Summary: Deceased Quota ---- Retrospective effect of SC judgement ---- Service Law ---- (a) Constitutional jurisdiction – Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 4, 5, 9, 25 & 27 ----Appointment under deceased quota – Omission of Rule 11-A, Sindh Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion & Transfer) Rules, 1974 – Effect on accrued rights – Petitioner’s father, a Chowkidar in Sindh Subordinate Judicial Service, died in 2012 – Application for appointment under deceased quota submitted within months of death and remained pending before competent authority for over 12 years – Rule 11-A, providing such quota, remained in force until omitted in September 2024 following General Post Office v. Muhammad Jalal (PLD 2024 SC 1276) – Held, omission of Rule 11-A has prospective effect and does not extinguish rights accrued prior to omission – Delay in decision attributable solely to respondents’ inaction – Denial of appointment would be discriminatory and violative of fundamental rights. (b) Service laws – Appointment under deceased quota ----Beneficial legislation – Scope and interpretation – Rule 11-A of the APT Rules intended to provide livelihood to bereaved families of civil servants dying in service – Such provisions to be construed liberally to advance object – Department bound to process applications expeditiously and extend equal treatment to similarly placed claimants – Lethargic attitude and failure to implement prior court directions held unjustified. (c) Retrospective operation of judgments – Scope ----Judgments of superior courts – Prospective effect – Supreme Court in Muhammad Jalal case struck down provisions relating to deceased quota but protected appointments made from 2002 to 2024 – Rights that accrued prior to pronouncement unaffected – Reliance placed on Zahida Parveen v. Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (CPLA No.556-P/2024, decided 17.03.2025). (d) Age relaxation in public service employment ----Where delay in processing appointment under deceased quota is attributable to the department, applicant’s upper age limit to be deemed relaxed and cannot be a ground for refusal of appointment. Outcome: Petition allowed – Respondents directed to consider petitioner’s case for appointment under deceased quota in accordance with law and policy applicable at time of application (2012) – Decision to be made within three months – Upper age limit deemed relaxed.

Summary: Majority Opinion ----- (a) Constitution of Pakistan – Arts. 200(1) & 175A – Transfer vs. Appointment of Judges – Scope and Constitutional Framework Transfer of judges from one High Court to another under Art. 200(1) is a distinct and independent constitutional power vested in the President of Pakistan, separate from the appointment of judges under Art. 175A through the Judicial Commission of Pakistan (JCP)—Held, the two provisions deal with different constitutional functions and do not overlap—Transfer of a judge under Art. 200 does not amount to a fresh appointment and can be exercised within the sanctioned strength of the receiving High Court—Such transfers cannot be questioned on the basis that vacancies should have been filled by the JCP—Constitutional framers intentionally provided for both mechanisms, and the independence of Art. 200 is not contingent upon Art. 175A. (b) Constitution of Pakistan – Art. 200(1) – Procedure for Transfer of High Court Judges – Judicial Safeguards and Executive Role Powers under Art. 200(1) are not unfettered—Transfer must be made with the consent of the judge concerned and after mandatory consultation with the Chief Justices of both High Courts and the Chief Justice of Pakistan—Held, such procedure ensures that the judiciary retains primacy in decision-making—Consent and meaningful consultation are sine qua non for lawful exercise of power by the President—Executive discretion is thereby subject to structured judicial process, preserving the independence of the judiciary. (c) Constitution of Pakistan – Art. 200(1) & Islamabad High Court Act, 2010, S.3 – Applicability to Islamabad High Court – Legislative Interpretation Section 3 of the Islamabad High Court Act, 2010, relates to appointment of judges and does not restrict the application of Art. 200—Held, transfer of judges to the Islamabad High Court is constitutionally permissible and not barred by the statute—Statutory provisions cannot override or curtail express constitutional powers—Interpretation excluding Islamabad High Court from Art. 200 would be repugnant to the constitutional text and intent. (d) Constitution of Pakistan – Art. 200 – Seniority of Transferee Judges – Nature of Transfer (Permanent or Temporary) Seniority disputes arising from inter-High Court transfers are distinguishable from inter se seniority within a single High Court—Held, absence