Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----S. 51---Execution of decree---Modes of execution---Money decree---Blocking CNIC of judgment debtor---Executing Court’s jurisdiction---Executing Court ordered blocking of judgment debtor’s CNIC until surety for decretal amount was furnished; High Court maintained order, treating CNIC blockage as a step towards execution of lawful decree---Supreme Court held that S.51, C.P.C. provides modes for execution of decrees and although clause (e) gives flexibility to execute decree “in such other manner as the nature of the relief granted may require”, such general power cannot be stretched so far that execution order loses contact with statutory provision---In case of simple money decree passed in summary suit, execution by blocking CNIC of judgment debtor was not permissible under S.51(e), C.P.C. (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----S. 51(e)---General mode of execution---Scope and limits---Supreme Court held that clause (e) of S.51, C.P.C. confers necessary flexibility and latitude upon executing Court to ensure decree is satisfied, but such power remains controlled by nature of relief granted and statutory framework---Robust approach may be adopted to secure execution, but it cannot become so excessive that it deprives judgment debtor of essential aspects of ordinary life---Blocking CNIC for execution of money decree would be akin to permitting executing Court to block utilities such as electricity or water at residence or workplace of judgment debtor, which is not contemplated by execution law. (c) Constitutional / civil rights---- ----CNIC---Essential document for ordinary life---Blocking CNIC in civil execution proceedings---Supreme Court observed that CNIC is not a luxury or mere statutory requirement; in present times, it is essential for carrying on normal way of life in ordinary course---Curtailing a judgment debtor from access to CNIC for execution of money decree is not proper exercise of discretion or statutory power---High Court erred in concluding that blocking CNIC was permissible discretionary step towards execution. (d) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----O. XXI, R. 117 as inserted in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa---Power to block CNIC for compelling attendance/execution---Applicability outside Khyber Pakhtunkhwa---Supreme Court noticed that Peshawar High Court had inserted O.XXI, R.117 in C.P.C. as applicable in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, expressly permitting blockage of CNIC as mode of compelling judgment debtor’s attendance or completing execution proceedings---Court reserved opinion on constitutional or legal validity of such provision for appropriate case---However, said provision applies only in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and not in Sindh---Existence of such express provision shows that, absent specific statutory/rule-based authority, no such power can be implied into executing Court’s discretion or general execution provisions. (e) Execution proceedings---- ----Money decree---Judgment debtor’s CNIC blocked until surety furnished---Order without lawful basis---Executing Court had no jurisdiction to order blocking of CNIC of judgment debtor as a step towards execution of simple money decree---High Court’s refusal to interfere with such order was legally unsustainable---Order of CNIC blockage could not be justified under S.51(e), C.P.C. or any implied execution power. Disposition: Leave petition was converted into appeal and allowed; order of High Court of Sindh at Karachi dated 01.08.2023, which had upheld executing Court’s direction for blocking petitioner/judgment debtor’s CNIC, was set aside; Supreme Court held that no jurisdiction vested in executing Court in Sindh to block CNIC of judgment debtor for execution of simple money decree.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan: ----Arts. 9 & 199 Right to identity and due process––Blocking of CNIC––Jurisdiction of NADRA––Scope and limitations––Petitioner’s CNIC was digitally impounded based on a letter from intelligence agencies alleging fraud in acquisition of citizenship––Held, NADRA has no authority under the Constitution or National Database & Registration Authority Ordinance, 2000 to determine or revoke citizenship of a person once registered––Such action, absent prior adjudication by the Competent Authority under the Pakistan Citizenship Act, 1951, was unlawful––Citizenship is a fundamental right, and arbitrary deprivation thereof infringes the right to dignity and life protected under Art.9 of the Constitution––Due process must be strictly followed before impounding identity documents––Intelligence agencies cannot unilaterally determine or recommend cancellation of citizenship; they may only submit material to the Federal Government, which is the competent authority to adjudicate such matters––Petition was partly allowed with direction to NADRA to restore CNIC until lawful adjudication by competent forum. Cited Cases: • Fatima v. National Database and Registration Authority PLD 2022 Balochistan 73 • Hafiz Hamdullah Saboor v. Government of Pakistan PLD 2021 Islamabad 305 • Abdul Qadir v. Federation of Pakistan 2024 MLD 1774 • Hafiz Awais Zafar v. Judge Family Court, Lahore PLD 2022 Lahore 756 (b) National Database & Registration Authority Ordinance, 2000: ----S. 18(2)(a)––Scope––Cancellation or impounding of CNIC––Jurisdictional bar––Held, NADRA may impound a CNIC only in cases involving tampering, forgery, or duplication, or where the CNIC was obtained by impersonation, provided that eligibility is not based on citizenship determination––Where CNIC was issued after due process, NADRA must not act on mere suspicion or unverified reports to impound the card––Power to adjudicate questions of citizenship vests solely in the Federal Government under the Pakistan Citizenship Act, 1951––NADRA's reference of such matters to “Verification Boards” or “District Committees” was declared ultra vires––NADRA may only act after final adjudication by the competent authority––Petition was partly allowed and CNIC ordered to be restored temporarily. (c) Pakistan Citizenship Act, 1951 & Citizenship Rules, 1952: ----S. 16 & Citizenship Rules––Determination of citizenship––Exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Government––Intelligence agency reports––Status––Held, the Federal Government is the sole competent authority to determine or revoke citizenship status––Intelligence agencies can report alleged fraud or concealment but cannot adjudicate or cause blocking of CNIC––Reports must be submitted to relevant Ministry, which may refer the case for adjudication––Right of citizenship cannot be revoked except by following the specific process under the Act and its Rules––Appeal under NADRA Ordinance does not substitute due process under the Citizenship Act––Restoration of CNIC directed pending lawful determination. ----Cited Cases: • Hafiz Hamdullah Saboor v. Government of Pakistan PLD 2021 Islamabad 305 • Abdul Qadir v. Federation of Pakistan 2024 MLD 1774 ----Disposition: Petition partly allowed––NADRA directed to temporarily restore Petitioner’s CNIC pending final determination by the Competent Authority under the Citizenship Act––Petitioner directed to cooperate and produce requisite documents––Respondents instructed to follow due process and ensure protection of fundamental rights.

