Summary: (a) Civil Procedure — Non-party appeals; leave to appeal — Test —Constitutional/Procedural practice; CPC, S.115; Transfer of Property Act, 1882, S.52 (lis pendens); Limitation Act, 1908, Art.113— A non-party may appeal with leave if they could properly have been a party to the proceedings and are affected by the impugned order. Applied: leave refused where applicants purchased subject property pendente lite, concealed the transaction, and could not show why they failed to seek impleadment at trial. Precedents reaffirmed: H.M. Saya, Sahib Dad, Munir Ahmed, Kanwar Arif Ali Khan. (b) Transfers pendente lite — Impleadment of transferee — Scope & discretion —TPA, S.52— Ordinarily, a transferee pendente lite may be joined to protect its interest; however, joinder is discretionary, and can be declined when the transfer appears not bona fide, is designed to frustrate proceedings, or where parties withheld disclosure from the court. Followed: Sajjad Hussain v. State; Fazal Karim v. Muhammad Afzal. (c) Bona fides & concealment — Effect Applicants were tenants who entered an agreement to purchase the disputed house during the suit without leave of court and kept it secret until after dismissal at trial. A contract clause envisaging loss of title and refund revealed awareness of the litigation risk; applicants therefore not bona fide purchasers and squarely hit by lis pendens. (d) Limitation for specific performance — Starting point & consequence —Limitation Act, 1908, Art.113— Agreement dated 22-01-2010 required balance payment by 22-07-2010; suit for specific performance filed 14-07-2016 was time-barred. A time-barred independent claim confers no enforceable interest warranting impleadment or leave to appeal. (e) Appellate/revisional posture — No right to protract litigation Applicants’ sequence—filing SP suit, then impleadment in appeal after a compromise between original parties—was viewed as a calculated attempt to prolong litigation; absent any valid reason for not joining at trial, they cannot intrude at the revisional stage. (f) Disposition: CMA No. 9923 of 2024 dismissed (leave to appeal refused); CMA No. 9924 of 2024 dismissed as infructuous.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure—Doctrine of Lis Pendens—Transfer of Property Act, 1882, S. 52—Sale during pendency of pre-emption suit—Applicability of doctrine to restored suits Respondents No. 2 to 4 purchased suit land during the pendency of a pre-emption suit that had been restored after earlier dismissal for non-prosecution. The Supreme Court held that under the doctrine of lis pendens (Section 52, Transfer of Property Act), such purchasers are bound by the outcome of the ongoing litigation. Held: Restoration of suit relates back to its original filing; thus, any sale during the pendency—even after a temporary dismissal—is subject to lis pendens. Cited Cases: Basit Sibtain v. Muhammad Sharif (2004 SCMR 578) Malik Amanullah v. Haji Muhammad Essa (2024 SCMR 1258) (b) Bona Fide Purchaser—Transfer by ostensible owner—TPA, S. 41—No shield against lis pendens Even a bona fide purchaser without notice is bound by the result of pending litigation. The Court reaffirmed that the doctrine of lis pendens is not based on notice but on the principle of finality in litigation. Held: Transferee steps into shoes of transferor and cannot escape legal consequences of the pending suit. Cited Cases: Muhammad Nawaz Khan v. Muhammad Khan (2002 SCMR 2003) Muhammad Ashraf Butt v. Muhammad Asif Bhatti (PLD 2011 SC 905) Tabassum Shaheen v. Uzma Rahat (2012 SCMR 983) Aasia Jabeen v. Liaqat Ali (2016 SCMR 1773) (c) Practice and Procedure—High Court’s remand order set aside—Suit for pre-emption restored The High Court’s decision to remand the case for fresh evidence on merits was held erroneous. The Supreme Court restored the trial court’s decree dated 22.01.2008, which had been passed after the plaintiff deposited the sale consideration in full. Held: High Court committed legal error by disregarding lis pendens and disrupting the finality of the trial court’s decree. Disposition: Appeal allowed. High Court’s impugned order dated 12.07.2010 set aside. Trial court’s decree dated 22.01.2008 restored.