of an All-Pakistan Cadre or unified seniority list creates ambiguity—Court partially remanded the matter to the President of Pakistan to determine the seniority and nature of the transfer (permanent or temporary) after reviewing the transferee judges’ service records—Transfer Notification itself upheld and not declared ultra vires. (e) Constitution of Pakistan – Art. 184(3) – Maintainability and Disposition Petitions under Art. 184(3) were maintainable on account of important constitutional questions concerning the independence of the judiciary, scope of executive authority, and inter-institutional balance—Held by majority (3–2) that impugned Notification No. F.10(2)/2024-A.II dated 1st February 2025 was constitutionally valid—However, matter regarding seniority and nature of transfer remanded to the President—Minority view (Justice Naeem Akhter Afghan and Justice Shakeel Ahmad) allowed the petitions and set aside the impugned Notification. Disposition: By 3–2 majority, constitutional petitions were partially allowed—Notification of transfer was upheld, while issue of seniority and permanence of transferred judges was remanded to the President of Pakistan for determination—Acting Chief Justice of Islamabad High Court to continue in office until final decision. Cited Constitutional Provisions: • Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 – Articles 200, 175A, 184(3) • Islamabad High Court Act, 2010 – Section 3

Summary: (a) Civil Servants Act, 1973 – S. 2(1)(b); Constitution of Pakistan – Arts. 4, 25, 27, 34 & 35 – Status of Civil Servant – Female Government Officer’s Right to Change Domicile Respondent, a female civil servant originally appointed under KPK domicile, changed her domicile to Balochistan post-marriage and applied for direct recruitment to a post under Balochistan quota—Held, respondent remained a “civil servant” within the meaning of S. 2(1)(b) of the Civil Servants Act, 1973 and was rightly subject to recruitment regulations applicable to civil servants—Mere success in competitive exam does not confer a vested right of appointment—FPSC acted within administrative capacity; locus standi to file appeal was upheld—Change of domicile after marriage is not automatic but a matter of legal choice, and constitutionally protected where permitted under policy. (b) Civil Service Regulations, Vol I – R. 310-A; Office Memoranda (O.M.) 1971 & 1975 – Change of Domicile During Service – Female Officer’s One-Time Right Held, under O.M. 1971, domicile declared at entry into service is frozen and immutable during service tenure to preserve provincial quotas and inter-federal equity—However, O.M. 1975 read with R. 310-A, CSR Vol. I, carves a gender-sensitive exception: married female civil servants may exercise a one-time option to adopt husband’s domicile for direct recruitment—Such change does not disrupt seniority or service structure if the recruitment involves a distinct post and fresh scale—Court affirmed the validity of respondent’s change of domicile under O.M. 1975 as a permissible and final legal exercise. (c) Interpretation of Service Law – “Direct Recruitment” vs. “Initial Recruitment” – Scope and Application Held, terms “direct recruitment” and “initial recruitment” are interchangeable in service jurisprudence—Both apply to appointments made otherwise than by promotion or transfer—Thus, in-service civil servants are eligible for “direct recruitment” to new posts if they meet criteria and obtain departmental NOC—O.M. 1975 applies equally to in-service female officers seeking fresh appointment on new posts, enabling one-time domicile adoption in line with spousal domicile. (d) Gender Equality – Article 25(3) of the Constitution – Women-Centric Constitutional Interpretation Court adopted purposive, gender-sensitive interpretation of O.M. 1975 in harmony with Art. 25(3), 34 and 35 of the Constitution—Held, law must be applied to recognize historical disadvantages faced by women—Affirmative action through lawful accommodation (e.g., permitting change of domicile for direct recruitment) is a constitutionally sanctioned tool to promote substantive gender equality—Respondent’s legal right to adopt her husband’s domicile for one-time use upheld as valid and non-discriminatory. (e) PMDC Regulations, 2018 – S. V(5), (6) & (9) – Validity of Experience Certificate – Jurisdiction of Certifying Authority Held, PMDC is the competent statutory authority to assess teaching experience in medical faculty appointments—PMDC’s unchallenged certification confirming respondent’s qualifying experience in BS-18 and BS-19 roles carries legal finality—Internal arrangements or terminology used by PIMS do not override PMDC’s certification—FPSC cannot disregard or override PMDC’s jurisdiction—Objections to experience certificate rejected as