Summary: Blocking CNIC ---- (a) Constitution of Pakistan – Arts. 9, 10-A, 15, 25 – Right to identity – Blockage of CNIC – Access to justice – Proclaimed offender stranded abroad – Constitutional safeguards – Scope The petitioner sought directions for unblocking the CNIC of his brother, Muhammad Luqman, who was declared a proclaimed offender in FIR No. 950/2023 under S. 489-F PPC. Luqman, currently in Dubai, was unable to renew his expired passport due to NADRA’s digital impoundment of his CNIC, issued in compliance with an order of the Magistrate. Petitioner contended that a compromise had been effected with the complainant, and Luqman now intends to return and surrender before the court, but his return is obstructed by the CNIC blockage. Held, the right to identity is fundamental and its arbitrary restriction violates the individual’s right to liberty, access to justice, and freedom of movement under Articles 9, 10-A, 15, and 25 of the Constitution. A valid compromise deed was on record, evidencing amicable settlement between parties. Since the accused wished to return and join trial, continuation of CNIC blockage served no lawful purpose and impeded due process. Respondents were directed to forthwith unblock the CNIC to facilitate passport renewal and return to Pakistan. Cited as precedent: PLD 2022 Lahore 756 PLD 2022 Balochistan 73 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) UN Convention on the Rights of the Child Disposition: Petition allowed; NADRA directed to unblock CNIC of Muhammad Luqman.

Summary: (a) National Database and Registration Authority Ordinance, 2000 ----S. 18 & S. 47; MoI Notification dated 19-04-2017 (blocked-CNIC SOPs)—Cancellation/impounding power—“Reason to believe”—Scope---CNIC previously issued to petitioner No.1 and MNICs/CNICs issued to her husband and father-in-law established a continuous chain of identity; passport also issued on the basis of CNIC—In absence of any allegation or proof under S. 18(2)(a)–(d) (ineligibility, multiple cards on same eligibility, obliteration/tampering, or forgery), NADRA could not refuse issuance of corrected CNIC or renewal—Pre-1978 documentary requirements in MoI SOPs (land record, domicile, pedigree, employment certificate, educational certificates, passport, arms/driving licence, MNIC etc.) may apply to blocked-CNIC cases, but were inapplicable where CNICs had already been lawfully issued and no S. 18 basis was invoked or established—“Reason to believe” must rest on tangible evidence; mere insistence on SOP formalities cannot defeat extant statutory protections. (b) Constitution of Pakistan ----Art. 199—Constitutional petition—Mandamus—Where Zonal Board recommended and respondent No.3 approved correction of date of birth, NADRA’s subsequent delay/refusal to issue corrected CNIC and to renew petitioner No.2’s CNIC was unjustified—Writ jurisdiction competently invoked to enforce performance of a legal duty arising under the Ordinance, 2000 and the approval already granted. (c) Administrative law—Presumption of regularity; burden on authority ----Prior issuance of CNICs/MNIC and passport carries presumption that statutory requirements were observed; unless rebutted through the S. 18 process (notice and proof within clauses (a)–(d)), NADRA must honour existing entitlements and approvals—No adverse presumption lies against the citizen where the department’s own records support identity and eligibility. Disposition --- Petition allowed. Respondents Nos. 2 and 3 directed to issue corrected CNIC to petitioner No.1 (as already approved) and to renew petitioner No.2’s CNIC without delay. Copy to DG NADRA, Balochistan, for compliance.

Summary: (a) National Database and Registration Authority Ordinance (VIII of 2000)--- ----S. 18---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI---Computerized National Identity Card, blocking of---Jurisdiction of Executing Court---Scope---Executing Court had issued orders for blocking CNIC of the petitioner, who had approached High Court without approaching the Executing Court for unblocking of his CNIC---Order of Executing Court was not without authority in view of O.XXI, C.P.C.---Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances. PLD 2022 Lah. 756 Distinguished. (b) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Arts. 5 & 199---Constitutional petition---Maintainability---Conduct of the petitioner, considering of---Non-appearance before the Executing Court---Effect---Blocking of CNIC---Validity---High Court while entertaining writ petition may also take into consideration conduct of the petitioner---Petitioner was avoiding his appearance before the Executing Court, which was his inviolable obligation under Art. 5 of the Constitution, thus, his approach before the High Court by filing writ petition could not be accepted to be in good faith---Petitioner failed to make out a case for interference of High Court in exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction---Constitutional Petition was dismissed in limine. Muhammad Arif v. Uzma Afzal and others 2011 SCMR 374; Dr. Azim Ur Rehman Khan MEO v. Government of Sindh and another 2004 SCMR 1299 and Aziz ur Rehman Ch v. M. Nasiruddin and others PLD 1965 SC 236 rel. Malik Anwar Ul Haq for Petitioner. Nemo for Respondents. Date of hearing: 7th November, 2024.

