Summary: (a) Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 ----Arts. 175F(1)(c), 202A, 199(1)(a)(i), 199(1)(a)(ii), 199(1)(b)(i), 199(1)(b)(ii), 199(1)(c) & 10A----Constitutional jurisdiction----Distribution of jurisdiction between Constitutional Benches and Regular Benches of High Court----Dominant object theory----Petitioner challenged vires of Section 109-A of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 and notice issued thereunder before Sindh High Court----Ad-interim order restraining respondents from passing adverse orders was granted by High Court on 20.12.2023----After passage of Constitution (Twenty-sixth Amendment) Act, 2024, matter was listed before Constitutional Bench of Sindh High Court which recalled interim order on 05.05.2025 on ground that it had effect of suspending operation of law----Said order was challenged through petition for leave to appeal which stood transferred to Federal Constitutional Court pursuant to Art. 175F(1)(c) after passage of Constitution (Twenty-seventh Amendment) Act, 2025----Jurisdiction is foundational issue that must be determined at very beginning of any proceeding and court that is authorized to render final judgment or order on lis is one vested with competence to adjudicate it----Legitimacy and finality of any judgment depend on whether bench delivering it had lawful authority to do so----Jurisdictional certainty is essential not only for validity of judicial decisions but also for safeguarding right to fair trial under Art. 10A of Constitution and for ensuring due process----Prior to Constitution (Twenty-seventh Amendment) Act, 2025, Art. 202A authorized Constitutional Benches of High Court to hear only matters falling under Art. 199(1)(a)(i) and Art. 199(1)(c), corresponding to writs of mandamus, prohibition and enforcement of fundamental rights----After Twenty-seventh Amendment, Art. 202A was expanded and Constitutional Benches now possess exclusive jurisdiction over full range of writ matters exercised under Art. 199----Dominant object theory requires court to look at primary relief sought in constitutional petition to identify appropriate forum----Character of relief claimed determines which bench has authority to hear petition----When validity of law is challenged and writ is filed before High Court seeking judicial review, court is exercising authority under Art. 199(1)(a)(ii), namely power to issue writ of certiorari, assessing action to be without lawful authority and of no legal effect----Challenge to vires of statute falls within ambit of Art. 199(1)(a)(ii) as it amounts to seeking declaration that impugned legislative provision is without lawful authority and of no legal effect----High Courts possess inherent power of judicial review as feature of constitutional framework----As guardians and protectors of Constitution, High Courts possess, under Art. 8 read with Art. 199(1)(c), authority to scrutinize legislation on touchstone of fundamental rights----Even where no specific fundamental right is directly involved, High Courts retain inherent authority to declare law ultra vires if it conflicts with any provision of Constitution----Oath taken by judges binds them to preserve, protect and defend Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan----If judge is faced with situation in which statute conflicts with Constitution, he cannot truly preserve, protect and defend Constitution if unable to strike down impugned law----It is inherent in jurisdiction and duty of High Court to strike down laws that are ultra vires to Constitution----Writ of certiorari envisaged in Art. 199(1)(a)(ii) may be issued against any individual performing functions connected with affairs of Federal, Provincial, or local authorities----High Court is empowered to intervene whenever act or proceeding is undertaken in violation of law or any well-established legal principle----Person mentioned in Art. 199(1)(a)(ii) includes Legislature as they are within ambit of body politic mentioned in Art. 199(5)----Petitioner assailed vires of Section 109-A of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 for being contrary to Entry 47 and 31 of Federal Legislative List and notice issued under that provision on multiple legal grounds----Said challenge, in substance, amounts to seeking writ under Art. 199(1)(a)(ii)----If High Court were to allow petition, Section 109-A would be declared without lawful authority and of no legal effect and notice issued thereunder would automatically become ineffective as ancillary consequence----Central relief sought in petition was challenge to vires of law, which constitutes relief under Art. 199(1)(a)(ii), namely declaration that impugned law is ultra vires----Under erstwhile Art. 202A, such relief did not fall within jurisdiction