baseless. Disposition: Petition dismissed—Orders of FPSC dated 10.07.2024 and 02.10.2024 rejecting respondent’s candidature were set aside—FPSC directed to consider respondent for appointment to post of Associate Professor on Balochistan quota within 15 days—Court upheld respondent’s domicile change and experience as lawful. Cited Constitutional Provisions and Statutes: • Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 – Articles 4, 25(3), 27, 34, 35 • Civil Servants Act, 1973 – S. 2(1)(b) • Civil Service Regulations, Volume I – R. 310-A • Establishment Division O.M. Nos. F.8/5/75-WC (1975) & 1/14/71-TRV (1971) • Pakistan Medical and Dental Council Regulations, 2018 • Citizenship Rules, 1952 Notable Cases and Authorities Cited: • Muhammad Mubeen us Salam v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2006 SC 602 • Dr. Rashid Anwar v. Federation of Pakistan 1996 PLC (C.S.) 1073 • District Education Officer v. Sonia Begum 2023 SCMR 217 • Waqar Zafar v. Mazhar Hussain Shah PLD 2018 SC 81 • Hadayat Ullah v. Federation of Pakistan 2022 SCMR 1691 • Mohsin Ali Hasani v. Government of Pakistan 1990 SCMR 1685 • Yaqub Ali Khan v. FPSC 2019 SCMR 413 • Lord Denning’s dissent, and international references including CEDAW Articles 2, 5, 15 & 16

Summary: (a) Punjab Civil Servants (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1974—Special Education Department (Directorate) Service Rules, 2006 ----Promotion---Departmental Promotion Committee (DPC)---Deferment of promotion due to proposed amendments in Rules—Authority of DPC—Scope Promotion to post of Lecturer Physical Education (BS-17) under 25% quota for PETs/PTIs/DPEs with requisite qualifications could not be withheld on ground that existing rules required amendment—DPC deferred petitioner’s promotion on such basis despite her fulfilling all eligibility conditions including possession of M.A. in Physical Education (1st Division)—Held, DPC has no authority to question or suspend enforceability of valid service rules framed under law—Proposed amendments cannot override binding effect of existing rules—Petitioner had legitimate expectation of being considered for promotion—Decision of DPC declared unlawful, violative of right to be considered for promotion—DPC directed to reconsider petitioner’s promotion within one month. Cited Cases: • Secretary, Ministry of Finance v. Muhammad Anwar 2025 SCMR 153 • Naseem Khan v. Government of KPK 2024 SCMR 1341 • Federal Public Service Commission v. Shiraz Manzoor 2023 SCMR 2087 • Muhammad Amjad v. DG QDA 2022 SCMR 797 • Abdul Hameed v. Ministry of Housing & Works PLD 2008 SC 395 • Muhammad Ishaque v. Govt. of Punjab 2005 SCMR 980 (b) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 ----Art. 9---Right to life---Scope and expansion---Inclusion of right to livelihood and career progression Right to life under Art. 9 of Constitution includes right to live with dignity, encompassing right to livelihood and professional advancement—Held, arbitrary deferment or obstruction in promotion amounts to denial of fair opportunity and violates constitutional guarantees—Transparent and merit-based promotion processes essential for realizing right to livelihood—Career stagnation due to unlawful service practices renders constitutional rights hollow and illusory—Legitimate expectation of promotion, once eligibility is met, forms part of constitutional protection under Art. 9. Cited Cases: • Shehla Zia v. WAPDA PLD 1994 SC 693 • Pir Imran Sajid v. Managing Director 2015 SCMR 1257 • Abdul Wahab v. HBL 2013 SCMR 1383 • Federation of Pakistan v. Jahanzeb 2022 SCMR 2020 • Mrs. Farkhanda Talat v. Federation of Pakistan 2007 SCMR 886 • Divisional Superintendent v. Umar Daraz 2023 SCMR 761 • Province of Punjab v. Kanwal Rashid 2021 SCMR 730 (c) Civil Service—Public Administration ----Impartiality of civil service—Meritocracy—Effect of political interference Supreme Court highlighted that civil bureaucracy must remain apolitical, professional, and merit-based—Observed that promotion processes must not be delayed arbitrarily or subjected to manipulation based on anticipated rule changes—Civil servants serve the Constitution, not political masters—Undue interference erodes morale, impartiality, and trust in public institutions—Quaid-e-Azam’s directive to civil servants cited: duty is to loyally serve any government formed under constitutional process—Transparent service laws essential to guard against favouritism and ensure equal opportunity. Cited Cases & References: • Muhammad Nasir Ismail v. Government of Punjab 2025 SCP 57 • Tariq Aziz-ud-Din 2010 SCMR 1301 • Quaid-e-Azam’s Address to Civil Officers (Peshawar, 1948) • Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization • Lorne Sossin, Speaking Truth to Power (2005) • E.N. Gladden, An Introduction to Public Administration (1952)