Summary: (a) Guardians and Wards Act (VIII of 1890)--- ----Ss. 12 & 25---Appointment of guardianship of minor---Conditions, violation of---Effect---Both the parties (parents) separately filed guardianship applications and the mother's application was accepted---Later, father filed application against mother before Family/Guardian Court for blocking her CNIC etc., which was allowed---Mother (guardian) assailed such order passed by the Family/Guardian Court---Held, that the Family/Guardian Court while dismissing the guardian application filed by father for custody of minor, (in relevant clause (e) of final order) had specifically restrained the parties from removing the custody of minor abroad as well as his permanent shifting beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the Court subject to prior permission of the Court---However, record was suggestive of the fact that the petitioner/mother had removed the custody of the minor from the territorial jurisdiction of the Family Court and took him to UAE without permission of the Court, which was a clear violation of the terms and conditions of that final order, and taking pain of such breach of terms and conditions of the final order, the Court took coercive measures of blocking the CNIC and Passport of the petitioner/mother---Thus, impugned order was proper and in accordance with law---Hence, the impugned order did not suffer from any illegality requiring interference by the High Court in exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction---However, in order to resolve the controversy and to facilitate the petitioner and also taking into account the welfare and well-being of the minor, the petitioner may approach the Family Court for relief (of unblocking of her CNIC/Passport as well as seeking permission to travel abroad)---Constitutional petition was disposed of accordingly. [p. 549] A & C (b) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 199---Guardians and Wards Act (VIII of 1890), Ss. 12 & 25---Appointment of guardianship of minor---Conditions, violation of---Effect---Interlocutory order, assailing of---Constitutional petition---Maintainability---Both the parties (parents) separately filed guardianship applications and mother's application was accepted---Later, father filed application before Family/Guardian Court against mother for blocking her CNIC, etc which was allowed---Mother (guardian) assailed such order passed by the Family/Guardian Court---Held that impugned order was interlocutory in nature which could not be entertained by the High Court in exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction---Constitutional jurisdiction is equitable and discretionary in nature and should not be exercised to defeat or bypass the purpose of a validly enacted statutory provisions until and unless the order passed thereunder suffers from any illegality or jurisdictional error---Hence, the impugned order did not suffer from any illegality, infirmity or irregularity that may require interference by the High Court in exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction---However, in order to resolve the controversy and to facilitate the petitioner and also taking into account the welfare and well-being of the minor, the petitioner may approach the Family Court for relief (of unblocking of her CNIC/Passport as well as seeking permission to travel abroad)---Constitutional petition was disposed of accordingly. G.N. Qureshi for Petitioner. Ramish Farhat for Respondent No. 1. Ali Zardari, AAG for Respondent No. 2. Date of hearing: 13th September, 2024.

Summary: ----S.160--- Constitution of Pakistan , Art. 199---Notice of appearance issued by Federal Investigation Agency (FIA)---Territorial jurisdiction of Peshawar High Court---Scope---Notice of appearance---Petitioner was aggrieved of notice under S.160, Cr.P.C. issued by FIA in connection with a criminal inquiry against her---Action of a Constitutional or Federal Authority that affected a person or group of persons in a particular Province could be challenged in the High Court of the Province in Constitutional jurisdiction under Art. 199 of the Constitution where the cause of action arose, or the effect was received/suffered, regardless of the location of the head-office of such Authority---No doubt FIA was a Federal institution/body and the impugned notice had been issued by the FIA Cyber Crime (Lahore), but the petitioner being permanent resident of (Peshawar) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and an MNA and affected by the impugned notice in that Province, could question the impugned notice before Peshawar High Court, particularly, in the circumstances when it was not certain from record that from where the alleged material was generated, uploaded and made viral on the alleged twitter Account of the petitioner---In that view of the matter, Peshawar High Court had got the territorial jurisdiction to entertain the instant petition---Petition was allowed, in circumstances. (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S.160--- Constitution of Pakistan , Art. 10A---Notice of appearance issued by Federal Investigation Agency (FIA)---Petitioner was aggrieved of notice under S.160, Cr.P.C., issued by FIA in connection with a criminal inquiry against her---Petitioner contended that she was being unfairly targeted for political reasons under the guise of prosecution---Petitioner claimed that the complaint supposedly triggering the issuance of the impugned notice was highly questionable, lacking crucial details such as a date, diary receipt number and essential information regarding the alleged offence and place of occurrence; that it merely summarized the accusation as a "highly intimidating campaign against State functionaries and creating violence in public and society through information system."---In the comments the respondents had furnished allegations of the complaint against the petitioner which were totally different from the one mentioned in the impugned notice---Held, that according to the principles of natural justice, constitutional provisions and statutory safeguards, an authority must promptly notify an individual of the charges against him/her allowing adequate time to prepare a defence or gather evidence, as necessary---Impugned notice was excessively ambiguous, making it difficult to provide a suitable response---Federal Investigation Agency, while adhering to the directives of the Islamabad High Court, issued a circular outlining the essential protocols to be followed by the Agency when issuing processes, etc.---Among the directives to be followed by the FIA and its functionaries in conducting investigation etc. was one specifying the obligation to inform the summoned individual about the essence of the allegation, etc.