Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973---- ----Art. 199---Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court---Alternate adequate remedy---Scope---Petitioner challenged judgment and decree passed by Family Court in favour of respondent-wife and also challenged order of Appellate Court whereby his appeal had been dismissed for non-prosecution---Office raised objection that proper remedy was to file restoration application before the Additional District Judge concerned---Record showed that petitioner had already invoked appellate remedy against Family Court decree but, after dismissal of appeal for non-prosecution, had not sought restoration before the Appellate Court and instead directly invoked constitutional jurisdiction of High Court---Held, that appeal was a substantive remedy permitting comprehensive reappraisal of both facts and law, whereas constitutional jurisdiction was discretionary and ordinarily confined to questions of jurisdiction, legality and violation/enforcement of fundamental rights---High Court, in ordinary circumstances, would not reappraise evidence where adequate alternate remedy before competent forum was available---Constitution petition was not maintainable at such stage without first availing remedy of restoration before Appellate Court. (b) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)---- ----S. 14---Family appeal---Scope of appellate jurisdiction---Family Court had partially decreed suit for recovery of past and future maintenance allowance, dower and dowry articles in favour of respondent-wife to the extent of maintenance allowance and dowry articles, while dismissing claim to deferred dower---Petitioner’s appeal against such decree was dismissed for non-prosecution---Held, that Appellate Court under S.14 of the Family Courts Act, 1964 had jurisdiction to examine legality of findings of fact recorded by Family Court and, after appraisal of record, could uphold, reverse or modify such findings---Remedy before Appellate Court was broader than remedy under constitutional jurisdiction of High Court and could not be treated as inadequate merely because execution proceedings were pending. (c) Civil procedure---- ----Dismissal of appeal for non-prosecution---Restoration---Proper remedy---Appeal filed by petitioner before Appellate Court was dismissed for non-prosecution when nobody appeared on his behalf---Petitioner did not attempt to get appeal restored and directly approached High Court through constitutional petition---Held, that proper course for petitioner was to file an application before Appellate Court for restoration of appeal, which, if filed, would be decided by the Appellate Court on its own merits in accordance with law---Constitutional petition could not be entertained by bypassing such remedy. (d) Election of remedies---- ----Doctrine of election---Not an absolute right in constitutional jurisdiction---Petitioner contended that where more than one remedy was available, he had right to select any one of them and could not be compelled to adopt a particular remedy---Held, that while exercising constitutional jurisdiction, High Court could always examine availability and adequacy of alternate remedy and, in its discretion, could refuse to entertain a constitution petition where adequate statutory remedy was available---Doctrine of election of remedies did not create an absolute right to bypass adequate remedy provided by law. (e) Execution of Family Court decree---- ----Arrest in execution proceedings---Effect on alternate remedy---Petitioner contended that as he had been arrested by order of Executing Court during execution proceedings, remedy before Appellate Court was not adequate---Held, that Appellate Court, while exercising jurisdiction under S.14 of the Family Courts Act, 1964, could also pass interim orders and petitioner could challenge his arrest in execution of impugned decree before the Appellate Court---Remedy before Appellate Court was therefore adequate in the circumstances. Cited Cases: No case law cited. Disposition: Office objection sustained; petitioner was directed in substance to avail proper remedy by filing restoration application before the Appellate Court; High Court declined to entertain the constitution petition without commenting on merits of the case-------- "The Appellate Court has got jurisdiction under Section 14 of the Family Courts Act, 1964 to adjudicate upon the legality of findings of fact recorded by the Family Court and while doing so, it can reverse, modify or uphold the said findings of fact and comment upon merits of the case and while exercising its appellate jurisdiction it can also pass interim order(s), therefore, the said remedy cannot be treated as inadequate in the given circumstances of the case. Hence, instead of insisting upon entertainment of the titled constitution petition, it would be appropriate for the petitioner in the first instance to file an application before the Appellate Court for restoration of his Appeal, which if he files is expected to be decided on its own merits in accordance with law."

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973---- ----Arts. 199 & 212---Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court---Service Tribunal---Question of maintainability---Promotion and upgradation---Distinction---Respondents objected that dispute related to promotion and, therefore, fell within exclusive jurisdiction of Service Tribunal under Art.212 of the Constitution---Held, that objection was misconceived as benefit in question was not promotion but Time Scale Personal Upgradation---Promotion signified advancement to a higher post in service hierarchy involving elevation in rank, duties, responsibilities and status, whereas upgradation was person-centric, remedial in nature and granted to alleviate stagnation without change in post, duties or responsibilities---Although policy letter dated 19.04.2019 used expression “Time Scale Promotion”, subsequent clarification dated 20.12.2019 itself stated that such expression was to be construed as “Time Scale Personal Upgradation”---Matter relating to upgradation of civil servants could be examined by High Court in constitutional jurisdiction and bar under Art.212 of the Constitution was not attracted---Constitutional petitions were maintainable. Secretary to the Government of Pakistan, Establishment Division, Islamabad and another v. Muhammad Ahmed Khan and others 2025 SCMR 434; Regional Commissioner Income Tax, Northern Region, Islamabad and another v. Syed Munawar Ali and others 2016 SCMR 859 rel. (b) Service jurisprudence---- ----Promotion and upgradation---Legal distinction---Upgradation not equivalent to promotion---Time Scale Personal Upgradation---Scope---Court observed that promotion was post-centric and structural in character, whereas upgradation was person-centric and remedial, intended to mitigate hardship caused by absence or limited availability of promotional avenues---Employee receiving upgradation continued to hold same post without alteration in duties or responsibilities, but was allowed higher pay scale to alleviate stagnation---Grant of Time Scale Promotion in the present case, in substance, amounted to personal upgradation under policy framework and did not constitute substantive promotion against a higher post. (c) Finance Department Punjab letter dated 19.04.2019---- ----Time Scale Promotion/Time Scale Personal Upgradation---Two distinct categories of eligible officers---Interpretation---Policy letter dated 19.04.2019 contemplated two separate classes: first, officers who had served for more than ten years in same scale and, despite promotional avenues, could not be promoted due to few posts in upper tier; second, officers in BS-16 and above holding stagnant posts, who could be allowed Time Scale Promotion twice in entire service on completion of ten years’ satisfactory service---Petitioners had served for more than two decades in BS-17 and had reached maximum stage of said scale before grant of benefit---Initial grant of two time scale personal upgradations by Higher Education Department itself showed that petitioners were treated as falling within second category, i.e. officers holding stagnant posts---Withdrawal of such benefit by later placing petitioners in first category was not justified. (d) Service jurisprudence---- ----Stagnation---Determination---Actual promotional mobility, not mere existence of promotional structure, relevant test---Respondents contended that existence of four-tier service structure for Directors of Physical Education showed availability of promotional avenues and, therefore, petitioners were not holding stagnant posts---Held, that stagnation in service jurisprudence was not to be determined merely by theoretical existence of promotional posts in hierarchy, but by actual lack of career progression over time---Where employees remained unpromoted for decades and reached ceiling of their pay scale, stagnation stood established in substance---Delayed regular promotion to BS-18 in 2023 did not wipe out prolonged stagnation already suffered by petitioners; rather, it confirmed that they had remained confined to one pay scale for an exceptionally long period. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of National Health Services v. Jahanzeb and others 2023 PLC (CS) 336 rel. (e) Finance Department clarification dated 20.12.2019---- ----Phrase “few number of posts in upper tier”---Applicability---Clarification restricting “few number of posts” to cases where upper tier posts were less than or equal to 10% of lower tier posts---Scope---Held, that such clarification applied to first category of policy letter dated 19.04.2019 and could not be imported into clause (ii), which independently dealt with officers having stagnant posts---Clause (ii) was clear, independent and unqualified and contained no numerical limitation regarding percentage of posts in upper tier---Where policy language was clear and unambiguous, no additional restriction could be read into it---Reliance by respondents on clarification dated 20.12.2019 to deny petitioners benefit under clause (ii) was misconceived. (f) Administrative law---- ----Beneficial policy---Interpretation---Fair and purposive implementation---Government policy framed to confer benefits on employees must be implemented in a manner advancing its object---Policy intended to alleviate stagnation could not be applied restrictively, technically or by introducing conditions that frustrated its remedial purpose---Court ordinarily would not interfere in policy matters, but where Government had framed a comprehensive beneficial scheme, its implementation was open to judicial review if applied unfairly or contrary to its object---Restrictive approach adopted by respondents in withdrawing petitioners’ Time Scale Personal Upgradation was inconsistent with settled principles governing beneficial schemes. (g) Administrative orders---- ----Recall, rescission or withdrawal of earlier order---Scope---Vested/consequential benefits---Administrative authority could rescind, modify or recall its own order, but such power was not unbridled and could be exercised only where original order was illegal, without lawful authority or suffered from patent infirmity---Where an order had been passed in accordance with law and governing policy, its subsequent withdrawal could not be justified merely on basis of later change in interpretation or administrative opinion---Initial upgradation orders granted to petitioners in 2022 were consistent with policy dated 19.04.2019 and could not be characterized as illegal or void---There was no allegation of misrepresentation, concealment or fraud by petitioners---Withdrawal of validly granted benefit was unlawful. Nazir Ahmad Panhwar v. Government of Sindh through Chief Secretary, Sindh and others 2005 SCMR 1814; Shakeel Ahmad Zaidi and others v. Secretary, Higher Education, Government of Punjab, Lahore and others 2021 SCMR 474 distinguished. (h) Civil service---- ----Time Scale Personal Upgradation---Directors of Physical Education---Entitlement---Petitioners appointed as Directors of Physical Education in BS-16 through PPSC, later granted personal upgradation to BS-17 after acquiring Master’s Degrees in Physical Education, and thereafter remained in BS-17 for more than two decades---They had reached maximum stage of BS-17 before issuance and implementation of policy dated 19.04.2019---Held, that petitioners were rightly treated as officers serving against stagnant posts and were entitled to Time Scale Personal Upgradation under clause (ii) of Finance Department letter dated 19.04.2019---Withdrawal orders were without lawful authority. Cited Cases: • Secretary to the Government of Pakistan, Establishment Division, Islamabad and another v. Muhammad Ahmed Khan and others 2025 SCMR 434 • Regional Commissioner Income Tax, Northern Region, Islamabad and another v. Syed Munawar Ali and others 2016 SCMR 859 • Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of National Health Services v. Jahanzeb and others 2023 PLC (CS) 336 • Muhammad Ijaz v. Government of the Punjab through Director General Fisheries, Punjab, Lahore 2021 PLC (CS) 1154 • Sheikh Shan Ilahi v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Interior, Ministry of Interior Islamabad PLD 2023 Lahore 359 • Alfalah Medicos v. Government of Punjab through Secretary, Primary and Secondary Healthcare PLD 2017 Lahore 124 • R (GC) v. Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis 2011 UKSC 21 • Government of Pakistan, M/o Railways, through Secretary and others v. Jamshed Hussain Cheema and others 2016 SCMR 442 • Nazir Ahmad Panhwar v. Government of Sindh through Chief Secretary, Sindh and others 2005 SCMR 1814 • Shakeel Ahmad Zaidi and others v. Secretary, Higher Education, Government of Punjab, Lahore and others 2021 SCMR 474 Disposition: Writ petitions allowed; impugned order dated 30.06.2025 and withdrawal order dated 20.02.2023 were set aside for having been passed without lawful authority; respondents were directed to restore petitioners’ upgradation orders along with all consequential benefits; any recovery action or adverse proceedings based on withdrawn benefit were annulled and declared to be of no legal effect; no order as to costs.

Summary: (a) Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance (VI of 1968)---- ----Ss. 1(4) & 2(b)---Commercial establishment---State Bank of Pakistan and State Bank of Pakistan Banking Services Corporation---Applicability of Standing Orders---Petitioners contended that State Bank of Pakistan, being Central Bank of the country, performed sovereign, regulatory and monetary functions and was not an industrial or commercial establishment, therefore, Standing Orders were not applicable---Held, that State Bank of Pakistan was established under State Bank of Pakistan Act, 1956 and, besides its traditional central banking functions such as issuance of currency, regulation and supervision of financial system, bankers’ bank, lender of last resort, banker to Government and conduct of monetary policy, it also performed developmental, agency and other functions including management of public debt, foreign exchange, development of financial framework and credit facilities---State Bank of Pakistan Banking Services Corporation was statutory subsidiary of State Bank of Pakistan under State Bank of Pakistan Banking Services Corporation Ordinance, 2001 and performed functions delegated by State Bank of Pakistan---Both institutions, in addition to central banking roles, performed activities of commercial nature generating substantial profits---Petitioners, therefore, squarely fell within definition of commercial establishment under S.2(b) of Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968. (b) Industrial Relations Act (X of 2012)---- ----S. 33---National Industrial Relations Commission---Jurisdiction---Trans-provincial establishment---Individual grievance petition---State Bank of Pakistan and State Bank of Pakistan Banking Services Corporation were trans-provincial federal statutory institutions---Respondent-workman sought redressal of grievance in respect of rights guaranteed to him under labour law---Held, that NIRC was vested with jurisdiction to hear and resolve disputes falling within scope and ambit of Industrial Relations Act, 2012 and Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968---Individual workman had right under S.33 of Industrial Relations Act, 2012 to institute grievance petition in respect of any right guaranteed or secured to him by or under any law. (c) Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance (VI of 1968)---- ----S. 1(4), first proviso---Exclusion of establishments carried on by or under authority of Federal or Provincial Government where statutory rules of service, conduct or discipline apply---Scope---Petitioners claimed exclusion from applicability of Standing Orders---Held, that exclusion in first proviso to S.1(4) did not apply to petitioners as they were independent statutory institutions---State Bank of Pakistan Staff Regulations, 2001 framed under S.54 of State Bank of Pakistan Act, 1956 had already been held to be non-statutory---Internal regulations of petitioners could not defeat or override statutory rights conferred upon workmen under Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 or Industrial Relations Act, 2012---Standing Orders were squarely applicable to respondent’s grievance. Punjab Small Industries Corporation v. Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal, Lahore and others 1988 SCMR 1725; Chief Manager, State Bank of Pakistan, Lahore and another v. Muhammad Shafi 2010 SCMR 1994; Muhammad Zaman and others v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Finance Division (Regulation Wing), Islamabad and others 2017 SCMR 571; Muhammad Sharif v. The Managing Director, State Bank of Pakistan & another, LHC judgment dated 07.09.2017 rel. (d) Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance (VI of 1968)---- ----Schedule, Standing Order 1(b)---Permanent workman---Daily wager/work-charged employee---Artificial breaks in service---Respondent was appointed as messenger and continued working for several years; petitioners admitted his engagement but described it as work-charged/daily-wage employment for specified periods with intervals---Labour Court and NIRC found that respondent had continuously served petitioners after initial appointment of 89 days and that artificial breaks were created to deprive him of status and benefits of permanent workman---Held, that a workman employed on work of permanent nature likely to last more than nine months and having completed prescribed period was entitled to be treated as permanent workman---Respondent was not a daily wager in substance as he was paid on monthly salary basis and worked against permanent nature of work---Concurrent findings that respondent had attained status of permanent workman by afflux of time were lawful. (e) Labour law---- ----Workman---State Bank of Pakistan Staff Regulations, 2001---Absence of category of “workman” in internal regulations---Effect---Petitioners argued that their regulations did not recognize any category of employee as “workman” and, therefore, respondent could not claim rights under Standing Orders---Held, that such contention was not relevant as respondent was admittedly employed as a workman and had never been proceeded against under such internal regulations---Statutory rights under Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 and Industrial Relations Act, 2012 prevailed over internal regulations of petitioners---A statutory right conferred on workman could not be denied or taken away by relying upon internal regulations. (f) Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance (VI of 1968)---- ----Termination of service---Verbal termination---Due process---Permanent workman---Respondent’s services were verbally terminated on 11.08.2006 without following procedure prescribed by Standing Orders---Held, that respondent having attained status of permanent workman could not be terminated verbally and without due process of law---Labour Court rightly set aside oral termination order, declared respondent as permanent workman, directed petitioners to maintain service record and grant consequential benefits---NIRC rightly maintained such order. State Bank of Pakistan v. The Full Bench of NIRC & others, Constitutional Petition No. D-2667 of 2024, High Court of Sindh at Karachi, order dated 16.02.2026 rel. (g) Constitutional jurisdiction---- ----Art. 199---Concurrent findings of Labour Court and NIRC---Scope of interference---Labour Court, after recording evidence, held that respondent had attained status of permanent workman and his verbal termination was unlawful; NIRC dismissed appeals and maintained findings---High Court found that forums below had correctly applied Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 and Industrial Relations Act, 2012 and had lawfully exercised jurisdiction---No illegality, jurisdictional defect or misreading warranting interference in constitutional jurisdiction was found---Petitions were devoid of merit. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Mubeen-us-Salam and others v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Defence and others PLD 2006 SC 602 • Messrs Sui Southern Gas Company Ltd. and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2018 SCMR 802 • Punjab Small Industries Corporation v. Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal, Lahore and others 1988 SCMR 1725 • Chief Manager, State Bank of Pakistan, Lahore and another v. Muhammad Shafi 2010 SCMR 1994 • Muhammad Zaman and others v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Finance Division (Regulation Wing), Islamabad and others 2017 SCMR 571 • Muhammad Sharif v. The Managing Director, State Bank of Pakistan & another, Lahore High Court judgment dated 07.09.2017 • State Bank of Pakistan v. The Full Bench of NIRC & others, Constitutional Petition No. D-2667 of 2024, High Court of Sindh at Karachi, order dated 16.02.2026 Disposition: Writ Petition No.73758 of 2019 and connected Writ Petition Nos.73811, 73791, 73760, 73763, 73767, 73807, 73802, 73800 and 73796 of 2019 were dismissed; consolidated orders of Labour Court dated 27.10.2007 and Full Bench, NIRC dated 23.07.2019 were maintained; respondent-workmen remained entitled to reinstatement/permanent workman status and consequential benefits as granted by forums below.

Summary: "Situation where limitation does not bar grant of past maintenance even beyond the outer limit provided under Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908. " ----- (a) Muslim Family Laws / Family law---- ----Past maintenance---Wife’s claim beyond six years---Limitation---Peculiar facts neutralizing objection---Suit for dissolution of marriage, maintenance and return of dowry articles was instituted on 20.09.2024; marriage had been solemnized on 20.02.2003---Family Court dissolved marriage on 19.12.2024 and thereafter decreed maintenance including past maintenance from January 2012 till period of Iddat---Appellate Court affirmed decree---Petitioner-husband challenged decree on ground that past maintenance could not be allowed beyond six years under Art.120 of Limitation Act, 1908---Held, that peculiar facts of the case neutralized objection of limitation because petitioner, while filing written statement, had sought decree for restitution of conjugal rights and had acknowledged in writing that wife had remained unmaintained since 2012, though alleging voluntary separation---In such circumstances, bar of limitation was not available to defeat wife’s claim for past maintenance merely because it extended beyond six years. (b) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)---- ----Art. 120---Past maintenance---Six years’ limitation---Applicability---Petitioner contended that each month’s maintenance gave rise to a separate cause of action and arrears could not be decreed beyond six years under Art.120 of Limitation Act, 1908---Held, that in ordinary circumstances limitation may define how far back a claim may go, but where husband himself sought restitution of conjugal rights while acknowledging that wife had remained unmaintained for a long period, claim for past maintenance could not be rejected on limitation alone---Where claims for restitution of conjugal rights, dissolution of marriage and maintenance converged in the same factual controversy, the Court could grant past maintenance for twelve years or more, as the case may be---Objection of limitation in such peculiar circumstances was unwarranted. Muhammad Aslam Chattha v. Shehnaz Akhtar Zahoor Ahmed and another 2025 SCP 426; Muhammad Nawaz v. Mst. Khurshid Begum and 3 others PLD 1972 SC 302 distinguished. (c) Family Courts Act / Family proceedings---- ----Restitution of conjugal rights and dissolution of marriage---Claim for past maintenance---Legal convergence of claims---Court considered hypothetical situation where husband files suit for restitution of conjugal rights against wife who had not been maintained for twelve years, and wife seeks Khula in response---Held, that while rejecting claim for restitution of conjugal rights and granting decree for dissolution/Khula, Court would be competent to decree past maintenance for entire unmaintained period---Though claims may be raised distinctly, in such circumstances they are treated as non-mutually exclusive and deemed converged/consolidated by legal fiction---Therefore, grant of past maintenance beyond six years was permissible. (d) Family law---- ----Restitution of conjugal rights---Effect on claim of maintenance---Doctrine of approbate and reprobate---Husband seeking decree for restitution of conjugal rights thereby admitted subsistence of marriage and wife’s separate residence and, by necessary implication, her entitlement to maintenance---Husband could not on one hand seek wife’s return and on the other hand deny maintenance---Such conduct attracted doctrine of estoppel and barred petitioner from pleading limitation as defence against past maintenance---Claim for restitution of conjugal rights had cascading legal consequences and neutralized question of limitation where such situation arose. (e) Constitutional jurisdiction---- ----Art. 199---Family Court decree---Past maintenance for twelve years---Concurrent findings---Scope of interference---Family Court had granted decree for past maintenance from January 2012 till Iddat period upon dissolution of marriage and dismissal of husband’s claim for restitution of conjugal rights; Appellate Court had affirmed the decree---High Court found no illegality or error of law in judgments of Courts below---Interference in constitutional jurisdiction was not warranted. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Aslam Chattha v. Shehnaz Akhtar Zahoor Ahmed and another 2025 SCP 426 • Muhammad Nawaz v. Mst. Khurshid Begum and 3 others PLD 1972 SC 302 Disposition: Constitutional petition dismissed; judgments of Family Court and Appellate Court granting past maintenance for twelve years, upon decree of dissolution of marriage and dismissal of claim for restitution of conjugal rights, were maintained.