Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) ---- O. XXXIX, Rr. 1 & 2 ---- Temporary injunction --- Scope and principles --- Interim relief cannot amount to granting main relief --- Financial loss is not “irreparable loss” --- Held, for grant of interim injunction, three conditions must coexist: (i) prima facie case; (ii) balance of convenience; and (iii) irreparable loss --- Mere apprehension of financial loss does not constitute irreparable injury --- Respondent’s claim that auctioning a new cattle market site would cause him financial loss was speculative and not supported by evidence --- Injunction granted by Trial Court effectively allowed the main relief without trial, contrary to settled law --- Reliance placed on Islamic Republic of Pakistan v. Muhammad Zaman Khan (1997 SCMR 1508) and Qazi Inamul Haq v. Heavy Foundry & Forge Engineering (Pvt.) Ltd. (1989 SCMR 1855) --- Impugned order held to be unsustainable. (b) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877) ---- S. 42 ---- Declaratory suit challenging auction proceedings --- Maintainability --- Legal character or right to property must be established --- Where plaintiff’s own contractual rights remain unaffected and no legal character is infringed, declaratory relief cannot be sought --- Respondent’s grievance regarding new auction sites did not involve any existing right in property or legal status --- Suit not maintainable under S. 42. (c) Administrative discretion ---- Auction of additional sites for public convenience ---- Judicial restraint ---- Appellant (Metropolitan Corporation Islamabad) within its lawful authority to advertise new sites for cattle markets to accommodate public needs --- Distance of nearly 10 km between existing and new sites demonstrated separate catchment areas --- Decision aimed at facilitating general public and did not violate respondent’s rights --- No mala fide or illegality established --- Judicial interference declined. (d) Civil procedure ---- Interlocutory orders ---- Nature and limits ---- Object of temporary injunction is to maintain status quo, not to create a new situation or pre-empt main relief --- Trial Court’s order staying auction of additional sites virtually decided main controversy without evidence --- Held, improper exercise of discretion and contrary to settled principles. Disposition: Application for impleadment dismissed; appeal allowed; impugned order dated 22.05.2025 set aside; appellant restored to conduct auction in accordance with law.

Summary: (a) Services—Hajj Welfare Staff (Muavineen/Nazims) selection—Hajj quota reduction and merit threshold—Final selection subject to scrutiny and operational requirements—Held, although 880 candidates were initially shortlisted through NTS, final deployment was contingent on scrutiny by the Ministry’s committee and actual requirements in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia; owing to a reduced Hajj quota, only 450 posts (400 field/support; 50 supervisory) were allocated within Muavineen/Nazims—Elevation of merit threshold was a rational consequence of limited vacancies—No material showed any deployment outside the announced merit or without mandatory NTS screening. Hajj and Umrah (Regulation) Act, 2024, S. 3; Hajj Policy, 2025, Cl. 15(ix). (b) Constitution of Pakistan—Arts. 4, 25 & 27—Allegation of arbitrariness, discrimination and non-merit pick-and-choose—Burden—Petitioners, though shortlisted, failed to show that any lower-merit or untested person was deployed, or that the Ministry departed from the notified criteria—No mala fides or breach of statutory duty established—Interference declined. (c) Judicial review—Administrative discretion in specialized operational deployment—Scope—Where deployment numbers and composition are tied to host-country laws/logistics and Cabinet-approved policy, courts will not substitute administrative judgment absent illegality, mala fides or violation of mandatory rules—None demonstrated. (d) Alternate/parallel remedy—Approach to Wafaqi Mohtasib—One petitioner having already seized the Wafaqi Mohtasib with the same grievance—Parallel adjudication under Art. 199 deprecated; factor weighs against writ intervention. (e) Relief—Directions sought to issue notifications to remaining ~450 shortlisted candidates and to restrain alleged favoritism—Not granted—No illegality, arbitrariness, or constitutional infringement found in the final selection and deployment. Disposition: Petitions dismissed; no case for interference made out.