam Dastgir PLD 1978 Supreme Court 220 • Raj Muhammad v. Haji Muhammad Zareen 1980 SCMR 339 • Muhammad Amin Lasania v. Messrs Ilyas Marine and Associates PLD 2015 Supreme Court 33 (d) Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979----S. 15(2)(iv)---Impairment of material value or utility of premises---Expression "likely to impair"---Expert evidence not invariable---Expression "likely to impair the material value or utility" is of significance---In Organon Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Rafat Ali Khan it was held that the impairment must be material and may relate either to the value or the utility of the premises; actual impairment is not indispensable where the act is likely to cause such impairment; the law does not confine the provision to structural alterations; and examination of an architect or other expert is not an invariable requirement, the evidence of the landlord, supported by the record, being in an appropriate case sufficient---Findings of the courts below were not based upon mere existence of ordinary business installations---Evidence included installation of industrial generators, drilling of holes in the structure for air-conditioning arrangements, erection of staircases without established written permission and, in the relevant cases, establishment of valet parking inside and other alterations affecting the building and its use---In the Universal Express rent case, the High Court additionally considered the construction/extension, valet parking and placement of generators in the open space, along with drilling for air-conditioning arrangements and erection of a staircase---Acts were found to have gone beyond ordinary use of the demised premises and to have affected the building or its utility---Argument that absence of an architect or engineer necessarily defeats the claim of impairment could not be accepted---In Intezar Ahmed Khan and others v. Mst. Khatoon Hadi and another, material impairment was declined to be presumed merely from removal of a partition wall where there was no evidence demonstrating that the act was likely to impair value or utility; material impairment must be established through evidence and cannot be presumed from every alteration---Present cases did not rest upon such a bare presumption; the courts below considered the nature of the alterations, the manner in which the installations were made, the absence of established permission and their cumulative effect---Findings under S. 15(2)(iv) could not be characterized as based merely upon conjecture---Reliance upon Habib Carpets (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Karachi Properties Investment Company (Pvt.) Ltd. and Karachi Properties Investment Company (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Habib Carpets (Pvt.) Limited was distinguishable on facts---Finding of impairment was maintained by the Rent Controller, the Appellate Court and the High Court. Cited Cases: • Organon Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Rafat Ali Khan 1999 SCMR 54 • Intezar Ahmed Khan and others v. Mst. Khatoon Hadi and another 1995 SCMR 194 • Habib Carpets (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Karachi Properties Investment Company (Pvt.) Ltd. 2022 MLD 1754; • Karachi Properties Investment Company (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Habib Carpets (Pvt.) Limited 2024 SCMR 1354; (e) Leave to appeal----Concurrent findings---Interference---Concurrent findings are not immune from interference where they are shown to be perverse, based upon misreading or non-reading of material evidence, or founded upon an erroneous proposition of law, but mere possibility of another view does not justify interference---Appellate Court independently examined the findings of the Rent Controller and the High Court thereafter considered the matter in constitutional jurisdiction---No error of law warranting interference---Impugned judgments of the High Court maintaining the orders of ejectment did not call for interference. Disposition: Petitions dismissed and leave to appeal refused. (Civil Petitions Nos.397-K and 399-K to 402-K of 2026, Supreme Court of Pakistan, judgment of Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui, J., announced in open Court on 9.10.2026 at Islamabad; Yahya Afridi, C.J. and Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui, J. Approved for Reporting.)

Summary: (a) Service matter---Reinstatement---Back benefits for intervening period---Conditional reinstatement---Waiver of condition---Respondent, a Stenographer, was removed from service on 25.06.2004 and, consequent to decision dated 16.04.2010 of the Punjab Service Tribunal, was reinstated by University of the Punjab on 10.06.2010 from the date of dismissal on condition that he would not claim back benefits for the intervening period (treated as leave without pay), the University being allowed to hold a regular inquiry---De novo inquiry was held by a Professor on the allegations already levelled against respondent, in which he was exonerated on 24.11.2010---Held, condition imposed by the University was thereby waived by itself---Respondent had waited for a proper time during which the University could have realized that, in the event of reinstatement and without awarding even a minor penalty, and in absence of any proof that respondent had earned something during the intervening period, he was to be awarded back benefits---Reinstatement of respondent was to be construed as if he was never dismissed from service---Intimation application for a licence as an advocate was not sufficient to even presume that he had practised and was earning some livelihood---View taken by the High Court was in line with Muhammad Sharif's case. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Sharif and others v. Inspector General of Police, Punjab, Lahore and others 2021 PLC (C.S.) 762 (b) Laches---Delay in claiming back benefits---Recurring cause of action---Respondent's application for back benefits was declined by the University on 16.11.2016 and, after proceedings before the Vice Chancellor, the Syndicate and the High Court, was again rejected---Held, High Court having directed the University to take up the matter afresh and decide it, delay, if any, had been impliedly condoned by the High Court---Claiming back benefits was a recurring cause of action, particularly when the condition for reinstatement was itself waived by the University by holding an unsuccessful de novo inquiry. (c) Limitation---Petition barred by 47 days---Condonation of delay---Public sector university---Explanation that a public sector university requires some procedural formality prior to filing of a petition---Held, even if date of filing was calculated from issuance of certified copies on 13.11.2025, petition was still time-barred---Law of limitation is the same for an individual or a public sector institution as the law does not distinguish between the two types of litigants. Disposition: Petition under Art. 175F(1)(c) of the Constitution; leave refused and petition dismissed on merits as well as being barred by limitation; order dated 23.10.2025 of the Lahore High Court in Writ Petition No.242058 of 2018 directing release of back benefits for period 25.06.2004 to 14.05.2010 left undisturbed. Not approved for reporting.