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Arts. 90 & 99---Rules of Business, 1973---Federal Government---Executive authority---Power to frame policy---“Policy for Local NGOs/NPOs Receiving Foreign Contributions-2022”---Validity---Federal Government framed Policy for Local NGOs/NPOs Receiving Foreign Contributions-2022 after approval of Federal Cabinet---Single Judge declared said Policy unlawful, invalid and of no legal effect---Division Bench held that under Arts.90 and 99 of Constitution, Federal Government is empowered to frame rules for allocation and transaction of business and to take policy decisions in accordance with Rules of Business, 1973---Rules of Business have constitutional sanction and are mandatory---Policy was issued and approved in conformity with Rules of Business, 1973 and was intended to regulate and enhance effectiveness of foreign funding received by NGOs/NPOs registered in Pakistan---Federal Government was competent to frame such Policy. Cited Cases: • Tariq Aziz-ud-din and others 2010 SCMR 1301 • Aman Ullah Khan and others v. Federal Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Islamabad and others PLD 1990 SC 1092 • Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Planning and Development Division, Islamabad v. Muhammad Akram and others 1995 SCMR 1647 • Zahid Akhtar v. Government of Punjab through Secretary, Local Government and Rural Development, Lahore and 2 others PLD 1995 SC 530 (b) Rules of Business, 1973---- ----Constitutional status---Mandatory compliance---Effect---Rules of Business framed under Art.99 of Constitution are constitutionally mandated rules and must be followed by Federal Government in carrying out its functions---Such Rules provide mechanism for allocation of governmental business among Divisions, inter-Division consultation, hierarchy of decision-making from Secretary to Minister, Prime Minister and Cabinet, and procedural requirements for valid policy decisions---Decision taken by Federal Government must be legally valid and procedurally in complete conformity with such Rules. Cited Cases: • Amin Jan v. Director-General, T & T and others PLD 1985 Lahore 81 • Messrs Mustafa Impex, Karachi and others v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary Finance, Islamabad and others PLD 2016 SC 808 (c) Rules of Business, 1973---- ----Rr. 15, 16, 17, 18, 20 & 24---Important policy decision---Cabinet approval---Procedure---Important policy decisions stand at a higher pedestal than ordinary business transacted by Government and require approval in accordance with Rules of Business---Policy for Local NGOs/NPOs Receiving Foreign Contributions-2022 was approved by Federal Cabinet vide Cabinet case No.559/Rule-19/2022 dated 11.11.2022 and communicated by Cabinet Division in accordance with Rules---Issuance of Office Memorandum dated 24.11.2022 demonstrated compliance with prescribed procedure---Recorded Cabinet approval confirmed that matter was properly deliberated and decided in Cabinet meeting, and Policy was lawfully issued. (d) Rules of Business, 1973---- ----Schedule II---Allocation of business---Ministry of Economic Affairs---Foreign contributions received by NGOs/NPOs---Competence---Ministry of Economic Affairs was competent authority to notify comprehensive regulatory framework governing receipt, utilization, monitoring and accountability of foreign contributions by locally registered NGOs/NPOs in Pakistan---Its mandate includes assessment, programming, negotiation, coordination and accounting of external economic assistance, which were directly reflected in regulatory mechanisms prescribed under Policy---Policy was within allocated business of Ministry and Federal Government. (e) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Art. 99---Policy-making power of Federal Government---Guidelines/policy without fresh enactment---Scope---Executive Government has primary responsibility for formulation of governmental policy and its implementation in accordance with constitutional framework---Federal Government may issue policy guidelines for regulating matters falling within its executive domain where such policy is framed in conformity with Rules of Business and does not offend Constitution or statute---No separate enactment was required merely for framing Policy for Local NGOs/NPOs Receiving Foreign Contributions-2022. Cited Cases: • Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur and others v. State of Punjab 1955 AIR (SC) 549 • Union of India v. Moolchand Khairati Ram Trust 2018 7 SCR 939 (f) Constitutional jurisdiction---- ----Judicial review of policy matters---Scope---Courts ordinarily do not interfere in policy matters and must exercise judicial restraint---Court cannot act as appellate authority to examine propriety, suitability, wisdom, adequacy or correctness of policy, nor can it act as adviser to Executive on matters of policy---Judicial review is confined to examining whether policy violates fundamental rights, is contrary to Constitution or statutory provision, or is demonstrably arbitrary, discriminatory or irrational---Legality of policy, and not wisdom or soundness of policy, is subject of judicial review. Cited Cases: • Senior General Manager, Pakistan Railways and others v. Muhammad Pervaiz 2024 SCMR 581 • Messrs Power Construction Corporation of China Ltd. v. Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority through Chairman WAPDA and 2 others PLD 2017 SC 83 • Dr. Akhtar Hassan Khan and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2012 SCMR 455 • Azra Jamali and others v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Commerce and another 2017 PLC (CS) 533 • Wattan Party through President v. Federation of Pakistan through Cabinet Committee of Privatization, Islamabad and others PLD 2006 SC 697 • Vice-Chancellor Agriculture University, Peshawar and others v. Muhammad Shafiq and others 2024 SCMR 527 • Government College University, Lahore through Vice-Chancellor and others v. Syeda Fiza Abbas and another 2015 SCMR 445 (g) Constitutional jurisdiction---- ----Policy matters---Judicial restraint---Executive domain---Policy-making falls within domain of Executive and Courts should not interfere merely because an alternative policy may appear better, fairer or wiser---Courts must remain within domain of law and mandate of Constitution and should not act as social reformer or as aid to administrative policy of Executive---To annul any law, policy or rules, it must be shown that same is against Constitution, statutory law, fundamental rights, or is arbitrary/discriminatory---No such ground was established against Policy for Local NGOs/NPOs Receiving Foreign Contributions-2022. Cited Cases: • Anun Dhawan and others v. Union of India and others 2024 2 SCR 812 • Parisons Agrotech (P) Ltd. and another v. Union of India and others 2015 10 SCR 505 • Racing Promotions Private Limited v. Dr. Harish and others 2025 2 SCR 1608 (h) NGOs/NPOs---- ----Foreign contributions---Policy for Local NGOs/NPOs Receiving Foreign Contributions-2022---Regulatory framework---Policy covered scope, eligibility, application procedure, approval mechanism, monitoring, suspension and grievance redressal framework for locally registered NGOs/NPOs receiving foreign contributions---Such policy was promulgated to regulate receipt and utilization of foreign funding and enhance effectiveness/accountability of foreign contributions---Federal Government, through competent Ministry and with Cabinet approval, was authorized to issue said regulatory instrument. (i) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Art. 18---Freedom of trade, business or profession---Applicability to Policy regulating foreign contributions of NGOs/NPOs---Single Judge proceeded on presumption that Art.18 was applicable---Division Bench held that Art.18, which concerns freedom of trade, business or profession subject to qualifications prescribed by law, was not attracted in facts of case---Issue concerned policy framed by Federal Government under Art.99 and Rules of Business, 1973 for regulating NGOs/NPOs receiving foreign contributions---Single Judge had not been properly assisted on this aspect. (j) Precedent---- ----Marie Stopes Society v. Federation of Pakistan 2022 CLC 880---Distinguishable---Single Judge relied upon Marie Stopes Society’s case while declaring Policy unlawful---Division Bench held that said judgment was distinguishable because in the present case Policy for Local NGOs/NPOs Receiving Foreign Contributions-2022 had been duly approved by Federal Cabinet, whereas such exercise was missing in Marie Stopes Society’s case---Therefore, earlier precedent could not govern validity of the 2022 Policy. Cited Case: • Marie Stopes Society v. Federation of Pakistan through Federal Secretary and 4 others 2022 CLC 880 (k) Intra Court Appeal---- ----Judgment of Single Judge set aside---Writ petitions dismissed---Single Judge had declared Policy for Local NGOs/NPOs Receiving Foreign Contributions-2022 unlawful, invalid and of no legal effect---Division Bench held that Federal Government was competent to frame Policy, that Policy was duly approved by Cabinet and issued in conformity with Rules of Business, 1973, and that no interference in policy matter was warranted in writ jurisdiction---Intra Court Appeals were allowed and writ petitions were dismissed. Disposition: I.C.A. No.59781 of 2024, I.C.A. No.59796 of 2024 and I.C.A. No.59818 of 2024 were allowed; judgment dated 06.09.2024 passed by Single Judge in Chamber was set aside; Writ Petitions No.15453 of 2024, No.29024 of 2024 and No.34713 of 2024 were dismissed; Policy for Local NGOs/NPOs Receiving Foreign Contributions-2022 was held validly framed by competent Federal Government authority with Cabinet approval and in conformity with Rules of Business, 1973.

