Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898): ----S. 203––Dismissal of complaint––Scope and stage of proceedings––Maintainability of special leave to appeal––Appellant’s private complaint under S. 200, Cr.P.C. was dismissed by the Additional Sessions Judge at the preliminary stage due to non-appearance and non-compliance with court orders for recording cursory statement––Held, at the stage of S. 203 Cr.P.C., where no process has been issued under S. 204 Cr.P.C. and the accused has not been summoned, the dismissal of the complaint does not amount to acquittal––Hence, no appeal under S. 417(2-A), Cr.P.C. lies––Petition for special leave to appeal was held not maintainable. ----Cited Cases: • Muhammad Jawad Hamid v. Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif 2019 PCr.LJ 665 (Lahore) • Azmat Bibi v. Asifa Riaz PLD 2002 SC 687 (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898): ----S. 403––Second complaint after dismissal––Bar of double jeopardy––Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, Art. 13––Held, dismissal of a private complaint at preliminary stage under S. 203 Cr.P.C. does not attract the bar under S. 403 Cr.P.C. or Art. 13 of the Constitution––Dismissal of complaint does not amount to acquittal; hence, does not preclude filing of a second complaint––A fresh complaint can be filed before the same court if supported by new facts or material not available earlier, or if earlier dismissal was based on incomplete record or misreading––Appellant may, if so advised, file second complaint before appropriate forum. ----Cited Cases: • Zahoor v. Said-ul-Abrar 2003 SCMR 59 • Azmat Bibi v. Asifa Riaz PLD 2002 SC 687 • Muhammad Akram v. Haji Mir Aziz Ahmed 2000 PCr.LJ 489 • Saeed Ahmed v. Abdul Shakoor 2005 PCr.LJ 1631 • Abdul Majid v. MD. Mansur Ali 1969 PCr.LJ 692 (c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898): ----Ss. 200, 203 & 204––Distinction in procedural stages––Issuance of process––Effect of non-recording of cursory statement––Where complaint is dismissed before recording of cursory statement and prior to issuance of summons under S. 204 Cr.P.C., Court may lawfully dismiss it under S. 203 Cr.P.C.––Use of phrase “if any” in S. 203 allows dismissal without recording cursory statement if justified––Such dismissal not a bar to reinstitution of complaint––Impugned order was found consistent with law; appeal dismissed. ----Disposition: Petition for Special Leave to Appeal dismissed as not maintainable––Held, dismissal under S. 203 Cr.P.C. at preliminary stage did not amount to acquittal––Appellant may file second complaint if so advised, in accordance with law. "PSLA against Acquittal from charge of S. 500 PPC, leaved through a private complaint."