Summary: (a) Anti-Terrorism Act 1997----S. 14(2), (3) [as amended by Anti-Terrorism (Sindh Amendment) Act 2025, S. 4]---Judge/Presiding Officer of Anti-Terrorism Court---Fixed tenure---Upper age limit of sixty-five years introduced by amendment---Applicability to Judge appointed before amendment---Prospective or retrospective operation---Petitioner, a retired District and Sessions Judge, was appointed under S. 14(2) of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 as Judge/Presiding Officer of Anti-Terrorism Court-IV, Karachi, for two and a half years, vide notification dated 19.09.2024, when S. 14 prescribed no upper age limit---Amending Act, published on 02.09.2025, prescribed age limit of sixty-five years for appointment and provided that Judge/Presiding Officer "appointed under this section" shall cease to hold office on attaining that age---Government of Sindh issued notification dated 22.10.2025 whereby petitioner and two other Presiding Officers were to cease to hold office with immediate effect, though their terms had not expired---Held, statute, including an amending statute, ordinarily operates prospectively unless retrospective effect is given by express enactment or necessary implication---Presumption against retrospectivity assumes particular significance where legislation affects substantive or vested rights; legislature, subject to constitutional limitations, is competent to legislate retrospectively and take away vested rights, but must use clear and unambiguous words or such intention must arise by necessary implication---Amending Act contained no express provision making age limit applicable to appointments made before it came into force; expression "appointed under this section" did not, by itself, necessarily indicate intention to curtail fixed tenure of Judges already appointed, being reasonably capable of referring to appointments made after the amendment---Fact that cessation of office would take effect after commencement of Amending Act did not, by itself, resolve whether legislature intended to affect rights already accrued---Petitioner, having been appointed for a specified tenure under the law then in force, had acquired a vested right to hold office for that period, which was not a mere expectation, subject to conditions governing its lawful continuation or premature termination---Where amended provision admitted of two reasonably possible interpretations, one preserving vested rights was to be preferred, and no statute should be construed to have retrospective effect to a greater extent than its language necessarily required---Newly prescribed age limit did not apply to existing fixed-tenure appointments so as to curtail their subsisting tenure---High Court erred in treating amended age limit as necessarily applicable to existing appointments without giving due effect to presumption against retrospective operation of legislation affecting vested rights; whether cessation of office occurs automatically by operation of law was a question distinct from, and subsequent to, the question whether the provision applies to appointments already made under the previous law---Question was not whether legislature was competent to prescribe an upper age limit, but whether the amended provision was intended to apply to existing appointments so as to curtail subsisting tenure. Cited Cases: • Sardar Sher Bahadar Khan v. Election Commission of Pakistan PLD 2018 SC 97 • Zila Council Jehlum v. Pakistan Tobacco Company Ltd PLD 2016 SC 398 • Muhammad Hussain v. Muhammad 2000 SCMR 367 • Rajby Industries Karachi v. Federation of Pakistan 2023 SCMR 1407 • Taisei Corporation v. A.M. Construction Company (Pvt) Ltd 2024 SCMR 640 • Commissioner Inland Revenue v. Mekotex (Pvt) Limited PLD 2024 SC 1168 • Badshah Gul Wazir v. Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 2015 SCMR 43 • Lt. Gen. (Retd) Jamshaid Gulzar v. Federation of Pakistan 2014 SCMR 1504 (b) Statutory interpretation---Retrospective operation---Fixed-tenure appointment---Distinction between vested right and mere expectation---Substituted provision and non obstante clause---Reliance on Badshah Gul Wazir case and distinction of Jamshaid Gulzar case---Held, right vests when all facts required by law to establish it have occurred, whereas it remains inchoate when some investitive facts have not occurred---Appointment for fixed tenure under law then in force cannot ordinarily be curtailed by subsequent amendment in absence of sufficiently clear legislative intention---In Badshah Gul Wazir case, Provincial Ombudsman appointed for four years could not be de-notified on attaining age limit introduced by amendment during his tenure, as amendment had no retrospective effect; substituted section, particularly one curtailing substantive rights, does not have retroactive operation unless legislature elects to give it such effect, nor does it obliterate accrued rights---Present case closely resembled Badshah Gul Wazir case---Jamshaid Gulzar case was distinguishable as amending legislation there expressly provided that substituted provision would be deemed always to have been so substituted and contained a separate non obstante provision overriding contracts/instruments of service and providing for cessation of office on commencement of the amending law---Although substituted S. 14(2) opened with non obstante clause, it contained no comparable stipulation expressly extending age limit to appointments already made, and Amending Act contained no deeming provision---Reliance of law officers on Mekotex case was misplaced, as that case reiterated that statutes relating to substantive rights are prospective unless expressly or by necessary implication given retrospective effect---Certainty in law is required; retrospective legislation is generally the exception and is expressly stated in the relevant law. Cited Cases: • Commissioner Inland Revenue v. Mekotex (Pvt) Limited PLD 2024 SC 1168 • Badshah Gul Wazir v. Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 2015 SCMR 43 • Lt. Gen. (Retd) Jamshaid Gulzar v. Federation of Pakistan 2014 SCMR 1504 (c) Practice and procedure---Leave to appeal---Person not party to original proceedings---Maintainability---Petitioner, whose application for impleadment (M.A. No. 8088 of 2025) in High Court was dismissed, sought permission to maintain petition for leave to appeal---Held, person not party to original proceedings may, with leave of the appellate court, prefer appeal if adversely affected by the judgment or order; petitioner being directly affected by impugned order, his application seeking permission to maintain petition was allowed---Remaining contentions of petitioner not examined as case could be disposed of on question of statutory interpretation alone and were left open. Cited Cases: • H.M. Saya & Co, Karachi v. Wazir Ali Industries Ltd, Karachi PLD 1969 SC 65 Disposition: Petition converted into appeal and allowed; impugned order dated 22.12.2025 of the High Court of Sindh, Circuit Court, Hyderabad in C.P. No. D-1917 of 2025 set aside; M.A. No. 8088 of 2025 for impleadment allowed; notification dated 22.10.2025 declared to be without lawful authority and of no legal effect; petitioner deemed to have continued in office and entitled to continue as Judge/Presiding Officer of Anti-Terrorism Court-IV, Karachi, until completion of his stipulated tenure of two and a half years, subject to conditions governing his appointment under the law; C.P. No. D-1917 of 2025 also allowed in those terms. Approved for Reporting.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan----Art. 199---Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court---Family matters---Scope---Article 199 confers a jurisdiction of supervision, not a second appeal---It keeps the Courts within the bounds of law; it does not invite the High Court to enter the arena of facts and fight the case anew---High Court does not sit to weigh the evidence afresh, reassess the credibility of witnesses, or substitute its own view merely because another inference might appear possible---High Court could correct illegality; it could not re-try the facts---Supervision was not substitution, and certiorari was not an appeal in disguise---Interference could nevertheless be warranted where the decision suffered from an error of law, want or excess of jurisdiction, was founded on no evidence, or rested upon such misreading or non-reading of material evidence as rendered the conclusion legally unsustainable---Essential distinction was between a mere error of judgment on facts and an error which affected the legality of the decision-making process; the former ordinarily belonged to the domain of appeal, the latter could invite constitutional correction---A possible alternative view was not a constitutional error; a disagreement with the weight of evidence was not, by itself, a jurisdictional defect---Claims relating to maintenance and dowry articles substantially turned upon appreciation of evidence; Family Courts examined the evidence and appellate courts found no legal infirmity---High Court was correct in declining to interfere with findings concerning maintenance and dowry articles merely because the petitioners invited it to take a different view of the evidence---Dower, however, stood on a different footing where the legal consequence attributed to it flowed from treating the proceedings as cases of khula although the underlying claims were founded upon statutory dissolution. Cited Cases: • Universal Camera Corp v. NLRB 340 US 474 • Muhammad Hussain Munir v. Sikandar PLD 1974 SC 139 • R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Khawaja 1984 AC 74 • Shajar Islam v. Muhammad Siddique PLD 2007 SC 45 • Minister of Citizenship and Immigration v. Vavilov 2019 SCC 65 • Mst. Tayyeba Ambreen v. Shafqat Ali Kiyani 2023 SCMR 246 • Arif Fareed v. Bibi Sara 2023 SCMR 413 • M. Hamad Hassan v. Mst. Isma Bukhari 2023 SCMR 1434 • Mushtaq v. Mst. Fatima PLD 2025 SC 434 (b) Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939----Ss. 2 & 5---Khula---Distinction from statutory dissolution on ground of cruelty---Consent and election of wife---Family Courts Act, 1964---Wives instituted family suits seeking dissolution of marriage on the ground of cruelty, together with recovery of maintenance, dower and dowry articles, and neither wife elected khula as an alternative basis for dissolution---Family Courts, having found cruelty unproved, nevertheless dissolved the marriages by khula, without first obtaining the wives' clear and voluntary consent or election, and directed return or surrender of dower---Held, that such course cannot be sustained---Khula and dissolution under the Act of 1939 are distinct legal avenues, although both may ultimately terminate the marital relationship---S. 2 of the Act of 1939 confers upon a Muslim woman a statutory right to seek dissolution upon proof of one or more prescribed grounds, including cruelty; such dissolution is founded upon an established matrimonial wrong or other statutory ground---Khula, on the other hand, is a distinct right of the