Summary: (a) Arbitration (FIDIC/Contract COPA) ----Clauses 64 & 67—Dispute Resolution Expert (DRE)—Binding effect—Time to commence arbitration—Scope—DRE recommended in contractor’s favour on 02-01-2010; employer sought “review” on 28-04-2010 (after 115 days) instead of issuing notice of intention to arbitrate within 14 days as required—Held: under the binding dispute-resolution clause, failure to serve timely notice renders the DRE recommendation final and binding on both parties unless revised in an arbitral award commenced in the prescribed time; indiscriminate recourse to a review outside the contract timeline cannot defeat the clause. (b) Arbitration Act, 1940 ----Ss. 14, 17, 30(c) & 33—Improperly procured award—Maintainability of objections—Trial Court set aside ex parte award on ground of improper procurement and accepted objections—Held: where the award is vitiated by violation of contractually mandated pre-conditions and foundational procedural defects, the court may annul it under s. 30(c); arguments premised on treating a s. 14(2) motion as one for making rule of court were misconceived in the face of substantive infirmities tainting the award. (c) Natural justice in arbitral proceedings ----Notice and opportunity to be heard—Minimum due process—Arbitrator must afford reasonable notice of date, time and place and opportunity to present evidence/arguments; proceedings at a party’s back without sufficient notice constitute misconduct and invalidate the award. AIR 1932 Bom 68 applied. (d) Contractual timelines vs. arbitral commencement ----Effect of missing the 14-day window—Where the contract stipulates a 14-day post-recommendation period to notify intention to arbitrate, non-compliance forecloses arbitration on that dispute and cements the DRE recommendation; later unilateral appointment of an arbitrator and conduct of ex parte proceedings cannot revive a lapsed entitlement. (e) Limitation (objections to award) ----Starting point—Record sufficiency—In absence of arbitrator’s properly filed record showing notices under s. 14(1) and service thereof, a rigid computation of limitation cannot be pressed to uphold a procedurally tainted award; courts will first address jurisdictional/procurement defects under s. 30(c). (f) Practice & procedure ----Section 14 vs. Section 17—Court’s role—A request under s. 14(2) to call the award does not pre-empt scrutiny under ss. 30/33 once parties are before the court; misreading/non-reading of notices and contract timelines by the award-seeker cannot cure foundational defects. (g) Disposition — Appeal dismissed. Impugned Order dated 11-04-2017, setting aside the award and dismissing the s. 14(2) prayer, upheld.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Art. 199, Art. 4—Maintainability—Judicial review of executive action affecting contractual pay fixed under a PC-1 approved by ECNEC—Although routine private contractual disputes are not ordinarily entertained in constitutional jurisdiction, where State functionaries act arbitrarily or contrary to the legal framework governing a public contract (PC-1/ECNEC approvals), the Court may intervene to enforce public-law duties and restrain perverse or unlawful action. Reliance: Messrs Airport Support Services v. Airport Manager, QAU Airport (1998 SCMR 2268); Hazara (Hill Tract) Improvement Trust v. Qaisra Elahi (2005 SCMR 678); PLD 2010 Lah 443. (b) Public projects—PC-1/ECNEC primacy over Finance Division O.M. ----PSDP projects—Revised Standard Pay Package, O.M. dated 19-07-2017 read with O.M. dated 19-10-2017—Condition (vii) & (viii)—Any change in number/pay scales requires prior decision/approval of the competent forum (CDWP/ECNEC) and revision/approval of PC-1—Absent ECNEC approval, Finance Division’s O.M. could not lawfully override the salaries earlier fixed under the duly approved PC-1 and administratively endorsed by the President. (c) Executive power—Vested rights & locus poenitentiae ----Unilateral variation/reduction of contractual salaries settled under approved PC-1—Impermissible—Benefits already accrued cannot be taken away retrospectively by executive instructions; only the Legislature may alter such rights by law—Subsequent O.M. cannot defeat past and closed transactions or rewrite contracts to employees’ disadvantage. Reliance: Fazal Din & Sons (Pvt.) Ltd. v. FBR (2009 SCMR 973); 2018 SCMR 691; 2023 PLC (C.S.) 1176. (d) Recovery of “over-payments” ----Withholding/recovery based on post-facto application of O.M. 19-07-2017—Illegal—Where salaries were paid per approved PC-1, later executive doubts cannot justify claw-back; doctrine of locus poenitentiae bars retrieval; recovery also offends fairness and due process. Reliance: Gov’t of West Pakistan v. Kazi Khan (1968 SCMR 921); 2016 PLC (C.S.) 642; 2024 PLC (C.S.) 393. (e) Fundamental