Summary: (a) Punjab Empowerment of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2022---- ----S. 31---Public employment---Mandatory 3% quota for persons with disabilities---Recruitment of Medical Officers/Women Medical Officers---Advertisement not reflecting disability quota---Effect---Petitioner, a qualified medical doctor suffering from permanent disability due to spinal cord injury, challenged recruitment advertisement for posts of Medical Officers/Women Medical Officers on ground that no 3% quota for persons with disabilities had been specified---Lahore High Court held that S.31 of Punjab Empowerment of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2022 is couched in mandatory terms and obligates every public sector department to reserve not less than 3% posts for persons with disabilities---Use of word “shall” leaves no discretion with recruiting authority---Failure to provide such quota at time of advertisement and recruitment is not a mere procedural lapse but violation of statutory mandate. (b) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Arts. 9, 14 & 27---Persons with disabilities---Right to livelihood, dignity and equality of opportunity---Public employment---Reservation of quota---Right to life under Art.9 includes right to livelihood---Employment is not merely source of income but instrument of self-reliance, social integration and personal dignity---For persons with disabilities, access to employment has greater constitutional significance as it enables them to overcome social exclusion and participate as equal citizens---Reservation in public employment is linked with dignity, equality, non-discrimination and adequate representation of marginalized classes. Cited Cases: • Province of Punjab through Secretary, Finance Department v. Kanwal Rashid and others 2021 SCMR 730 • Divisional Superintendent, Pakistan Railways and another v. Umar Daraz 2023 SCMR 761 (c) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Art. 27---Safeguard against discrimination in service---Adequate representation of marginalized classes---Scope---Art.27 guarantees equality of opportunity in public service while permitting State to make special provisions for advancement and adequate representation of marginalized or underrepresented classes---Quota for persons with disabilities is therefore not an exception to equality but a constitutional method of ensuring substantive equality and meaningful inclusion in public employment. (d) Punjab Empowerment of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2022---- ----Preamble & S.31---Rights-based approach---Inclusion and empowerment of persons with disabilities---Act was enacted to promote and ensure effective inclusion of persons with disabilities in community, protect their rights, eliminate discrimination, promote accessibility and create enabling conditions for independent life with dignity---Statute aligns domestic framework with United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and international best practices---Implementation of disability quota must therefore be meaningful, transparent and rights-oriented, not merely symbolic. (e) Punjab Empowerment of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2022---- ----S. 31---Computation and implementation of 3% quota---Reserved posts---Recruiting authority required to calculate quota against total available posts and expressly provide reserved posts in recruitment process---Respondents submitted that total general seats were 2461, comprising 1453 seats in Phase-I and 1008 seats in Phase-II, and 3% quota for special persons came to 74 seats---Court accepted that quota must be implemented through proper recruitment process and not through vague or internal departmental communication. (f) Public employment---- ----Persons with disabilities---Exclusion from employment---Effect---Persons with disabilities are often marginalized, underprivileged and denied meaningful access to employment and quality of life---Their inclusion in public service promotes human capital development, institutional diversity, empathy, equality and socio-economic progress---Exclusion from employment deprives such persons of financial independence, dignity, self-worth and social integration. Cited Case: • Muhammad Yousaf and another v. Chairman, Federal Public Service Commission and others PLD 2017 Lahore 406 (g) Persons with disabilities---- ----Employment quota---Charity-based approach rejected---Rights-based paradigm adopted---Modern disability jurisprudence has shifted from charity or pity to rights-based approach---Disability is not to be viewed merely as personal limitation but as consequence of social and structural barriers impeding equal participation---State is obliged to dismantle such barriers through affirmative measures including reservation in public employment---Employment of persons with disabilities is not charity but a right. Cited Case: • Peerzada Waqar Aslam v. National Accountability Bureau through Chairman, Islamabad and others 2023 SCMR 742 (h) Public employment---- ----Recruitment advertisement---Transparency and equal opportunity---Subsequent internal letter/corrigendum not properly published---Effect---Respondents claimed that subsequent letter dated 02.04.2026 invited applications from eligible quota candidates till 15.04.2026---Court held that initial advertisement dated 28.12.2025 was published in newspapers and widely disseminated, whereas nothing on record showed that subsequent letter/correction was published or circulated through any recognized and effective medium to reach intended class of candidates---Mere internal correspondence or departmental letter cannot be equated with public advertisement---Such method was insufficient to secure meaningful participation of persons with disabilities. (i) Public employment---- ----Reserved quota---Post hoc corrective measure---Effect on earlier defective advertisement---Respondents’ later attempt to observe quota after filing of petition and issuance of notice showed acknowledgment of statutory requirement, but could not validate earlier omission in recruitment advertisement---Subsequent corrective measures do not ipso facto cure illegality where initial advertisement failed to expressly provide mandatory quota and deprived eligible candidates of timely opportunity to compete. (j) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Art. 199(1)(c)---Enforcement of fundamental rights---Scope broader than mandamus---Petition sought enforcement of statutory right under S.31 of Punjab Empowerment of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2022 and fundamental rights under Arts.9, 14 and 27 of Constitution---High Court held that power under Art.199(1)(c) is wider than ordinary mandamus and enables Court not only to declare unlawful action inconsistent with fundamental rights but also to practically enforce such rights by issuing appropriate directions. Cited Case: • Human Rights Commission of Pakistan and 2 others v. Government of Pakistan and others PLD 2009 SC 507 (k) Public employment---- ----Fresh advertisement for disability quota---Direction issued---Where recruitment advertisement failed to provide mandatory 3% quota for persons with disabilities and later remedial step was not properly publicized, respondents were directed to re-initiate recruitment process to extent of reserved quota by inviting applications through fresh comprehensive advertisement on official websites of concerned department, testing agencies, widely circulated Urdu and English dailies and other appropriate media platforms---Reasonable time was to be afforded for submission of applications to ensure transparency, wider dissemination and meaningful participation of eligible candidates. (l) Constitutional duty of State---- ----Persons with disabilities---Strict compliance by all recruiting authorities---Court observed that faithful implementation of statutory quota is not only legal obligation but constitutional imperative---State must act as facilitator of inclusion and ensure that no segment of society is left behind in march towards equality, dignity and justice---Judgment was directed to be transmitted to Chief Secretary, Punjab for circulation to all Administrative Secretaries of Government of Punjab so that recruiting authorities comply with mandatory quota at time of advertisement and appointments. Disposition: Writ petition was disposed of with directions to respondents to re-initiate recruitment process to the extent of reserved quota for persons with disabilities on basis of computation placed before Court, by issuing fresh and comprehensive advertisement through official websites, testing agencies, widely circulated Urdu and English newspapers and other appropriate media platforms. Office was directed to transmit copy of judgment to Chief Secretary, Punjab for circulation to all Administrative Secretaries for strict future compliance with S.31 of Punjab Empowerment of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2022.