wife to seek release from the marital bond where continuation of the marriage has become intolerable and the limits prescribed by Allah Almighty cannot be observed---A suit for dissolution does not, by itself, amount to a suit for khula; khula is an independent right of the woman; and a court cannot convert a claim for statutory dissolution into khula without her clear and voluntary election, particularly where such conversion affects her dower rights---S. 5 of the Act of 1939 expressly preserves the wife's right to dower where the marriage is dissolved under that Act---Khula, by contrast, ordinarily carries the financial consequences applicable to the wife's surrender or return of benefit for her release from the marital bond---A court cannot, by merely changing the legal description of the wife's claim from statutory dissolution to khula, impose upon her the consequences of a remedy which she never elected to pursue---Wife's consent in such circumstances is not an empty procedural formality; it constitutes the juridical election by which she chooses khula, together with its legal consequences---Error committed by the Family Courts was one of law and jurisdictional character, rather than a mere procedural irregularity---Courts proceeded upon a juridical basis which the petitioners had neither pleaded nor elected and which carried consequences materially different from those attached to the remedy invoked by them---In the absence of a clear statement, consent or election by the wives, decrees of khula could not lawfully have been passed---Failure to establish cruelty does not authorise the court to manufacture an election of khula on behalf of the wife---She remains entitled to choose whether to pursue her statutory claim or, if she so elects, to seek khula upon its lawful terms. Cited Cases: • Mst. Khurshid Bibi v. Muhammad Amin PLD 1967 SC 97 • Ibrahim Khan v. Mst. Saima Khan PLD 2024 SC 645 • Dr. Faryal Maqsood v. Khurram Shehzad Durrani PLD 2025 SC 262 (c) Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939----S. 2(ix)---"Any other ground which is recognised as valid for the dissolution of marriages under Muslim law"---Shiqaq---Residuary provision---Scope and ingredients---None of the grounds specified in S. 2(i) to (viii) of the Act of 1939 was established so as to warrant dissolution on any of those specific grounds---Language of S. 2(ix) is deliberately residuary; the legislature did not confine dissolution under the Act of 1939 to the eight preceding grounds, but preserved within the statutory scheme other grounds recognised as valid for dissolution under Muslim law---Council of Islamic Ideology, whose opinion was sought, stated in substance that where there exists a serious breach between the spouses, the parties are unable to live together in accordance with the purposes of marriage, allegations arise from both sides or fault cannot fairly be attributed exclusively to one spouse, and reconciliation has failed, the resulting condition may constitute shiqaq recognised by Muslim law for purposes of dissolution---Opinion of the Council helps the Court understand the relevant principles of Muslim law but does not substitute for judicial determination; interpretation and application of S. 2(ix), and whether a particular matrimonial condition satisfies the requirements of shiqaq, remain matters for the Court---Source of the concept of shiqaq is found in the Holy Qur'an (Al-Qur'an, 4:35); the expression denotes serious breach, discord or rupture between spouses---Holy Qur'an describes the purpose of marriage in terms of tranquillity, affection and mercy (Al-Qur'an, 30:21) and directs "retain in honour or release with kindness" (Al-Qur'an, 2:229)---Principles of imsak bil-ma'ruf (retention in a proper and honourable manner) and tasrih bi-ihsan (release with kindness) provide the moral and legal framework within which continuation and dissolution of marriage are to be understood---Qur'anic concept does not support either extreme: that every disagreement must result in dissolution, or that a marriage must continue indefinitely after the relationship has become a sustained and irreconcilable breach---Shiqaq is not established by every quarrel, disagreement, incompatibility or temporary estrangement; it requires a genuine and continuing rupture of such character that the essential purposes of marriage cannot realistically be fulfilled, coupled with the failure of reasonable efforts at reconciliation---Shiqaq must be distinguished from cruelty: cruelty is a matrimonial wrong attributable to conduct falling within S. 2(viii) of the Act of 1939; shiqaq, by contrast, concerns the condition of the matrimonial relationship itself, and a marriage may reach a state of serious rupture even though the evidence is insufficient to establish, against either spouse, the particular statutory wrong of cruelty---View expressed in Balqis Fatima preferred to the reservations in Umar Bibi---Held, that where the factual requirements of shiqaq are established, and the safeguards of fair procedure are satisfied, shiqaq is capable of constituting a ground recognised as valid for dissolution under Muslim law and therefore falls within the residuary provision contained in S. 2(ix) of the Act of 1939---This conclusion does not amount to the judicial creation of a general doctrine of "irretrievable breakdown of marriage" independent of statute, nor does it authorise a Family Court to dissolve every unhappy marriage merely by describing it as shiqaq---Jurisdiction remains controlled by S. 