Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 — Art. 212(1) & (2), Art. 199 — Service matters; exclusive jurisdiction; bar on writs — Disputes relating to civil servants’ terms and conditions of service (promotion, eligibility, FR-17 claims, seniority) fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal — High Court’s writ jurisdiction under Art. 199 is ousted, even when mala fides or fundamental-rights violations are alleged — Followed: Ahmad Ullah v. DEO (Male), Buner, 2024 PLC (C.S.) 1530 (SC); Muhammad Hassanullah v. Chief Secretary Balochistan, 2025 SCMR 134; PDOHA v. Lt-Col. Syed Jawaid Ahmad, 2013 SCMR 1707. (b) Civil Servants Act, 1973 — S. 9(2) & (3); Revised Promotion Policy, 2007 (as amended) — Promotion to BS-20/21; nature; criteria — Promotion to BS-20/21 is a selection post based on merit and CSB recommendation; eligibility (length of service, trainings, PERs, variety of experience) does not confer a vested right to promotion — Courts will not substitute their assessment for CSB’s collective judgment. (c) Fundamental Rules — FR-17(1) — Pro forma/ante-dated promotion — FR-17(1) contemplates relief only where an otherwise-entitled civil servant was, for no fault of his own, wrongfully prevented from serving in the higher post; where, at the relevant time, the officer was ineligible under the governing criteria (minimum service in BS-20 and at least one year to superannuation), FR-17(1) does not arise. (d) SRO 617(I)/2022 (20-05-2022) & Finance Division O.M. No. 2(1) FR-17/2021 (20-05-2022) — Post-2022 legal position — The proviso to FR-17(1) was deleted and FR-17 Committees dissolved; the earlier facility of ante-dated pro forma promotions no longer exists; subsequent “way-forward” governs fixation/seniority issues. (e) Parity / Discrimination (Art. 25) — Comparator must be truly alike — The petitioner relied on promotion of another Railways officer (Mr. Shamim Ahmed Sherazi) to BS-21; plea rejected — The Court noted material differences: the comparator’s promotion occurred after SRO 89(I)/2014, when apportionment/share in the Federal Secretariat for Railways (C&T) existed, whereas no such Federal share existed during petitioner’s service (retired 29-02-2012) and the pre-2014 criteria (including minimum service/remaining service requirements) applied to petitioner — No discriminatory treatment established. (f) Maintainability / Alternate Remedy — Given Art. 212 bar and availability of statutory forum, the writ petition was not maintainable; additionally, on merits, petitioner was ineligible at the relevant time; FR-17(1) could not be invoked. Disposition: Petition dismissed as not maintainable under Art. 212 and, in any event, devoid of merit; no direction for pro forma promotion or reference to FR-17 Committee (now dissolved).