of Constitutional Bench----Interim relief may only be granted by forum that is empowered to render final decision----Constitutional Bench from start lacked competence to hear matter involving issuance of writ under Art. 199(1)(a)(ii), and interim order it passed was without jurisdiction----After enactment of Constitution (Twenty-seventh Amendment) Act, 2025, exclusive writ jurisdiction lies solely with Constitutional Benches, and Regular Benches of High Court no longer possess this authority----Petition was allowed, converted into appeal and accepted; impugned order was set aside and matter was remanded to Sindh High Court for fresh adjudication on application for interim relief before Constitutional Bench. Cited Cases: • Kh. Muhammad Fazil v. Mumtaz Munnawar Khan Niazi (deceased) through his legal heirs 2024 SCMR 1059 • Benazir Bhutto (Miss) v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1988 SC 416 • Attock Cement case 2024 SHC 1302 • Sharjeel Inam Memon CP D-473 of 2025 • Marbury v. Madison 5 U.S. 137 (1803) • Rahim Shah v. Chief Election Commissioner PLD 1973 SC 24 • Federation of Pakistan v. Aitzaz Ahsan PLD 1989 SC 61 • Khawaja Adnan Zafar v. Hina Bashir 2024 SCMR 1295 (b) Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 ----Art. 202A----Constitutional Benches----Ad-interim orders----Suspension of operation of law----Challengeability before appellate forum----High Court, while exercising constitutional jurisdiction under earlier form of Art. 202A, proceeded on assumption that order dated 20.12.2023 had effect of suspending operation of law----Impugned order restrained respondents from passing any adverse orders against petitioner till next date of hearing----This in essence suspended operation of law which could not have been done----No authority acting legally could be refrained by courts from acting until vires of law has been determined by courts----It is well-settled principle of constitutional interpretation that until law is finally held to be ultra vires for any reason it should have its normal operation----High Court, although proceeded on right assumption that effect of statute was suspended via interim order, however, as bench acted without jurisdiction, it committed significant error of passing ad-interim order without jurisdiction----Although ad-interim orders are not ordinarily disturbed due to their temporary nature, such orders may nevertheless be interfered with where jurisdictional defect is present or illegality has occurred----Appellate court empowered to assess interim orders provided preceding conditions are met----According to established practice, settled principles of law and policy, ordinarily interim orders passed by High Court are not interfered and such intervention is warranted only in exceptional circumstances involving flagrant violation of law, wrongful exercise of jurisdiction or manifest grave injustice. Cited Cases: • Federation of Pakistan v. Aitzaz Ahsan PLD 1989 SC 61 • Khawaja Adnan Zafar v. Hina Bashir 2024 SCMR 1295 (c) Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 ----S. 109-A----Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, Arts. 199(1)(a)(ii) & 202A----Challenge to vires of statutory provision----Jurisdiction of Constitutional Bench vis-a-vis Regular Bench----Petitioner submitted declaration under 2018 Amnesty Scheme, paid certain amount, and disclosed ownership of foreign company----Petitioner was issued notice under S. 109-A of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, provision introduced through Finance Act, 2018----Petitioner filed constitutional petition challenging both validity of S. 109-A and impugned notice itself on independent legal grounds in addition to vires challenge----Ad-interim order restraining respondents from passing final adverse order was granted----Matter was later listed before Constitutional Bench of Sindh High Court which recalled interim order on ground that it had effect of suspending enactment/provision under consideration----Challenge to vires of S. 109-A for being contrary to Entry 47 and 31 of Federal Legislative List, in substance, amounts to seeking writ under Art. 199(1)(a)(ii)----Under erstwhile Art. 202A, Constitutional Bench lacked jurisdiction to hear matter involving challenge to vires of statute as such relief fell under Art. 199(1)(a)(ii)----Interim order passed by Constitutional Bench was without jurisdiction----Matter remanded for fresh adjudication before Constitutional Bench which now possesses jurisdiction after Constitution (Twenty-seventh Amendment) Act, 2025. Disposition: Petition allowed, converted into appeal and accepted. Impugned order dated 05.05.2025 passed by Constitutional Bench of Sindh High Court set aside. Matter remanded to Sindh High Court for fresh adjudication on application for interim relief before Constitutional Bench.