Summary: Deceased Quota ------ ''A married daughter remains equally a child of her deceased parent, and to deny her this entitlement on the basis of marriage is to deny her constitutional identity as an equal citizen. (2). Financial independence is not a privilege but a necessary precondition for the full realization of citizenship, autonomy, and personhood. (3) Executive clarification cannot override statutory rules.'' ---- (a) Constitution of Pakistan----Arts. 14, 25, 27 & 184(3)---Married daughter---Compassionate appointment---Equality---Non-discrimination---Right to dignity---Marital status---Legal personhood---Constitutional guarantees---Petitioner, appointed as Primary School Teacher under deceased son/daughter quota per Rule 10(4) of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion & Transfer) Rules, 1989, was removed from service through an executive clarification that excluded married daughters from entitlement---Held, such exclusion amounts to gender-based discrimination, violating Arts. 14, 25, and 27 of the Constitution---Married daughters remain children of their deceased parent and cannot be denied compassionate employment merely due to marital status---Executive clarification issued by the Establishment Department amounted to impermissible curtailment of a statutory rule through administrative fiat---Doctrine of separation of powers violated by executive interference in legislative domain---Clarification struck down for being ultra vires, unconstitutional, discriminatory, and without lawful authority---Held further, Constitution guarantees rights to individuals regardless of gender or marital status; treating married daughters as dependent liabilities contravenes both constitutional principles and Islamic jurisprudence, which upholds a woman’s financial autonomy irrespective of marital status.(b) Service Law----Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Civil Servants Act, 1973, S. 26---Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion & Transfer) Rules, 1989, R.10(4)---Interpretation of rules---Scope---Compassionate appointment---Married daughter---Executive clarification---Legal competence---Held, Rule 10(4) of the 1989 Rules does not exclude married daughters from compassionate appointment---Executive clarification purporting to limit rule’s applicability to unmarried daughters or separated women lacked legal authority under S.26 of the Act---Only the Governor is competent to frame or amend rules---Executive instruction cannot override or amend a statutory rule---Clarification introducing gender-based classification between married sons and daughters declared unconstitutional and violative of equal protection under the law.(c) Islamic Law----Financial autonomy of women---Marital status---Islamic jurisprudence---Scope---Held, Islamic law recognizes the right of a woman to retain full ownership and control over her earnings and property irrespective of marriage---Presumption of economic dependency of married women is neither legally tenable nor religiously grounded.(d) Feminist Legal Theory----Gender equality---Legal identity---Patriarchal assumptions---Held, exclusion of married daughters reflects regressive, patriarchal notions that equate womanhood with dependency on male relatives---Legal personhood and entitlement to economic rights are individual and not contingent on marriage---State policies denying women equal access to employment on the basis of marital status reinforce structural inequality---References made to feminist theorists such as Martha Fineman, bell hooks, Simone de Beauvoir, and jurisprudence rejecting doctrine of coverture and affirming women’s rights as autonomous individuals.(e) International Law----CEDAW---Articles 1, 2 & 11---Gender discrimination---Marital status---Pakistan’s international obligations---Held, exclusion of married daughters from compassionate employment violates Pakistan’s obligations under CEDAW, ICCPR, and ICESCR---Administrative practices rooted in customary gender roles and stereotypes are incompatible with international standards requiring substantive equality.(f) Judicial Language----Gender-neutral judicial reasoning---Structural bias---Held, phrase “a married daughter becomes a liability of her husband” used in the impugned Service Tribunal judgment was patriarchal, factually and legally erroneous, and constitutionally incompatible---Judicial and administrative authorities must adopt gender-sensitive and gender-neutral language as part of their constitutional duty to uphold dignity and equality---Judgments must not encode bias through language.