Summary: (Application under Section 12(2) C.P.C)(a) The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908?(Act No.V of 1908)?S.12(2) and S.115? Suit for declaration and permanent injunction filed by the respondent No.4/decree holder concurrently decreed in his favour against defendants therein, including Muhammad Azeem, real brother of the petitioners?During execution proceedings the executing Court directed possession of only 1 marla and 2/6 sarsai, which order was set aside by appellate Court directing delivery of possession of decreed area of 8 marlas?During hearing of the revision petition, a consensus developed, whereby the learned counsel for the parties agreed that they will have no objection if the deficiency is made good from the area of Ghulam Yasin and Muhammad Ismail and with the consent of learned counsel for the parties, the revision petition was accepted and the matter was sent to the learned executing Court with the direction to make good the deficiency out of the area comprising the houses of Ghulam Yasin and Muhammad Ismail, petitioners herein. The contention of petitioners that order dated 19.9.2022 was procured by playing fraud is without force.----(b) The petitioners were delivered possession by Muhammad Azeem. At the most, if the petitioners had purchased the property, already a subject matter of the decree, then petitioners were defrauded by Muhammad Azeem, their brother.(c) Transfer of Property Act, 1882?S.52?Transfer of the suit property during pendency of suit was also hit by the doctrine of lis-pendence.----(Revision petition was dismissed in the circumstances).

Summary: [discussion on validity of mutation, power of attorney, specific performance, agreement to sell] The Supreme Court of Pakistan, in its appellate jurisdiction, reviewed the judgment of the Lahore High Court. The dispute involved the sale of land owned by Mst. Channan Jan, which was transferred by Ghulam Rasool, acting as her attorney, to his sons, the appellants. The mutation of the sale was subsequently challenged and cancelled by the concerned Assistant Commissioner/Collector. The appellants filed a suit seeking ownership of the land based on an oral sale mutation and a decree for specific performance of an agreement to sell. The primary argument presented by the appellants was that Ghulam Rasool had the authority to sell the land on behalf of Mst. Channan Jan. However, the evidence presented failed to establish that Mst. Channan Jan fully understood the power of attorney and its implications. Additionally, the power of attorney did not explicitly authorize the conveyance of the property to the appellants or any other party. Furthermore, it was established that the power of attorney had been revoked by Mst. Channan Jan before the purported sale of the land. The revocation rendered the transfer without authority and of no legal effect. The appellants also claimed the existence of an agreement to sell between Mst. Channan Jan and Ghulam Rasool. However, Mst. Channan Jan denied entering into any such agreement, and the evidence provided by the appellants lacked crucial details and failed to substantiate their claim. Finally, the appellants argued that the sale of the land to respondents No. 8 to 10 was in violation of the doctrine of lis pendens. However, since the sale in favor of the appellants was deemed illegal and without authority, they had no standing to object to the sale to respondents No. 8 to 10. Ultimately, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the judgment of the Lahore High Court, declaring the impugned sale of the land illegal and without authority. The case emphasizes the importance of establishing clear authority in land transactions and adhering to legal procedures. It also sets a precedent for future land sale disputes in Pakistan.

Summary: Section of law; 12 (2) of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. (a) For the purpose of application of the principle of lis pendens, the course of litigation include pendency of appeal or revision available under the law as well as the period of limitation provided for filing such appeals or revisions. When a transaction takes place during all these times, same would be subject to the principle of lis-pendens.

