Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)–––S. 96–––Regular First Appeal–––Scope of interference with findings of fact–––Appellant filed suit for recovery of insurance claim against insurance company which was dismissed by trial Court–––Plea of appellant that vehicle was stolen and insurance claim was wrongly repudiated–––Held, that appellate Court would not interfere with concurrent findings of fact unless judgment is shown to suffer from illegality, misreading or non-reading of evidence–––No such infirmity found; trial Court rightly concluded that appellant failed to substantiate claim with credible evidence–––Appeal dismissed. (b) Contract of insurance–––Claim repudiation–––Vehicle used for commercial purposes–––Policy exclusion–––Insurance company declined claim on ground that insured vehicle was being run on rent contrary to terms of policy–––Appellant’s own evidence and FIR showed that the vehicle was in possession of his friend who lodged the theft report–––Appellant failed to examine said person or produce corroborating evidence to rebut presumption of commercial use–––Held, insurer rightly declined liability under exclusion clause as risk covered did not extend to vehicle used for hire. (c) Civil procedure–––Pleadings and evidence–––Consistency–––Principle–––Party cannot lead evidence beyond pleadings–––Appellant alleged theft from outside his own house but evidence showed theft from outside house of another person–––Such material contradiction rendered case unreliable–––Court cannot consider evidence inconsistent with pleadings–––Reliance placed on Muhammad Naeem Khan v. Muqadas Khan (PLD 2022 SC 99) and Sardar Muhammad Naeem Khan v. Returning Officer, PP-12 (2015 SCMR 1698). (d) Evidence–––Burden of proof–––Articles 117 & 119, Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984–––Burden lies on party asserting a fact–––Appellant who alleged entitlement to indemnity under insurance contract failed to discharge onus by producing necessary witnesses or documents–––Failure to produce material witness (friend in whose custody vehicle was stolen) invited adverse inference–––Held, appellant failed to prove claim. Disposition: Appeal dismissed.

Summary: (a) National Accountability Ordinance, 1999–––Ss. 18(c) & 19–––Protective bail–––Scope and entitlement–––Petitioner sought protective bail in respect of a Call-Up Notice issued by NAB under Section 19 during inquiry under Section 18(c), NAO–––Held, that protective bail is an equitable and discretionary relief, granted only to enable an accused to approach the competent forum and not to defeat the process of law–––Petitioner failed to appear before NAB despite notice and invoked jurisdiction of multiple courts to obtain interim protection–––Conduct of petitioner disentitled him to equitable relief–––Petition dismissed. (b) Constitution of Pakistan–––Art. 10-A–––Fair trial and due process–––Extent of protection–––Right to fair trial does not immunize a litigant from lawful inquiry or excuse non-compliance with investigation notices–––Protective bail cannot be invoked as shield against lawful process or as a means to stall investigation. (c) Administration of justice–––Abuse of process–––Suppression of material facts and forum shopping–––Petitioner concealed pendency and outcomes of multiple petitions filed before different benches and the Peshawar High Court concerning same subject matter–––Held, that deliberate concealment and misrepresentation constitute abuse of judicial process and disentitle petitioner from equitable relief–––Court imposed exemplary costs and directed copy of order to be placed on record of related petitions. (d) Criminal Procedure–––Protective bail–––Duty of candor–––Misstatement in certification that petition is first of its kind amounts to misleading the Court–––Relief obtained by suppression or misrepresentation cannot be sustained. Disposition: Petition dismissed with exemplary costs of Rs.10,000 to be deposited with Deputy Registrar (Judicial) within ten days.

