Summary: (a) Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service) Act, 1973 (NECOSA)--- ----Implementation Tribunal for Newspaper Employees (ITNE)---Jurisdiction and scope of proceedings---Applications under Rule 15(1) of the Implementation Tribunal for Newspaper Employees (Procedure and Functions) Rules, 1977---Contractual employees---Maintainability---Private respondents, working on contractual basis, sought enforcement of 7th and 8th Wage Board Awards before ITNE---Tribunal dismissed claim under 7th Wage Award as time-barred but directed implementation of 8th Wage Award effective from 01.02.2019---Held, ITNE is the competent forum under NECOSA, 1973 to enforce wage awards for all employees functionally connected with a newspaper establishment, irrespective of the technical form of their employment contract---Contractual status of employees does not bar their entitlement under statutory wage awards---Reference made to Daily Khabrain v. Iqbal Mustafa (2019 PLC (CS) 541), Fauji Fertilizer Co. v. NIRC (2013 SCMR 1253), and Pakistan State Oil Co. v. Bakht Siddiqui (2018 SCMR 1181). (b) ---Industrial Relations Act (XIX of 2012)--- ----S.33 read with Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968, S.12(3)---Parallel proceedings before NIRC---Effect---Petitioner contended that cases regarding respondents’ regularization were pending before NIRC---Held, proceedings before NIRC relating to regularization had no bearing on ITNE’s jurisdiction to implement statutory wage awards---NIRC subsequently regularized services of private respondents, further confirming their employment relationship and reinforcing entitlement to wage award benefits. (c) ---Constitution of Pakistan, 1973--- ----Art.199---Supervisory jurisdiction of High Court---Exercise thereof---Scope---ITNE’s decision based on concurrent findings of fact and lawful exercise of jurisdiction under NECOSA, 1973---No violation of law, procedural irregularity, or lack of jurisdiction established---High Court declined to reappraise factual determinations or substitute its view in exercise of constitutional jurisdiction. Petitions dismissed.

Summary: (a) Federal Public Service Commission Ordinance, 1977--- ----S.7(3)(a)-(d)---Representation, review and appeal---Scope---Petitioner, a candidate for CSS Competitive Examination-2024, challenged rejection of her candidature and dismissal of representation by Federal Public Service Commission (FPSC)---Held, under S.7(3) of the Federal Public Service Commission Ordinance, 1977, a complete statutory mechanism exists providing first for representation before the Commission, then review petition, and thereafter an appeal to the High Court against the review decision---Petitioner, without availing statutory remedy of review before the Commission, directly invoked constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court---Such petition, in presence of an alternate efficacious remedy, is not maintainable. (b) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973--- ----Art.199---Writ jurisdiction---Exercise of extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction where adequate statutory remedy exists---Principle---Where a special law provides its own remedy, parties are required to pursue that statutory forum instead of directly invoking constitutional jurisdiction---High Court’s jurisdiction under Art.199 is discretionary and to be exercised only in absence of any adequate or efficacious alternative remedy---Reference made to Ch. Muhammad Ismail v. Fazal Zada (PLD 1996 SC 246) and Indus Trading and Contracting Co. v. Collector of Customs (Preventive) Karachi (2016 SCMR 842). (c) Administrative law--- ----Maintainability of constitutional petition---Availability of alternative remedy---Effect---Petition challenging rejection of candidature by FPSC held not maintainable in view of unavailed review remedy under special statute---High Court declined to entertain petition in constitutional jurisdiction. Petition dismissed.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----S.12(2), O.XXI, R.11---Execution of decree---Conditional decree---Failure to comply with condition---Effect---Petitioner obtained a conditional decree for specific performance on 26.03.2015 subject to payment of remaining sale consideration within seven days---Petitioner failed to deposit the amount within stipulated period and sought extension, which was dismissed---Held, decree being conditional in nature ceased to exist upon non-fulfilment of the condition precedent, and consequently no executable decree survived in petitioner’s favour---In absence of compliance, decree became inoperative and incapable of execution. (b) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)--- ----Art.181---Execution petition---Limitation period---Commencement---Scope---Decree passed on 26.03.2015 attained finality and was never challenged, modified, or stayed---Execution petition filed on 10.06.2021, more than three years after decree, was time-barred under Art.181---No valid justification for delay produced---Appellate Court rightly set aside order of Executing Court and dismissed execution petition as hopelessly barred by limitation---Reliance placed on Abdul Qayyum v. Ali Asghar Shah (1992 SCMR 241) and Bakhtiar Ahmed v. Shamim Akhtar (2013 SCMR 5). (c) ---Civil revision---Scope of interference---Concurrent findings of fact by subordinate Courts---Effect---Appellate Court’s findings based on proper appreciation of record and settled law on limitation and executability---No illegality, material irregularity, or jurisdictional defect established---High Court declined to interfere in revisional jurisdiction. Revision dismissed.