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ---- Arts. 4 & 14; Art. 10A (presumption of innocence); Police Rules, 1934, r. 24.5; Police Order, 2002, Art. 10(3); Punjab Right to Public Services Act, 2019, s. 10 - Police Record Certificates (PRCs) and acquittals—Disclosure of non-conviction data—Right to be dealt with in accordance with law and dignity—Held, inclusion in a PRC of any case that has culminated in acquittal, discharge, or cancellation (Category-1 matters) is unconstitutional and unlawful as it offends Arts. 4 and 14 and undermines the presumption of innocence protected by Art. 10A—Such disclosure carries stigma which a “no adverse effect” notation cannot cure—Absent an express statutory framework authorizing calibrated disclosure with safeguards, police cannot publish non-conviction history in PRCs—Directions issued to omit the petitioner’s acquitted case from PRC and to re-issue within ten days; however, preservation of internal records under r. 24.5 remains unaffected. (b) Police administration—Disclosure vs. preservation—Standing Orders/SOPs cannot substitute legislation ----Police Rules, 1934, r. 24.5; Police Order, 2002, Art. 10(3); Punjab Right to Public Services Act, 2019, ss. 4(1), 10 ---- Rule 24.5 mandates preservation of FIR registers and related entries for sixty years; it does not authorize disclosure to third parties through PRCs—IGP’s Standing Order No. 2 of 2024 and related SOPs may regulate internal processes but do not create substantive power to disclose criminal-record information—PRPSA is procedural and applies only to Gazette-notified services; issuance of PRCs (and disclosure of non-conviction data therein) is not shown to be duly notified—Reliance on Art. 10(3) of the Police Order and s. 10 PRPSA to justify PRC disclosures is misplaced. (c) Criminal justice—Effect of acquittal; presumption restored in full ----Art. 10A; Cr.P.C., ss. 249-A, 345(6); Evidence—Standards ---- An acquittal by a competent court confers a “double presumption of innocence” and restores legal and social standing; Pakistani jurisprudence recognizes that all acquittals are honourable, whether on merits or by benefit of doubt; no shades of acquittal—Any State action that re-stigmatizes by publicizing the concluded accusation must meet strict legality, necessity, and proportionality; without statute, Category-1 matters must be excluded from PRCs. Cited: Muhammad Shafi v. Muhammad Raza (2008 SCMR 329); Chairman ADBP v. Mumtaz Khan (PLD 2010 SC 695); The State v. Abdul Khaliq (PLD 2011 SC 554); Muhammad Bashir v. SHO (PLD 2007 SC 539). (d) Pending cases and convictions—Future legislative path ----Structured disclosure only by statute ---- Pending proceedings (Category-2) may justify calibrated disclosure for narrowly defined, role-specific contexts (e.g., sensitive employment), but only under specific legislation articulating offence classes, relevance, necessity, and proportionality tests—Conviction history (Category-3) likewise requires statutory calibration; blanket, context-free disclosure is inconsistent with contemporary standards of privacy and dignity—Comparative regimes (UK/Australia/US) are statutory and filtered; Pakistan lacks equivalent legislation. (e) Judicial directions in Zulfiqar Ali (PLD 2023 Lahore 512)—Limited scope ---- Directions there concern accuracy and status-updating of records filed in judicial proceedings; they neither address nor authorize disclosure of non-conviction data in PRCs—Reliance on Zulfiqar Ali to justify PRC disclosures is misconceived. (f) Consent and “citizen-driven” issuance—No waiver of fundamental rights---- A PRC sought to satisfy administrative requirements (e.g., visas) is not a voluntary waiver of Arts. 4 or 14—Consent under administrative compulsion cannot validate an otherwise unauthorized disclosure. (g) Comparative law—Inapplicability absent statute ---- UK case law on Enhanced Certificates (e.g., AR v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police [2018] UKSC 47) operates within a detailed statutory framework (Police Act 1997; statutory guidance; filtering)—Pakistan has no comparable legislative scheme; importing outcomes without statutory footing is impermissible. (h) Maintainability—Ripeness---- Objection of prematurity overruled—The impugned PRC had already been issued for use in a visa process; risk of denial/delay and reputational harm is concrete and immediate; petition is ripe for adjudication. Cited: Mughal-e-Azam Banquet Complex v. Federation (2011 PTD 2260); Sabira Khatoon (2021 PLC (C.S.) 1600); Muhammad Hammad-ur-Rehman Zafar (PLD 2022 Lahore 177). (i) Misstatement in PRC—Correction mandated; dignity engaged---- PRC wrongly recorded acquittal as under s. 494 