rights & administrative fairness ----Art. 4, Constitution; s. 24-A, General Clauses Act—State action must be just, fair, reasonable, and within authority—Unilateral reduction/recoupment without ECNEC approval is arbitrary; where livelihoods are implicated (hard postings at Torkham/Chaman without security/hard-area allowances), heightened fairness applies. Reliance: PLD 1997 SC 342; PLD 1997 SC 823. (f) Project pay vs. Finance Division package ----Where the department knowingly fixed market-based salaries under PC-1 (independent of Finance Division’s 2009/2017 packages) and employees acted upon such representation, later substitution by O.M. is ultra vires absent PC-1 revision by ECNEC. Reliance: 2010 PLC (C.S.) 1262. (g) Directions— ----O.M. dated 19-07-2017 held inapplicable to petitioners absent prior ECNEC approval; Letter dated 08-12-2017 (AGPR) set aside; respondents restrained from any recovery and directed to refund amounts already deducted forthwith; future action, if any, must follow revision/approval of PC-1 by competent forum. (h) Disposition — Writ Petition allowed in the above terms; declarations/directions apply equally to petitioners who did not press the petition; no adverse inference against their salary entitlements. Approved for reporting.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code, 1908 ----O. XVII r. 3—Closure of evidence/cross-examination—Pre-conditions—Where defendant, after recording of examination-in-chief (DW-1 on 31-10-2024), repeatedly defaulted in appearance for cross-examination despite multiple dates, costs, and explicit “last and final” warnings, Trial Court rightly invoked O. XVII r. 3 CPC to close (i) defendant’s evidence and (ii) right of cross-examination. Mere appearance through proxy counsel and a bare plea of illness without any medical document is not “sufficient cause.” (b) Revisional jurisdiction ----S. 115 CPC—Scope—Interference lies only for jurisdictional error, illegality, material irregularity, or perversity—Impugned Order closing evidence after chronic non-compliance reflected a proper exercise of discretion; no jurisdictional defect or perversity shown—Revision not maintainable. (c) Fair trial ----Art. 10-A, Constitution—Natural justice—No denial where ample, meaningful opportunities were afforded and repeatedly squandered—Courts must prevent abuse of process; law favors the vigilant, not the indolent. (d) Practice & procedure ----Adjournments—Standards—Courts are obligated to move litigation to finality; serial, unreasoned adjournments cannot be claimed as of right. Recent Supreme Court guidance (CPLA No. 1033-L/2024) reiterated that after multiple opportunities, costs, and final cautions, O. XVII r. 3 CPC may be applied to decide the lis on available material; similar principles affirmed in 2024 SCMR 887; PLD 2024 SC 672; 2020 SCMR 300; 2015 SCMR 1401. (e) Evidence ----Cross-examination—Consequences of absence—Where a party produces its witness but persistently withholds the witness from cross-examination, the court may lawfully foreclose that party’s evidence/rights and proceed to decision on the record already available. (g) Disposition — Civil Revision dismissed. Impugned Order dated 21-01-2025, closing the petitioner’s evidence and right of cross-examination under O. XVII r. 3 CPC, upheld; case to proceed on available record; no order as to costs.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 ----Art. 199—Maintainability—Premature invocation of constitutional jurisdiction—Call-up / restraint notice at enquiry stage—Writ lies only where the notice is patently without jurisdiction or mala fide on its face—Petitioner must first respond to notice and cooperate; courts avoid stultifying statutory enquiries. Reliance: Al-Ahram Builders (Pvt.) Ltd. v. ITAT (1993 SCMR 29); Virasat Ullah (1969 SCMR 154); Khalid Mehmood Ch. (2002 SCMR 805); 2001 PLC (C.S.) 939; 2011 PTD 2260; 2012 PLC 270; 2011 PLC (C.S.) 1551; PLJ 2002 Lahore 1479. (b) Federal Investigation Agency Act, 1974 ----Ss. 5(1) & 5(5)—Scope—FIA’s power to conduct enquiry and issue interim non-disposal directions—Where allegations disclose possible money-laundering linked to a scheduled/predicate offence, FIA may proceed under s.5 and issue a cautionary direction not to transfer property pending enquiry. (c) Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2010 (as amended) ----Ss. 2(xxvi), 3 & 25—Predicate offence—Jurisdictional threshold—Registration of FIR for offences falling in Schedule I (e.g., ss. 161/162/163 PPC r/w s.5(2) PCA 1947) provides the jurisdictional basis to initiate an AML enquiry; requisitions for records under s.25 are part of lawful enquiry steps. (d) Cooperative housing societies—Internal approvals / by-laws ----Disputed compliance with society resolutions, Registrar approvals, or