Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Art. 199(3)---Maintainability---Members of Armed Forces—Service matters—Bar of jurisdiction—Petitioners (retired Warrant Officers, PAF) sought “incentive promotion” to Chief Warrant Officer under AFO 30-14 (2018), challenging denial under AFO 30-14 (2023)---Held, questions relating to promotions/incentive ranks of PAF personnel arise out of terms and conditions of service within the Armed Forces’ internal regulatory framework; High Court’s jurisdiction is expressly barred under Art.199(3) unless the impugned action is shown to be mala fide, coram non judice, or without jurisdiction—No such infirmity established—Petitions not maintainable. Cited Cases: Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. v. Muhammad Anwar Mandokhel 2024 SCMR 298; Sadaqatullah v. Federation of Pakistan 2019 PLC (C.S.) 695. (b) Pakistan Air Force Act, 1953; Defence Services Regulations, 1988; Administrative Instruments (AFOs)---- ----Promotion/incentive rank—Nature of right—Discretionary policy matter—Held, incentive rank is a policy-based, discretionary privilege contingent on prescribed benchmarks and available vacancies; it is not a vested or accrued legal right enforceable under Art.199(1) absent jurisdictional defects—Internal codes and AFOs constitute a complete scheme for service structure, discipline and promotions. (c) Administrative law---- ----Retrospectivity—Policy transition—Baseline performance criteria—Petitioners alleged retrospective application of AFO 30-14 (2023) introducing Base Line Index (BLI)---Held, record showed BLI/performance-based standards were formally disseminated on 27.12.2022 and applied uniformly thereafter; challenge to “retrospectivity” misconceived in face of prior, duly circulated criteria—No arbitrariness or colourable exercise made out. (d) Constitutional law---- ----Arts. 4, 9, 10-A & 25—Alleged violation of due process, property (pensionary) rights and equality—Held, where claim itself is non-justiciable under Art.199(3) and no vested right exists in incentive rank, assertions of fundamental-rights infringement do not furnish an independent cause—No denial of fair trial or discriminatory treatment established. Disposition: Writ Petition dismissed as not maintainable; connected petitions listed in Annexure-A also dismissed.

Summary: (a) Federal Public Service Commission Ordinance, 1977---- ----S. 7(3)(b) & (d)---Alternate remedies---Review petition and appeal—Maintainability of writ petition—Petitioner’s representation against CSS 2022 result dismissed due to absence—Held, petitioner had statutory remedies of review before the Commission and appeal thereafter before the High Court under s.7(3)(b) & (d) of the Ordinance, 1977—Having failed to avail those remedies within limitation, writ petition under Art.199 of the Constitution was not maintainable. (b) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Art. 199—Judicial review—Disputed questions of fact—Petitioner claimed inability to attend representation hearing due to traffic blockage—Held, such factual controversy requiring evidence cannot be adjudicated in Constitutional jurisdiction—Petition therefore not maintainable. (c) Civil service examinations---- ----CSS Competitive Examination, 2019 Rules, r.17(1)—Representation against marks—Rejection due to non-appearance—Held, representation properly dismissed in accordance with prescribed procedure—Petitioner’s non-attendance constituted failure to prosecute remedy available under rules. (d) Administrative law---- ----Finality of proceedings—CSS 2022 result already finalized and allocations made—Matter held to be past and closed transaction—No interference warranted. Disposition: Writ Petition dismissed as not maintainable; Impugned Memorandum dated 04.07.2023 upheld.

Summary: (a) Payment of Wages Act, 1936---- ----Ss. 1(4) & 2(g)---Scope and applicability—Managerial/supervisory posts—Gratuity claim under s.15—Petitioners served as Production Incharge and Production Manager—Held, Act, 1936 applies to persons employed in specified establishments performing skilled/unskilled manual or clerical work; managerial/supervisory functions fall outside s.2(g)—Authority rightly declined gratuity claims as the petitioners were not covered by the Act. (b) Industrial Relations Act, 2012---- ----S. 2(xxxiii) (“worker”/“workman”)—Interpretation in tandem with Payment of Wages Act—Held, persons mainly in managerial or administrative capacity are excluded from “workman”; when read with s.2(g) of the Act, 1936, only those doing manual/technical/clerical labour can invoke its remedies—Petitioners’ roles/ responsibilities were managerial/supervisory; they are not “workmen.” Cited Cases: Getz Pharma (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Muhammad Nafees 2021 SCMR 1785; Habib Bank Ltd. v. Gulzar Khan 2019 SCMR 946. (c) Labour adjudication---- ----Jurisdiction of Authority under Payment of Wages Act—Gratuity claims by managerial staff—Held, petitions under s.15 of the Act, 1936 by non-workmen are misconceived and not maintainable; Impugned Orders dismissing claims suffer from no illegality. Disposition: Writ Petitions dismissed; Impugned Orders dated 25.11.2019 and 06.12.2019 upheld.