---Upholding the principle of natural justice, one of the oldest tenets, it was imperative that individuals were promptly informed of the specific charge or allegations against them at the outset of any legal proceedings---An executive body tasked with investigating offences bore both moral and legal obligations to proceed with caution, diligence and respect for the constitutional rights of the public---Authoritatively summoning an individual without adequately informing him of the nature of the charge represented the misuse of power, which was unequivocally prohibited in a well-functioning justice system---Impugned notice was issued in violation to petitioner's fundamental right to due process of law---Mechanism adopted by the respondents being against the law smelled of mala fide on their part, therefore, the impugned notice was liable to be set at naught---Courts normally do not interfere in the matter when it is in investigation phase, but when mala fide is floating on the face of record then in such like situation the Courts cannot sit as silent spectators---Petition was allowed by setting aside the impugned notice. Federal Government through Secretary Interior Government of Pakistan v. Ms. Ayyan Ali and others 2017 SCMR 1179; 2017 PCr.LJ 1540; 2016 PCr.LJ 1056; pld 2020 Sindh 9; 2021 MLD 1330 and 2022 PCr.LJ 245 ref. Dr. Arsalan Iftikhar v. Malik Riaz Hussain and others PLD 2012 SC 903; Anwar Ahmad Khan v. The State 1996 SCMR 24; Shahnaz Begum v. Honourable Judge of the High Court of Sindh and Balochistan PLD 1971 SC 677; Raja Rustam Ali Khan v. Muhammad Hanif 1997 SCMR 2008 and Ghulam Sarwar Zardari v. Piyar Ali alias Piyaro 2010 SCMR 624 rel. Muhammad Muaazam Butt and Bassam Ahmad Siddiqui for Petitioner. Sana Ullah, D.A.G. for Respondents along with Ali Raza SI, Nand Lal, AD (Investigation), CCRC Lahore and Arshad Iqbal, AD (Legal). Date of hearing: 6th June, 2024 JUDGMENT ISHTIAQ IBRAHIM, C.J.--- By invoking the constitutional jurisdiction of this court under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 ("Constitution"), Shandana Gulzar Khan, the petitioner, an elected Member National Assembly ("MNA") NA-30 Peshawar, is aggrieved from a notice dated 09.03.2024 ("impugned notice"), issued under section 160, Cr.P.C. by Enquiry Officer FIA/CCRC, Lahore, whereby she been directed to appear in person before the Enquiry Officer in an Enquiry No.598/24 pending at Cyber Crime Reporting Centre Lahore, situated at Building 8-B Block G, Gulberg-II Lahore, for recording her statement. The impugned notice is reproduced below:- FEDERAL INVESTIGATION AGENCY CYBER CRIME REPORTING CENTER 8-B, Block G. Gulberg II, Lahore NOTICE FOR ATTENDANCE UNDER SECTION 160, Cr.P.C. To, Name: Shandana Gulzar Khan daughter of Gulzar Khan resident of Village Mashogagar, Kohat Road Peshawar. CNIC: 61101-4516665-2. Subject:- ENQUIRY NO. 598/24 OF FIA, CYBER CRIME REPORTING CENTRE, LAHORE. FIA, Cyber Crime Reporting Centre, Lahore is conducting a probe on the above titled enquiry. Details are mentioned below:--- Name of complainant: Shoaib Mirza Name of the Alleged: Shandana Gulzar Khan Enquiry No. 598/24 Gist of allegation: Highly intimidating campaign against State functionaries and creating violence in public and society through information system 2. Therefore, you are directed to appear in person before the undersigned to record your statement at FIA Cyber Crime Reporting Centre on 14.03.2024 at 02.00 PM, situated at Building 8-B Block G, Gulberg-II Lahore for fair trial process. You are also directed to bring your original CNIC and the relevant record/documents with you. In case of non-appearance, it will be assumed that you have nothing to present or state in your defence. Ali Raza SUB INSPECTOR ENQUIRY OFFICER FIA/CCRC/LHR Dated:09.03.2024 Non-compliance to the notice is punishable under law, therefore your willful non-obedience of the order will render you liable for criminal proceedings under section 174, P.P.C. 1860. 2. It is averred in the writ petition that the impugned notice having no date, time, place of occurrence, gist of allegations, sections of law and other necessary details is against the mandate of Circular No.FIA/CCWHQ/DIR/OPS/ISB/2021/6035-42 dated 28.06.2021, issued in pursuance of judgment rendered by the worthy Islamabad High Court, Islamabad, in Writ Petition No.2939/2020 as well as various rules of the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Investigation Rules, 2018. It is further averred that the impugned notice being unlawful, against the law, void ab initio, in conflict with the fundamental rights of the petitioners guaranteed under the Constitution, based on mala fide and political victimization is liable to be set at naught, hence, the petitioner seeks issuance of the following writ:- i. The respondents may be required to act in accordance with law and if they intend to initiate any inquiry then they must disclose sufficient information in the notice so that the petitioner know the purpose for being summoned and the respondents must inform the petitioner of the fact, point, allegation, offence, date of registration of enquiry and specified matter in the notice so that the petitioner can furnish/state her position in response thereto. ii. Consequent to above, the impugned notice may be set at naught, dismissed and set-aside with a direction to the respondents to observe the due process and if they intend to proceed with the so-called enquiry, the proceedings to that effect may be conducted and carried out in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa where the petitioner permanently resides, elected as the Member National Assembly and remains with the electorate to perform her function as their chosen representative and the same is the place to be deemed as the core of her entire activities carried out by her as public service in the public interest. iii. Any other relief which though has not been specifically prayed for but is found appropriate may also be granted to the petitioner. Besides, the petitioner has also sought the following interim relief. "Interim Relief. In the meanwhile the operation of impugned notice dated 09.03.2024 and the further proceeding to that effect in the enquiry No.598/24 of FIA Cyber Crime may please be suspended till the final disposal of case in hand with a direction to the respondent that no adverse action shall be taken against the petitioner". 3. On 18.03.2024 when the instant petition came up for hearing, Mr. Sanaullah, the worthy DAG, representing the Federation, raised the following two preliminary objections:- i. That as the impugned notice has been issued by the Enquiry Officer FIA Circular Lahore, therefore, cannot be questioned before this court in constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution because of lack of the territorial jurisdiction in the matter: ii. That as enquiry against the petitioner is at very initial stage; therefore, in such premature stage constitutional jurisdiction of a High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution cannot be pressed into service: 4. Since complaint against the petitioner was not before the court, therefore, this court directed respondents Nos.2 and 3 to submit para-wise comments accompanied by complete record of the inquiry in consequence of which the impugned notice has been issued and the case was posted to 25.03.2024; however, till then, interim relief, that "no adverse action shall be taken against the petitioner", was granted in her favour. 