auction procedure—Questions of fact and record scrutiny—Not determinative at threshold for quashing an enquiry; appropriate forum is the investigating agency in the first instance. (e) Judicial review—Doctrine of ripeness; “notice” stage ----Courts deprecate constitutional petitions against mere notices / call-ups absent demonstrated lack of jurisdiction—Interference at incipient stage risks paralysing statutory duties of investigative bodies. Reliance: 1993 SCMR 29; 1969 SCMR 154; 2002 SCMR 805; 2011 PTD 2260; 2008 PCr.LJ 1463; 2003 PCr.LJ 1512. (f) Practice & procedure ----Alternate remedies—If adverse action follows the enquiry, aggrieved party may avail appropriate statutory/civil remedies; High Court will not pre-empt fact-finding by the agency. (g) Disposition — Petition dismissed as premature; FIA enquiry in Enquiry No.25/2023 may proceed in accordance with law. Petitioner to cooperate; liberty reserved to seek appropriate remedy, if aggrieved by any final action.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 ----S. 249-A—Scope and pre-requisites—Magistrate’s power to acquit at any stage—Where the available record shows a private land dispute, no recovery, complainant’s persistent non-appearance to support the charge, and no reasonable prospect of conviction, an order under S.249-A Cr.P.C. is a lawful exercise of jurisdiction. The provision may be invoked to prevent fruitless trials; it is not necessary to record full evidence if the charge appears groundless or conviction unlikely on the admitted/material facts. (b) Appeal against acquittal ----Standard of interference—Double presumption of innocence—An acquittal strengthens the presumption of innocence; the appellate court will not substitute its view unless the impugned order is perverse, arbitrary, based on gross misreading/non-reading, or in patent violation of law. Mere possibility of a different view on re-appraisal is insufficient. Reliance: State v. Abdul Khaliq (PLD 2011 SC 554). (c) Criminal justice principles ----“Accused is the favourite child of law”—Rationale—Courts ensure fair trial and due process; sparing the guilty is preferred to condemning an innocent. The maxim does not entail undue favour but safeguards against erroneous convictions and defective investigations. Reliance: Muhammad Riaz v. Khurram Shehzad (2024 SCMR 51). (d) Civil dispute overlay & mala fides ----Pending civil litigation over title/possession—Criminal proceedings arising from possession tussles require cautious scrutiny; additions of accused by supplementary statement, without independent corroboration, and absence of eye-witness testimony by the complainant weigh against likelihood of conviction. (e) Evidence—Hearsay; non-production; no recovery ----Complainant not an eye-witness; narration premised on information from labourers—Failure to secure presence/coercive process for PWs; no weapon or contraband recovered—Such deficiencies undermine the substratum of charges under Ss. 440, 506, 148 & 149 PPC and justify recourse to S.249-A. (f) Practice & procedure ----Notice and opportunity—Where prosecution/complainant, despite knowledge of FIR and proceedings, does not pursue evidence, and nothing on record suggests a realistic prospect of conviction, the trial court’s early termination of proceedings does not violate audi alteram partem. (g) Disposition — Criminal Appeal dismissed; order dated 28.11.2023 under S.249-A Cr.P.C. acquitting respondents maintained.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ----S. 417---Appeal against acquittal---Principles---Scope of interference by appellate court---Appellant assailed judgment whereby accused were acquitted of charges under Ss. 452/440, P.P.C.---Held, that in criminal jurisprudence, burden of proof squarely lies upon the prosecution to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt---Appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against acquittal should not substitute its own view merely because another possible view could have been taken on the evidence---Unless findings of the trial court are shown to be perverse, arbitrary, or based on misreading or non-reading of evidence, interference is not warranted---Trial Court had correctly appreciated the evidence and found that prosecution failed to discharge its burden---Appeal against acquittal, therefore, liable to be dismissed. (b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860) ----Ss. 452 & 440---House-trespass and mischief---Ingredients---Prosecution evidence---Reliability---No eye-witness produced---Complainant not present at the spot---Servant (PW) admitted absence at the time of main occurrence and ignorance of ownership sequence---Witness admitted both complainant and accused owned land in same Khasra numbers and that accused’s sale deed