(g) Practice & Procedure----Prospective application of precedent---Retrospective effect---Held, SC judgment in GPO Islamabad v. Muhammad Jalal (PLD 2024 SC 1276), which struck down Rule 10(4), applies prospectively and does not affect appointments already made under the Rule.Disposition: Petition converted into appeal and allowed. Impugned judgment and executive clarification set aside. Petitioner’s appointment restored with all back-benefits.Cited Cases:• Muhammad Nadeem Arif v. IG Police, Punjab 2011 SCMR 408• Federal Public Service Commission v. Altaf Hussain 2015 SCMR 581• Province of Punjab v. Kanwal Rashid 2021 SCMR 730• Khawaja Ahmad Hassan v. Government of Punjab 2005 SCMR 186• Federation of Pakistan v. Shuja Sharif 2023 SCMR 129• Pakistan Peoples Party Parliamentarians v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2022 SC 574• General Post Office, Islamabad v. Muhammad Jalal PLD 2024 SC 1276• Zarai Taraqiati Bank v. Sarfraz Khan Jadoon 2021 SCMR 1305• Pakistan Medical & Dental Council v. Muhammad Fahad Malik 2018 SCMR 1956Cited International Instruments:• Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)• International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)• International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)

Summary: (a) Service Law – Proforma Promotion – Principles and Entitlement---Punjab Civil Servants (Appointment & Conditions of Service) Rules, 1974, R. 13(i)---Punjab Subordinate Judiciary---Proforma promotion---Right of consideration---Appellant was terminated in 2004 but later reinstated in service in 2014 with back benefits and continuity of service---His junior was promoted as Senior Civil Judge in 2013, whereas he was promoted in 2019 after clearance of adverse reports---Held, once all impediments to promotion had been removed and appellant was deemed continuously in service, he was entitled to consideration for promotion from the date his junior was promoted---Failure to grant such relief would amount to unfair treatment and denial of legitimate career progression---Reliance placed on Abdul Jabbar Khan v. Government of Sindh (1996 SCMR 850), Chief Secretary, Sindh v. Riaz Ahmed Massan (2016 SCMR 1784), and Nazir Ahmed Langah v. Lahore High Court, Lahore (2024 PLC (C.S.) 1566).(b) Administrative Law – Officiating Promotion – Effect on Proforma Promotion---Officiating promotion v. regular promotion---Whether officiating promotion precludes a civil servant from claiming proforma promotion---Held, an officiating promotion, if made in accordance with eligibility criteria and not rescinded later, does not permanently preclude a civil servant from receiving proforma promotion if his junior was promoted to a substantive post---Respondents failed to show that the junior’s promotion was not made against a regular vacancy, thus the appellant’s claim was valid---Reliance placed on Secretary to Government of Punjab, Communication and Works Department v. Muhammad Khalid Usmani [2017 PLC (C.S.) 373].(c) Service Law – Limitation – Joinder of Necessary Parties---Limitation Act, 1908, S. 22---Whether an appeal is barred due to impleading necessary parties at a later stage---Held, if an appeal is filed in time against the primary department, subsequent joinder of necessary parties does not render the entire appeal time-barred---Where administrative inefficiency or procedural delays cause a civil servant to be deprived of his rightful claim, he cannot be non-suited merely due to a technical procedural lapse---Reliance placed on Messrs Khurshid Soap and Chemical Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2020 SC 641) and Chami Narayanan v. V.R. Krishna Iyer (AIR 1998 Kerala 365).(d) Administrative Justice – Doctrine of Bona Fide Mistake – Effect on Procedural Compliance---Principle Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea (an act alone does not make one liable unless there is wrongful intent)---Bona fide mistakes in procedural matters such as misjoinder or non-joinder of parties should not hinder substantive justice---Held, where an appellant makes a genuine procedural mistake without mala fide intent, courts should prioritize substantive justice over technicalities---Reliance placed on Pitt v. Holt [(2013) UKSC 26], Barclays Bank Ltd v. W J Simms, Son and Cooke (Southern) Ltd [(1980) QB 677], and Guruvayya v. Dattatraya [(1903) ILR 28 Bom. 11].(e) Fundamental Rights – Fair Treatment in Service Matters---Right to equal opportunity in service progression---Failure to consider a civil servant for proforma promotion despite removal of adverse remarks constitutes denial of fair treatment and violates principles of equality and justice---Reliance placed on Federation of Pakistan v. Jahanzeb [2023 PLC (C.S.) 336] and Wadhu Mal v. Province of Sindh [2023 PLC (C.S.) 1310].--- Disposition:Appeal allowed – Impugned orders dated 15.11.2021 and 18.12.2021 set aside.Respondent authority directed to reconsider the appellant’s proforma promotion from the date his junior was promoted, in accordance with law.