Summary: (a) Guardian and Wards Act, 1890---- ----S. 25—Custody of minor—Dismissal for want of evidence—Remand granting one final opportunity—Paramount consideration of welfare—Held, in custody matters the child’s welfare overrides procedural defaults; Appellate Court rightly set aside the dismissal for non-production of evidence and remanded the case granting respondent-father a single, time-bound opportunity to lead his entire evidence so that the Guardian Court may adjudicate on merits in the minor’s best interests. (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----O. XXVII, R. 3—Failure of a party to produce evidence—Proper course—Held, before invoking consequences for default, the Court ought to have recorded the defaulting party’s statement and then proceeded; record did not show such compliance by the Guardian Court—reference made to Hashim Khan v. Haroon-ur-Rashid (2022 SCMR 1793). (c) Family law—Administration of justice---- ----Merits over technicalities—Where the father has maintained contact and contributed to maintenance, shutting him out without a final chance would risk prejudice to both sides and hamper a fully informed welfare assessment—Limited remand with one chance was a balanced, lawful exercise of appellate jurisdiction. (d) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Art. 199—Judicial review of appellate remand—Scope—No jurisdictional error, perversity, or illegality shown in the Appellate Court’s order; interference declined. Disposition: Writ Petition dismissed; Appellate Court’s order dated 07.03.2025 upheld; matter remanded to Guardian Judge with one final, fixed-date opportunity to respondent No.1 to produce complete evidence, thereafter to be decided on merits keeping the minor’s welfare paramount.

Summary: (a) Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---- ----Ss. 214-D & 119(3)–(4)---Automatic selection for audit—Extension of time to file return—Requirement of written order—Held, strict construction applies to s.214-D; the provision is attracted only where the Commissioner has, by a written order under s.119(3)–(4), granted (or refused) an extension and the taxpayer then fails to file within the extended period—Inaction or non-disposal of the extension application cannot operate as a deemed refusal; while the application remains pending, s.214-D cannot be invoked—Accordingly, automatic audit selections premised on late filing without a written s.119 order were without lawful authority. Cited Cases: Commissioner Inland Revenue, Lahore v. Atta Cables (Pvt.) Ltd. 2024 SCMR 468. (b) Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---- ----S. 119(4)---Statutory scheme—Taxpayer’s further remedy—Held, the Act obliges the Taxation Officer to decide extension applications in writing; only then can the taxpayer pursue the statutory recourse to the Chief Commissioner under s.119(4)—Departmental inaction that forecloses this pathway cannot be used to penalize the taxpayer via s.214-D. (c) Finance Act, 2018---- ----Omission of s. 214-D—Penal character and proportionality—Even when operative, s.214-D (being severe in effect) had to be applied exactly and only upon fulfillment of its textual preconditions; any deviation enures to taxpayer’s benefit—Where no written s.119 order exists, s.214-D is inapplicable ab initio. Cited Cases: 2024 SCMR 468 (ibid). (d) Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---- ----Ss. 177 & 122(9)---Downstream proceedings—Validity—Where selection for audit under s.214-D is void, all consequential notices and proceedings under s.177 and s.122(9) based thereon are coram non judice and liable to be set aside. (e) Constitutional jurisdiction---- ----Art. 199—Illegality/lack of lawful authority—Held, writ is competent to quash proceedings initiated without fulfillment of statutory preconditions; taxpayers cannot be made to suffer for the Department’s failure to pass mandatory written orders. Disposition: Petitions allowed; Impugned Notices of automatic selection for audit under s.214-D and all consequential proceedings/notices (including under s.177 and s.122(9)) set aside.