was prior in time---Investigation Officer admitted no independent resident supported prosecution version and no recovery was effected from accused---Held, that prosecution failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt that accused had committed criminal trespass or mischief---Trial Court rightly acquitted respondents. (c) Evidence--- ----Appreciation of evidence---Onus on prosecution to prove its case on its own strength---Failure to produce material witnesses---Effect---Eye-witness (alleged abductee) Muhammad Amin not examined and material witnesses, including bailiff and Investigating Officer, not produced---Admitted contradictions and lack of corroboration rendered prosecution case doubtful---Held, benefit of doubt must go to accused---Reliance placed on Ali Ahmad and another v. The State and others (PLD 2020 SC 201). (d) Criminal trial--- ----Acquittal---Presumption of innocence strengthened by acquittal---Held, once trial court has acquitted accused after proper appraisal of evidence, presumption of innocence stands fortified and appellate court should be slow to interfere unless findings are patently perverse or against record---Impugned judgment upheld---Appeal dismissed. Disposition: Appeal dismissed; acquittal maintained. Cited Case: • Ali Ahmad and another v. The State and others PLD 2020 SC 201.a

Summary: (a) Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 ----Ss. 3, 4 & 8-A—Scope—Complaints between co-owners/co-sharers—Property not partitioned by metes and bounds; both sides claiming title/possession in the same Khasra numbers—Proceedings under the Act are not meant to resolve bona fide civil co-sharer disputes; remedy targets land-grabbers/Qabza groups, not co-owners—Where parties are co-sharers and civil litigation over title/possession is already pending, recourse to the Act is misconceived. Relied on: PLD 2010 SC 661 (Bashir Ahmed). (b) Criminal trial—Burden of proof ----Standard—Onus on complainant to prove illegal dispossession beyond reasonable doubt through cogent and trustworthy evidence—Complainant not an eyewitness; star witness (employee Muhammad Amin) not produced; no independent witness examined—Failure to discharge burden warrants non-interference with acquittal. Relied on: PLD 2020 SC 201 (Ali Ahmad). (c) Evidence—Non-production of material witnesses ----Adverse effect—Where the only direct eyewitness is withheld without justification, the complaint under the Act cannot be sustained merely on documents, demarcation reports or photographs absent primary ocular support. (d) Parallel civil proceedings ----Effect—Civil suit over the same land sub judice—Criminal process cannot be employed to convert a bona fide civil controversy into an offence under the Act; parties to establish their respective claims before the civil court. (e) FIR and subsequent complaint—Inconsistencies ----Earlier FIR regarding the same occurrence neither named all persons later alleged to have dispossessed, nor established presence of respondent No.2 at the spot—Such discrepancies further weaken the prosecution version. (f) Appeal against acquittal ----Interference—Narrow scope—Acquittal strengthens presumption of innocence; absent perversity, misreading, or jurisdictional flaw, appellate court will not substitute its view merely because another view is possible—Impugned acquittal found well-reasoned and in consonance with law. (g) Disposition — Criminal Appeal dismissed; judgment dated 09-05-2024 acquitting respondent No.2 under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 maintained; parties to pursue their remedies before the civil forum.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ----Ss. 497, 498—Pre-arrest bail—Parity/Rule of consistency—Co-accused with indistinguishable role had been granted pre-arrest bail by Sessions Judge; petitioner’s application dismissed the same day without articulating a factual or legal distinction—Differential treatment, absent cogent reasons, amounts to material irregularity—Matter remanded for afresh, reasoned decision ensuring uniform application of parity. (b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860) ----Ss. 341, 506(ii), 34—Nature of accusations—Offences alleged do not per se fall within the prohibitory clause of S. 497, Cr.P.C.; considerations of further inquiry, absence of recovery, and willingness to cooperate may legitimately inform bail discretion; however, primary defect identified was inconsistent treatment vis-à-vis co-accused. (c) Practice & Procedure (Bail) ----Announcement of orders—Directions to courts below—Pre-arrest bail orders must be pronounced in open court in the presence of both the accused and the Investigating Officer to ensure transparency, avoid procedural abuse, and prevent abscondence—Member Inspection Team directed to circulate instructions to all AD&SJs, Islamabad (East/West) for strict compliance. (d) Remand—Scope ----Where parity and reasoning deficiencies infect the impugned bail order, appropriate course is remand for re-hearing rather than substitution of discretion at the revisional/constitutional stage. (g) Disposition — Case remanded to learned Sessions Judge, Islamabad (West) to re-hear and decide afresh the pre-arrest bail applications of the petitioner and co-accused Raja Muhammad Riazul in light of parity/consistency observations; petitioner directed to appear on 13.05.2025; administrative directions issued for open-court pronouncements in presence of accused and IO.