Cr.P.C. (withdrawal) whereas judicial record shows s. 249-A Cr.P.C. (reasoned acquittal)—This mischaracterization is substantive, not semantic; it diminishes the judicial nature of exoneration and offends dignity—Correction directed. (j) Record deletion vs. non-disclosure ---- Prayer to delete petitioner’s name from PSRMS/CRMS declined—Police are bound to preserve FIR indexes and case outcomes for sixty years under r. 24.5—Constitutional protection is achieved by prohibiting public disclosure of Category-1 matters in PRCs, not by erasing lawful internal records—This does not preclude disclosure when specifically required by statute or court order. (k) Service/disciplinary proceedings—Autonomy preserved---- Exclusion of acquitted matters from PRCs does not bar permissible departmental action under service law/Police Rules (e.g., r. 16.3) where independently warranted; standards and objectives differ from criminal adjudication. Cited: Muhammad Nawaz Khan v. IGP Punjab (2023 PLC (C.S.) 884). (g) Disposition — Petition allowed to this extent: Respondents shall, within ten days of receipt of certified copy, issue a revised PRC to the petitioner omitting any reference to FIR No. 570/2016 and correctly reflecting her status; preservation and annotation of internal police records under r. 24.5 remain intact; nothing herein precludes disclosure where specifically mandated by statute or court order; no order as to costs. Cited cases (select): • Waqas Khan v. The State (PLD 2025 Peshawar 67) • Zulfiqar Ali v. Ex officio Justice of Peace (PLD 2023 Lahore 512) • Jawwad S. Khawaja v. Federation (PLD 2024 SC 337) • Muhammad Shafi v. Muhammad Raza (2008 SCMR 329) • Chairman ADBP v. Mumtaz Khan (PLD 2010 SC 695) • Muhammad Bashir v. SHO (PLD 2007 SC 539) • Mughal-e-Azam Banquet Complex (2011 PTD 2260) • Muhammad Hammad-ur-Rehman Zafar (PLD 2022 Lahore 177) • AR v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police [2018] UKSC 47

Summary: "Adjournments on the part of learned counsel appearing on behalf of the accused cannot be counted as an act or omission on the part of the accused to delay the conclusion of the trial" --- Bail granted --- (a) Criminal Procedure—Statutory bail on delay ----Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, S. 497(1) third proviso; Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, Ss. 302/34 Accused arrested on 27.12.2022; trial not concluded beyond two years—Held, right to bail on statutory ground accrues as of right once the stipulated period expires and trial remains unconcluded, unless delay is attributable to the accused—Computation runs from date of detention in the case, not from framing of charge. Cited Cases: • PLD 2022 SC 112 (Nadeem Samson v. The State) • 2024 SCMR 28 (Muhammad Usman v. The State) (b) Delay attributable to accused—Effect of defence adjournments ----Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, S. 497(1) third proviso Mere adjournments sought by defence counsel do not per se defeat the statutory right; only adjournments without sufficient cause on crucial hearings, or a patterned design to delay, count against the accused—Record showed major delays due to non-availability of prosecution witnesses; even excluding limited defence-caused delay, custody still exceeded two years. Cited Case: • 2022 SCMR 1 (Shakeel Shah v. The State) (c) Exceptions to statutory bail—“Hardened, desperate or dangerous” etc. ----Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, S. 497(1) sixth proviso To invoke the sixth proviso, court must form an opinion on material that the accused is a previously convicted, hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal, or involved in terrorism—No such material produced; exception inapplicable. Cited Case: • PLD 1990 SC 934 (Moundar v. The State) (d) Constitutional guarantee—Speedy and fair trial ----Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 10-A Prolonged incarceration without reasonable prospect of early conclusion offends the right to fair and expeditious trial; continued custody serves no useful purpose where statutory period has elapsed and prosecution delays predominate. (e) Additional references ----Practice and procedure—Calculation and approach to delay Courts must assess cumulative impact on progress of trial rather than mathematical exclusion of every date sought by defence; attendance of witnesses and readiness for evidence are central considerations. Cited Cases: • 2024 YLR 2029 • 2015 P.Cr.L.J 259 • 2018 P.Cr.L.J 140 (g) Disposition — Bail allowed on statutory ground; petitioner admitted to bail upon furnishing bonds of Rs. 200,000 with two sureties each in the like amount to the satisfaction of Illaqa/Duty Judicial Magistrate, who shall ensure sureties are local, reliable and men of means.