2(ix), the requirements of Muslim law, the evidence on record and the procedural obligation to attempt reconciliation---Court must distinguish between an unhappy marriage and one in a state of shiqaq; mere incompatibility, occasional disagreement, anger, short separation or the existence of matrimonial litigation cannot, by themselves, satisfy the test---Court must be satisfied that the breach is genuine, serious and continuing; that the matrimonial relationship has ceased to function in accordance with its essential purposes; and that reconciliation has failed despite meaningful judicial effort. Cited Cases: • Mt. Umar Bibi v. Mohammad Din AIR 1945 Lahore 51 • Mst. Balqis Fatima v. Najm-Ul-Ikram Qureshi PLD 1959 (W.P) Lahore 566 (d) Constitution of Pakistan----Arts. 4, 14 & 25---Dignity and equality in matrimonial adjudication---Khula distinguished from shiqaq---Financial consequences as to dower---Article 4 requires that every person be dealt with in accordance with law; Art. 14 guarantees dignity; and Art. 25 recognises equality before the law and equal protection of the law---Wife should not be compelled to surrender dower through an involuntary conversion of her statutory claim into khula---Equally, the husband should not be judicially characterised as cruel or guilty of matrimonial misconduct without the evidentiary foundation required by law---Where the evidence does not establish a particular matrimonial wrong to the standard required by law, the Court should refrain from declaring it proved; conversely, where the evidence establishes that the matrimonial relationship itself has descended into a state of serious and continuing rupture, the absence of proof of a particular matrimonial wrong does not necessarily require the parties to remain bound to one another indefinitely---Khula proceeds from the wife's voluntary election to obtain release from the marriage and ordinarily carries the financial consequences applicable to that remedy---Shiqaq, by contrast, arises from an objectively established condition of serious matrimonial breach and does not depend on the wife's surrender of dower or any benefit as consideration for her release; its legal foundation lies in Muslim law as preserved through S. 2(ix) of the Act of 1939---A court cannot employ shiqaq merely as a device to achieve khula without the wife's consent; nor can it employ khula to avoid determining whether an independent statutory or Muslim-law ground of dissolution is established---Where dissolution takes place under the Act of 1939, S. 5 preserves the wife's right to dower; where dissolution takes place through khula, the financial consequences are governed by the principles applicable to that remedy, including the question of return or surrender of financial benefit---Once it is concluded that the decrees could not lawfully have been passed as khula decrees, the directions requiring the wives to return, surrender or waive dower merely by reason of khula cannot survive---This determination affects only those consequences which flowed solely from the erroneous characterisation of the dissolution as khula. (e) Family Courts Act, 1964---Inquisitorial procedure---Determination of shiqaq on existing record without remand---Family proceedings are not conducted under the general procedural framework of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, nor do the strict technical rules regarding admissibility and scrutiny of evidence common in ordinary civil litigation apply to them; an inquisitorial procedure, intended to facilitate fair and effective adjudication of family disputes, is adopted while preserving the fundamental requirement that each party has a fair opportunity to know and contest the case against him or her---Question was not whether a new factual controversy should now be introduced, but whether the facts already established on the record disclosed an independent legal ground upon which the marriages may lawfully be dissolved---A decree founded upon shiqaq cannot ordinarily be passed against a party who has had no fair opportunity to contest the factual and legal basis of such relief---In the present cases, however, the matrimonial allegations were fully litigated; husbands contested the allegations; wives sought dissolution; evidence was recorded; reconciliation was attempted but failed; and the parties thereafter had opportunities before the appellate and constitutional forums---Finding of shiqaq reached by the Supreme Court was not founded upon a new allegation, new evidence or a new factual controversy, but was a legal characterisation of the matrimonial condition emerging from evidence already brought on the record and tested by the parties---On the facts, in one case the wife categorically stated that she was unwilling to resume matrimonial life even if the husband provided maintenance and a separate residence; in the other, persistent arguments, taunts and verbal exchanges culminated in a physical altercation and criminal proceedings, with failed reconciliation---Cumulative effect of the evidence established a condition of serious and continuing matrimonial rupture amounting to shiqaq in both cases, without attributing exclusive blame to either spouse---This finding does not amount to a determination that either husband is guilty of cruelty, nor does it attribute fault to either wife---Shiqaq recognises the condition of the matrimonial relationship rather than requiring the Court to manufacture a culprit---A decree founded upon shiqaq neither treats the wives as having voluntarily