Summary: Conviction upheld ---- (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 512—Trial in absentia—Subsequent retrial—Effect— Appellant was initially convicted and sentenced to death in absentia under S. 512, Cr.P.C. upon his escape from judicial custody. After his re-arrest, the High Court set aside the conviction and remanded the case for retrial. The trial court again convicted and sentenced the appellant to death on five counts under S. 302(b), P.P.C., which was upheld by the High Court. Held, retrial following arrest and remand is lawful and does not attract double jeopardy under Art. 13 of the Constitution or S. 403, Cr.P.C. Retrial was consistent with due process and legal remedy. (b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S. 302(b)—Murder—Quantum of sentence—Rule of expectancy of life—Delay in execution—Mitigating factors—Concurrent sentence— Appellant remained incarcerated for over twenty-five years, most of which was served in the death cell, pending conclusion of legal remedies. Supreme Court held that while conviction was valid and supported by ocular and medical evidence, several mitigating factors warranted commutation of sentence: (i) prolonged incarceration in death cell without remission; (ii) appellant’s young age at the time of occurrence; (iii) lack of prior criminal record; (iv) role under influence of his father who had enmity with victims; (v) unreliable recovery of weapon; and (vi) unauthorized punishment due to degrading prison conditions. Death sentence on five counts converted to imprisonment for life on five counts to run concurrently. Benefit of S. 382-B, Cr.P.C., extended. Cases cited: • Abdul Malik v. The State PLD 2006 SC 365 • Dilawar Hussain v. The State 2013 SCMR 1582 • Hassan v. The State PLD 2013 SC 793 • Khalid Iqbal v. Mirza Khan PLD 2015 SC 50 • Ghulam Rasool v. The State 2025 SCMR 74 • Shahid Ali v. The State PLD 1970 SC 447 • Khadim Hussain v. Secretary HR PLD 2020 Islamabad 268 (c) Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 9, 12(b), 13(a), 14 & 37(d)—Right to life and dignity—Double punishment—Cruel and inhumane treatment—Delay in appellate disposal— Held, prolonged delay of over 17 years in final disposal of death sentence appeal, not attributable to the appellant, subjected him to unauthorized punishment beyond the statutory scope of S. 302(b), P.P.C. Such incarceration in substandard prison conditions amounts to cruel, degrading, and inhumane treatment, violating Arts. 9, 12(b), and 14 of the Constitution. Court emphasized constitutional responsibility of State organs to eliminate systemic delays and ensure humane treatment of prisoners. Judiciary, executive, and legislature must coordinate to reform and restore trust in the criminal justice system. (d) Administration of justice—Delay in appellate process—Impact on fairness and public confidence— Delay of six years in High Court and nearly a decade in Supreme Court to hear and decide appeal constituted failure of the criminal justice system. Held, such delays undermine public trust, especially when disproportionately affecting economically marginalized convicts. Supreme Court urged urgent structural reforms to ensure expeditious, transparent, and dignified delivery of justice. Disposition: Appeal partly allowed; conviction upheld; death sentence on five counts commuted to life imprisonment on five counts to run concurrently; benefit under S. 382-B, Cr.P.C., granted.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Art. 199---Constitutional jurisdiction---Maintainability---Alternative remedy---Petitions under Art. 199 for quashment of FIRs and orders under S. 249-A, Cr.P.C.—Scope---Where statutory remedy of revision existed and no constitutional right was infringed, extraordinary jurisdiction could not be invoked merely to circumvent the regular criminal process—However, Court examined legality as petitions were consolidated and involved identical legal questions. (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ----Ss. 561-A, 249-A & 403—Quashment of FIRs—Double jeopardy—Dishonoured cheques issued on different dates---Distinct transactions---Held, each dishonour arising from separate cheque constitutes a separate cause of action and distinct offence; multiple FIRs, each based on an independently dishonoured cheque, do not attract the bar of S. 403, Cr.P.C. or Art. 13 of the Constitution---Petitioner’s plea that subsequent FIRs were hit by double jeopardy was misconceived—No illegality in dismissal of S. 249-A applications by trial and revisional courts. Cited Cases: • *Saira Fatima v. The State* (2024 P Cr.LJ 1289) • *State v. Saeed Khan* (2021 P Cr.LJ 608) (c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ----S. 234—Joinder of charges—Dishonour of cheques within twelve months—Discretion of trial court---Where several offences of the same kind are alleged within one year, trial court may, on request, join them in a single trial to prevent multiplicity of proceedings. (d) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ----Ss. 503 & 539-B—Recording of complainant’s statement through local commission---Legality---Where complainant’s physical appearance before court was impracticable due to health or security concerns, trial court may appoint an advocate-commissioner to record evidence at residence—No prejudice caused to accused if attendance is already dispensed with—Order modifying mode of recording evidence held lawful and within discretion of trial court. (e) Penal Code (XLV of 1860) ----S. 489-F—Dishonoured cheque—Successive prosecutions---Separate FIRs for distinct cheques dishonoured on different dates do not offend double jeopardy principles; each dishonour gives rise to a fresh and independent offence. (f) Criminal Justice—Quashment proceedings ----Jurisdiction under S. 561-A Cr.P.C.—Parameters—Only exercisable where continuation of proceedings is manifestly illegal, oppressive, or amounts to abuse of process—Mere existence of multiple FIRs for separate transactions or pendency of trial does not justify quashment. Disposition --- All petitions dismissed. Orders dated 20-07-2022 (refusing acquittal under S. 249-A), 15-10-2022 (revisional order), 10-06-2023 (appointment of local commission), and 26-08-2023 (revisional confirmation) upheld. Trial court directed to ensure police security during recording of complainant’s statement at his residence. No order as to costs.

Summary: Background: The petitioner sought quashment of multiple FIRs lodged across various districts, accusing him of spreading subversive and intimidating messages via Twitter against state institutions, including the military. The petitioner was charged under various sections of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) and the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act (PECA). The petitioner contended that the multiple FIRs constituted double jeopardy and violated his rights under the Constitution and law, particularly as the charges stemmed from the same alleged occurrence. -----Issues: 1- Whether multiple FIRs for the same occurrence are permissible. -----2- Whether the filing of multiple FIRs violates the principle of double jeopardy. -----3- Whether remand procedures followed by lower courts in these cases were compliant with legal requirements. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court quashed the FIRs, holding that multiple FIRs regarding the same occurrence cannot be lodged, as it violates the principle of double jeopardy under Article 13 of the Constitution and Section 403 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.). The court also noted that forcing the petitioner to defend himself in multiple courts across different jurisdictions for the same offense would be a violation of Articles 4 and 13 of the Constitution. Additionally, the court expressed concern about the improper remand procedures followed in lower courts, stating that remand orders should not be granted mechanically without sufficient justification. The petitions for quashment were allowed, and the court ordered the release of the petitioner, provided he was not required in any other case. -----Citations/Precedents: Mst. Sughran Bibi v. The State (PLD 2018 Supreme Court 595) – Multiple FIRs for the same occurrence are impermissible. Ghulam Sarwar v. The State (1984 PCr.LJ 2588) – Guidelines on the grant of remand in criminal cases. Articles 4, 9, 13, and 10-A of the Constitution of Pakistan – Rights to due process, protection of the law, liberty, and freedom from double jeopardy.