Summary: (a) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)---- ----Ss. 14(3) & 17-A---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199---Fixation of interim maintenance---Maintainability of writ petition---Scope---Petitioner/father assailed order of Family Court fixing interim maintenance allowance for minors at Rs.30,000/- per month each---Held, that interim maintenance is provisional in nature and liable to variation after evidence---Petitioner may lead evidence before Family Court to establish income and seek alteration of amount---Interference under Art.199, Constitution, not warranted unless order is without jurisdiction, perverse, or patently illegal---No such illegality or jurisdictional defect shown---Family Court’s order within lawful jurisdiction---Petition not maintainable. (b) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)---- ----S.17-A---Failure to comply with order for payment of interim maintenance---Consequences---Petitioner’s non-compliance amounted to contumacious conduct---As per law laid down in Shahzad Abid Farid v. Mst. Sobia Amir Farid (2024 SCMR 1292), Family Court has lawful authority to strike off defence and decree suit if interim maintenance is not paid by 14th day of every month---High Court found no infirmity in Family Court’s direction invoking S.17-A in case of default. (c) Constitutional jurisdiction--- ----Interlocutory orders of Family Court---No interference warranted---Quantum of maintenance being factual question cannot be adjudicated under Art.199, Constitution---Legislative bar under S.14(3) of Family Courts Act, 1964 excludes appeal against interim orders, and allowing constitutional petitions in such cases would defeat legislative intent---Division Bench in Minhaj Saqib v. Najam-us-Saqib (2018 CLC 506 Islamabad) followed. Disposition: Writ petition dismissed, being ill-founded and not maintainable. Cited Cases: • Shahzad Abid Farid v. Mst. Sobia Amir Farid 2024 SCMR 1292 • Minhaj Saqib v. Najam-us-Saqib 2018 CLC 506 (Islamabad)

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----Ss. 200, 435 & 439---Illegal Dispossession Act (XI of 2005), Ss. 3 & 4---Complaint dismissed by Trial Court without recording complainant’s statement in open Court---Mandatory compliance with S.200, Cr.P.C.---Non-compliance rendering order void ab initio---Held, that S.200, Cr.P.C. makes it obligatory upon the Magistrate to record the statement of complainant and witnesses, if any, on oath in open Court before proceeding further---In the present case, a typed statement was placed on record bearing only the complainant’s signature, without the signature or seal of the learned Judge---Trial Court failed to perform the mandatory act of recording statement in open Court; such omission vitiated the entire proceedings---Impugned order, therefore, was legally unsustainable and warranted interference in revision. (b) Police Order (XXII of 2002)--- ----Police Rules---Inquiry report—Vagueness and non-compliance with law---Held, that the Trial Court directed SHO P.S. Khanna to hold inquiry regarding possession and ownership, but the report submitted was vague, perfunctory, and contrary to the mandatory provisions of the Police Order, 2002, and Police Rules---Investigating Officer was bound to associate both parties and record their statements as in an FIR under S.154, Cr.P.C.---Failure to conduct such lawful inquiry rendered the report defective and the Trial Court erred in relying upon it without scrutiny. (c) Administration of justice--- ----Procedural irregularity—Effect---Failure to follow mandatory procedure under S.200, Cr.P.C. and reliance on defective police report constituted serious procedural irregularities rendering impugned order null and void---Matter remanded for fresh proceedings. Disposition: Petition allowed; impugned order set aside; case remanded to the Trial Court with directions to record statements of complainant and witnesses on oath under S.200, Cr.P.C., obtain fresh detailed police report, and proceed strictly in accordance with the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, and Cr.P.C.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Arts. 2-A, 3, 4, 9, 14, 18 & 25---Code of Criminal Procedure (V of 1898), Ss. 22-A, 22-B, 54 & 55---Police Rules, 1934---Protection against unlawful harassment---Scope---Petitioners alleged continued harassment by police despite securing protective orders from Ex-Officio Justice of Peace---Held, that the State’s power to investigate and prosecute offences must be exercised strictly in accordance with law---Arbitrary arrest, detention, or coercive measures without registration of a cognizable offence or in defiance of judicial directions constitute a violation of fundamental rights guaranteed under Arts. 4, 9, and 14 of the Constitution---Once the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace has issued directions restraining police harassment, such orders are binding unless modified or set aside by a competent Court---Disregard of such judicial orders amounts to abuse of authority and negation of rule of law---Police officials are under statutory obligation to act fairly and lawfully in every case. (b) Administration of justice--- ----Judicial protection---Scope and effect---Where judicial protection has already been extended by Ex-Officio Justice of Peace under Ss. 22-A & 22-B, Cr.P.C., the police are bound to comply with such directives and cannot initiate retaliatory or arbitrary actions against citizens---Failure to observe such protection invites judicial interference under Art.199, Constitution. Disposition: Petition allowed; Respondents directed not to harass or summon Petitioners or their family members unlawfully; any actionable information to be processed strictly in accordance with Ss. 54 & 55, Cr.P.C., and judicial safeguards; police to comply with orders of Ex-Officio Justice of Peace in letter and spirit.