Summary: This application, filed under section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, is presented by Mr. Muhammad Latif, the subsequent transferee of a property initially purchased at auction by Mr. Abid Hussain (respondent No.14). The applicant seeks a declaration against the judgment, where the court allowed an appeal and set aside an auction held. The applicant, impleaded as respondent No.15 in the main appeal, argues that no opportunity was given to defend its rights. The court examined the issues framed, including fraud and misrepresentation, engagement of legal representation, and the relief sought. During the proceedings, it is revealed that the auction purchaser (respondent No.14) independently challenged the judgment before the Supreme Court but subsequently withdrew the appeal. The court determined whether the interests of the applicant and the auction purchaser overlap, if they can pursue separate remedies, and the implications of the withdrawal of the appeal by the auction purchaser. The court concluded that the applicant, as a subsequent transferee, cannot claim independent rights in the property when the auction sale is set aside. The principle of lis pendens is applied, and the withdrawal of the appeal by the auction purchaser is deemed an acceptance of the order setting aside the auction. The court dismissed the application, ruling that the applicant lacks the standing to contest the order independently of the auction purchaser.

Summary: The respondent, had filed a suit for pre-emption against the petitioner, claiming a superior right of preemption as a co-sharer and owner of contiguous land. The petitioner had initially sold the land to another respondent, Nazra, and during the proceedings, Nazra admitted receiving payment from the plaintiff (Arif Hussain Shah) and agreed to the issuance of a decree on the payment of zar-e-soim. Later, Mamdan Bibi sought impleadment in the suit, claiming to have challenged the mutation of sale in a declaratory suit. However, she withdrew her declaratory suit, and the trial court decreed the suit for pre-emption against Nazra. The petitioner appealed the decision, arguing that proper issues were not framed. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decree, stating that the subsequent mutation during the pendency of the suit was a result of collusion and amounted to a new sale, which was legally untenable. The High Court, in its judgment, found the arguments raised by Mamdan Bibi lacking legal substance. It emphasized that the subsequent transaction was hit by the rule of lis pendens, and Mamdan Bibi, having stepped into Nazra's shoes, would be bound by the decree against him. The court dismissed the revision, stating that the findings of the lower courts did not suffer from misreading or non-reading of the record or any error of law.

Summary: The doctrine of lis pendens, embodied in Section 52 of the 1882 Transfer of Property Act, effectively provides that during the pendency of a suit in which any right to immovable property in is question, the property cannot be transferred by any party to the suit so as to affect the rights of other parties.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) ---- S. 12(2) --- Suit for specific performance --- Consolidation of suits --- Effect of lis pendens --- Appellants filed a suit for specific performance, claiming an agreement to sell dated 18-6-1988, while respondent No.1 claimed a prior agreement dated 7-6-1988 --- During pendency of the litigation, the vendors executed a compromise with the respondent, leading to a consent decree and subsequent sale deed in his favor --- Appellants challenged the decree under S. 12(2), C.P.C., leading to consolidation of suits --- Held, that the sale deed in favor of respondent No.1, executed during the pendency of the suit, was subject to the principle of lis pendens and its validity depended on the final adjudication of the case --- However, the appellants failed to prove their own agreement and readiness to perform, making the principle of lis pendens inapplicable in their favor --- Appeal dismissed. Cited Cases: Muhammad Ashraf Butt v. Muhammad Asif Bhatti (PLD 2011 SC 905) (b) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877) ---- S. 22 --- Discretionary relief --- Grant of specific performance not a matter of right --- Appellants sought specific performance of an agreement that was neither signed by them nor proved in accordance with law --- Vendors initially admitted the agreement but later changed their stance, alleging appellants' failure to fulfill their obligations --- Supreme Court held that specific performance is a discretionary relief and courts are not bound to grant it merely because it is lawful to do so --- Conduct of the parties, readiness and willingness to perform, and totality of circumstances must be considered --- Given the appellants' failure to demonstrate good faith and lack of proactive steps to complete the transaction, the court declined to exercise discretion in their favor. Cited Cases: Liaqat Ali Khan v. Falak Sher (PLD 2014 SC 506) Mst. Mehmooda Begum v. Syed Hassan Sajjad (PLD 2010 SC 952) Shakeel Ahmed v. Mst. Shaheen Kousar (2010 SCMR 1507) (c) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 ---- Arts. 17 & 79 --- Proof of agreement to sell --- Attesting witnesses --- Admissibility of evidence --- Appellants relied on an agreement to sell that was not signed by them --- Held, that an agreement to sell immovable property requires attestation by two witnesses under Article 17(2), Q.S.O., 1984, and must be proved in accordance with Article 79 --- Appellants examined only one attesting witness, failing to meet the evidentiary requirement --- Furthermore, a scribe of the document is not a substitute for an attesting witness --- Given that the respondent had denied the execution of the agreement, the burden was on the appellants to prove it through proper attestation, which they failed to do. Cited Cases: Hafiz Tassaduq Hussain v. Muhammad Din (PLD 2011 SC 241) Mst. Gulshan Hamid v. Kh. Abdul Rehman (2010 SCMR 334) (d) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) ---- S. 115 --- Revision petition against a deceased person --- Effect --- Maintainability --- Respondent No.1 filed a civil revision before the High Court, but one of the respondents (Shaukat Ali) was deceased at the time of its institution --- Appellants contended that the revision was a nullity in law --- Supreme Court held that failure to implead legal heirs of a deceased party does not automatically render proceedings void, as such defects are curable --- Since Shaukat Ali’s legal heirs were already involved in the litigation and had full opportunity to present their case, the objection was technical and lacked merit. Cited Cases: Malik Bashir Ahmed Khan v. Qasim Ali (PLD 2003 Lah 615) Muhammad Yar v. Muhammad Amin (2013 SCMR 464) (e) Administration of Justice ---- Discretionary powers of the court --- Balancing competing claims --- Rival claims of specific performance were made by appellants and respondent No.1 regarding the same property --- Supreme Court held that courts must assess competing interests based on conduct, equities, and readiness to perform contractual obligations --- Appellants' lack of proactive efforts, failure to prove their agreement, and inability to demonstrate readiness to perform were key factors in denying them relief --- Appeal dismissed. Disposition: Appeal dismissed. Judgment of the High Court upholding the dismissal of the appellants' suit for specific performance was maintained.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) ----Order XXXIX, Rules 1 & 2----Interim Injunction----Prima facie case----Balance of convenience----Irreparable loss----Scope and principles for granting interim relief. In a suit for declaration filed by the petitioner, who claimed ownership of 32-kanals of land based on a gift deed executed on 28.10.2009, interim relief was sought to restrain dispossession and further transfer of the property. The courts below dismissed the application for interim injunction on the grounds that: (i) The petitioner failed to produce evidence to establish the validity of the gift deed. (ii) The property had been transferred to respondent No.2 via mutation No.1536 dated 17.03.2018. (iii) Prima facie case could not be presumed as the petitioner's claim relied on an unregistered document requiring evidence for authenticity. (iv) Balance of convenience favored the respondents, given the documented mutation in favor of respondent No.2. (v) The petitioner failed to demonstrate any irreparable loss in the absence of an injunction. The principle of lis pendens was held sufficient to protect the petitioner’s rights during litigation. (b) Doctrine of Lis Pendens ----Protection of rights during litigation----No interim injunction required where rights are safeguarded by the principle of lis pendens. The court observed that the petitioner’s rights were adequately safeguarded under the principle of lis pendens, and the grant of interim relief was unnecessary. (c) Constitutional Jurisdiction of High Court ----Scope of interference in interim relief orders----No misreading or non-reading of evidence. The High Court reiterated that it does not interfere in the findings of lower courts on interim injunctions unless misreading, non-reading, or illegality in the appreciation of evidence is established. No such error was found in the judgments of the courts below, which were held to be well-founded and justified. Disposition: Petition dismissed. Trial court directed to decide the main case on its merits, uninfluenced by observations made in the interim injunction orders. Cited Laws: Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (Order XXXIX, Rules 1 & 2). ----- ''Third wife on the basis of unregistered gift deed in her favour challenged the transfer of property by husband in favour of second wife through gift mutation in her favour, as third wife was required to prove unregistered gift in her favour to dislodge transfer in favour of second wife recorded in revenue record, prima facie case could not be assumed in her favour.''