Summary: (a) Family Courts Act, 1964 ----S. 9(1) & 9(5A) (as substituted/inserted by the Punjab Family Courts (Amendment) Act, 2015)---Written statement—statutory timeline and consequence—Earlier view in Maqsood Ahmad (2001 CLC 567) held inapplicable—After the 2015 amendment, the defendant must file the written statement on the date fixed under S.8; for sufficient reasons the Family Court may allow filing on the next date not exceeding fifteen days; failing which the defence stands struck off under S.9(5A). Reliance on pre-amendment case-law to assert “no time limit” is misconceived. Cited Cases: • Maqsood Ahmad v. Judge Family Court, Burewala (2001 CLC 567) [distinguished owing to post-2015 legal position] (b) Family Courts Act, 1964 ----S. 9(1) & 9(5A)---Extension of time—scope of “sufficient reasons” and constitutional oversight—Where the statutory period lapsed and defence was struck off after repeated adjournments (with costs and final warning), the High Court, exercising constitutional jurisdiction, may in exceptional circumstances allow one further opportunity conditioned on costs to prevent failure of justice, without diluting the amended scheme of S.9. Cited Cases: • Sajawal v. Judge Family Court, Multan (2020 YLR 359) (c) Constitution of Pakistan ----Art. 10-A---Right to fair trial—Valuable right to defend—Preference for decisions on merits over technical defaults—Courts may lean towards affording a final opportunity, subject to costs, where denial would disproportionately impair the right to a fair hearing, particularly in maintenance matters affecting fundamental family rights. (d) Practice and procedure ----Counsel’s mistaken advice from mufassil—Lenient view in procedural defaults—While ignorance of law is no excuse, precedents recognize that litigants should not invariably suffer for counsel’s bona fide error; delay/omission may be condoned to advance substantial justice in appropriate cases. Cited Cases: • Abdul Rauf v. Khurshid Ali (1992 SCMR 592) • Ali Muhammad v. Qaisar Mehmood Shah (1991 SCMR 1114) • Badrul Haque Khan v. Election Tribunal, Dacca (PLD 1963 SC 704) • Atta-Ur-Rehman v. Abdul Wahab (2007 MLD 1603 Lahore) • Sajawal v. Muhammad Din (2000 CLC 267 Lahore) (e) Family Courts Act, 1964 ----S. 8 & S. 9---Case management—Multiple opportunities and costs—Where the Family Court had granted successive dates, imposed costs, and issued an absolute last/final opportunity before striking off, the High Court nonetheless intervened once—strictly conditioned—to balance procedural discipline with substantive justice, without casting any opinion on the merits of the underlying maintenance claim. (g) Disposition— Writ petition allowed in the foregoing terms—Order striking off the right to file written statement set aside—One final opportunity granted to file written statement before the Family Court subject to payment of Rs.5,000 as costs to the other side on production of the High Court’s order; upon payment, the trial court shall fix a date for filing and proceed thereafter—On failure, the Family Court shall continue in accordance with law—Notice to private respondents dispensed with to avoid delay and expense; liberty reserved to them to seek resurrection for decision afresh on merits.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code, 1908 ----O. XVII r. 3—Closure of evidence/cross-examination—Pre-conditions—Where defendant, after recording of examination-in-chief (DW-1 on 31-10-2024), repeatedly defaulted in appearance for cross-examination despite multiple dates, costs, and explicit “last and final” warnings, Trial Court rightly invoked O. XVII r. 3 CPC to close (i) defendant’s evidence and (ii) right of cross-examination. Mere appearance through proxy counsel and a bare plea of illness without any medical document is not “sufficient cause.” (b) Revisional jurisdiction ----S. 115 CPC—Scope—Interference lies only for jurisdictional error, illegality, material irregularity, or perversity—Impugned Order closing evidence after chronic non-compliance reflected a proper exercise of discretion; no jurisdictional defect or perversity shown—Revision not maintainable. (c) Fair trial ----Art. 10-A, Constitution—Natural justice—No denial where ample, meaningful opportunities were afforded and repeatedly squandered—Courts must prevent abuse of process; law favors the vigilant, not the indolent. (d) Practice & procedure ----Adjournments—Standards—Courts are obligated to move litigation to finality; serial, unreasoned adjournments cannot be claimed as of right. Recent Supreme Court guidance (CPLA No. 1033-L/2024) reiterated that after multiple opportunities, costs, and final cautions, O. XVII r. 3 CPC may be applied to decide the lis on available material; similar principles affirmed in 2024 SCMR 887; PLD 2024 SC 672; 2020 SCMR 300; 2015 SCMR 1401. (e) Evidence ----Cross-examination—Consequences of absence—Where a party produces its witness but persistently withholds the witness from cross-examination, the court may lawfully foreclose that party’s evidence/rights and proceed to decision on the record already available. (g) Disposition — Civil Revision dismissed. Impugned Order dated 21-01-2025, closing the petitioner’s evidence and right of cross-examination under O. XVII r. 3 CPC, upheld; case to proceed on available record; no order as to costs.