Summary: Superdari of vehicle denied --- 9C CNSA --- (a) Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXV of 1997)---- ----Ss. 32, 48(1), 9(1)3(e), 9(1)5(f) & 15---Code of Criminal Procedure (V of 1898), S. 516-A---Application for superdari of vehicle seized in narcotics case---Scope---Vehicle recovered from accused containing huge quantity of narcotics in its secret cavities---Appellant claimed to be bona fide purchaser and sought release of vehicle on superdari---Held, that the vehicle, being case property and crucial evidence for prosecution, must remain available for production and exhibition during trial---Appellant was neither registered owner nor last possessor of the vehicle---Mere pendency of a separate FIR regarding alleged snatching of vehicle did not justify release of property seized with contraband---Principle of law well settled that when vehicle is directly connected with commission of offence under CNSA, its release before conclusion of trial is impermissible---Application for superdari rightly dismissed by Special Court (CNS). (b) Criminal law--- ----Preservation of case property---Purpose and necessity---Vehicle in which narcotics were concealed formed an essential exhibit for proving recovery and establishing nexus between accused and offence---Production of such property before Court is indispensable to the evidentiary process---Release at interim stage would prejudice the prosecution case and defeat ends of justice. Disposition: Appeal dismissed; impugned order upheld; vehicle to remain in custody of ANF till conclusion of trial.

Summary: (a) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)---- ----Arts. 115 & 65---Suit for recovery based on breach of agreement and surety bond---Period of limitation---Computation---Appellant University granted study leave with pay to Respondent No.1 under an agreement for Ph.D. studies, subject to completion within four years and post-study service for another four years---Respondent failed to complete his Ph.D. and allegedly breached the agreement dated 01.02.2011---Held, that the breach occurred upon expiry of the last extension on 13.02.2015---Under Art.115 of the Limitation Act, period of limitation for compensation for breach of contract is three years from the date of breach---Similarly, for the surety bond executed by Respondent No.2, Art.65 of the Limitation Act applies, providing a three-year limitation from the occurrence of contingency---Appellant instituted suit on 27.07.2019, about one year and five months beyond the prescribed limitation period---Held, suit was barred by limitation and rightly dismissed by the Trial Court. (b) Limitation---Acknowledgment or negotiations after breach---Effect---Appellant contended that continued negotiations with Respondent till 2019 extended the limitation period---Held, such contention misconceived---Limitation runs from date of breach, not from subsequent communications or denial of claim---Mere correspondence or negotiations do not extend limitation period unless there is a valid acknowledgment in writing under S.19 of the Limitation Act---No such acknowledgment produced---Suit held time-barred. (c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----Regular First Appeal---Scope of interference---Findings of fact and limitation---Trial Court having decided the issue of limitation as a preliminary issue on proper appraisal of record and evidence---No illegality, irregularity, or misreading of evidence shown---Appellate Court declined to substitute its view merely because another interpretation was possible---Findings of limitation being well-reasoned and consistent with statutory provisions, interference not warranted. Disposition: Regular First Appeal dismissed, being misconceived and devoid of merit.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Art. 199---Maintainability---Scope of judicial review---Petitioner, a BS-19 officer of Commerce and Trade Group, challenged his exclusion from the final stage of selection for the post of Trade & Investment Officer (TIO) abroad and the validity of Clause 3.12(i) of the Guide to Performance Evaluation (GPE), which allowed non-communication of “Average” Performance Evaluation Reports (PERs)---Held, that the selection process was governed by the Policy Guidelines for Selection, Appointment and Posting of TIOs (BS-18 to BS-20) issued on 03-07-2023, which required an average of “Very Good” PERs for the preceding five years---Petitioner’s PERs for 2019 and 2020 carried an “Average” grading by the