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Art. 199---Habeas corpus---Illegal detention of minor---Custody of child---Scope of constitutional jurisdiction---Petitioner (maternal grandmother) sought recovery and custody of her minor grandson, alleging his illegal detention by the father (Respondent No.1) and his siblings (Respondents No.2 & 3)---Record revealed that after the death of the minor’s mother, the Petitioner raised the child until Respondent No.1 forcibly took him away in 2020---Guardian Court, vide order dated 07.06.2023, had already declared the Petitioner lawful guardian of the minor---Appeal filed by Respondent No.1 was dismissed for non-compliance, and the said order attained finality---Held, that continued withholding of the minor by the Respondents constituted illegal detention and a violation of lawful court orders---High Court, in exercise of constitutional jurisdiction, is competent to issue directions for the recovery of a minor illegally detained by any person acting contrary to judicial orders. (b) Guardians and Wards Act (VIII of 1890) ----S. 25---Custody of ward---Execution of guardianship order---Respondent’s failure to comply with guardian court’s decree---Effect---Once a person is declared guardian by a competent court and the order attains finality, refusal or failure to hand over the minor amounts to unlawful custody and contempt of lawful authority---Respondents No.1 to 3, despite final adjudication, failed to produce or surrender the minor, thereby frustrating execution proceedings---Held, such conduct undermines the authority of courts and warrants coercive measures for enforcement. (c) Administration of justice--- ----Defiance of court orders---Consequences---Courts’ authority cannot be rendered illusory by willful disobedience of judicial directions---Respondents’ failure to produce the minor despite warrants and CNIC blocking orders demonstrated deliberate obstruction---Held, that the court is bound to protect the sanctity of its orders and ensure compliance through appropriate penal action under the PPC and Cr.P.C. (d) Child welfare--- ----Best interest of minor---Custody to maternal grandmother---In absence of mother, welfare of the child is of paramount consideration---Petitioner had already nurtured the child since infancy and was declared lawful guardian---Held, that minor’s welfare lies in restoring custody to the Petitioner. Disposition: Petition allowed---Inspector General of Police, Islamabad, directed to recover the minor from illegal custody of Respondents No.1 to 3, produce him before the Guardian Court, and hand over custody to the Petitioner in compliance with the guardian court’s order dated 07.06.2023---Proceedings under relevant provisions of PPC and Cr.P.C. to be initiated against those obstructing compliance.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ---- Arts. 199, 212(1)(a), 240 & 260(1) ---- Islamabad Subordinate Judiciary Service Tribunal --- Jurisdiction --- Whether members of the Islamabad Judicial Service are in the “service of Pakistan” for the purpose of attracting the constitutional bar under Art.212(2) --- Held, that the Islamabad Judicial Service, constituted under Rule 3 of the Islamabad Judicial Service Rules, 2011 framed under Art.203 read with section 6 of the Islamabad High Court Act, 2010, was not a service or post in connection with the affairs of the Federation or a Province, nor was it an All-Pakistan Service or service in the Armed Forces --- Not declared to be “service of Pakistan” by Act of Parliament under Art.260(1) --- Members of Islamabad Judicial Service therefore not in the service of Pakistan within meaning of Arts.212(1)(a), 240 & 260(1) --- Consequently, bar contained in Art.212(2) not attracted and constitutional petition maintainable. Cited cases: Muhammad Mubeen-us-Salam v. Federation PLD 2006 SC 602 ref. (b) Administrative law ---- Limitation on powers of appellate tribunal functioning under a statute ---- Scope ---- Appellate authority’s jurisdiction confined to powers expressly conferred by statute creating it --- It cannot enlarge its jurisdiction or decide issues