5. In compliance of the order (ibid), the respondents have filed the requisite comments, wherein the following facts of the case has been furnished:- "That FIA CCRC, Lahore has initiated an enquiry against the petitioner on the basis of written complaint filed by one Shoaib Mirza complainant wherein he has alleged that a video featuring interview of the petitioner was circulated wherein she has accused Maryam Nawaz (The sitting chief Minister of Punjab) for murder of one Zille Shah deceased while the local police of the Punjab had already concluded investigation into Zille Shah's death case; that petitioner's involvement in disseminating such accusations constitutes as highly intimidating campaign against the State functionaries. That, during the course of the enquiry, a technical report was obtained from Technical Expert, confirming the existence of the video on the Twitter Account of the petitioner. Subsequently, impugned notice was issued to the petitioner by the Enquiry officer directing her to appear in person before him for recording statement on 14.03.2024. Further more an intimation letter under section 52(2) of the Majilis-e-Shoora Privileges and Immunities Act, 2023 was dispatched to the Secretary of the National Assembly, for information. It is asserted in the comments that the impugned notice issued to the petitioner by the Enquiry Officer is entirely lawful and in accordance with due process and the relevant legal provisions. It is pertinent to mention that the said notice maintains the principles outlined in the judgment of Rana Muhammad Arshad v. Federation of Pakistan, contrary to the petitioner's assertions". 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the impugned notice has been issued by the Enquiry Officer of the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) Lahore in consequence of pending inquiry and the FIA is functioning/running its affairs under the Federation all over the country; that if a Body, Institution or an Authority being run/ functioning under the Federal Government, passes any order or initiates any action and such order or action affects any person at the place other than the place of the Office of such Body, Authority or Institution, such aggrieved person shall have a cause of action to agitate about his/her grievance within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court in which the said order/action is affecting him/her; that petitioner is permanent resident of Badh Ber Peshawar and the impugned order is affecting her; that nothing in black and white is available on file to show as to where the alleged offence was committed and where the twitter account of the petitioner was used. He further contended that petitioner is a lady elected MNA of NA-30 Peshawar and is dealing with her day to day affairs in the Province of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa; therefore, this court has got the jurisdiction to entertain the instant petition. In support of his arguments he placed reliance on the judgments rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case titled, "Federal Government through Secretary Interior Government of Pakistan v. Ms. Ayyan Ali and others" (2017 SCMR 1179). 7. On merit, he contended that the complaint before FIA is politically motivated with mala fide intention just to harass and victimize the petitioner; that the complaint does not bear the date and diary number of the office of FIA as well as the date, time and place of occurrence; that allegations in the impugned notice are different from the allegations in the complaint which manifestly shows the mala fide intention of the respondents just to harass the petitioner, hence, requested for setting aside of the impugned notice. 8. Conversely, the worthy DAG contended that as the enquiry is being conducted by the Cyber Crime Reporting Centre Lahore, therefore, this court has got no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the instant petition. In support of his arguments he placed reliance on the judgments of worthy Islamabad High Court Islamabad, reported as (2017 PCr.LJ 1540) and (2016 PCr.LJ 1056) and worthy Sindh High Court (PLD 2020 Sindh 09). 9. On merit he contended that as the enquiry is in its initial stage and the petitioner has been directed by the Enquiry Officer to appear in person before him for recording statement and it is yet to be determined after conclusion of the enquiry as to whether the petitioner is made accused or a witness; therefore, in such a premature stage constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of the High Court cannot be pressed into service. In support of his arguments he placed reliance on the judgments reported as 2021 MLD 1330 and 2022 PCr.LJ 245. 10. We have heard the arguments of learned counsel for the parties advanced at the bar and perused the record annexed with the petition as well as gone through the law on the subject. 11. First we are going to meet the question of jurisdiction of this court. In the year 2016 the Federal Government Promulgated Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act, 2016 ("PECA"). Object of the PECA, as is manifest from its preamble, was to prevent unauthorized acts with respect to information system and provide for related offences as well as mechanisms for their investigation, prosecution, trial and international cooperation with respect thereof and for matters connected therewith or ancillary thereto. In exercise of powers conferred by section 51 of the PECA read with section 29 thereof, the Federal Government was pleased to make the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Investigation Rules, 2018 ("PECA Rules"). Under Rule 3(1) of the PECA Rules, the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) has been designated as investigation agency for the investigation of offences under the Prevention of PECA and it shall discharge its function under the Act and the Rules through the Cyber Crime Wing under the supervision of the Director General. Under Rule 5 of the PECA Rules, the Director General is responsible for overall administration of the Cyber Crime Wing and is authorized to exercise the powers of the investigation Agency under the PECA 2016. The impugned notice has been issued against the petitioner under section 160, Cr.P.C., but it does not contain the gist of allegation, therefore, is against the circular No.FIA/CCW-HQ/DIR, OP S/I SB/ 2021/56035-2 dated 28.06.2021 and Standing Operating Procedure issued thereafter wherein it has been made obligatory upon the FIA to specifically state the section of law of the alleged offence, the date of registration of enquiry, fact, point and specified matter. The impugned notice is also silent about the date, day, time and place of the occurrence. Similarly, the complaint does not bear the date of institution and diary number of the office. In such eventualities, the place of occurrence is still unknown. It is also not discernible from the available record that the place of occurrence as falling within the original area of the inquiry Officer. Besides, the FIA being a Federal Institution is working/functioning throughout the country. The