Summary: (a) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pre-emption Act, 1987---- ----Ss. 24, 27 & 28---Pre-emption suit---Deposit of one-third sale consideration---Actual sale consideration disputed---Plaint rejected under O.VII, R.11, C.P.C. for alleged non-compliance with statutory deposit requirement---Supreme Court held that pre-emption law is anchored to the sale transaction itself and not to an independent or automatic assessment of market value---Pre-emptor ordinarily steps into shoes of vendee and must purchase property at same consideration where price is found genuine and fixed in good faith---Market value is not the default rule; it becomes relevant only where declared consideration is proved fictitious, inflated or mala fide. (b) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pre-emption Act, 1987---- ----S. 27---Determination of price payable by pre-emptor---Genuine sale price versus market value---Two-stage mechanism---Supreme Court held that where sale consideration is found to be genuine and fixed in good faith, Court shall fix such price to be paid by pre-emptor---Pre-emptor cannot claim property merely on perceived “realistic” or market value---Only where Court concludes that stated price was not fixed in good faith, for example where it was inflated or fictitious to defeat pre-emption, Court may determine market value as price payable by pre-emptor. Cited Cases: • Zilla Muhammad v. Qamar Ali Khan 2016 SCMR 184 • Allah Bakhsh v. Umar 1991 SCMR 1692 (c) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pre-emption Act, 1987---- ----S. 24---Deposit in pre-emption suit---“Sale consideration” not “pre-emption money”---Supreme Court reiterated that statutory deposit under S.24 is one-third of sale consideration---Courts should avoid loose expression “pre-emption money” and instead use correct statutory terminology, namely “sale consideration”---Lower Courts must calculate and specify precise amount required for deposit within reasonable time. Cited Case: • Wasal Khan v. Niaz Ali Khan 2016 SCMR 40 (d) Pre-emption---- ----Inflated or exaggerated sale consideration---Burden of proof---Market value lower than transaction price---Effect---Appellant/pre-emptor contended that value shown in sale transaction was exorbitantly higher than market value---Supreme Court held that such plea is insignificant unless it is shown that inflated value was purposely stated to defeat right of pre-emption---A very heavy burden rests on pre-emptor seeking to enforce pre-emption on such plea---Seller is not deprived merely because property fetched price higher than prevailing market value; what matters is whether declared price was actually paid and represented bona fide transactional value. (e) Pre-emption---- ----Bona fide transactional value---Court’s duty---Supreme Court held that Trial Court must determine whether sale consideration disclosed in transaction was exaggerated and not actually paid to vendor, or whether it was true transactional value actually paid, irrespective of market value---The Court must first examine bona fides of sale price before resorting to valuation based on comparable sales or surrounding circumstances. (f) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----O. VII, R. 11---Rejection of plaint---Pre-emption suit---Dispute regarding correct sale consideration and statutory deposit---Trial Court rejected plaint on ground that plaintiff had not deposited actual one-third sale consideration and bank guarantee for remaining two-thirds---Appellate Court restored suit because substantial evidence had already been recorded and dispute regarding actual transactional value required determination---Supreme Court upheld restoration approach, observing that where sale consideration itself is disputed and evidence exists, matter should proceed for determination in accordance with Ss.24, 27 and 28 of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pre-emption Act, 1987. (g) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----S. 115---Revisional jurisdiction---Limits---Appellate Court’s lawful exercise of jurisdiction---High Court in revision set aside Appellate Court’s judgment and restored Trial Court’s rejection of plaint---Supreme Court held that once Appellate Court had lawfully exercised jurisdiction by remanding/restoring suit for proper determination, revisional Court had no room to substitute another view in absence of jurisdictional defect, illegality or material irregularity---No ground was available for High Court to exercise revisional jurisdiction under S.115, C.P.C. (h) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Art. 185(2)(d)---Appeal as of right---Pre-emption matter---Appellant filed direct appeal before Supreme Court against High Court judgment allowing revision and restoring rejection of plaint---Supreme Court entertained appeal as of right and corrected High Court’s interference with Appellate Court’s lawful order. Disposition: Appeal was allowed; judgment of Peshawar High Court dated 23.02.2022 was set aside; matter was remanded to Trial Court to proceed with pre-emption suit in light of Supreme Court’s observations regarding genuine sale consideration, market value as exceptional mechanism, and statutory deposit; Trial Court was permitted to frame issue if deemed necessary and allow additional evidence, if any; trial was directed not to take more than three months.