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ---- Art. 199 ---- Maintainability of constitutional petition ---- Service under non-statutory rules ---- Scope and effect ---- Petitioner, employee of Canteen Stores Department (CSD), challenged order of Full Bench National Industrial Relations Commission (NIRC) upholding his dismissal from service ---- Held, CSD neither a statutory body nor a department of the Federal Government, not included in Schedule III to the Rules of Business, 1973 ---- Internal service instructions of CSD (Revised Instructions and Procedures Manual, 2006) have no statutory force ---- Relationship between CSD and its employees purely contractual, creating a master–servant arrangement ---- Where service rules are non-statutory, no public law element arises and constitutional jurisdiction under Art.199 cannot be invoked. Cited cases: Chairman, Board of Control, CSD v. Muhammad Azam Khan (Civil Appeal No. 515 of 2025); PIAC v. Tanweer-ur-Rehman PLD 2010 SC 676; PIAC v. Syed Suleman Alam Rizvi 2015 SCMR 1545; Abdul Wahab v. HBL 2013 SCMR 1383; Pakistan Defence Officers’ Housing Authority v. Lt. Col. Syed Jawaid Ahmed 2013 SCMR 1707; Syed Nazir Gilani v. Pakistan Red Crescent Society 2014 SCMR 982; Pakistan Electric Power Company v. Syed Salahuddin 2022 SCMR 991 ref. (b) Constitutional jurisdiction ---- Consent or silence of parties ---- Jurisdictional competence cannot be conferred by acquiescence ---- High Court bound to determine its own jurisdiction even if not objected to by the parties ---- Absence of statutory backing for terms of service bars exercise of writ jurisdiction. (c) Industrial relations ---- National Industrial Relations Commission (NIRC) ---- Jurisdiction ---- CSD not an “industry” or “commercial establishment” within meaning of applicable labour laws ---- Dispute between CSD and its employee not amenable to NIRC jurisdiction under Industrial Relations Acts. Disposition: Petition dismissed as not maintainable; High Court declined to exercise jurisdiction under Art.199 due to non-statutory nature of petitioner’s employment.

Summary: Acquittal ---- (a) Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 — S. 9(c) — Criminal trial — Standard of proof — Benefit of doubt — Prosecution case rested on alleged recovery of 1,301g heroin from appellant’s house following his disclosure at the airport — No contraband recovered from vehicle at airport; air ticket of appellant admittedly neither recovered nor taken into possession — Material contradictions inter se prosecution witnesses regarding the nature of the wrapping/parceling of narcotics (polythene bag vs. unknown wrapping) — Held: where a single material circumstance creates a reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to acquittal as of right; prosecution failed to prove charge beyond reasonable doubt. Tariq Pervez v. The State 1995 SCMR 1345 ref. (b) Criminal procedure — Investigation by complainant himself — Legality and effect — Inspector who headed the raid acted as complainant and Investigating Officer — Such practice disapproved; Investigating Officer must remain neutral and is often a material witness for the defence — Investigation by complainant can cause prejudice and undermines confidence in fairness of inquiry. Police Rules, 1934, r. 25.2(3); State v. Bashir PLD 1997 SC 408 ref. (c) Appreciation of evidence — Recovery proceedings — Absence of independent corroboration — Chain of custody — Although sample was dispatched to NIH and chemical report obtained, surrounding circumstances (no recovery at airport, no air ticket, contradictions about packing, and investigation by complainant) rendered the prosecution story unsafe for conviction — Courts will not bolster a doubtful recovery with a positive laboratory report when foundational facts are shaky. (d) Criminal jurisprudence — Interlocutory/ancillary facts — Non-examination of material aspects — Where investigation and core facts give rise to reasonable doubt, benefit must go to accused; doubts are not to be resolved in favour of prosecution. Disposition: Appeal allowed; conviction and sentence under S. 9(c), CNSA set aside; appellant acquitted; to be released forthwith if not required in any other case; benefit of S. 382-B, Cr.P.C. already extended noted.