surrendered their financial rights through khula nor brands the husbands as legally cruel when cruelty has not been established. (f) Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939----Ss. 2(ix) & 5---Decrees modified---Family Courts committed an error of law in converting the petitioners' claims for dissolution on the ground of cruelty into decrees of khula without obtaining their clear and voluntary consent or election---Those decrees, to the extent that they rest upon khula, cannot be sustained---Record, however, does not warrant setting aside the dissolution altogether---Dissolution can lawfully be sustained upon a juridical basis different from that adopted by the Family Courts, namely shiqaq falling within S. 2(ix)---Directions requiring the petitioners to return, surrender or waive their dower merely as a consequence of khula shall stand set aside---Entitlement to dower shall be determined in accordance with the Act of 1939 and the findings otherwise sustainable on the record---Findings concerning maintenance and dowry articles, not having been shown to suffer from any error of law, jurisdictional defect, material misreading or non-reading of evidence warranting interference under Art. 199 of the Constitution, shall remain undisturbed---Petitions converted into appeals and partly allowed; no order as to costs. Disposition: Petitions converted into appeals and partly allowed; decrees of the Family Courts modified only to the extent necessary to substitute dissolution on the ground of shiqaq under S. 2(ix) of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939, in place of dissolution based on khula, and to set aside the consequential directions concerning return, surrender or waiver of dower founded solely upon khula; remaining findings, including those concerning maintenance and dowry articles, remain intact to the extent stated; no order as to costs. (C.P.L.A. No.57 of 2025 and C.P.L.A. No.1350 of 2025, Supreme Court of Pakistan, judgment dated 17.08.2026, Shahid Waheed, Naeem Akhter Afghan, Muhammad Hashim Khan Kakar, Ishtiaq Ibrahim and Miangul Hassan Aurangzeb, JJ.; APPROVED FOR REPORTING)

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (C.P.C.)----O. V, Rr. 16 to 20---Substituted service---Ex parte proceedings after remand---Due service distinguished from knowledge of proceedings---Counsel stating want of instructions---Suit for specific performance of agreement to sell dated 30.11.2004---After remand, trial Court, on the process server reporting inability of former counsel to appear for lack of instructions, proceeded to substituted service and ultimately passed an ex parte judgment and decree dated 02.11.2016---Held, that the statement of counsel appearing on the order sheet that he had no instructions could by no stretch be treated as service upon the petitioners---Nothing on record established that the petitioners themselves were served or that any valid and effective process was thereafter effected upon them before substituted service was adopted---A counsel who expressly states that he has no instructions cannot, merely by virtue of earlier appearance, be regarded as having accepted service on behalf of the party, particularly where the record discloses no subsequent authorization or appearance---Once the trial Court was apprised that counsel had no instructions, the proper course was to ensure service upon the petitioners in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law before proceeding further against them---Distinction between knowledge of proceedings and due service cannot be lost sight of. (b) Civil Procedure Code (C.P.C.)----O. V, R. 20---Substituted service---Preconditions---Substituted service can only be resorted to after the Court has adhered to the prescribed procedure for ordinary service and has satisfied itself that the defendant cannot be served through ordinary modes or is deliberately avoiding service---Where the mandatory requirements preceding substituted service are not fulfilled, the process of service is rendered a nullity and the superstructure built thereon automatically collapses---Every litigant must be afforded a fair opportunity to plead and defend his case and no person should be condemned unheard---Before resorting to substituted service under O. V, R. 20, C.P.C., the Court must satisfy itself that ordinary service could not be effected and must adhere to the mandatory procedure prescribed by law---Proceedings founded upon defective service cannot be sustained---An inadvertent lapse of the Court ought not to prejudice a party. Cited Cases: • Messrs Mobiserve Pakistan (Pvt.) Limited v. Messrs V-Tech and others 2025 SCMR 1936 • Hashim Khan and others v. Mst. Musarat Begum and others 2025 SCMR 564 (c) Natural justice---Audi alteram partem---Due notice---Defect in service not a mere technical irregularity---Right of a party to receive due notice and an opportunity to contest the proceedings lies at the very foundation of a fair adjudication---Where the record itself demonstrates absence of due service, the Court cannot presume that the party had knowledge of the proceedings merely because a counsel who had represented the party at an earlier stage happened to be before the Court and stated that he had no instructions---Principle of audi alteram partem requires that the party against whom an adverse adjudication is to be made must be given a meaningful opportunity to participate---Subsequent judgment and decree, being founded upon proceedings in which the petitioners were not afforded an