Summary: (a) Pakistan Arms Rules, 2022 & 2023---- ----Rr. 12 & 41—Cancellation of manual arms licences—Renewal of computerized licence—Discretion of competent authority—Held, all manual arms licences stood cancelled under the statutory framework introduced by the Pakistan Arms Rules, 2022 and reaffirmed by the 2023 Rules—Petitioner’s manual licence, later converted into a one-year computerized licence subject to verification, expired on 26-07-2021—Renewal was contingent upon fresh approval by the competent authority; no vested or perpetual right accrued in petitioner’s favour—Refusal of renewal by the Ministry of Interior/NADRA was thus lawful and within jurisdiction. (b) Constitutional jurisdiction---- ----Art. 199—Judicial review—Executive policy matters—Scope—Policy decision cancelling all manual arms licences made in exercise of statutory powers cannot be interfered with by the Court absent discrimination, mala fides, or violation of law—Petitioner neither challenged the validity of the Rules nor impugned the relevant notification—No illegality, arbitrariness, or infringement of fundamental rights shown—Writ not maintainable. (c) Licence renewal---- ----Nature of right—Arms licence, being a privilege regulated by statute and subject to renewal at the discretion of the licensing authority, does not create any perpetual or indefeasible right in the holder—Non-renewal on policy grounds cannot be termed arbitrary when grounded in notified law. (d) Constitutional relief---- ----Public interest and separation of powers—Courts refrain from substituting their judgment for that of executive authorities in policy implementation unless the policy is shown to be ultra vires or discriminatory—No such case made out. Disposition: Writ Petition dismissed on merits; refusal to renew arms licence upheld—Petitioner, however, at liberty to apply afresh for a new arms licence under prevailing law and policy.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Art. 199 & Art. 212(2)—Maintainability—Jurisdiction of Service Tribunal—Scope—Petitioner sought direction for nomination to Senior Management Course (SMC)—Held, the relief sought was not in respect of “terms and conditions of service” such as appointment, promotion, transfer, or disciplinary action, but rather for professional development opportunity; hence, the writ petition was maintainable and not barred by Art. 212(2) of the Constitution. (b) Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1973---- ----r. 3(2) read with S.R.O. 1025(I)/2008, dated 25-09-2008—Promotion to post of Director General (BPS-20)—Eligibility for SMC—Petitioner, a Director (Works) BPS-19 with over eleven years’ service and placed at Serial No.1 of the seniority list, fulfilled the prescribed criteria for nomination to SMC—Respondents’ plea that petitioner was not in promotion zone was inconsistent with the governing rules and Establishment Division’s O.M. No.5-4/2024-T-II/36 SMC dated 10-06-2024, which required consideration of all eligible BPS-19 officers in order of seniority. (c) Administrative law---- ----Discretionary powers—Duty to act fairly—Arbitrary withdrawal of nomination—Held, respondents first nominated the petitioner for SMC and later withdrew his nomination on technical grounds unsupported by law; such inconsistent and selective conduct amounted to arbitrariness, discrimination, and misuse of authority—Administrative discretion must be exercised fairly, transparently, and in accordance with statutory and policy framework. (d) Civil service---- ----Training and career progression—Legitimate expectation—A civil servant lawfully nominated for mandatory training acquires a legitimate expectation to attend unless disqualified by a lawful bar—Repeated exclusion of senior-most eligible officer violated the principles of merit, fairness, and good governance. (e) Constitutional jurisdiction---- ----Art. 199—Judicial review—Scope—Where executive action is arbitrary, discriminatory, or violative of statutory duty, High Court may grant corrective relief under Art.199 notwithstanding availability of internal administrative remedies. Disposition: Writ Petition allowed; respondents directed to nominate and select petitioner for the next forthcoming Senior Management Course (SMC) and submit compliance report through Registrar of Court.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 476---Power of Court to initiate proceedings for offences committed in relation to judicial proceedings---Scope and object---Purpose of S.476, Cr.P.C is to preserve the sanctity and dignity of the judicial process by empowering Courts to take action against those who give false evidence, submit forged documents, or otherwise abuse the process of law---Said power extends to civil, criminal and revenue Courts in respect of offences enumerated in Ss.193 to 196, 199 to 200, 205 to 211 and 228, P.P.C---Before initiating such proceedings, the Court is bound to hold a fair preliminary inquiry and provide opportunity of hearing to the accused in accordance with principles of natural justice---Failure to conduct such inquiry or to afford hearing renders the proceedings illegal and violative of due process of law---Reference made to Qazi Naveed ul Islam v. District Judge Gujrat (PLD 2023 SC 298) and Abdul Hakeem v. The State (1994 SCMR 1103). (b) ---Revisional jurisdiction---Exercise of power by Revisional Court under S. 435, Cr.P.C---Revisional Court had lawfully exercised its authority in remanding matter to Magistrate for proper inquiry under S.476, Cr.P.C---Revisional Court had neither exceeded its jurisdiction nor committed any illegality or irregularity---Order passed in accordance with law and procedural fairness---No ground for interference in constitutional jurisdiction of High Court. (c) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973--- ----Arts. 10-A & 13---Due process and protection against double punishment---Contention that passing of Impugned Order amounted to double punishment after imposition of costs at time of withdrawal of civil suit, held to be misconceived---Imposition of costs by Civil Court was civil in nature while direction for inquiry under S.476, Cr.P.C pertained to criminal liability for false verification and perjury---Two operate in distinct legal spheres and do not constitute double jeopardy---No violation of Arts.10-A or 13 of the Constitution made out. Petition dismissed.