Summary: Customs Act (IV of 1969)-------Ss.85, 89, 156 & 157---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss.561-A & 403---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.13---General Clauses Act (X of 1897), S.26---Smuggling---Quashing of FIR---Protection against double punishment and self incrimination---Persononce convicted or acquitted not to be tried for the same offence---Provision as to offencespunishable under two or more enactments---Scope---Accused persons sought quashing ofsecond FIR on the ground that it amounted to double jeopardy---Validity---Customs officialswere initially busy in discharge of their official duties and were checking the vehicles when atruck arrived at the check post, which was stopped for checking purposes but in themeantime the accused persons also arrived there in another vehicle, forbade the officialsfrom checking the truck, abused and beaten the officials as well as blocked the road bycalling more than 100 persons---However, search of the truck resulted into recovery offoreign origin smuggled goods---Customs authorities had rightly lodged the first FIR underthe Customs Act, 1969, for the recovery of foreign origin smuggled goods and the secondFIR under the provisions of Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 for restraining the officials fromperformance of their official duties and giving beatings to them---Section 403, Cr.P.C.,Art.13 of the Constitution and S.26 of General Clauses Act, 1897, provided that no one couldbe vexed twice and prosecuted or punished for the same offence, but if one was guilty ofoffence under another enactment, though by the same chain of facts, he could be tried,convicted and punished under that very offence committed by him---Principle of doublejeopardy was not applicable to the facts of the case---Petition, being devoid of merits, wasdismissed, in circumstances.PLD 2018 SC 322 and PLD 2019 Bal. 27

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-------Ss. 200, 203 & 403---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 13---Protection against doublepunishment and self-incrimination---Person once convicted or acquitted not to be tried forsame offence---Dismissal of private complaint---Scope---Complainant, after acquittal ofrespondents by Trial Court, filed a private complaint against them, which was dismissedthrough impugned order---Respondents had faced trial in the FIR case on registration of FIRand the same allegations were levelled in the private complaint, as such Art. 13 of theConstitution as well as S. 403, Cr.P.C., came into play---Subject matter had already beentried by the court of competent jurisdiction in registered case between the same partiestherefore, Magistrate had rightly dismissed the private complaint---Constitutional petitionwas dismissed. (b) Constitution of Pakistan-------Art. 13---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 403---Protection against doublepunishment and self-incrimination---Person once convicted or acquitted not to be tried forsame offence---Scope---Once a person is prosecuted for an offence and is acquitted, hecannot be subsequently tried for the same offence.The State through Collector of Customs v. Nasim Amin Butt and others 2011 SCMR1083 and Muhammad Nadeem Anwar v. Securities and Exchange Commissioner of Pakistanthrough Director NBFs Deptt: Islamabad 2014 SCMR 1376 ref.Nazir Ahmad v. Capital City Police Officer, Lahore and another 2011 SCMR 484 rel.(c) Maxim-------Nemo bis punitur aut vexatur pro eodem delicto---Meaning: No one should be vexedtwice for the same offence.

Summary: Accused was not tried for the same offence. Trial of the accused was not barred u/s 403 Cr.P.C or on principle of double jeopardy. ---- Customs Act (IV of 1969)-------Ss. 156(89) & 185-F---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss.468 & 471---Criminal ProcedureCode (V of 1898), S.403---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.13(a)---Possessing smuggledgoods, forgery and using forged documents as genuine---Double jeopardy---Appreciation ofevidence---Sentence, reduction in---Appeal to Special Appellate Tribunal---Appellant/accusedwas convicted and sentenced and vehicle in question having also been confiscated, accused hadfiled appeal---Counsel for accused had contended that the challan of accused in the same F.I.R.was the breach of Art.13(a) of the Constitution, as well as in contravention of S.403, Cr.P.C. asthe trial of accused would amount to double jeopardy, which was not warranted by law---Accused was convicted and sentenced under S.156(89) of the Customs Act, 1969 and underSs.468 & 471, P.P.C.---Said provisions of two different statutes/laws had revealed that theoffence of smuggling of goods was punishable under the Customs Act, 1969; whereas offencesof forgery and using forged documents as genuine was punishable under Ss.468 & 471, P.P.C.---Said offences were not the same, in circumstances---Second trial would be only barredwhen offence was the same and in case offences were different/distinct, then accused could be tried by the two different courts under two different enactments on the basis of common set offacts and trial would not be barred---Contention of counsel for accused having no force wasrepelled---Accused was not tried for the same offence, but for the different and distinct offencesin different Courts; trial of accused, in circumstances was not barred under S.403, Cr.P.C. oron the principle of double jeopardy---Accused was arrested on 7-4-2003 and since then he wasfacing the hardship of trial---Nothing was on record to indicate that accused was habitualoffender or was ever involved previously in the case of smuggling---Sentence of accused wasreduced to the period already undergone by him.