Summary: (a) Companies Ordinance, 1984–––Ss. 263 & 265–––SECP investigation into affairs of a company–––Source and limits of jurisdiction–––Show-cause notice issued under S. 265 and, thereafter, inspectors appointed to investigate based on a private shareholder complaint–––Held, S. 265 empowers the Commission to act suo motu (or upon a company’s resolution/court order) on the Commission’s own, independent satisfaction of the statutory indicators; where action is triggered by a shareholder complaint, S. 263 is the proper route and requires, inter alia, the statutory threshold of members holding not less than one-tenth of total voting power–––Proceedings initiated under S. 265 on the basis of a single shareholder’s complaint, without meeting S. 263’s threshold, were without lawful authority; show-cause and appointment of inspectors set aside. (b) Companies Ordinance, 1984–––S. 263–––Shareholder-triggered investigations–––Purpose of 10% threshold–––Statutory threshold is a substantive safeguard to prevent undue regulatory intrusion at the behest of individual shareholders; non-compliance vitiates proceedings commenced on such complaint. (c) Companies Act, 2017–––S. 513–––Validation clause–––Effect–––While S. 513 preserves legal effect of actions under the repealed Ordinance, such preservation does not cure foundational jurisdictional defects; action taken under an inapplicable provision or contrary to mandatory preconditions remains void ab initio. (d) Administrative / regulatory law–––Due process and “manner prescribed by law”–––Regulator must act strictly within the bounds of the enabling statute; when the law prescribes a particular manner, it must be followed and other modes are barred–––Proceedings commenced under an inapplicable provision, without satisfying mandatory preconditions, are unconstitutional, illegal and void. Reliance placed on Federation of Pakistan v. E-Movers (Pvt.) Ltd. (2022 SCMR 1021) and Chairman NAB v. Nasar Ullah (PLD 2022 SC 497). (e) SECP proceedings–––Provident fund non-compliance and land-advance allegations–––Parallel proceedings and prior rounds–––Record showed the provident-fund issue had already been separately proceeded with under the Companies Act, 2017 and disposed of via adjudication order dated 07-12-2021 after a payment plan; no basis remained for appointment of inspectors on that head–––As to alleged misappropriation in land-advance, SECP had earlier (2012–2013) sought and received documentation without culminating in adverse action; reopening via the impugned notice, without addressing the earlier round or explaining delay, reflected non-application of mind and offended procedural fairness–––SECP, however, retains liberty to initiate fresh, independent proceedings strictly in accordance with law. Disposition: Petition allowed; impugned show-cause notice and order appointing inspectors set aside.

Summary: (a) Companies Ordinance, 1984–––S. 231 vs. Ss. 263 & 265–––Inspection and investigation—distinct scope and consequences–––SECP’s “inspection” under S. 231 is an administrative, compliance-checking power confined to inspection of books of account/records after recording reasons; an “investigation” under Ss. 263/265 is a serious proceeding with potential financial/penal consequences and may be invoked only on statutory grounds and with due process safeguards–––Held, powers are mutually exclusive and cannot be intermingled; SECP cannot conduct an investigation under the cloak of an inspection. Reliance placed on Saif Power Ltd. v. Federation (2023 SCMR 714) and Atlas Power Ltd., W.P. No. 20088/2012 (LHC). (b) SECP–––Appointment of inspectors and show-cause–––Limits under S. 231–––SECP had, via “inspection” order/letter, appointed inspectors and tasked them beyond mere examination of books, effectively triggering an investigation without meeting Ss. 263/265 prerequisites or issuing show-cause–––Held, such overreach is without lawful authority; under S. 231 (now S. 221, Companies Act, 2017) SECP cannot appoint inspectors to investigate affairs or simultaneously set investigative tasks; before resorting to S. 265, prior show-cause and statutory preconditions are mandatory. (c) Administrative / regulatory law–––Substance over form–––Court will examine the real nature of the action; where reasons/tasks extend to probing allegations, misuse of funds, or business conduct beyond books/records, it is an investigation in substance and must satisfy Ss. 263/265 rather than S. 231. (d) Relief / directions–––SECP confined to inspection power–––SECP directed to strictly confine itself to S. 231 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 / S. 221 of the Companies Act, 2017 while conducting any inspection; restrained from resorting to investigative measures under the pretext of inspection–––If investigative powers are exercised under guise of inspection, petitioner may seek appropriate relief before the competent forum. (e) SECP Act, 1997–––S. 33(1) (amendment)–––Constitutional challenge–––Not adjudicated; petition disposed of on narrower grounds relating to the inspection/investigation distinction. Disposition: Petition disposed of with directions; SECP restrained from using inspection to undertake investigation.