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Art. 199(1)(b)(ii)---Writ of quo warranto---Scope---Nature of proceedings---Public office---Appointment of Member Judicial, Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue---Appellant, as citizen and taxpayer, challenged appointment of respondent as Member Judicial, ATIR, alleging that respondent had previously been nominated in criminal case and acquitted on compromise---Lahore High Court held that writ of quo warranto is meant to examine authority and legal right of a person to hold public office---Proceedings are inquisitorial and not adversarial---Applicant need not be an aggrieved person as required in mandamus, certiorari or prohibition---Any person may invoke quo warranto jurisdiction as whistleblower, but such invocation must be for public benefit and not for personal vengeance, private gain or mala fide object. Cited Case: • Muhammad Shahid Akram v. Government of Punjab through Chief Secretary and 3 others 2016 PLC (CS) 1335 (b) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Art. 199(1)(b)(ii)---Quo warranto---Discretionary relief---Exceptional nature---Writ of quo warranto cannot be issued as matter of course or in run-of-the-mill manner---Issuance depends upon judicial conscience of Court and cannot be claimed as right by applicant---Court must consider principles of equity and conscience, legality of office-holder’s appointment, and whether his status suffers from patent legal deficiency---Court must also examine bona fides of person bringing petition, and if there is doubt regarding bona fides, Court may refuse to exercise constitutional jurisdiction. (c) Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---- ----S. 130(3)---Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue---Appointment of Judicial Member---Eligibility---Respondent was appointed as Member Judicial, ATIR through notification dated 26.04.2019 by Government of Pakistan, Law and Justice Division, on recommendation of Federal Public Service Commission---Appointment was made under S.130(3) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---At time of appointment, respondent fulfilled all statutory preconditions for appointment as Judicial Member, ATIR---No illegality in appointment was shown on ground of lack of eligibility under S.130(3). (d) Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---- ----S. 130(3)---Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1973---Appointment of Judicial Member, ATIR---Prior criminal case ending in acquittal---Effect---S.130(3) prescribes qualifications for appointment as Judicial Member, ATIR but does not impose restriction relating to antecedents or prior involvement in criminal case ending in acquittal---Rules governing appointment likewise did not contain any impediment that a person who had remained accused in criminal case and was ultimately acquitted would be disqualified from appointment as Judicial Member---Nor was there any requirement for candidate to disclose involvement in a criminal case from which he had been acquitted. (e) Civil Servants Act, 1973---- ----S. 6---Probation---Character verification---Appointment as Member Judicial, ATIR---Applicability---Notification stated that respondent’s services would be governed by Civil Servants Act, 1973 and he would remain on probation for one year, extendable for another year---Court held that such stipulation did not mean respondent had to undergo rigours of S.6 of Civil Servants Act, 1973 stricto sensu for attaining status of regular Judicial Member---Appellant failed to show any mandatory statutory breach affecting respondent’s appointment. (f) Criminal law / Service law---- ----Acquittal on compromise---Whether honourable acquittal---Effect on public appointment---Respondent had been nominated in criminal case lodged by his real paternal uncle arising out of property dispute, which was amicably settled and resulted in acquittal on compromise---Court held that law does not recognize dishonourable acquittal; all acquittals, whether on benefit of doubt or compromise, are honourable because prosecution has failed or proceedings have ended in lawful acquittal---Acquittal on compromise could not by itself disqualify respondent from holding public office. Cited Cases: • Dr. Muhammad Islam v. Government of N.-W.F.P. through Secretary, Food, Agriculture, Livestock and Cooperative Department, Peshawar and 2 others 1998 SCMR 1993 • Mumtaz Ali Shah v. Chairman, Pakistan Telecommunication Company Ltd., H.Q., Islamabad and 6 others PLD 2002 SC 1060 • Suo Motu Case No.03 of 2017 PLD 2018 SC 703 (g) Public appointment---- ----Prior criminal case---Police recruitment cases distinguished---Character verification requirements---Cases concerning appointment in police department were distinguishable because Police Rules, 1934, especially R.12.14, require recruits to be of good character and great care in selection for police service---Standing Order No.6 of 2015, as amended, required candidates to submit affidavit of non-involvement in criminal cases at time of application---No similar statutory or regulatory requirement applied to appointment of Member Judicial, ATIR---Therefore, police recruitment precedents could not govern respondent’s appointment. Distinguished Cases: • Mirza Shahzeb v. City Police Officer, Police Line, Rawalpindi and 4 others 2023 PLC (CS) 749 • Saqib Ali v. Government of Punjab and others 2023 PLC (CS) 310 (h) Public appointment---- ----Acquittal under S.265-K, Cr.P.C. cases distinguished---Respondent acquitted on compromise in family property dispute---Precedents where candidates were acquitted under S.265-K, Cr.P.C. were not applicable to facts of present case---Appointment of respondent as Member Judicial, ATIR could not be invalidated merely by reference to cases dealing with different factual and legal settings. Distinguished Cases: • Model Customs Collectorate, Islamabad v. Aamir Mumtaz Qureshi 2022 SCMR 1861 • President National Bank of Pakistan and others v. Waqas Ahmed Khan 2023 SCMR 766 (i) Constitutional petition---- ----Pro bono publico---Bona fides of petitioner---Quo warranto---Court’s scrutiny---Although quo warranto may be sought by any person and personal aggrievement is not necessary, Court must still ensure that petition is bona fide and brought for public benefit---Where serious aspersions existed regarding bona fides of appellant, discretionary relief of quo warranto could validly be refused---Findings of Single Judge regarding absence of bona fides were found unexceptionable. (j) Intra Court Appeal---- ----Challenge to dismissal of writ petition---Appointment of Member Judicial, ATIR---No legal infirmity shown---Respondent’s candidature had been duly scrutinized at time of appointment to ascertain his qualification in terms of Constitution and law---Appellant failed to point out illegality or material irregularity in judgment of Single Judge dismissing writ petition---No patent legal defect existed in respondent’s appointment and no case for quo warranto was made out. Disposition: Intra Court Appeal No.111 of 2023 was dismissed with no order as to costs; judgment dated 19.09.2023 passed by Single Judge dismissing writ petition was maintained; appointment of respondent No.5 as Member Judicial, Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue was not interfered with.