Summary: (a) Service law—OGDCL (1994 Regulations)—Pro-forma/ante-dated promotion—Scope—Regulations 5 & 32—Held: The 1994 Service Regulations contain no mechanism for pro-forma or ante-dated promotion; promotions are against available vacancies and on merit/fitness/seniority per DPC criteria—no employee has a vested right to promotion merely by length of service. Reliance placed on Muhammad Amjad v. DG QDA (2022 SCMR 797) and Kashif Aftab Ahmed Abbasi v. Federation (2022 SCMR 1618). (b) Departmental policy—Qualification bar—Prospective effect—For promotion from EG-III to EG-IV (Senior Driller) the 2005 policy required a DAE (Electrical/Mechanical); petitioner lacking DAE was rightly not promoted w.e.f. 01-12-2005. In 2009 OGDCL revised policy removed the bar; petitioner accepted promotion w.e.f. 01-12-2009 under the new policy. Earlier eligibility cannot be retroactively claimed absent a rule permitting ante-dating. (c) Waiver/estoppel—Approbate and reprobate—Having accepted benefits under the 2009 policy (promotion to EG-IV and later EG-V), petitioner waived any claim to ante-date promotion to 2005 and is estopped from taking inconsistent positions. Principles reiterated from Jam Pari v. Muhammad Abdullah (1992 SCMR 786) and Combind Investment (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Wali Bhai (PLD 2016 SC 730). (d) Precedent—Party-specific relief—Zulfiqar-ul-Husnain v. OGDCL (2003 SCMR 1115) expressly confined to its appellants; could not be invoked to claim identical relief by others. (e) Constitutional jurisdiction—Judicial review limits—Art. 199—Courts do not substitute administrative discretion in service matters absent illegality, irrationality or procedural impropriety. Guidance from Dossani Travels (PLD 2014 SC 1) and Govt. of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa v. Hayat Hussain (2016 SCMR 1021). Disposition: Writ petition dismissed; claim for ante-dated promotion to EG-IV w.e.f. 01-12-2005 declined; promotions already granted under 2009 policy stand.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----S.12(2) & O. IX, R.13---Ex parte decree---Application for setting aside ex parte judgment and decree on ground of fraud and want of notice---Scope---Petitioner contended that ex parte judgment and decree were obtained without notice and by concealment of facts---Record revealed that petitioner and other defendants had actively participated in proceedings after restoration of suit from record room and attended several hearings through counsel---Their absence at later stages was found deliberate, and right of cross-examination was struck off after repeated adjournments---Held, petitioner’s claim of fraud and denial of hearing was unfounded---Ex parte decree was passed in accordance with law and no illegality was found in dismissal of application u/s 12(2), C.P.C. (b) ---Constitution of Pakistan, 1973--- ----Art.199---Constitutional jurisdiction---Concurrent findings of fact by Trial Court and Revisional Court---Scope of interference---Both Courts below found that petitioner had been negligent and provided multiple opportunities before being proceeded ex parte---Findings being concurrent and based on evidence, High Court in its constitutional jurisdiction cannot act as appellate or revisional forum to reappraise factual matters---No material illegality or jurisdictional defect established warranting interference. (c) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)--- ----Principle of laches---Delay in filing writ petition---Effect---Impugned judgment passed on 27.01.2016 while writ petition filed on 29.05.2017, showing delay of one year and four months---Explanation offered that certified copy could not be obtained due to missing record was unsupported by credible evidence---Held, delay unexplained and petition barred by laches---Court declined to condone delay in absence of sufficient cause. Petition dismissed.