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S.156(1), definition of “officer-in-charge of a police station” under S.4(p)---Investigation and raid by CIA staff---Legality---Raid conducted by CIA officials without prior intimation to local police or record entry in police station register---Held, CIA personnel are not “officers-in-charge” within the meaning of S.4(p), Cr.P.C. and thus have no lawful authority to investigate or conduct search and seizure operations independently---Any investigation or recovery carried out by such unauthorized agency is void ab initio---Reliance placed on State v. Bashir (PLD 1997 SC 408). (b) Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997--- ----S.9(c)---Recovery of narcotics---Proof of conscious possession---Absence of link evidence---Recovery made from an iron stand in house basement, not from person of accused---No pointation or disclosure leading to recovery established---Prosecution failed to prove ownership, tenancy, or possession of house by accused---Held, mere presence at scene does not constitute conscious possession or knowledge under law; essential chain of custody and possession not established. (c) Criminal trial--- ----Contradictions in evidence---Material discrepancy regarding location of recovery---FIR stated recovery from House, while I.O. (PW-3) deposed recovery from house in Sohan---Contradiction on material point of location created serious doubt as to authenticity of recovery proceedings, thereby undermining prosecution case. (d) ---Standard of proof in narcotics cases---Principle of benefit of doubt---Scope---In offences under CNSA, prosecution must establish guilt beyond all reasonable doubt owing to severity of punishment---Any material infirmity or contradiction must be resolved in favour of accused---Followed Ameer Zeb v. State (PLD 2012 SC 380). Appeal allowed; conviction and sentence set aside; appellant acquitted of charge under S.9-C, Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 and S.3/4, Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order; appellant to be released forthwith if not required in any other case.

Summary: (a) National Database and Registration Authority Ordinance, 2000--- ----S. 18(1) & (2)(a)---Cancellation/impounding of CNIC---Show-cause and hearing mandatory---Scope---CNICs of petitioners were digitally impounded/blocked since 2016 without issuance of written show-cause notice or affording opportunity of hearing---Held, proviso to S.18(1) mandates prior notice and audi alteram partem; non-compliance vitiates action as offending Art.10-A, Constitution---CNIC carries presumption of truth; once issued after codal formalities, accrued rights cannot be withdrawn on suspicion or flimsy grounds---Reliance placed on Fatima v. NADRA (PLD 2022 Balochistan 73) and Muhammad Aslam v. Member (Colonies) BoR (2019 CLC 1141). (b) Pakistan Citizenship Act, 1951--- ----S.16 read with Citizenship Rules, 1952---Determination of citizenship status---Jurisdiction---NADRA/ intelligence agencies lack competence to adjudicate citizenship; eligibility linked to citizenship can only be determined by the Competent Authority/Federal Government under the Citizenship Act in the manner prescribed---NADRA may exercise S.18(2)(a) powers only after a prior, final determination under S.16 has attained finality; “blocking/suspension” of CNIC on citizenship grounds absent such determination is ultra vires---Reliance placed on Hafiz Hamdullah Saboor v. Govt. of Pakistan (PLD 2021 Islamabad 305) and Abdul Qadir v. Federation (2024 MLD 1774). (c) ---NADRA Ordinance, 2000--- ----S.18; concept of “blocking” CNIC---Impounding distinguished---Statute contains no mechanism for “blocking”; only cancellation/impounding/confiscation is contemplated, subject to notice and reasons; impounding entails taking the document into custody pursuant to due process---Reliance placed on Muhammad Umar v. Federation (PLD 2017 Sindh 585). (d) Passports Act, 1974--- ----S.8(2)---Cancellation/withholding of passport---Written notice and opportunity of hearing---Requirement---Blocking/withholding passports without prior notice is illegal and violative of due process; authorities must adhere to statutory procedure before imposing any embargo on travel documents---Followed Muhammad Aslam (2019 CLC 1141). (e) Constitutional and international guarantees--- ----Arts. 4 & 10-A, Constitution; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Arts. 6 & 15---Citizenship as a foundational right enabling enjoyment of all other rights; arbitrary deprivation through opaque administrative measures is impermissible; measures impairing CNIC/passport paralyze fundamental civil life and must meet strict due process standards. Disposition---Petition partly allowed---NADRA and Directorate General, Immigration & Passports directed to restore petitioners’ CNICs and passports for the time being; NADRA to initiate/route appropriate proceedings before Competent Authority under the Citizenship Act, 1951 and conclude within 30 days after providing full opportunity of hearing; petitioners to cooperate and produce requisite documents---Competent Authority not precluded from proceeding per law on credible material.