Summary: (a) Family Courts Act, 1964---- ----S. 17-A---Interim maintenance---Minor child---Jurisdiction of Family Court and power of Appellate Court while remanding matter---Petitioner challenged condition imposed by Appellate Court while remanding family suit, requiring him to pay past and future maintenance as previously determined---High Court held that S.17-A, Family Courts Act, 1964, which empowers Family Court to fix interim maintenance at first appearance of defendant, does not curtail jurisdiction of Appellate Court to impose reasonable conditions while granting relief of remand---Power of remand is discretionary and may be exercised subject to just and proper terms, particularly where such condition is necessary to safeguard subsistence rights of minor child. (b) Family law---- ----Maintenance of minor child---Father’s obligation---Nature and scope---Liability of father to maintain minor child is not only legal obligation but also moral and social duty of highest order---Such obligation is absolute and does not depend upon pendency of litigation between spouses or outcome thereof---Minor child cannot be left unattended or deprived of basic necessities even for short duration, much less during prolonged litigation---Petitioner had not asserted that he had regularly maintained his minor daughter after separation or after institution of suit, which omission showed that minor had been left to be maintained through her mother. (c) Family law---- ----Ex parte decree for maintenance set aside---Remand for decision on merits---Condition to pay maintenance---Validity---Family Court had decreed suit ex parte and Appellate Court had enhanced maintenance; subsequently, petitioner obtained remand on ground of lack of proper opportunity to defend---High Court held that although earlier judgments were set aside for denial of opportunity, quantification of maintenance made therein could not be treated as wholly arbitrary or without basis---Such assessment provided prima facie indication of needs of claimants and means attributed to petitioner, subject to re-examination after evidence on remand. (d) Family law---- ----Minor’s maintenance---Quantum---Rs.10,000 per month---Economic conditions---Amount of Rs.10,000 per month fixed for minor daughter could not prima facie be regarded as excessive keeping in view prevailing economic conditions and needs of school-going child---Petitioner would have full opportunity before Trial Court to prove actual income and financial capacity---Any excess amount, if ultimately found after final adjudication, could be adjusted. (e) Civil Procedure / Family proceedings---- ----Recall of ex parte decree---Conditional relief---Scope---Relief of setting aside ex parte decree or restoration of lis for decision on merits cannot be claimed as absolute or unconditional right---Court may impose just, fair and reasonable terms to balance equities, safeguard legitimate interests of opposite side and ensure bona fide prosecution of defence---Depending on facts, such terms may include payment of costs, deposit of amount, furnishing of security or other directions necessary to prevent abuse of process or undue prejudice caused by delay. Cited Case: • Faiz-ul-Hassan v. Mst. Jan Sultan and 2 others 2001 SCMR 1323 (f) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Art. 199---Constitutional jurisdiction---Family maintenance matter---Equitable and discretionary relief---High Court declined interference with condition imposed by Appellate Court on public policy grounds---A father cannot be permitted to benefit from his own absence, default or prolonged non-participation in proceedings by securing unconditional reopening of case while avoiding accrued and continuing maintenance obligations---Allowing such course would reward default and penalize innocent minor who had no control over litigation or conduct of parties---Constitutional jurisdiction being equitable and discretionary was not exercised in favour of petitioner. (g) Family law---- ----Maintenance of minor---Public policy---Reopening proceedings after ex parte decree---Child’s needs continue during litigation---Expenses of food, clothing, education, healthcare and daily upbringing do not stand suspended during legal contests---Where petitioner seeks restoration of opportunity to contest after respondents had already obtained decrees, condition requiring continuity of maintenance, particularly for minor child, advances substantial justice and prevents reopening of proceedings from becoming instrument for delaying or defeating child’s lawful subsistence rights. (h) Family law---- ----Maintenance of wife---Plea of prior divorce---Effect---Petitioner asserted that respondent No.3 had been divorced on 26.06.2017 and was therefore not entitled to maintenance---High Court held that such plea, if genuine, would materially affect claim of maintenance and must be examined by Trial Court on relevant evidence and record---Petitioner may produce valid documentary proof of alleged divorce before Trial Court at earliest opportunity, whereafter Trial Court shall determine effect thereof in accordance with law while deciding interim and final entitlement of respondent No.3---Unsubstantiated plea in constitutional proceedings could not justify total avoidance of impugned order. (i) Family law---- ----Claims of wife and minor child distinguished---Maintenance during remand proceedings---High Court drew distinction between claim of wife and claim of minor daughter---Minor’s entitlement to maintenance from father was unquestionable, only quantum being open to determination---Wife’s entitlement was subject to adjudication in view of petitioner’s plea of prior divorce---Thus, condition of maintenance was particularly justified to protect minor’s subsistence rights, while petitioner retained right to prove defence regarding wife’s status before Trial Court. (j) Constitutional petition---- ----Challenge to remand condition---No jurisdictional defect---Appellate Court had remanded matter for fresh adjudication after giving petitioner opportunity to produce defence, but imposed condition of payment of past and future maintenance---High Court found condition neither punitive nor without jurisdiction; it balanced petitioner’s right of defence with minor’s right to timely financial support---No illegality or material irregularity warranting interference under Art.199 was shown. Disposition: Writ Petition No.2021 of 2026 was dismissed in limine; condition imposed by Additional District Judge while remanding family suit, requiring payment of past and future maintenance as earlier determined, was maintained; petitioner was permitted to raise plea of prior divorce and produce documentary proof before Trial Court, which was directed to consider its effect strictly in accordance with law.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Challenge to order closing right to file written statement---Annexure containing proposed written statement---Certified copy objection---Petitioner challenged order of Family Court whereby his right to submit written statement had been closed/struck off---Office objected that certified copies of documents attached at pages 17 to 21 be filed---Petitioner contended that said document was proposed written statement, not yet filed before Trial Court, therefore certified copy could not be obtained from copying agency---High Court held that proposed written statement which was never filed before Trial Court could not be treated as a regular court document capable of certification. (b) Pleadings---- ----Written statement---Proposed written statement---Unsigned and unverified document---Legal status---Proposed written statement attached with writ petition was neither signed by petitioner/defendant nor verified according to law and bore only signature of counsel on last page---Such document was merely a proposed pleading, incomplete in nature, and had not matured into a legal document---Petitioner could still modify it if permission to file written statement was later granted---Such proposed and incomplete document could not be allowed to be attached as an undisputed annexure having finality. (c) Constitutional petition---- ----Annexures---Incomplete/proposed documents---Effect---Incomplete documents or documents providing incomplete information may cause prejudice to rights of parties---Unsigned proposed written statement, not yet filed before Trial Court and open to later amendment, could not be treated as a document whose authenticity was beyond doubt---Incomplete document cannot be taken as proof of what it purports to establish, nor can it be presumed to be a validly executed complete document. Cited Cases: • Messrs Fateh Yarn (Pvt.) Ltd., Faisalabad v. Commissioner Inland Revenue, Faisalabad and others 2021 SCMR 1133 = 2021 PTD 1392 • Akeel Ahmad v. Chairman, Punjab Public Service Commission, Lahore and others PLD 2024 Lahore 228 (d) Constitutional petition---- ----Filing of proposed written statement as annexure---Proper procedure---Where petitioner seeks to place proposed written statement on record for perusal of High Court, appropriate course is to file separate application seeking permission to place such document on record and also pray that petitioner be permitted to file proposed written statement before Trial Court---Such application should be accompanied by another application for dispensing with production of certified copy because certified copy cannot be issued for a document not filed before Trial Court. (e) Constitutional petition---- ----Certified copy---Dispensation---Scope---Where document is complete but certified copy is unavailable or unnecessary, High Court may, in its discretion, allow it to be attached as annexure upon application for dispensing with certified copy---However, where document itself is incomplete, unsigned, unverified and merely proposed, it cannot be placed on record as an annexure without proper application and permission of Court. (f) Practice and procedure---- ----Options available to petitioner---Proposed written statement attached with writ petition---High Court held that petitioner had two options: either remove proposed written statement from record, or, if he considered it necessary for Court’s perusal, file application seeking permission to place it on record along with application for dispensing with certified copy---Office objection requiring proper treatment of such document was therefore sustained. Disposition: Office objection was sustained; High Court held that unsigned, unverified and unfiled proposed written statement could not be treated as a complete/legal document or undisputed annexure; petitioner was required either to remove it from record or file proper application seeking permission to place it on record along with application for dispensing with certified copy.