object of determination of jurisdiction is the first step of any/all adjudication(s). A similarly structured question about territorial jurisdiction came up before the Apex Court in the case of Asghar Hussain 1 . The High Court of the East Pakistan had dismissed a petition that impugned order of the Tribunal/EC in respect of provincial constituency of East Pakistan. The august Apex Court allowed the appeal against the judgment of the High Court of East Pakistan in the following manner (terms):-- "The decision given by the High Court of East Pakistan that it has no jurisdiction to issue a writ or a direction to the election Commission of Pakistan is thus unreasonable in law from every point of view. The election Commission is "a person" or "authority" which exercises in the Province of East Pakistan functions in connection with their affairs of the Centre namely, election to the office of President, National Assembly and the Provincial Assemblies and for holding a Referendum as provided for in the Constitution. In that, the Commission is subject to the jurisdiction of High Court under Article 98(2)(a)(1) notwithstanding that its main office and secretariat are located in the Province of West Pakistan". In the case of Federal Government 2 , the worthy Sindh High Court was approached against a notification issued by the Federal Government whereby on the recommendation of the Punjab Government, Ms. Ayan Ali, was prevented from departure at Karachi Airport for being enlisted in the Exit Control List (ECL). The matter eventually arrived before the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the Hon'ble apex court in the judgment (supra) rejected the argument of the Federal Government relating to the territorial jurisdiction of Sindh High Court by relying upon the LPG's case (2009 CLD 1498) and held as under:-- "As regard the question of territorial jurisdiction, it hardly need emphasis that the impugned notification/memorandum has been issued by the Federal Government which functions all over the country and since the respondent No.1 resides in the Karachi and has a right and choice to proceed abroad through Jinnah International Airport Karachi and in fact at least twice earlier she had proceeded to go abroad through Jinnah International Airport Karachi, though she was stopped owing to the earlier notification/memorandum and therefore, the embargo placed on her leaving the country has in fact taken place at Karachi, which prevention in all likelihood was to be repeated at Karachi in pursuance of the third notification/memorandum and thus giving rise to a cause of action against a third notification/memorandum at Karachi because of its taking effect there. It is now well settled that the Federal Government, though may have exclusive residence or location at Islamabad would still be deemed function all over the country". (emphasis supplied). Similarly, in case of Messrs Al-Iblagh Limited 3 , the issue of territorial jurisdiction of the High Court was tackled in the following manner:-- "The Central Government has set up a Copyright Board for the whole of Pakistan and it performs functions in relation to the affairs of the Federation in all the Provinces. Hence, any order passed by it or proceedings taken by it in relation to any person in any of the four Provinces of Pakistan would give the High Court of the Province, in whose territory the order would affect such a person, jurisdiction to hear the case. It was further observed that:-- "We agree and are of the opinion that both the Lahore High Court as well as the Sindh High Court had concurrent jurisdiction in the matter and both the Courts could have entertained a Writ Petition against the impugned orders in the circumstances of this case. We, therefore, hold that the Lahore High Court has illegally refused to exercise jurisdiction in this case. The case will, therefore, go back to the Lahore High Court for the decision of the Writ Petition filed by the appellant before it for decision on merits, in accordance with law". In the case of LPG Association of Pakistan through Chairman 4 , the territorial jurisdiction of Hon'ble Lahore High Court, Lahore, was questioned on the ground that the contesting respondents were functioning at Islamabad; while the impugned notice was issued by the Commission at Islamabad and, as such, the Hon'ble Lahore High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition. However, the Hon'ble Lahore High Court, Lahore, rejected the objection in the following terms:-- "From the judgments cited at the Bar on both the sides, the portions whereof have been extensively reproduced, the following ratio is deducible:-- (A) The Federal Government or any body politic or a corporation or a statutory authority having exclusive residence or location at Islamabad with no office at any other place in any of the Provinces, shall still be deemed to function all over the country. (B) If such government, body or authority passes any order or initiates an action at Islamabad, but it affects the "aggrieved party" at the place other than the Federal capital, such party shall have a cause of action to agitate about his grievance within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court in which said order/action has affected him. (C) This shall be more so in the cases where a party is aggrieved or a legislative instrument (including any rules, etc) on the ground of it being ultra vices, because the cause to sue against that law shall accrue to a person at the place where his rights have been affected. For example, if a law is challenged on the ground that it is confiscatory in nature, violative of the fundamental rights to property; profession, association etc, and any curb has been placed upon such a right by a law enforced at Islamabad, besides there, it can also be challenged within the jurisdiction of the High Court, where the right is likely to be affected: In this context, illustrations can be given, that if some duty/tax has been imposed upon the withdrawal of the amounts by the account holders from their bank account and the aggrieved party is maintaining the account at Lahore, though the Act/law has been passed at Islamabad, yet his right being affected where he maintains the account (Lahore), he also can competently initiate a writ petition in Lahore besides Islamabad; this shall also be true for the violation of any right to profession, if being conducted by a person at Lahore, obviously in the situation, he shall have a right to seek the enforcement of his right in any of the two High Courts. (D) On account of the above, both the Islamabad and Lahore High Courts shall have the concurrent jurisdiction in certain matters and it shall not be legally sound or valid to hold that as the Federal Government etc. resides in Islamabad, and operates from there; the assailed order/action has also emanated from Islamabad, therefore, it is only the Capital High Court which shall possess the jurisdiction. The dominant purpose in such a situation shall be irrelevant, rather on account of the rule of choice, the plaintiff/petitioner shall have the right to choose the forum of his convenience". 