Countersigning Officer, rendering him ineligible---Under the GPE, only adverse entries were required to be communicated; “Average” grading not being adverse, non-communication did not constitute illegality---No unlawful act or omission by respondents was established to justify interference under Art.199 of the Constitution---Direction to review Countersigning Officer’s grading beyond Court’s jurisdiction---Petitions, held, not maintainable and devoid of merit. (b) Civil Servants (Performance Evaluation) Rules, 2004--- ----Clause 3.12(i)---Non-communication of “Average” reports---Validity---Under the GPE, only adverse remarks were to be communicated in writing; “Average” evaluation not deemed adverse---Countersigning Officer’s discretion to award such grading was lawful and supported by reasons recorded in the PERs---Petitioner’s contention that Clause 3.12(i) violated Arts.4, 8, 10-A, 19-A, 25 and 27 of the Constitution, held, misconceived---Policy neither arbitrary nor discriminatory---No violation of fundamental rights established. (c) Service matters---Promotion and selection criteria---Requirement of “Very Good” PERs---Petitioner’s “Average” grading disqualified him from consideration for BS-19 TIO posts abroad---Court found that the eligibility criteria were uniformly applied and no deviation shown in favour of any candidate---No mala fide, favouritism, or violation of 50% quota for Commerce & Trade Group officers proved---Selection process held fair, transparent, and in accordance with approved Policy Guidelines, 2023. (d) Constitution of Pakistan ----Art. 199---Writ jurisdiction---Limitations---Court observed that writ jurisdiction may be exercised only to correct illegal or mala fide executive action or to enforce fundamental rights---Matters involving subjective evaluation of performance or assessment of officers fall outside judicial interference---Direction to alter or reassess PERs, being an administrative discretion, cannot be issued in writ proceedings. Disposition: Both Writ Petitions dismissed being devoid of merit.

Summary: Acquittal ---- (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---- ----S. 489-F---Dishonoured cheque---Essential ingredients---Proof---Held, prosecution was bound to establish (i) issuance of cheque by accused, (ii) dishonesty in issuance, (iii) issuance towards repayment of loan or obligation, and (iv) dishonour of cheque upon presentation---In present case, neither the original cheque nor the dishonour memo was produced in evidence---Only photocopies were exhibited without complying with Articles 76–78 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, which regulate admissibility of secondary evidence---Non-production of original cheque, a primary document, rendered prosecution case defective and fatal to conviction---Reliance placed on Gulraiz v. The State (2021 PCr.LJ 145). (b) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order (X of 1984)---- ----Arts. 76–78 & 129(g)---Evidence---Production of best evidence---Withholding of witnesses---Presumption---Prosecution failed to produce witnesses named in the FIR who were present at the time of alleged monetary transactions involving Rs.79 million, nor any application was moved to summon them---Such omission justified drawing an adverse presumption under Art.129(g) that their evidence would not have supported prosecution---Self-serving statement of complainant unsupported by documentary proof of investment or debt, held, insufficient to sustain conviction---Reliance placed on Qalander Said v. The State (2013 YLR 759). (c) Criminal trial---Burden of proof---Principles---Prosecution must succeed on strength of its own case and not on weakness of defence---Where doubt arises, it must always go in favour of accused---Trial Court’s findings that evidence was not confidence-inspiring were supported by record and consistent with precedents---Reliance placed on Abdul Samad v. The State (2025 SCMR 639) and Ahmed Ali v. The State (2023 SCMR 781). (d) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----S. 417---Appeal against acquittal---Interference by appellate Court---Scope---Interference warranted only where findings are perverse, arbitrary, or suffer from manifest illegality---Appellate Courts must exercise restraint and not disturb acquittal if two possible views exist---Where Trial Court’s appreciation of evidence is reasonable and based on correct legal principles, acquittal cannot be set aside---Reliance placed on Alhaaj Malik M. Ashraf v. Javed Akhtar (2025 SCMR 787), Inayat Ullah Butt v. Muhammad Javed (PLD 2003 SC 563), and Mst. Anwar Begum v. Akhtar Hussain (2017 SCMR 1710). Disposition: Appeal dismissed; acquittal of accused maintained.