effective opportunity of hearing, held, liable to be set aside. (d) Constitution of Pakistan----Art. 185(3)---Leave to appeal---Specific performance---Ex parte decree after remand---Connected civil appeal arising from the same post-remand ex parte judgment and decree---Leave granted; petition converted into appeal and allowed; connected civil appeal also allowed in the same terms---Impugned judgment of High Court and consequential post-remand judgments/orders, including the ex parte judgment and decree, set aside---Matter remanded to trial Court for decision afresh, strictly in accordance with law, after ensuring due and effective service upon all concerned parties and affording them full opportunity to file pleadings, produce evidence and address arguments---Trial Court directed to endeavour to decide the suit expeditiously, preferably within four months from the date on which the parties first appear pursuant to the order---Supreme Court expressed no opinion on the merits of the controversy; trial Court to decide independently, uninfluenced by any observation touching upon the merits of the suit. Disposition: C.P.L.A. No.1748 of 2023 converted into an appeal and allowed; connected Civil Appeal No.298 of 2023 also allowed; impugned judgment dated 20.02.2023 of the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench in Civil Revision No.1646 of 2017, as well as consequential judgments/orders passed in the post-remand proceedings, including the ex parte judgment and decree dated 02.11.2016, set aside; matter remanded to the trial Court for fresh decision in accordance with law after due service; parties to appear before the learned District Judge concerned on 26.10.2026 without awaiting further notice; no opinion expressed on merits. (C.P.L.A. No.1748 of 2023 a/w C.A. No.298 of 2023, Supreme Court of Pakistan, judgment dated 05th of October, 2026, Jamal Khan Mandokhail and Shahid Bilal Hassan, JJ.; Approved for Reporting)

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan----Art. 212(3)---Federal Service Tribunal---Proforma promotion---Leave to appeal---Scope---Petition by Pakistan Railways against judgment of Federal Service Tribunal directing consideration of respondent for proforma promotion to Train Supervisor (BS-11) with effect from 31.05.2019---Respondent, initially appointed as Junior Assistant Train (JAT / BS-5) on 23.05.1986 on ad-hoc basis, regularized in 2005 and promoted as Senior Assistant Train, suffered a fracture of the right femur and was assigned light sedentary duties on the recommendation of the Railway Medical Board vide letter dated 04.10.2007---He was placed at Serial No.1 in the seniority list of SAT issued in September 2018 and stood retired on attaining the age of superannuation on 25.11.2021---Department's objection that completion of the T-7(a) training course was a mandatory requirement for promotion, which the respondent had failed to complete, held, misconceived---Tribunal had rightly held that the T-7(a) course was a training requirement relating to promotion to SAT, but was not mandatory for onward promotion to Train Supervisor (BS-11)---Department had earlier demoted the respondent from SAT (BS-9) to JAT (BS-5) on the same ground of non-completion of the T-7(a) course; that action was declared void ab initio by the Tribunal in Appeal No.665(R)CS/2022, with direction to grant pensionary and other benefits of SAT (BS-9), and the Tribunal's judgment was maintained by the Supreme Court in CPLA No.3622/2024 vide order dated 22.01.2026---Objection regarding the T-7(a) course therefore stood settled between the parties, and the Department could not be permitted to re-agitate the same settled issue to deny consideration for proforma promotion---No legal error, procedural infirmity or misreading of record in the Tribunal's judgment dated 12.11.2024 that would warrant interference under Art. 212(3) of the Constitution. (b) Service matter---Proforma promotion---Medical disability---Light sedentary duties---Non-completion of field training---When an employee is assigned light duty by the employer due to medical disability, non-completion of a field training course not offered to him for medical reasons cannot be treated as wilful default on the part of the employee, who is otherwise entitled to be promoted---Department cannot deprive a senior employee of his legitimate right to be considered for proforma promotion alongside his juniors---Tribunal had merely directed the Department to consider the claim for proforma promotion to Train Supervisor (BS-11) with effect from 31.05.2019 under the relevant rules, which directions were well within the domain of the Tribunal and did not give rise to any grievance at the leave stage. Disposition: Petition dismissed and leave to appeal refused. (Civil Petition No.428 of 2025, Supreme Court of Pakistan, order dated 02.10.2026, by Aqeel Ahmed Abbasi, J.; Ayesha A. Malik, J. agreeing. Approved for Reporting)