12. After thoroughly examining the above-referred case law, we are firm in our view to hold that an action of a constitutional or Federal Authority that affects a person or group of persons in a particular Province, can be challenged in the High Court of the Province in constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution where the cause of action arose, or the effect was received/suffered, regardless of the location of the head-office of such Authority. Therefore, we hold that no doubt FIA is the Federal Institution/body and the impugned notice has been issued by the FIA Cyber Crime Lahore, but the petitioner being permanent resident of the Peshawar Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, a lady MNA and affected by the impugned notice in this Province can question the impugned notice before this court, particularly, in the circumstances when it is not certain from record that from where the alleged material was generated, uploaded and made viral on the alleged twitter Account of the petitioner. In this view of the matter, this court has got the territorial jurisdiction to entertain the instant petition. 13. Adverting to the substance of the issue at hand, the petitioner contends that she is being unfairly targeted for political reasons under the guise of prosecution. She claims that the complaint supposedly triggering the issuance of the impugned notice is highly questionable, lacking crucial details such as a date, diary receipt number and essential information regarding the alleged offense such as the gist of allegations, the day, date, time and place of occurrence; that it merely summarizes the accusation as a "Highly intimidating campaign against State functionaries and creating violence in public and society through information system." Contrary, in the comments the respondents have furnished allegations of the complaint against the petitioner which are totally different from the one mentioned in the impugned notice. 14. According to the principles of Natural Justice, constitutional provisions, and statutory safeguards, an authority must promptly notify an individual of the charges against him/her allowing adequate time to prepare a defense or gather evidence, as necessary. At the cost of repetition, impugned notice is excessively ambiguous, making it difficult to provide a suitable response. The august Supreme Court, in the case titled "Dr. Arsalan Iftikhar v. Malik Riaz Hussain and others" [PLD 2012 Supreme Court 903, while interpreting the provisions of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 has observed and held as follows:- "The clear and unambiguous pronouncements given in the case titled Ghulam Hussain Baloch and another v. Chairman, National Accountability Bureau Islamabad and 2 others (PLD 2007 Karachi 469) were violated by NAB in its two letters. In the cited precedent NAB has been given express guidelines as to its responsibilities while summoning or requiring the attendance of persons/witnesses in an inquiry. As per ratio of the case, before summoning a person to attend, NAB was duty bound to identify and particularize the information sought from any witness etc. and to state the nexus between such information and the subject of the inquiry being conducted by NAB. It was observed by the Court that "while calling [for] the information from any person, the person must be informed of the fact, point, allegation, offence, name of accused, specified matter, if any, concerning the matters ... in the notice so that the person can furnish such information" Commenting on the ruling of the apex court, Islamabad High Court has remarked as follows: "5. It is noted that the above guidelines regarding the responsibilities of an investigating officer while summoning a person would also be attracted in case of proceedings relating to criminal offences dealt with by the Agency. The officials, particularly investigating officers of the Agency, are public functionaries vested with expansive powers to investigate and inquire into criminal offences. It is their duty to ensure that their actions are not in breach of the essential and elementary principles of fairness. It is their obligation to exercise coercive powers in such mode and manner that does not appear to be arbitrary nor that powers are being used recklessly for other than bona fide purposes. . . ." Next the court proceeded to issue guidelines to be observed by the respondents in issuing processes, and which, purportedly, were implemented by the respondents: Keeping in view the above discussion and having regard to the paramount public importance of protecting the constitutionally guaranteed rights, particularly under Articles 19 and 19 A of the Constitution, it is observed and directed as follows; i. The Director General of the Agency is expected to formulate guidelines for the investigating officers, inter alia, having regard to the principles highlighted in the aforementioned judgment of the august Supreme Court. It is further expected that the Agency will consider prescribing special guidelines regarding proceedings against persons engaged in the profession of journalism on account of the profound effect on the freedom of press and independence of a journalist when the coercive powers are abused, giving rise to a perception of retaliation to professional functions performed. In this regard the Agency may consult the key stake holders. " The respondents/FIA, while adhering to the directives of the Islamabad High Court, issued a circular outlining the essential protocols to be followed by the Agency when issuing processes, etc. A copy of the circular dated 28/06/21, is on file as Annexure-E with the comments. Among the directives to be followed by the FIA and its functionaries in conducting investigation etc. is one specifying the obligation to inform the summoned individual about the essence of the allegation, etc. The directive reads as: Gist of allegations (facts, point, section of law applicable and specified matter). Respondents claim that they have adhered to and complied with the said obligation. As referred above, the impugned notice contain the gist of following allegation: Gist of allegation: Highly intimidating campaign against State functionaries and creating violence in public and society through information system This court differs with the respondents' assertion of meeting the criteria outlined for issuing processes in the provided circular. Upholding the principle of natural justice, one of the oldest tenets, it is imperative that individuals are promptly informed of the specific charge or allegations against them at the outset of any legal proceedings. Referring to the specifics of the current case, the circular, which contains guidelines, clearly mandates that factual details must accompany the gist of the allegation provided to the respondent or accused. Mere presentation of a generic statement regarding the commission of an offense cannot be considered sufficient to convey pertinent information or fulfill the respondents' mandated responsibilities. For example, an individual implicated or suspected of involvement in a robbery should be informed of the precise particular facts of the offense rather than being notified of the suspicion harbored by the body of his involvement in a serious offense against life and property. Labels such as "offense against life and property" or "serious campaign for intimidation and violence" categorize offenses rather than specifying a particular offense. Under the constitutional safeguard of the right to a fair trial, individuals prosecuted or facing legal proceedings have the right to be informed of the charges against them. The specifics of the case are crucial, particularly in criminal charges, as each case differs in its factual context. An executive body tasked with investigating offenses bears both moral and legal obligations to procee