Summary: (a) Civil service—PERs/ACRs—Communication of “Average” grading—Scope—Under the Guide to Performance Evaluation (GPE/AGPE-2004), only adverse remarks/entries are required to be communicated; an overall grading of “Average” by the countersigning officer—though detrimental for future postings—does not per se constitute an adverse remark requiring communication—Non-communication of “Average” PERs for 2019 & 2020 did not, by itself, violate Arts. 4, 10-A, 19-A, 25 & 27 of the Constitution. (b) Foreign posting—Trade & Investment Officers (BS-18 to BS-20)—Eligibility matrix—Policy Guidelines, 03-07-2023—Requirement of an average of “Very Good” PERs for the preceding five years—Petitioner graded “Average” for 2019 & 2020 (by countersigning officer) and thus fell short of the mandatory threshold—Exclusion from final interview/consideration held lawful; Court declined to substitute administrative assessment or to direct reassessment of PERs. (c) Constitutional jurisdiction—Art. 199—Limits—No illegality, mala fides, or jurisdictional defect shown in respondents’ conduct of the TIO selection cycle—High Court will not (i) act as a performance-appraisal forum, or (ii) issue directions compelling a countersigning authority to revise PER gradings—Petitions seeking such directions are not maintainable in writ. (d) Recruitment quotas—TIO posts reserved for CTG—Construction of Policy Guidelines, cl. 1(d)—Reservation of minimum 40%/50%/60% for BS-20/BS-19/BS-18 CTG officers; unfilled reserved vacancies revert to general pool—Allegations of quota breach and irregular elevation of BS-18 officers to BS-19 postings not established on record given the policy’s fallback mechanism and the uniform written test across grades. (e) Principles—Service matters—Courts defer to specialized selection structures where processes conform to approved policy and no violation of law or fundamental rights is demonstrated—Judicial review targets decision-making process, not the merits of comparative assessments or performance gradings absent patent illegality. Result: Both writ petitions dismissed; no direction issued to revisit PERs; no interference with ongoing/ completed TIO selection process.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----Ss. 22-A & 22-B, 154 & 200---Registration of FIR---Scope and discretion of Justice of Peace---Role of inquiry---Petitioner sought direction for registration of FIR alleging threats and obstruction at construction site---Police inquiry found allegations exaggerated and linked to existing civil dispute over property---Held, Justice of Peace is not bound to order registration of FIR in every case disclosing alleged cognizable offence; discretion must be exercised to prevent misuse of process through vexatious or mala fide complaints---Mere allegations, unsupported by credible material, do not justify registration of a criminal case---Reliance placed on State v. Khalid Mehmood (PLD 2021 SC 562) and Muhammad Bashir v. Station House Officer (PLD 2007 SC 539). (b) ---Private complaint---Alternate remedy---Availability---Where police refuse to register an FIR, complainant has efficacious statutory recourse under S.200 Cr.P.C. before competent Magistrate, enabling him to produce evidence and seek issuance of process; remedy under Ss.22-A & 22-B Cr.P.C. is not exclusive. (c) Constitutional jurisdiction--- ----Art.199---Maintainability---Exercise of discretion---Scope---Impugned order of Justice of Peace based on inquiry report and reasoned finding that dispute was civil in nature and allegations unsubstantiated---No illegality, perversity or jurisdictional defect shown warranting interference under constitutional jurisdiction---High Court declined to compel initiation of criminal proceedings in matter predominantly civil in nature. Petition dismissed.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — O.XII r.6 & O.XV r.1 — Decree on admission — When the defendant’s unequivocal, unqualified and voluntary admission stands recorded in Court proceedings (including an affidavit/compromise and statements recorded by the Trial Court in presence of counsel), the Court may pass a judgment to the extent of such admission without embarking upon a full trial — Sanctity attaches to judicial proceedings; a party cannot resile from a clear admission subsequently through a belated written statement alleging fraud in the absence of a timely challenge to the recorded statement or to the compromise itself. (b) Evidence Act (Qanun-e-Shahadat), 1984 — Estoppel — Defendant having received full sale consideration and recorded a statement before the Court expressing no objection to decree in plaintiff’s favour, stood estopped from