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan–––Arts. 4, 9, 15, 18 & 25–––Right to movement, livelihood and dignity–––Unlawful restriction on travel–––Petitioner, a private cook employed by an Air Commodore during his posting in Italy, was repeatedly detained at the airport and prevented from travelling abroad on the pretext of being an “Army Deserter”–––Record revealed that petitioner was never an employee of any branch of the Armed Forces–––Respondents failed to produce any proof of military employment or desertion–––Held, that placing petitioner’s name on Exit Control List (ECL) without lawful authority and in absence of any credible material amounted to arbitrary exercise of power and violation of fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 4, 9, 15, 18 and 25 of the Constitution–––Such administrative action could not be sustained. (b) Exit from Pakistan (Control) Ordinance, 1981–––S. 2–––Placing of name on Exit Control List–––Scope and limitations–––Petitioner’s name was placed on ECL on intelligence recommendation labeling him as a “deserter”–––No record or service history substantiated that claim–––Mere assumption or unverified intelligence input cannot justify curtailment of constitutional right to travel abroad–––Ministry of Interior and FIA required to act strictly within statutory framework and ensure that inclusion on ECL is supported by lawful material and due process. (c) Administrative law–––Due process and abuse of authority–––Duty of public functionaries–––Held, that no citizen may be deprived of liberty or right to travel except by due process of law–––Misuse of administrative discretion to obstruct petitioner’s lawful movement constituted abuse of power and violation of constitutional guarantees. (d) Fundamental rights–––Employment abroad–––Protection of livelihood–––Where petitioner’s overseas employment and visa renewal were jeopardized by arbitrary travel restrictions, Court intervened to protect his right to earn livelihood through lawful means abroad. Disposition: Petition allowed; respondents directed to forthwith remove petitioner’s name from Exit Control List and permit him to travel abroad.

Summary: (a) Civil procedure–––Maintainability of suit against cooperative society–––Jurisdiction of Civil Court–––Petitioner, a member of a registered cooperative housing society, sought specific performance of an agreement to sell plots—Held, that under Sections 51, 70 and 70-A of the Cooperative Societies Act, 1925, disputes between a member and the society concerning membership, allotment, or management are to be resolved under the statutory framework of the Act; Civil Courts are barred from entertaining such matters unless statutory preconditions are met—Failure to comply with Section 70-A notice requirement renders the plaint incompetent. (b) Cooperative Societies Act, 1925–––Sections 54, 70 & 70-A–––Scope and effect–––Statute provides a self-contained mechanism for dispute resolution, including arbitration before the Registrar—Before approaching a Civil Court, member must serve prior notice on the society and allow the prescribed period to lapse—Non-compliance with this mandatory requirement ousts Civil Court jurisdiction. (c) Specific performance–––Agreement to sell plots in cooperative housing society–––Where transaction arises from membership rights within a cooperative society, such agreements are governed by the society’s bylaws and the 1925 Act; remedy lies before Registrar, not Civil Court. (d) NOC cancellation or NAB investigation—irrelevance to jurisdiction–––Cancellation of CDA NOC or pendency of NAB inquiry does not vest Civil Courts with jurisdiction barred by statute; jurisdictional bar remains absolute irrespective of alleged illegality of the society’s affairs. Disposition: Appeal dismissed—Impugned order and decree dated 20-04-2019 upheld—Appellant advised to seek remedy before Registrar Cooperative Societies under the 1925 Act—No order as to costs.