Summary: (a) Administrative Law – Appointment to Public Office – Tenure Determination ----Public office appointments must be made strictly in accordance with the advertised terms and conditions----Where an advertisement explicitly states the tenure of office, the executive cannot subsequently alter the duration post-appointment----The extension of tenure beyond the advertised period violates the principles of fairness, transparency, and due process. Cited Cases: Muhammad Shafeeq vs. Federation of Pakistan (2023 PLC(C.S.) 205) Usmat Batool vs. Bahauddin Zakariya University (2013 PLC(C.S.) 484) (b) Constitutional Law – Role of the President in Executive Appointments – Article 48 of the Constitution ----The President, while appointing public officeholders under a statute, is bound to act on the advice of the Prime Minister and does not have independent discretion unless expressly provided----The appointment of the Chairman PARC under Section 9 of the PARC Ordinance must conform to constitutional requirements and cannot be treated as an exclusive presidential prerogative. Cited Cases: Mushtaq Ahmed Sukhera vs. The President (PLD 2020 Islamabad 1) University of the Punjab vs. Ch. Sardar Ali (1992 SCMR 1093) (c) Executive Discretion – Judicial Review of Policy Decisions ----Courts have the authority to review executive decisions where they violate principles of due process, transparency, and fairness----Judicial restraint does not apply where the question pertains to the legality of a public appointment rather than a mere policy decision. Cited Cases: Muhammad Yasin vs. Federation (PLD 2012 SC 132) Muhammad Ashraf Tiwana vs. Pakistan (2013 SCMR 1159) (d) Quo Warranto – Challenge to Public Office Holders – Locus Standi ----A writ of quo warranto may be filed by any member of the public to question the legality of a public officeholder's appointment----Courts can deny relief if the petition is filed with mala fide intent, but mere delay in filing does not bar maintainability unless bad faith is demonstrated. Cited Cases: Qazi Hussain Ahmed vs. General Parvez Musharraf (PLD 2002 SC 853) Jawad Ahmad Mir vs. Prof. Dr. Imtiaz Ali Khan (2023 SCMR 162) (e) Fair Competition in Public Sector Appointments – Non-Alteration of Advertisement Terms ----The government must adhere to the advertised tenure and selection criteria for public sector appointments----Modifying the tenure post-appointment undermines transparency and may deprive other candidates of an equal opportunity to compete. Cited Cases: Muhammad Yasin vs. Federation (PLD 2012 SC 132) Dr. Naveeda Tufail vs. Government of Punjab (2003 SCMR 291) Disposition: Petition allowed. The extension of tenure for respondent No.6 beyond the advertised two-year period was declared unlawful. The appointment was deemed expired, and the office of Chairman PARC was declared vacant. The government was directed to fill the position afresh in accordance with legal requirements.

Summary: (a) Ehtesab Bureau—Appointment of Chairman; constitutional and institutional safeguards ----Azad Jammu & Kashmir Ehtesab Bureau Act, 2001 (EBA), S. 6 (as amended 2020); Public Offices—Independence and integrity of anti-corruption institutions—Interpretation of eligibility, suitability and appointment procedure. Resignation of the impugned appointee rendered appeal infructuous, yet Supreme Court examined principles for future appointments to preserve institutional integrity of Ehtesab Bureau—Held, Ehtesab Bureau performs pivotal role in eradicating corruption and ensuring accountability; its Chairman is the cornerstone of the Bureau’s functional and moral authority—Position demands unimpeachable integrity, impartiality, competence, and independence—Integrity is not an accessory but an intrinsic element of qualification—Possession of technical eligibility (e.g., being qualified as Judge or senior civil servant) alone is insufficient without proven honesty and character—Appointment process under current S.6 vests discretion solely in the executive, lacking transparency and bipartisan consultation, hence prone to politicization and conflict of interest—Recommended legislative reforms to align selection process with standards under National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, ensuring bipartisan consultation (Prime Minister and Leader of Opposition), independent parliamentary committee oversight, fixed tenure, and secure removal procedure through judicial inquiry—Government directed not to make further appointments of Chairman Ehtesab Bureau until suitable amendments are enacted. (b) Administrative law—Integrity as part of qualification; scope of suitability ----Principles of good governance—Eligibility versus suitability—Integrity, honesty, character, merit, and efficiency deemed integral to qualification for high public offices; mere possession of formal criteria not sufficient—Relied on: Mrs. Shaheen Ashai v. Muhammad Anwar Chaudhary (2014 SCR 1169); Syed Mumtaz Hussain Naqvi v. Raja Muhammad Farooq Haider Khan (2014 SCR 43); Muhammad Yasin v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2012 SC 132); Tariq Aziz-ud-Din (2010 SCMR 1301); Centre for PIL v. Union of India (AIR 2011 SC 1267)—Courts emphasized that institutions enforcing accountability or regulating merit must be led by persons of unquestionable integrity; suitability evaluation must extend beyond academic or technical fitness to moral and ethical probity. (c) Comparative framework—Pakistan NAB model and AJ&K