Summary: (a) Enforcement of Women’s Property Rights Act, 2020 — Ss. 4, 5 & 11 — Jurisdiction of FOSPAH — Bar on civil courts and injunctions — Complaint filed by female heirs before Federal Ombudsman (FOSPAH) seeking possession and partition of inherited property — Held, FOSPAH lawfully exercised powers under Ss. 4 & 5 of the 2020 Act to secure women’s property rights; once Section 4 is triggered, Section 11 expressly bars any court or authority from granting injunctions or questioning validity of FOSPAH’s actions — Parallel civil proceedings subsequently instituted by petitioner cannot oust FOSPAH’s jurisdiction — Rais Munir Ahmed v. Women Ombudsperson Punjab (2024 MLD 822) & Fajar Ali v. Mst. Jamila (PLD 1969 Lahore 545) ref. (b) Constitution of Pakistan — Art. 199 — Writ against interim and lawful administrative orders — Maintainability — Representation before the President under the Act dismissed as premature since FOSPAH’s order was interim and just; constitutional jurisdiction not attracted absent illegality, mala fides or lack of jurisdiction — No misreading or violation of law found in concurrent findings of FOSPAH and the President — Interference declined. (c) Doctrine of Limine Control — Summary dismissal of unmerited petitions — High Court reaffirmed principle that petitions lacking prima facie grounds may be dismissed at limine to prevent unnecessary process and delay — Reliance placed on Asif Saleem v. Chairman BOG University of Lahore (PLD 2019 Lahore 407) and Muhammad Mustafa v. Government of Pakistan (PLD 1992 SC 62). (d) Succession and property transfer — CDA direction — FOSPAH’s direction to Capital Development Authority to transfer suit house among all legal heirs upheld as consistent with mandate of the 2020 Act. Disposition: Petition dismissed in limine; FOSPAH and Presidential orders upheld; no interference warranted.

Summary: (a) Wafaqi Mohtasib — Representation before President Secretariat — Withdrawal recorded — Effect. The President Secretariat’s Legal Consultant recorded on 10-02-2025 that WAPDA’s DG (Recruitment) withdrew WAPDA’s representation against the Mohtasib’s recommendations (para-7 of the order). Having elected to withdraw, the Petitioner could not later re-agitate the same challenge via constitutional jurisdiction on a contrary factual stance. (b) Mohtasib’s jurisdiction — Maladministration in recruitment/merit list — Articles 2(2) & 9, President’s Order, 1983. Complaint alleged reduction of marks (74.1→72.4) and displacement on the Punjab Open Quota list for AXEN (Electrical). Such allegations squarely fall within “maladministration” (Art. 2(2): arbitrary, unreasonable, discriminatory, or departure from rules/procedure) and within the Mohtasib’s mandate to investigate “any Agency” for maladministration (Art. 9(1)). (c) Bar under Art. 9(2) — ‘Personal service grievance of a public servant’ — Inapplicable. The complainant was not an employee asserting a personal service dispute with his employer; he was a candidate for fresh appointment. Hence, the Art. 9(2) exclusion for internal service grievances of a serving public servant did not oust jurisdiction. (d) Service matters vs. recruitment oversight — Scope. Oversight to rectify arbitrary departures from notified recruitment criteria, unexplained tampering with marks, or non-transparent list placement is administrative justice, not adjudication of a civil service dispute; Mohtasib’s recommendations to restore merit fall within the statutory remit. Authorities cited by the Petitioner regarding non-justiciability of “service matters” before the Mohtasib were distinguished on facts. (e) Conduct of Agency — Estoppel/clean hands. After withdrawing its representation before the President Secretariat, and in the face of implementation directions issued on 25-02-2025, WAPDA could not claim pendency or seek re-opening through writ; its plea of “pending clarification” was meritless. Disposition: Writ Petition dismissed. Federal Ombudsman’s recommendations dated 18-10-2024 and President Secretariat order dated 10-02-2025 sustained; directions for implementation to hold field.