Summary: (a) Pakistan Penal Code (PPC)----Ss. 302(b)/34---Qatl-i-amd---Unnatural death of wife in matrimonial house---Eye-witness subsequently introduced---Reliability---Petitioner was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for life as Tazir with compensation under S. 544-A, Cr.P.C.; High Court maintained conviction of petitioner while acquitting co-accused---FIR disclosed no eye-witness; it was lodged about four hours after the alleged phone call of the petitioner, and even then named no eye-witness---On the same night, another son-in-law of the complainant, resident of a different district, was introduced as an eye-witness---Said witness failed to furnish necessary details of the shopping which he claimed as the reason for his presence in Hyderabad, conceded that he did not inform the complainant (who had a mobile phone) or the local police, and stated that after witnessing the occurrence he went back to Mirpur Khas---Held, that evidence of the subsequently introduced eye-witness was not worthy of reliance and had rightly been disbelieved by the High Court---After discarding the only eye-witness, the case rested on circumstantial evidence. (b) Circumstantial evidence---Alleged extra-judicial confession by telephone---Recovery of pistol and positive FSL report---Safe custody---Neither the phone number of the complainant nor that of the petitioner was mentioned in the FIR, and no CDR was brought on record to establish the alleged call in which the petitioner was said to have confessed the murder---No other circumstantial evidence such as last seen, wajtakar or extra-judicial confession was available except recovery of a pistol and positive FSL report---Empties and pistol were deposited together in the office of FSL, and it was not safe to rely upon such evidence---Witness who had taken the pistol and empties to FSL was not produced to establish safe custody of the alleged recoveries---Possibility could not be ruled out that recovery of pistol and positive FSL report were fabricated to strengthen a weak prosecution case, particularly when an eye-witness had been subsequently planted---Held, not safe to rely upon recovery of pistol and positive FSL report. Cited Cases: • Abdul Wahid v. The State 2023 SCMR 1278 • Sarfraz v. The State 2023 SCMR 670 (c) Pakistan Penal Code (PPC)----S. 302---Motive---Vague and ambiguous motive of matrimonial dispute---Deceased was living with the petitioner till the date of occurrence---Prosecution witnesses gave no reason of the alleged matrimonial dispute, such as non-payment of maintenance, drug addiction or intended second marriage, and no family suit or application by either party was brought on record---Held, that prosecution could not prove the alleged motive. (d) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984----Art. 122---Burden of proof---Unnatural death of wife inside the house---Scope---Contention that, the dead body having been recovered from the house of the petitioner and the deceased being his wife, it was his duty under Art. 122 to explain the death, and that in the absence of a plausible explanation conviction was justified---Held, that an accused cannot be convicted and sentenced merely on the ground of absence of a plausible explanation under Art. 122, or merely on the basis of recovery of the dead body from his house, in the absence of other reliable evidence---Art. 122 comes into play only when the prosecution has first discharged its legal burden to prove guilt by producing convincing and reliable evidence---Where the entire case of the prosecution stands demolished or is found utterly unbelievable, an accused cannot be convicted merely because he did not explain the circumstances in which his wife or some vulnerable dependent had lost his life, and the entire burden of proof cannot be shifted to him if the prosecution case itself collapses---Apart from the petitioner, his brother (co-accused since acquitted) and other family members were also residing in the same house; the house was not in exclusive possession of the petitioner and was jointly owned by other family members, so that it was difficult to fix responsibility of the murder only on the petitioner---Until the prosecution first discharges its duty through cogent and reliable evidence, the onus to explain the unnatural death of the wife does not shift to the accused---Presumptions or probabilities, howsoever strong, cannot take the place of conclusive proof required to convict an accused---Finding of guilt cannot be based merely on high probabilities inferred from evidence; mere conjectures and probabilities cannot take the place of proof---For giving benefit of doubt, more than one infirmity is not required; a single infirmity creating reasonable doubt regarding the truth of the charge makes the whole case doubtful---Prosecution failed to prove its case against the petitioner beyond the shadow of doubt. Cited Cases: • Arshad Mehmood v. The State 2005 SCMR 1524 • Saeed Ahmed v. The State 2015 SCMR 710 • Muhammad Pervaiz v. The State and others PLD 2019 Supreme Court 592 • Asad Khan v. The State PLD 2017 Supreme Court 681 • Nazeer Ahmed v. The State 2016 SCMR 1628 • Abdul Majeed v. The State 2011 SCMR 941 • Naveed Asghar and 2 others v. The State PLD 2021 Supreme Court 600 • Nasrullah alias Nasro v. The State 2017 SCMR 724 • Ghulam Qadir and 2 others v. The State 2008 SCMR 1221 • Muhammad Jamshaid and another v. The State and others 2016 SCMR 1019 • Abdul Mateen v. Sahib Khan and others PLD 2006 Supreme Court 538 • Muhammad Luqman v. The State PLD 1970 SC 10 Disposition: Jail petition converted into an appeal and allowed; judgments dated 17.10.2022 of the High Court of Sindh, Circuit Court, Hyderabad in Criminal Jail Appeal No.S-275-A of 2017 and dated 07.11.2017 of the Additional Sessions Judge, Hyderabad, set aside; petitioner acquitted of the charge while giving him the benefit of doubt; to be released from jail forthwith unless required to be detained in any other case. (Jail Petition No.565 of 2022, Supreme Court of Pakistan, judgment dated 02.10.2026, Malik Shahzad Ahmad Khan and Shakeel Ahmad, JJ.; Approved For Reporting)