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)–––Ss. 22-A & 22-B–––Application for registration of criminal case–––Scope and object–––Respondent No. 4 filed an application under Sections 22-A & 22-B, Cr.P.C. before the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace alleging abduction of her son by unknown persons in official uniform–––Learned Justice of Peace, upon obtaining report from police, directed registration of a case–––Petitioner contended that the order was passed without hearing him and in ignorance of material facts showing involvement of respondent’s family members in various criminal cases–––Held, that proceedings under Sections 22-A & 22-B, Cr.P.C. are meant to ensure that a citizen’s complaint regarding commission of a cognizable offence is duly entertained and that no person is deprived of legal recourse owing to inaction of police–––Justice of Peace rightly exercised jurisdiction to direct registration of FIR when the report showed unexplained delay between respondent’s 15-call and formal arrest of her son, giving rise to reasonable apprehension of unlawful detention–––No illegality or irregularity found in the impugned order directing registration of FIR. (b) Constitution of Pakistan–––Arts. 4, 9 & 10–––Fundamental rights–––Unlawful detention–––Protection of liberty–––Court observed that wrongful confinement of respondent’s son by police amounted to gross violation of fundamental rights guaranteed under Arts. 4, 9 and 10 of the Constitution–––Such conduct reflected abuse of authority and disregard for rule of law and could not be condoned. (c) Administration of justice–––Exercise of revisional or constitutional jurisdiction–––Interference with orders of Ex-Officio Justice of Peace–––High Court held that where an order is well-reasoned and based on proper appreciation of record, no interference is warranted–––Petition challenging order dismissed accordingly. Disposition: Petition dismissed.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)–––S. 497–––Cancellation of bail–––Principles governing recall of bail order–––Petitioner, accused in FIR No.561/2021 under Section 406, PPC, was granted post-arrest bail on the basis of a written compromise/Iqrarnama dated 01.07.2022–––Her bail was later recalled by the trial Court for breach of the agreed terms, and the order was upheld in revision–––Held, that once bail is granted on the basis of a conditional compromise voluntarily executed by the accused herself, any failure to comply with those conditions constitutes sufficient cause for its recall–––Accused did not object to the compromise deed when it was recorded in her presence before the Magistrate, nor did she challenge its validity before any competent forum–––Allegation of coercion or duress raised belatedly after default was devoid of merit–––No illegality found in cancellation of bail based on breach of voluntarily agreed conditions. (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)–––S. 497–––Bail granted on compromise–––Effect of breach–––Although bail cannot ordinarily be made conditional, when an accused seeks release based on a settlement and undertakes specific obligations, those undertakings become enforceable–––Default or non-compliance with such voluntarily assumed conditions justifies recall of bail–––Practice deprecated where accused obtain conditional bail and later retract under pretext of coercion after benefiting from release. (c) Constitution of Pakistan–––Arts. 4, 9 & 10-A–––Due process and protection of liberty–––Scope–––Court held that cancellation of bail in consequence of non-compliance with a lawful compromise does not violate constitutional guarantees of liberty or due process when the bail order itself arose from voluntary consent of the accused–––No violation of fundamental rights established. (d) Administration of justice–––Supervisory jurisdiction of High Court–––Interference with concurrent findings–––Where both the trial Court and revisional Court have passed concurrent reasoned orders after examining the record, the High Court would not interfere in constitutional jurisdiction absent illegality or material irregularity–––Both Courts below rightly concluded that the petitioner failed to honour her own undertakings and that cancellation of bail was lawful. Disposition: Petition dismissed.