beyond those the original authority could have determined --- Tribunal under Islamabad Subordinate Judiciary Service Tribunal Act, 2016 (“2016-Act”) thus bound by section 6(1) thereof, limiting its power to confirm, set aside, vary or modify the order appealed against --- It could not adjudicate upon matters not brought before it through an appeal or act beyond its statutory remit. Cited case: Standard Printing Press v. Sind Employees’ Social Security Institution 1988 SCMR 91 ref. (c) Constitution of Pakistan ---- Art.199 ---- Writ jurisdiction --- Maintainability --- Order passed without lawful authority, void or coram non judice --- High Court’s duty to strike down orders passed without jurisdiction --- Where statutory tribunal acts in excess of authority or without jurisdiction, its order is nullity --- Availability of alternate remedy becomes immaterial --- High Court may exercise constitutional jurisdiction to rectify such illegality. Cited cases: Abdul Majeed Khan v. Maheen Begum 2014 SCMR 1524; Izhar Alam Farooqi v. Sheikh Abdul Sattar Lasi 2008 SCMR 240; Abdul Bari v. Government of Pakistan PLD 1981 Kar. 290 ref. (d) Constitution of Pakistan ---- Art.175(2) & 199 ---- Islamabad Subordinate Judiciary Service Tribunal Act, 2016 ---- Suo motu jurisdiction --- Tribunal not vested with suo motu power --- Jurisdiction of Tribunal dependent on appeal filed by aggrieved member against final order of departmental authority concerning terms and conditions of service --- Reconstitution of Tribunal by Presidential Notification dated 18.03.2025 not impugned before it --- Tribunal’s act of taking suo motu cognizance and setting aside notification amounted to judicial overreach and was coram non judice --- Tribunal exceeded statutory powers under ss.5 & 6 of the 2016-Act. Cited case: Federal Government Employees Housing Authority v. Ednan Syed PLD 2025 SC 11 ref. (e) Administrative tribunals ---- Adjudication of vires of law creating the tribunal ---- Competence ---- Forum created under a statute cannot adjudicate upon vires of the statute or notification under which it has been constituted --- Only High Court under Art.199 possesses jurisdiction to examine validity of law or notification creating such forum --- Tribunal, therefore, not competent to set aside Presidential Notification reconstituting itself. Cited cases: Pir Sabir Shah v. Shad Muhammad Khan PLD 1995 SC 66; Humayun Saifullah Khan v. Federation PLD 1990 SC 599 ref. (f) Constitution of Pakistan ---- Art.199(1)(b)(ii) ---- Writ of quo warranto --- Scope --- Power to issue writ of quo warranto exclusively vested in High Court --- Tribunal constituted under 2016-Act not empowered to exercise such jurisdiction --- By setting aside notification appointing Chairman and Members of reconstituted Tribunal, erstwhile Tribunal wrongly exercised quo warranto powers beyond its competence. (g) Constitution of Pakistan ---- Arts.4 & 10A ---- Fair trial and due process --- Right of hearing --- Notification of reconstitution of Tribunal set aside without affording opportunity of hearing to affected parties including the Federation, President, and Islamabad High Court --- Proceedings vitiated for violation of principles of natural justice and right to fair trial --- Any order passed without notice and hearing is void. Cited cases: Federal Government Employees Housing Authority v. Ednan Syed PLD 2025 SC 11; Muhammad Yousaf v. Province of Sindh 2024 SCMR 1689; Mohsin Shah v. Federation 2023 PLC(CS) 1467; New Jubilee Insurance Co. v. NBP PLD 1999 SC 1126; Ishtiaq Ahmed v. Competent Authority 2016 SCMR 943 ref. (h) Islamabad Subordinate Judiciary Service Tribunal Act, 2016 ---- Section 7 ---- Review jurisdiction --- Scope and effect --- Tribunal’s observation suspending its own review powers for thirty days to enable appeal before Supreme Court declared uncalled for and contrary to law --- Power of review conferred by s.7 broad enough to correct errors apparent on face of record or other sufficient cause --- Redundancy cannot be attributed to legislature --- Tribunal’s comments rendering s.7 ineffective unsustainable. Cited cases: Haji Tooti v. FBR 2023 PTD 1617; Collector of Sales Tax v. Mega Tech (Pvt.) Ltd. 2005 SCMR 1166 ref. (i) Constitutional jurisdiction ---- High Court’s interference limited to question of law regarding constitution of tribunal ---- High Court converted petition into review petition under s.7 of 2016-Act and directed Tribunal to proceed according to law ---- Interference confined to resolving jurisdictional defect, not merits of service dispute. Disposition: Petition allowed in above terms; impugned order dated 21.03.2025 of erstwhile Tribunal set aside to extent of quashing notification dated 18.03.2025; case remitted to duly constituted Tribunal for review proceedings.