Ehtesab Bureau ----S.6 of EBA contrasted with S.6 of National Accountability Ordinance, 1999— NAB appointment procedure entails consultation between Leader of the House and Leader of the Opposition and, failing consensus, reference to a bipartisan parliamentary committee ensuring transparency and balance—EBA confers unilateral discretion on Prime Minister’s advice to President—Supreme Court observed that concentration of appointment power in one political executive defeats the very object of accountability and raises issues of conflict of interest—Recommended replication of NAB’s consultative and bipartisan safeguards in AJ&K framework. (d) Perks and privileges—Equivalence to Judge High Court; impermissibility ----Administrative practice; 2016 SCR 206 followed. Grant of pay and privileges equivalent to a High Court Judge to Chairman Ehtesab Bureau held contrary to the spirit of the Constitution—Such parity permissible only for constitutional/judicial offices performing identical functions—Government may devise appropriate package but must refrain from labeling it “perks and privileges equal to Judge High Court.” (e) Public accountability and reform directives ----Governance and institutional independence—Court noted public perception of misuse of Bureau for political ends; urged Government to reform law to ensure apolitical appointments, security of tenure, transparent selection, and rationalization of law-officer cadre to reduce fiscal burden—Cited Azad Govt v. Sardar Muhammad Mukhtar Khan (2016 SCR 206) and Ehtesab Bureau v. Abid Hussain (2015 SCR 408). Disposition: Appeal disposed of in view of respondent’s resignation; observations issued in public interest. Government directed not to appoint any new Chairman Ehtesab Bureau until suitable statutory amendments ensuring transparent, merit-based, and bipartisan process are enacted. Perks and privileges equal to Judge High Court declared impermissible. No order as to costs.

Summary: Petitioner applied for the post of Trade and Investment Officer at Pakistan Trade Missions abroad. He qualified written test and was called for interview. Despite being called for an interview, alleges that his interview has not been taken. (a) Service Law – Appointment to Trade and Investment Officer (TIO) – Eligibility Criteria: ---- Policy Guidelines for Selection, Appointment and Posting of Trade and Investment Officers (BS-18 to BS-20) – Paragraph 1(d) – Performance Evaluation Reports (PERs) – Held, an officer applying for appointment as a Trade and Investment Officer (TIO) in Pakistan’s Trade Missions Abroad must have complete PERs for the last five years with a minimum average of “very good.” – Any deficiency in PERs disqualifies a candidate from selection. (b) PERs – Validity and Rectification – Role of Reporting and Countersigning Officers: ---- Guide to Performance Evaluation (PER Guide) – Paragraphs 2.32, 2.44, 3.10(iii) – Held, a PER recorded for a period less than three months is irregular and must be removed from the character roll dossiers per Paragraph 2.32 of the PER Guide. – If an officer has worked under multiple reporting officers in a year, the countersigning officer may obtain separate reports from each and exercise discretion in deciding which to accept under Paragraph 2.44 of the PER Guide. – However, PER remarks once recorded cannot be altered, and any change in evaluation must be incorporated in the next year’s report under Paragraph 3.10(iii) of the PER Guide. (c) Judicial Review – Courts' Limited Role in PER-Related Disputes: ---- Constitution of Pakistan – Article 212 – Jurisdiction of Service Tribunals – Held, issues relating to the recording, validity, and expunction of adverse remarks in PERs fall within the jurisdiction of Service Tribunals, and constitutional courts cannot interfere in such matters. – The petitioner may seek expunction of adverse remarks through the procedure provided in the PER Guide. (d) Discretion of Countersigning Officer – Validity of PERs: ---- Guide to Performance Evaluation (PER Guide) – Paragraph 2.44 – Held, a countersigning officer must base their evaluation on the reporting officers’ assessments. – Where two different reporting officers evaluate an officer for different periods, the countersigning officer may agree with either evaluation. – In the present case, the countersigning officer revised the petitioner’s grading from “outstanding” to “average” after considering a newly recorded PER, which was lawfully within his discretion. (e) Procedural Fairness in Service Matters – No Personal Bias Established: ---- Held, the petitioner alleged personal bias and unfair treatment by the Secretary, Ministry of Commerce, but failed to establish any mala fide intent or violation of law. – The Secretary was a member of the Interview Board and identified an irregularity in the petitioner’s PER, which led to its review – The Court found no procedural irregularity or discriminatory treatment. (f) Judicial Direction – Review Application Dismissed: ---- Held, the petitioner submitted to the Court’s order requiring the Secretary, Ministry of Commerce to record his PER but later challenged the order only after an adverse PER was issued. – Since the petitioner failed to show an error apparent on the face of the order, the review application was dismissed. ----Disposition: ---- Writ petition dismissed – Review application dismissed – Petitioner directed to seek expunction of adverse remarks through proper administrative channels.