Summary: (a) Penal Code, 1860 — S. 365-B (kidnapping/abduction to compel for illicit intercourse) — Standard of proof — Delayed nomination & supplementary statement — FIR initially lodged against unknown persons; appellant first nominated five days later through a supplementary statement without disclosure of any new material. Such belated accusation, absent explanation, is inherently suspect and cannot safely sustain conviction; supplementary statements carry no independent evidentiary value to improve the prosecution case. Akhtar Ali v. State (2008 SCMR 6); Kashif Ali v. ATC-II Lahore (PLD 2016 SC 951) ref. (b) Criminal trial — Recovery narrative — Independent corroboration — Complainant’s account that appellant “led” him to a house, opened a locked room, and the parties then jointly proceeded to the police station is unnatural; no neutral/public witness from the densely populated locality associated with the alleged recovery. Omission to secure independent attestation in such circumstances renders the recovery story doubtful. (c) Sexual assault allegation — Medical corroboration — Adverse inference from refusal — IO moved for medical examination on recovery; the abductee declined examination and pregnancy test was negative. In rape-linked prosecutions, prompt medical evaluation is a vital, objective aid; refusal, without cause, materially weakens the charge. (d) Defence plea of lawful marriage — Evidentiary effect — Civil remedy not pursued — Defence produced Nikah-khawan (DW-1) and Nikahnama (Exh.DA). Abductee’s assertion of a forced/invalid marriage was never tested through a civil action (e.g., suit for jactitation/nullity), which omission further dents the prosecution narrative. (e) Benefit of doubt — Scope — Prosecution evidence suffered from material infirmities (belated nomination; uncorroborated recovery; lack of medical proof; contradictions). Under settled law, even a single reasonable doubt entitles the accused to acquittal as of right, not concession. Muhammad Mansha v. State (2018 SCMR 772); Tariq Pervez v. State (1995 SCMR 1345) ref. Disposition: Appeals allowed. Conviction and sentence under S. 365-B, PPC set aside; appellant acquitted and to be released forthwith if not required in any other case.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Art. 199---Maintainability---Scope of constitutional jurisdiction---Petitioner, a PhD scholar, sought directions to the Higher Education Commission (HEC) for adjustment of scholarship funding from March 2023 instead of November 2024, reimbursement of tuition and maintenance expenses incurred due to delay, and inclusion of the period of Fall Session from March 2023 to November 2024 in the Final Award Letter---Held, that the petitioner had been granted a provisional offer of scholarship on 07.07.2022 under the Overseas Scholarship for PhD in Selected Fields Phase-III/Advanced Skills Development Program, with specific terms and conditions---Petitioner proceeded abroad in March 2023 without prior approval or issuance of a Final Scholarship Award, without execution of the mandatory legal bond, and without submission of required documents---The provisional award letter did not create any vested or enforceable right until issuance of the Final Award---As the petitioner had subsequently consented to the final terms of the scholarship through email dated 29.12.2024 and accepted the Final Scholarship Award dated 18.02.2025, he could not thereafter challenge its terms before the High Court---Where a petitioner voluntarily accepts contractual conditions, constitutional jurisdiction cannot be invoked to rewrite or alter the agreed terms---Petition was therefore not maintainable under Article 199 of the Constitution. (b) Contractual obligation---Execution of scholarship award---Effect of acceptance of final terms---HEC acted within its authority in fixing the effective date of funding from 01.11.2024, as the petitioner had consented to those terms---Having accepted the final offer and received the benefits thereunder, the petitioner was estopped from challenging the conditions of the Final Award---Provisional scholarship did not confer a legal entitlement to earlier payments, and petitioner’s self-financed period prior to the effective date could not be reimbursed---Petition dismissed. (c) Administrative discretion---Financial constraints---HEC’s action in deferring scholarship funding---HEC had temporarily suspended issuance of Final Scholarship Awards due to financial constraints and direction from the Finance Division not to create further foreign exchange liabilities for fiscal year 2023-2024 without prior concurrence---Such policy-based financial decisions fell within administrative discretion and did not constitute arbitrariness or mala fide exercise of power---No violation of fundamental rights was established. Petition dismissed.