Summary: (a) National Accountability Ordinance, 1999–––Ss. 18(c) & 19–––Protective bail–––Scope and entitlement–––Petitioner sought protective bail in respect of a Call-Up Notice issued by NAB under Section 19 during inquiry under Section 18(c), NAO–––Held, that protective bail is an equitable and discretionary relief, granted only to enable an accused to approach the competent forum and not to defeat the process of law–––Petitioner failed to appear before NAB despite notice and invoked jurisdiction of multiple courts to obtain interim protection–––Conduct of petitioner disentitled him to equitable relief–––Petition dismissed. (b) Constitution of Pakistan–––Art. 10-A–––Fair trial and due process–––Extent of protection–––Right to fair trial does not immunize a litigant from lawful inquiry or excuse non-compliance with investigation notices–––Protective bail cannot be invoked as shield against lawful process or as a means to stall investigation. (c) Administration of justice–––Abuse of process–––Suppression of material facts and forum shopping–––Petitioner concealed pendency and outcomes of multiple petitions filed before different benches and the Peshawar High Court concerning same subject matter–––Held, that deliberate concealment and misrepresentation constitute abuse of judicial process and disentitle petitioner from equitable relief–––Court imposed exemplary costs and directed copy of order to be placed on record of related petitions. (d) Criminal Procedure–––Protective bail–––Duty of candor–––Misstatement in certification that petition is first of its kind amounts to misleading the Court–––Relief obtained by suppression or misrepresentation cannot be sustained. Disposition: Petition dismissed with exemplary costs of Rs.10,000 to be deposited with Deputy Registrar (Judicial) within ten days.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----S. 12(2)---Decree obtained by fraud or misrepresentation---Scope and maintainability---Eviction proceedings decided in absence of Petitioner---Petitioner claiming ownership on basis of agreements to sell and challenging decree under S.12(2) CPC---Held, that an agreement to sell does not itself create any title or proprietary rights in immovable property and ownership can only be transferred through a registered sale deed in terms of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882---Petitioner’s pending Suit for Specific Performance does not confer ownership rights until adjudicated by competent Court---Hence, he could not be considered a necessary party to the eviction proceedings, nor could the decree be declared void on that ground---Application under S.12(2) CPC was rightly dismissed by the Rent Controller. (b) Islamabad Rent Restriction Ordinance, 2001---- ----S. 17---Eviction proceedings---Non-impleadment of alleged owner in possession---Effect---Petitioner not being a tenant or registered owner of the premises, had no locus standi to challenge eviction order under rent laws---Ejectment decree passed between landlord and tenant found to be lawful and binding---Rent Controller and Appellate Court both correctly exercised jurisdiction in dismissing Petitioner’s plea. (c) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Art. 10-A---Right to fair trial---Scope---Principle of audi alteram partem not violated where person claiming ownership had no established legal right in the property and was neither tenant nor party to lease---No constitutional violation made out---Jurisdiction of Constitutional Court not attracted where findings are based on proper appreciation of law and evidence. Disposition: Writ Petition dismissed; Orders of Rent Controller dated 16.04.2025 and Additional District Judge dated 03.06.2025 upheld.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 476---Power of Court to initiate proceedings for offences committed in relation to judicial proceedings---Scope and object---Purpose of S.476, Cr.P.C is to preserve the sanctity and dignity of the judicial process by empowering Courts to take action against those who give false evidence, submit forged documents, or otherwise abuse the process of law---Said power extends to civil, criminal and revenue Courts in respect of offences enumerated in Ss.193 to 196, 199 to 200, 205 to 211 and 228, P.P.C---Before initiating such proceedings, the Court is bound to hold a fair preliminary inquiry and provide opportunity of hearing to the accused in accordance with principles of natural justice---Failure to conduct such inquiry or to afford hearing renders the proceedings illegal and violative of due process of law---Reference made to Qazi Naveed ul Islam v. District Judge Gujrat (PLD 2023 SC 298) and Abdul Hakeem v. The State (1994 SCMR 1103). (b) ---Revisional jurisdiction---Exercise of power by Revisional Court under S. 435, Cr.P.C---Revisional Court had lawfully exercised its authority in remanding matter to Magistrate for proper inquiry under S.476, Cr.P.C---Revisional Court had neither exceeded its jurisdiction nor committed any illegality or irregularity---Order passed in accordance with law and procedural fairness---No ground for interference in constitutional jurisdiction of High Court. (c) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973--- ----Arts. 10-A & 13---Due process and protection against double punishment---Contention that passing of Impugned Order amounted to double punishment after imposition of costs at time of withdrawal of civil suit, held to be misconceived---Imposition of costs by Civil Court was civil in nature while direction for inquiry under S.476, Cr.P.C pertained to criminal liability for false verification and perjury---Two operate in distinct legal spheres and do not constitute double jeopardy---No violation of Arts.10-A or 13 of the Constitution made out. Petition dismissed.