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----Ss. 87, 88, 514 & 265-C---Declaration of accused as proclaimed offender---Mandatory procedure---Non-compliance---Validity---Petitioner was declared a proclaimed offender by the Trial Court without first issuing bailable warrants and without proper service of notice under S.87, Cr.P.C.---Held, that the learned Trial Court had not followed the mandatory procedure prescribed under Ss.87 and 88, Cr.P.C.---The purpose of successive processes (summons, bailable warrants, non-bailable warrants, and proclamation) is to secure the attendance of the accused before the Court and not to punish for non-appearance---Issuing non-bailable warrants and declaring the accused a proclaimed offender without ensuring proper service amounted to denial of due process and violation of principles of natural justice---Impugned Order, therefore, suffered from material illegality and was liable to be set aside. (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----Ss. 435 & 439---Revision---Scope---Where procedural irregularity affects the legality of the order, revisional jurisdiction can be exercised to rectify miscarriage of justice---Trial Court’s failure to comply with mandatory requirements of Ss.87 & 88, Cr.P.C., being a jurisdictional error, warranted interference by the High Court in revision proceedings---Impugned Order declaring the petitioner a proclaimed offender set aside to the extent of the petitioner. (c) Criminal law---Fair trial and due process---Principles---Accused’s non-appearance not shown to be deliberate or contumacious---She had earlier appeared, received copies under S.265-C, Cr.P.C., and was on post-arrest bail based on compromise with complainant---Held, in the interest of justice, the petitioner deserved an opportunity to face trial rather than being penalized for procedural lapses of the Court---Direction issued for her appearance before the Trial Court and for continuation of proceedings from the stage where broken. Disposition: Criminal Revision Petition allowed; Impugned Order dated 23.04.2025 set aside to the extent of petitioner; petitioner directed to appear before Trial Court on 10.07.2025.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----O. XVII, R. 3—Striking off right to lead evidence—Pre-conditions—Scope—Plaintiff in a pre-emption suit repeatedly failed to produce witnesses despite multiple opportunities, costs, and a caution under O.XVII, R.3, C.P.C.—Held, requirements for invoking R.3 stood satisfied; the Trial Court, having granted ample and last opportunities and imposed costs, was justified in striking off the plaintiff’s evidence and deciding the suit forthwith—Litigants cannot proceed at their whims to the agony of the opposite party; law favours the vigilant, not the indolent—Guidance reaffirmed from recent Supreme Court pronouncements (including C.P.L.A. No. 1033-L of 2024). (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----S. 96—Appeal against order dismissing suit for want of evidence after O.XVII, R.3 notice—Interference by Appellate Court—Principles—Where the Trial Court’s exercise of discretion is preceded by repeated opportunities, costs, and express warning, appellate interference is unwarranted absent jurisdictional error, perversity, or misreading—Impugned order found reasoned and consonant with procedural discipline; no illegality made out. (c) Muslim Law of Pre-emption---- ----Sections 226 & 228—Strict compliance—Proof of notices—Failure to list/postman witness or produce A.D. card—Effect—Right of pre-emption being a weak/qualified right demands meticulous pleadings and proof of requisite communications—Plaintiff neither enlisted the postman nor filed the acknowledgement-due to evidence service of notice of intention; omission to produce the “best evidence” was fatal to the claim—Suit rightly dismissed. (d) Administration of justice—Case to be decided on merits vs. procedural discipline—Courts aim to decide on merits but cannot permit endless indulgence where a party persistently defaults despite final opportunities and costs; procedural rules exist to ensure timely adjudication and preserve public confidence in the system—No violation of fair trial shown. Disposition: Regular First Appeal dismissed; order striking off evidence under O.XVII, R.3, C.P.C. and dismissal of suit maintained.