Summary: (a) Punjab Food Authority Act, 2011---- ----Ss. 13 & 36---Seizure of vehicle by Food Safety Officer---Release on superdari/interim custody---Scope---Petitioner sought release of vehicle seized by Assistant Food Safety Officer in connection with crime report under Ss.22-A, 23 and 24 of Punjab Food Authority Act, 2011---Special Court dismissed application on ground that it was filed after seven days and vehicle had stood automatically forfeited---High Court held that seizure and release provisions under S.13 must be construed purposively---Special Court may pass order for interim custody of seized item pending trial, and release of property during proceedings neither absolves accused nor prejudices trial---Purpose is to prevent needless deterioration, deprivation and loss of value of property, subject to surety and final determination. Cited Case: • Lung Fung Chinese Restaurant PLD 2021 SC 684 (b) Punjab Food Authority Act, 2011---- ----S. 13(3), (4) & (5)---Application for release within seven days---Automatic forfeiture---Vehicle---Applicability---Although S.13 refers to seizure of food, apparatus, utensil or vehicle in earlier subsections, the legislative scheme did not include “vehicle” within automatic forfeiture under S.13(5)---The omission of “vehicle” from automatic forfeiture provision was deliberate and significant---Court cannot add or omit words in statute under guise of interpretation---Vehicle was therefore not automatically forfeited merely because release application was filed after seven days. Cited Cases: • Khan Gul Khan v. Daraz Khan 2010 SCMR 539 • Deputy Registrar/Representative of Employees of Federal Shariat Court v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2019 Islamabad 591 • Crescent Jute Products Ltd. v. Government of the Punjab PLD 2004 Lahore 686 (c) Punjab Food Authority Act, 2011---- ----S. 13---Food Safety Officer---Seizure powers---Regulatory regimes---Punjab Food Authority Act, 2011 contains three regulatory regimes: Food Safety Officer, Food Authority and Special Court---Each performs distinct statutory function---Food Safety Officer may seize food, apparatus, utensil or vehicle and must prepare statement describing seized items and deliver copy to person from whom items were seized---Person aggrieved may approach Special Court under S.13(3), which may confirm seizure or order return of seized items. (d) Punjab Food Authority Act, 2011---- ----S. 36---Final order regarding seized property---Power of Special Court after conclusion of trial---Interim release of vehicle does not prevent Special Court from passing final order regarding confiscation or forfeiture after evidence and conclusion of trial---If trial Court ultimately concludes that seized vehicle is liable to confiscation or forfeiture, it may pass appropriate order under S.36 of Punjab Food Authority Act, 2011---Interim custody therefore does not defeat statutory purpose. (e) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----S. 516-A---Interim custody of case property---Vehicle---Principles---Application for interim custody must be decided expeditiously with cogent reasons for release or refusal---Court must exercise discretion judicially while determining entitlement to possession, subject to bond/surety equal to value of property and clear terms in bond---Interim custody of vehicle neither prejudices trial nor gives clean chit to accused, and recipient remains bound to produce vehicle whenever required by Court. Cited Case: • Ashan Ali Dawach v. The State 2025 SCMR 1041 (f) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Arts. 23 & 24---Right to property---Vehicle seized under Punjab Food Authority Act, 2011---Continued custody without lawful basis---Effect---Every citizen has right to acquire, hold and dispose of property subject to law, and no person can be deprived of property except in accordance with law---Withholding vehicle without cogent reason, especially where petitioner produced ownership documents and no rival claimant existed, would infringe constitutional property rights---Court must protect individual rights while ensuring enforcement of law. (g) Criminal proceedings---- ----Vehicle seized in food offence---Whether case property---Owner not nominated as accused---Effect---Vehicle was neither used for commission of offence in sense attracting penal liability nor was it itself adulterated food or prohibited article---Petitioner was not accused in crime report but merely owner of vehicle which had been rented out---No material showed that petitioner knew of transportation of offending substance---Vehicle could not be retained indefinitely merely on assumption that it was case property. Cited Cases: • Zaheer Abbas v. Muzafar Khan 2016 YLR Note 21 Lahore • Sheikh Saqab Kapoor v. The State 2009 YLR 602 Lahore • Muhammad Ajmal v. The State 2025 MLD 533 Quetta (h) Superdari---- ----Vehicle---No rival claimant---Ordinary rule---Where no rival claimant exists for superdari of vehicle, vehicle should ordinarily be released to person from whom it was taken or to person establishing lawful ownership, subject to satisfaction of Court and furnishing of surety---Petitioner produced relevant ownership documents and no competing claim was shown. (i) Constitutional jurisdiction---- ----Art. 199---Certiorari---Alternate remedy not availed---Patent illegality/excess of jurisdiction---Maintainability---Where order suffers from patent illegality, absence/excess of jurisdiction, misdirection or error apparent on face of record, constitutional petition may be entertained even if appeal or revision remedy exists---Special Court wrongly presumed automatic forfeiture of vehicle under S.13(5), Punjab Food Authority Act, 2011---Such error amounted to illegal exercise of jurisdiction and warranted interference under Art.199. Cited Cases: • Rahim Shah v. Chief Election Commissioner of Pakistan PLD 1973 SC 24 • Adeel-ur-Rehman v. Federation of Pakistan 2005 PTD 172 SC • Riaz Hussain v. Board of Revenue 1991 SCMR 2307 • Ahad Sharif alias Muhammad Ahad v. Javed Tariq 2006 SCMR 1356 • Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi v. Additional District and Sessions Judge 1994 SCMR 1299 • Nagina Silk Mill, Lyallpur v. Income Tax Officer PLD 1963 SC 322 • Pakistan v. Ziauddin PLD 1962 SC 440 • Messrs S.A. Haroon v. Collector of Customs, Karachi PLD 1959 SC 177 • Kinza Anwar v. Office of the Ombudsman for Protection against Harassment of Women at the Workplace 2022 CLC 1477 Islamabad (j) Constitutional jurisdiction---- ----Impugned order based on erroneous presumption---Release of seized vehicle---High Court held that Special Court acted with impulse and committed error apparent on face of record by treating vehicle as automatically forfeited---Such order amounted to illegal exercise of jurisdiction---Constitutional petition was competent and liable to be accepted. (k) Punjab Food Authority Act, 2011---- ----Seized vehicle lying under open sky---Depreciation and deterioration---Interim custody---Where seized vehicle was lying dormant under open sky and likely to deteriorate, depreciate or be misused/damaged if retained, release on interim custody was justified subject to surety bond and verification of ownership---Retention of vehicle served no useful purpose where final forfeiture could still be considered after trial under S.36 of the Act. Disposition: Constitutional petition was accepted; impugned order dated 15.01.2026 passed by Senior Civil Judge/Judicial Magistrate Section 30, Kasur acting as Special Court was set aside; vehicle bearing registration No.BK-320 was directed to be released to petitioner subject to submission of surety bond of Rs.1,000,000 with one surety in like amount to satisfaction of Trial Court and verification of ownership; no order as to costs.