taking a contrary plea — Allowing resilement from a court-recorded admission would result in miscarriage of justice. (c) Specific Relief — Specific performance of agreements to sell (27-11-2019 & 27-01-2020) — Part-performance established by prior mutations of 5 kanals and admitted receipt of remaining consideration — On these admitted facts, decree on admission was the proper course; Trial Court’s refusal amounted to non-reading/misdirection. (d) Constitutional jurisdiction — Supervisory correction of interlocutory refusal — Where the Trial Court declines relief under O.XII r.6 despite a clear admission on the record, the High Court may set aside such order in writ to prevent failure of justice and to enforce obedience to law. (e) Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Acts, 2020 & 2023 — Savings — Writ filed in 2021 remained competent in view of s.159 CPC (as substituted by Act, 2023) preserving proceedings instituted prior to the 2023 commencement; hence, petition maintainable. Result/Disposition: Petition accepted; Trial Court’s order set aside; application under O.XII r.6 read with O.XV r.1 CPC allowed; suit for specific performance of contracts dated 27-11-2019 and 27-01-2020 decreed with costs Rs.50,000 payable by respondent No.2.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan (1973) — Art. 199 — Writ against NADRA in service matters — Maintainability — Where terms and conditions are governed by non-statutory service regulations framed by the Authority under s.45 of the NADRA Ordinance, 2000 (and not by the Federal Government), the relationship is that of master and servant; constitutional jurisdiction is not available to challenge disciplinary orders (removal from service, etc.). Reliance placed on Maj. (Retd.) Syed Muhammad Tanveer Abbas v. Federation of Pakistan (2019 SCMR 984), Chairman NADRA v. Muhammad Ali Shah (2017 SCMR 1979), Muhammad Zaman (2017 SCMR 571), PTCL v. Maqsood Ahmad Bhatti (2016 SCMR 1362), ZTBL v. Said Rehman (2013 SCMR 642), DHA v. Lt. Col. Syed Jawaid Ahmad (2013 SCMR 1707), PIAC v. Tanweer-ur-Rehman (PLD 2010 SC 676), PIAC v. Syed Suleman Alam Rizvi (2015 SCMR 1545), Abdul Wahab v. HBL (2013 SCMR 1383), Syed Nazir Gilani v. PRCS (2014 SCMR 982), and The General Manager, PPCBL v. Ghulam Mustafa (2024 SCMR 1458). (b) NADRA Employees (Appointment, Promotion & Transfer) Regulations, 2002 — Nature — Regulations issued by NADRA under s.45 of the Ordinance are non-statutory; hence violation thereof does not furnish a ground for a writ. (c) Constitutional jurisdiction — Scope — High Court will interfere in service matters only where statutory rules are violated or where lack of jurisdiction/ malice in law is shown; allegations regarding incompetence of disciplinary authority, denial of inquiry report, opportunity of defence, etc., need not be examined once the petition itself is not maintainable for want of statutory footing. (d) Result — Petition dismissed as not maintainable; no adjudication on merits (disciplinary due process) in view of the master-and-servant bar. Disposition: Writ petition dismissed.

Summary: Acquittal denied --- (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) — S. 265-K — Power to acquit at any stage — Scope and limitations — Relief under S. 265-K Cr.P.C. is discretionary, not absolute; it may only be invoked in clear and exceptional cases where, even assuming the prosecution case to be true, no probability of conviction exists — Where challan has been submitted, charge framed, and prosecution evidence is underway, premature interference is unwarranted — Proper course is to allow the trial to conclude and determine culpability on the basis of evidence. (b) — Revisional jurisdiction — Interference by High Court — High Court will not substitute its opinion for that of the trial court when the latter has exercised discretion under S. 265-K Cr.P.C. judiciously — Revisional powers cannot be used to short-circuit an ongoing trial unless continuation would be manifestly oppressive or futile. (c) — Double jeopardy / prior acquittal — Earlier acquittals in distinct FIRs do not automatically bar proceedings under a separate FIR unless identity of offences, transactions, and evidence is identical in substance — Whether ingredients of offences are the same is a factual determination to be made at trial. (d) — Directions to trial court — While declining to quash proceedings, the High Court may nonetheless direct expeditious conclusion of the trial to prevent unnecessary delay. Result / Disposition: Petition dismissed; trial court’s refusal to acquit under S. 265-K Cr.P.C. upheld; trial to be concluded within thirty (30) days in accordance with law.