Summary: (a) CDA acquisition & rehabilitation—possession not a pre-condition—Under S.32 Capital Development Authority Ordinance, 1960, acquired land vests in CDA upon making of the award, and possession may thereafter be taken by the Deputy Commissioner; neither the Ordinance nor CDA Land Acquisition & Disposal Regulations, 1961 (Reg.21) nor rehabilitation policies make allotment of rehabilitation plots contingent on “handover” of BuP possession by affectees—plea that plots could be denied absent such handover, rejected. Reliance: Ministry of Interior Employees CHS v. CDA (2025 CLC 75 [Isl.]). (b) Rehabilitation entitlement & policy framework—Definition of “Affectee” and plot entitlement under Islamabad Displaced Persons Rehabilitation Policy, 1984 (cl.2(1), cl.4) affirmed—oustees of Mouza Badia Qadir Bakhsh, whose BuPs stood acquired (Award 26-07-1987), remained entitled to rehabilitation plots per policy. (c) Compromise/Package Deal (June 1995) approved by CDA Board—binding effect—Where CDA negotiated, executed and Board-approved a compromise admitting entitlement of verified affectees and partially implemented it (some allotment letters issued), CDA is bound to honour remaining commitments; selective retreat violates good governance and fiduciary obligations of public authorities. Doctrine of legitimate expectation attracted. Reliance: NADRA v. Jawad Khan (2023 SCMR 1381); Noman Ahmed v. CDA (PLD 2021 Isl. 75). (d) Discrimination / Art.25 Constitution—CDA having allotted plots to some affectees on the very same Demolition List, Review Awards and package deal cannot later repudiate those documents for similarly placed affectees—“pick-and-choose” struck down as arbitrary and violative of Art.25. (e) Review Awards & demolition record—burden and proof—CDA failed to produce any inquiry/FIA report or competent adjudication declaring Review Awards “bogus”; its sole witness (DW-1) admitted payment of compensation against Review Awards/Demolition List and existence of affectees’ names; photocopy objections immaterial where CDA’s own witness and conduct acknowledge the records; authenticity stands. Articles 117–119, QSO 1984 discussed—party alleging fraud must prove it; CDA did not. (f) Possession and compensation/allotment—legal sequence clarified—Since vesting occurs on award (S.32 CDA Ordinance) and Reg.21 authorizes taking possession irrespective of payment status, CDA cannot defer rehabilitation allotments on the premise of “non-handover”; affectees were entitled to timely plots to resettle, the four-decade delay being unjustified. (g) Appellate remit after SC remand—On remand (SC order 14-05-2014) High Court re-appraised evidence/issues; Trial Court’s careful sifting (decreeing only verified claims and excluding unsubstantiated ones) found sound—no misreading/non-reading shown. (h) Disposition—Appeal dismissed; Judgment & Decree dated 31-07-2000 upheld—trial decree for specific performance/possession in favour of verified affectees maintained; CDA’s objections on BuP possession, “bogus” reviews, and evidentiary complaints fail.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----S. 514---Forfeiture of bond---Scope of Court’s powers---Surety’s CNIC, Passport, SIMs and bank accounts blocked by Trial Court upon absconsion of accused---Legality and proportionality of coercive measures---Held, that under S.514, Cr.P.C., the Trial Court may forfeit the bond and recover penalty from the surety upon failure to produce the accused or to show sufficient cause---However, the statute does not authorize additional coercive actions such as blocking of CNIC, Passport, SIMs, or freezing of bank accounts---Such actions directly interfere with fundamental rights and must satisfy the test of proportionality---In the absence of any allegation of mala fide or collusion between the surety and the absconding accused, the extreme measures adopted by the Trial Court were found to be excessive and unconstitutional. (b) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Arts. 9, 15 & 25---Fundamental rights---Restrictions on movement and deprivation of identification documents---Blocking of CNIC and Passport of surety found violative of fundamental rights to liberty, movement, and equality before law---Principle of proportionality applied---Court held that actions affecting personal liberty must have lawful basis and be the least restrictive means to achieve a legitimate aim---A surety, not being an accused or convict, cannot be subjected to punitive measures beyond the scope of bond forfeiture proceedings---Such actions were declared constitutionally infirm. (c) Administration of justice---- ----Natural justice---Right of hearing---Order passed without effective opportunity of hearing---Surety unable to appear or issue power of attorney due to blocked CNIC and Passport---Held, that the principle of audi alteram partem demands that no adverse order be passed without notice and opportunity to respond---Impugned order passed without affording due process rendered unsustainable. (d) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----S. 514---Deposit of surety amount---Petitioner’s offer to deposit full amount of PKR 500,000/- accepted---Purpose of surety bond achieved upon deposit---No further coercive action warranted---Trial Court directed to accept deposit and drop forfeiture proceedings accordingly. Disposition: Writ Petition allowed; Impugned Order dated 01.11.2024 set aside; CNIC, Passport, SIMs, and bank accounts of surety ordered to be unblocked subject to deposit of PKR 500,000/- before Trial Court within fifteen (15) days.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----S. 12(2)---Decree obtained by fraud or misrepresentation---Scope and maintainability---Eviction proceedings decided in absence of Petitioner---Petitioner claiming ownership on basis of agreements to sell and challenging decree under S.12(2) CPC---Held, that an agreement to sell does not itself create any title or proprietary rights in immovable property and ownership can only be transferred through a registered sale deed in terms of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882---Petitioner’s pending Suit for Specific Performance does not confer ownership rights until adjudicated by competent Court---Hence, he could not be considered a necessary party to the eviction proceedings, nor could the decree be declared void on that ground---Application under S.12(2) CPC was rightly dismissed by the Rent Controller. (b) Islamabad Rent Restriction Ordinance, 2001---- ----S. 17---Eviction proceedings---Non-impleadment of alleged owner in possession---Effect---Petitioner not being a tenant or registered owner of the premises, had no locus standi to challenge eviction order under rent laws---Ejectment decree passed between landlord and tenant found to be lawful and binding---Rent Controller and Appellate Court both correctly exercised jurisdiction in dismissing Petitioner’s plea. (c) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Art. 10-A---Right to fair trial---Scope---Principle of audi alteram partem not violated where person claiming ownership had no established legal right in the property and was neither tenant nor party to lease---No constitutional violation made out---Jurisdiction of Constitutional Court not attracted where findings are based on proper appreciation of law and evidence. Disposition: Writ Petition dismissed; Orders of Rent Controller dated 16.04.2025 and Additional District Judge dated 03.06.2025 upheld.