Summary: Declatory suit instituted by the Respondent for unblocking of his CNIC directly before the Civil Court without exhausting remedies provided under the NADRA Ordinance, 2000 was not maintainable. 1025Civil Original Suit (C.O.S)- Suit For Recovery 21-17 NBP LTD. VS M/S SALMAN NOMAN ETERPRISES LTD, ETC. Mr. Justice Abid Aziz Sheikh 13- 06- 2024 2024 LHC 3125

Summary: Background: This case involves a civil revision filed by the National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) against a judgment and decree passed by the Additional District Judge, Ferozewala. The Respondents had previously filed a suit seeking a declaration to restore their Computerized National Identity Cards (CNICs) and Passports, which NADRA had blocked. The suit was initially dismissed by the Civil Judge but later decreed in favor of the Respondents by the Appellate Court. The case raises significant questions about the jurisdiction of civil courts in matters relating to citizenship and the issuance of identity documents. ----Issues: 1- Whether the sovereign right of the State to confer nationality upon an individual can be subject to a civil suit or must be decided under special laws relating to citizenship. 2- Whether the grant or denial of identity documents (CNIC & Passport) based on nationality or alien status can be subject to a civil suit or falls within the purview of special laws. 3- Whether a civil suit is maintainable without impleading the Federal Government as a necessary party. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: Sovereign Right and Special Laws: The court held that the sovereign right of the State to confer or deny citizenship is regulated by special laws such as the Pakistan Citizenship Act, 1951, the NADRA Ordinance, 2000, and the Passports Act, 1974. These laws provide comprehensive mechanisms and remedies for addressing disputes regarding citizenship and identity documents. Therefore, such matters should be resolved through the procedures established by these special laws rather than through civil suits. Grant or Denial of Identity Documents: The court determined that the issuance and revocation of CNICs and Passports fall within the jurisdiction of NADRA and the relevant government authorities as stipulated in the NADRA Ordinance and the Passports Act. Civil suits cannot override the specific procedures and remedies provided under these laws. Necessary Party: The court emphasized that the Federal Government must be impleaded in cases involving questions of citizenship and identity documents. The failure to include the Federal Government as a necessary party rendered the suit procedurally defective. The court allowed the civil revision, setting aside the judgment of the Appellate Court. The suit was deemed not maintainable due to the availability of alternate remedies under the special laws and the failure to implead the Federal Government. The Respondent was granted the liberty to avail these remedies within 30 days from the date of the judgment. ----Citations/Precedents: West Punjab Government versus Pindi-Jhelum Valley Transport Ltd., Rawalpindi and six others (PLD 1953 Lahore 339) Muhammad Siddique (Deceased) through LRs and Others versus Mst. Noor Bibi (Deceased) through LRs and Others (2020 SCMR 483) Najeebullah and others versus Director NADRA, Balochistan, Quetta and others (PLD 2016 Balochistan 1) Gul Shereen Bibi versus Federal Government of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Interior and 5 others (2016 CLC 1928) Saeed Abdi Mahmud versus National Database Registration Authority through Chairman and 03 others (2018 CLC 1588) Ghulam Sanai versus The Assistant Director, National Registration Office, Peshawar and another (PLD 1999 Peshawar 18) Hafiz Hamdullah Saboor versus Government of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Interior, Islamabad and 2 others (PLD 2021 Islamabad 305) Mst. Rukhsana Bibi and others versus Government of Pakistan and others (PLD 2016 Lahore 857) Nasrullah Khan and another versus Mst. Khairunnisa and others (2020 SCMR 2101) Government of Balochistan, CWPP&H Department and others versus Nawabzada Mir Tariq Hussain Khan Magsi and others (2010 SCMR 115) ----Quote: Declatory suit instituted by the Respondent for unblocking of his CNIC directly before the Civil Court without exhausting remedies provided under the NADRA Ordinance, 2000 was not maintainable.

Summary: ''Banking court did not have the power to block CNIC'' ----- Issues:Whether the issuance of non-bailable warrants of arrest and the blocking of CNICs were legally justified under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001.Whether due process, including inquiry and show cause notice, was followed before taking such actions against the appellants.----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The High Court found the issuance of non-bailable arrest warrants and the blocking of CNICs to be illegal due to a lack of procedural compliance with the required legal standards. The court noted that no inquiry or show cause notice was issued prior to these actions, which was deemed necessary under the law. Furthermore, it was determined that the blocking of CNICs did not fall within the legal powers of the Banking Court as stipulated under the relevant statutes.The Court set aside the impugned order due to these procedural and legal shortcomings and allowed the appeal, remanding the case back to the Executing Court to initiate a fresh process in accordance with the law and the observations made by the High Court.-----Citations/Precedents:Messrs Azhar & Co. and others v. National Bank of Pakistan (2018 CLD 830)Muhammad Asif v. Standard Chartered Bank (Pakistan) Limited through Manager (2022 CLD 1021)Muhammad Umar v Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Interior, Islamabad and 2 others (PLD 2017 Sindh 585)Hafiz Awais Zafar v Judge Family Court, Lahore and 2 others (PLD 2022 Lahore 756)Urooj Tabani v Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Interior, Islamabad and 2 others (PLD 2021 Islamabad 105)Habib Ahmad v. Haji Munir Ahmad (2004 YLR 1540)Messrs 3-A Trade Impex through Partner and 2 others v. Askari Commercial Bank Ltd, through Branch Manager (2005 CLD 1379)Abdul Basit Zahid v. Modaraba Al-Tijarah through Chief Executive and 2 others (PLD 2000 Karachi 322)Muhammad Kaleem v. Arslan Aslam and others (2023 CLC 796)