Summary: (Against order dated 12.07.2010 passed in W.P. No. 1631 of 2008 by Lahore High Court, Lahore). (a) Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882)--- ----S. 52---Punjab Pre-emption Act (IX of 1991), S. 13---Pre-emption suit---Dispute over actual sale consideration---Suit dismissed for non-prosecution---Restoration of suit---Alienation of property during interregnum---Effect and legality---Lis pendens---Principle---Applicability---Alienation of suit property after dismissal of suit for non-prosecution and before its restoration falls within the sphere of lis pendens---Factual background of present case was that appellants / plaintiffs (pre-emptors) filed a suit for possession through pre-emption against respondent No. 5 (vendor) regarding the suit land claiming the sale price was Rs.200,000, while respondent No.5 asserted that it was Rs.250,000---Suit was dismissed for non-prosecution and was later on restored---After dismissal of suit and before its restoration, respondent No.5 (vendor) sold the property to respondents Nos. 2 to 4 (subsequent vendees)---During pendency of the suit, respondent No. 5 (vendor) made a statement before the trial court that the original vendor could be summoned to confirm the actual sale consideration and that whatever amount the vendor admitted to have received could be treated as the sale price for decreeing the suit---The only question before the Trial Court requiring determination was the price of the suit land and respondent No.5 had no objection if the original vendor was summoned for ascertaining the actual amount of sale, but the Trial Court did not accede to the request of the appellant and proceeded to frame the issues---Trial Court dismissed the said request but the revisional court accepted it, decreeing the suit---Respondents Nos. 2 to 4 (subsequent vendees) challenged the revisional court verdict before the High Court, whereby, the decree was set aside and the matter was remanded for decision on merits, prompting the present appeal by the preemptor concerning the applicability of the doctrine of lis pendens---Primary question warranting determination before the Supreme Court was as to "whether the Respondents Nos. 2 to 4, who purchased the suit property during the pendency of the pre-emption suit despite a stay order, were bound by the statement of their predecessor-in-interest under the rule of lis pendens, and whether the appellant (pre-emptor), who had already deposited the amount of Rs.250,000/- in compliance with that statement, could claim that the transaction was struck by lis pendens and was entitled to have the suit decreed?"---Held: So far as the argument that the property was purchased during the period when the suit was dismissed, therefore, the principle of lis pendens did not apply to the case of the subsequent buyers, the said argument had no force, because if a suit was dismissed and then restored, the restoration order related to back period and a transfer/sale after dismissal and before restoration was subjected to the principle of lis pendens embodied in section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882---However, in the present case, the petitioners purchased the disputed property through a mutation when the proceedings in the suit were in progress after its restoration after dismissal for non-prosecution---Respondents Nos. 2 to 4 had acquired the title to the suit property subject to the final outcome of the lis and as such were bound by the result of the suit stricto sensu in all respects, as their transferor i.e. respondent No.5 was bound---High Court erred in law while passing the impugned order, which suffered from material illegality, therefore, same could not be allowed to sustain further---Resultantly, the impugned order was set aside and appeal was allowed, in circumstances. Aasia Jabeen v. Liaqat Ali 2016 SCMR 1773 rel. (b) Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882)--- ----S. 52---Punjab Pre-emption Act (IX of 1991), S. 13---Preemption suit---Doctrine of lis pendens---Applicability---Exception stated---The doctrine of lis pendens is fully applicable to suits for pre-emption---Validity of a pre-emption decree is not affected by any sale made during litigation and is binding on the purchaser---The only exception to the doctrine of lis pendens applicable to pre-emption claims is in one situation, where the sale by the vendee is to one who has a superior right of pre_emption provided that the sale is within the period of limitation when such right can be exercised. Basit Sibtain v. Muhammad Sharif 2004 SCMR 578 and Sawar Muhammad Sharif v. Makhmool 1991 SCMR 1419 rel. (c) Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882)--- ----Ss.41 & 52---Lis pendens---Principle---Defence against lis pendens---Being bona fide purchaser, plea of---A transfer by ostensible owner does not automatically become void simply because it was made pendente lite but such transfer cannot affect the rights of the other parties in the suit, thereby making the sale subject to the outcome of the decree---In other words, a bona fide purchaser, who retains title, remains bound by the final decree and bears the risk that any rights declared in the suit will prevail over their purchase---Even a bona fide purchaser without notice of litigation is bound by the result of the suit---Where a suit land is alienated during pendency of proceedings before the Supreme Court any person who purchases the land or raised construction thereon would be doing so at his own risk and cost. Muhammad Nawaz Khan v. Muhammad Khan 2002 SCMR 2003; Muhammad Ashraf Butt v. Muhammad Asif Bhatti PLD 2011 SC 905; Sheikh Muhammad Iftikhar Ahmad v. Faiz Ahmad 2023 SCMR 2158; Tabassum Shaheen v. Uzma Rahat 2012 SCMR 983 and Aasia Jabeen v. Liaqat Ali 2016 SCMR 1773 rel. Ch. Muhammad Maqsood Buttar, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant. Mian Muhammad Athar, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents Nos. 2 and 3. Date of hearing: 10th June, 2025.