Summary: (a) Service laws (OGDCL)---- ----Oil and Gas Development Company Limited (Reorganization) Ordinance, 2001, S. 5; OGDCL Employees (Service) Regulations, 1994—Applicability—Employees appointed prior to promulgation of Ordinance, 2001—Held, petitioners having been appointed on regular basis before the Ordinance, 2001 are governed by the Regulations, 1994; their service terms stand protected under S. 5 of the Ordinance, 2001. (b) Service laws—Promotion---- ----OGDCL Employees (Service) Regulations, 1994, Regs. 5 & 32—Promotion not a vested right—Vacancy and criteria—Held, under Regs. 5 and 32, promotion is to be made on recommendations of the competent Promotion Committee, against available vacancies, on the basis of merit, fitness and seniority as per prescribed criteria; where an eligible in-house candidate exists, the vacancy is ordinarily to be filled by promotion, failing which by direct recruitment—No employee can claim promotion as of right merely on length of service or qualification—Court reiterated that antedated promotion/seniority cannot be claimed as a matter of right. Cited Cases: Muhammad Amjad v. DG QDA 2022 SCMR 797; Abdul Hameed v. M/o Housing & Works PLD 2008 SC 395; Abid Hussain Sherazi v. Secretary Industries 2005 SCMR 1742; Kashif Aftab Ahmed Abbasi v. Federation 2022 SCMR 1618. (c) Constitutional jurisdiction—Judicial review of administrative/policy discretion---- ----Art. 199—Scope—Courts do not substitute administrative judgments in promotion matters absent illegality, irrationality, or procedural impropriety—OGDCL’s refusal to grant promotion from EG-II to EG-IV did not disclose any such infirmity—No grounds made out to interfere. Cited Cases: Dossani Travels (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Travels Shop (Pvt.) Ltd. PLD 2014 SC 1; Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa v. Hayat Hussain 2016 SCMR 1021. (d) Constitutional petitions—Laches and delay---- ----Art. 199—Reasonable time—Impugned promotion orders dated 30.11.2010 challenged in 2023—Inordinate, unexplained delay of about 13 years—Equitable relief declined on laches; reasonable time to approach Constitutional Court generally 90 days—Petitions dismissed on this ground as well. Cited Cases: PIA v. Tanveer-ur-Rahman PLD 2010 SC 676; Ahmed v. Ghama 2005 SCMR 119; also followed: 2016 SCMR 183; PLD 2016 SC 872; 2019 SCMR 1720; PLD 2016 SC 514; Ardeshir Cowasjee v. KBCA 1999 SCMR 2883; Muhammad Din v. Abdul Ghani 2012 SCMR 1004. (e) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Arts. 4, 10-A, 25 & 38—Alleged denial of fair trial, equality and socio-economic protection—Held, in absence of a vested right to antedated promotion and where the regulatory scheme conditions promotion on vacancy and prescribed criteria, no breach of fundamental rights was established; mere disparity with other employees or length of service does not ground a Constitutional claim. Disposition: Writ Petitions dismissed on merits as well as on the principle of laches.