Summary: The petitioner was working as Constable when he applied for the post of Sub-Inspector and was recommended by the Punjab Public Service Commission and appointment order dated 03.08.2023 was issued which was later on withdrawn through impugned order dated 30.04.2024 on the ground that an F.I.R. has been registered against him (after filing of his application). The petitioner admittedly was acquitted by the Court of competent jurisdiction when his application under Section 249-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 was accepted and in first departmental inquiry, he was also declared innocent but on the strength of the second departmental inquiry with which the petitioner was not associated, the impugned withdrawal order was taken as valid by the department. Held: The respondent-department seems to have fallen in error inasmuch as when the Court of competent jurisdiction, i.e., Magistrate Section 30, has clearly found that necessary material for commission of alleged offence is not made out from the facts of the case in addition to the fact that complainant of the case was also not interested to prosecute the case, therefore, in such an eventuality, the impugned order is without any lawful basis. Moreover, it has been held that the underlying rationale of the policy of the respondent-department to withdraw appointment as Sub-Inspector from a Constable who is found involved in a criminal act?registration of case, seems to maintain discipline in the force by shunning out such candidates who could potentially be troublesome for the discipline. In the instant case, strangely and ironically enough, the petitioner found to be involved in FIR can perform his duties as a Constable, by remaining part of the force but cannot be offered appointment as Sub-Inspector. Thus, the policy, the underlying rationale and the manner in which it has been implemented in the present case create a paradoxical situation and conflicting position of the respondent-department, the answer to which is absent on the part of the respondent-department. The petitioner could be or could not be troublesome both as Constable and as Sub-Inspector. -----Background: The petitioner was initially appointed as a constable in the police force and later applied for the position of Sub-Inspector. He successfully passed the written examination, interview, and medical test. On 03.08.2023, he was recommended by the Punjab Public Service Commission (PPSC) and issued an appointment order. However, during the verification of his antecedents, it was revealed that a criminal case (FIR No. 269/2023) under Section 392 of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) was registered against him. Despite being acquitted of the charges in the criminal case by a competent court, the police department withdrew the petitioner’s appointment on 30.04.2024, based on the FIR. The petitioner challenged the withdrawal, asserting that his acquittal invalidated the department's decision. -----Issues: 1- Whether the withdrawal of the petitioner’s appointment was lawful, given that he was acquitted in the criminal case. -----2- Whether the second departmental inquiry conducted by the respondent-department was justified and conducted in adherence to principles of natural justice. -----3- Whether the respondent-department's policy regarding criminal cases and the withdrawal of appointments is reasonable, considering the petitioner’s fundamental right to livelihood. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --Acquittal and Withdrawal of Appointment: The Court ruled that the petitioner had been acquitted by the Magistrate under Section 249-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.) due to lack of evidence. The Court emphasized that the acquittal decision from a competent court held more weight than the FIR and ruled that the withdrawal of his appointment based on the FIR was legally unjustifiable. --Second Inquiry and Natural Justice: The Court noted that although a second inquiry was conducted by the respondent-department, the department failed to provide any reasonable justification for initiating the second inquiry, which appeared to violate the principles of natural justice. The petitioner was not informed or involved in the second inquiry, undermining his right to a fair process, as guaranteed under Article 10-A of the Constitution of Pakistan. --Policy and Fundamental Rights: The Court observed that the respondent-department’s policy of withdrawing the appointment due to a criminal case, despite the petitioner’s acquittal and continued service as a constable, created a contradictory and unjust situation. The Court stated that the withdrawal of the Sub-Inspector appointment, after the petitioner had earned it through merit, violated his fundamental right to livelihood, which is protected under the Constitution. The petition was allowed, the withdrawal order was set aside, and the respondent-department was directed to proceed with the petitioner’s appointment as Sub-Inspector in accordance with the law. -----Citations/Precedents: Section 249-A, Cr.P.C. (Acquittal based on insufficient evidence) Pakistan Penal Code, Section 392 (Robbery) Constitution of Pakistan, Article 10-A (Right to a fair trial and principles of natural justice) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Sections on departmental inquiry and acquittal)