Summary: (a) Contract Act, 1872 — Ss. 2, 10 & 29 — Specific Relief Act, 1877 — S. 12 — Specific performance — Certainty and enforceability of agreement — Agreement to sell dated 20-07-2004 pertained to an un-allotted plot in a housing scheme; petitioner possessed no existing title or transferable right. An agreement founded on a prospective allotment lacking certainty of subject matter is speculative and unenforceable. Courts below failed to apply settled principle that only a definite, identifiable property can be specifically enforced. (b) Limitation Act, 1908 — Art. 113 — Period for suit for specific performance — Commencement of limitation — Suit instituted on 10-07-2019 after fifteen years of agreement execution. No plea or proof of later refusal or continuing cause of action; hence time-barred. Finding of appellate court that limitation did not commence absent explicit refusal held contrary to Muhammad Ramzan v. Muhammad Qasim (2011 SCMR 249). (c) Evidence — Burden of proof — Payment of consideration — Only Rs. 113,000 proved as down payment; balance Rs. 500,000 denied by petitioner. No documentary proof of further payment produced by respondent No. 1; his inconsistent stance that entire amount stood paid contradicts written agreement requiring payment at transfer. Appellate decree based on conjecture, not evidence. (d) Relief beyond pleadings — Jurisdictional impropriety — Trial court’s direction to refund double the advance was neither pleaded nor supported by issues or evidence; such relief was beyond jurisdiction and legally untenable. (e) Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — S. 115 — Scope of revisional jurisdiction — High Court found material irregularity and misapplication of settled law by both courts below. Specific performance for non-existent plot already transferred to a third party constituted improper exercise of jurisdiction; interference warranted. Disposition: Civil revision allowed; appellate judgment and decree dated 22-07-2024 set aside; respondent No. 1’s suit for specific performance dismissed. Petitioner directed to refund admitted Rs. 113,000 to respondent No. 1.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ----Ss. 145, 561-A----Disputed possession when civil litigation is pending---Subservience of s.145 Cr.P.C. to orders of Civil Court---Parties were already before the Civil Court regarding the disputed property and a status-quo order had been passed---Held, when title/possession is sub judice before a Civil Court, proceedings under s.145 Cr.P.C. are not sustainable; the criminal court must stay its hands and cannot render findings that may conflict with the Civil Court’s determination---The learned Additional Sessions Judge rightly interfered with the Magistrate’s sealing order, noting the pendency of civil suits and status-quo; no illegality shown warranting exercise of inherent jurisdiction under s.561-A---Petition under s.561-A, Cr.P.C., dismissed as misconceived. Cited cases: Muhammad Akbar v. The State PLD 1968 SC 281; Shah Muhammad v. Haq Nawaz PLD 1970 SC 470. (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ----Ss. 107/151, 145----Preventive jurisdiction and breach of peace---Scope---Where apprehension of breach of peace exists but civil proceedings over the same property are pending and regulated by orders of the Civil Court, the proper recourse is to bind down parties under ss.107/151 Cr.P.C.; attachment, sealing, or delivery of possession under s.145 is impermissible in such circumstances---Criminal process cannot be used to overreach or nullify civil orders. (c) Appellate/revisional oversight over Magistrate’s orders under s.145 Cr.P.C.----Standard of interference---Where the Magistrate proceeds under s.145 despite the matter being seized by the Civil Court, the revisional court is justified in setting aside such action to prevent conflict of decisions and to preserve the primacy of civil adjudication on title/possession---No material irregularity or legal infirmity demonstrated in the impugned revisional order; interference declined under s.561-A. Petition dismissed.