Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Arts. 9, 10-A & 199—Fundamental rights—Concurrent vs. consecutive sentencing—Jurisdiction of High Court—Sentence awarded under FCR regime—Conversion of consecutive sentences into concurrent ones—Scope— Petitioner was convicted under the Frontier Crimes Regulation, 1901 (FCR) for offences under Sections 302 and 365-A PPC and sentenced to 14 years’ R.I. on each count, amounting to 28 years of imprisonment. He sought a writ declaring the Assistant Political Agent’s order illegal for mandating consecutive sentencing. High Court held that although the impugned order did not explicitly mention the term “consecutive,” the language implied consecutive sentencing, which, under Section 35 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.), is not permissible beyond an aggregate of 14 years unless expressly ordered. Held, courts have discretion under Sections 35 and 397 Cr.P.C. to direct that sentences run concurrently. In absence of such direction, sentences run consecutively. However, where aggregate punishment exceeds 14 years or life terms are involved, superior courts have consistently interpreted such punishments as concurrent to avoid illegality and to secure the ends of justice. Petitioner’s case warranted exercise of such judicial discretion, and his plea for concurrent sentencing was found valid. High Court declared that the sentences must run concurrently. ----Cited Cases: • Shah Hussain v. The State, PLD 2009 SC 460 • Ishfaq Ahmad v. The State, 2017 SCMR 307 • Mst. Zubaida v. Falak Sher & others, 2007 SCMR 548 • Muhammad Sharif v. The State, 2014 SCMR 668 • Faiz Ahmed v. Shafiq-ur-Rehman, 2013 SCMR 583 • Ghulam Haider v. The State, 1984 SCMR 887 • Sajjad Ikram v. Sikandar Hayat, 2016 SCMR 467 "The most crucial question to be determined is whether in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, a High Court can order the conversion of consecutive sentences into concurrent ones, despite not being a trial or appellate/revisional court? It is imperative to recognize that this Court possesses inherent jurisdiction as well under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 in addition to its constitutional jurisdiction. Section 561-A Cr.P.C. is broad in scope empowering the Court to pass any order necessary to prevent the abuse of the process of court and to secure the ends of justice."

Summary: Bail granted----(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898): ----S. 497(1), third & fourth provisos—Bail—Statutory delay in conclusion of trial—Two-year limit—Scope and interpretation— Petitioner was arrested on 27.12.2022 in a murder case registered under Sections 302/34 PPC. His initial bail application was declined on merits, but after the lapse of two years of incarceration without conclusion of trial, he moved for bail on statutory grounds under the third proviso to Section 497(1) Cr.P.C. The record revealed that although some adjournments were sought by petitioner’s counsel due to professional preoccupations, the major cause of delay was the non-availability of prosecution witnesses. Held, mere adjournments sought by counsel do not constitute delay attributable to the accused unless they are repeated, unjustified, and sought on crucial dates. The trial had not concluded even after two years and nearly three months, which violated the statutory time frame. Under the settled law, the right to bail on statutory grounds cannot be defeated except when delay is attributable to the accused. The petitioner had not been shown to be a previously convicted, hardened, desperate, or dangerous criminal under the fourth proviso to Section 497(1). His continued incarceration, despite the delay being largely on part of the prosecution, was unjustified. ----Cited Cases: • Shakeel Shah v. The State, 2022 SCMR 1 • Nadeem Samson v. The State, PLD 2022 SC 112 • Muhammad Usman v. The State, 2024 SCMR 28 • Moundar v. The State, PLD 1990 SC 934 • 2024 YLR 2029 • 2015 PCrLJ 259 • 2018 PCrLJ 140 ----Disposition: Bail granted on statutory grounds; petitioner admitted to bail upon furnishing surety bonds of Rs. 200,000/- with two sureties to the satisfaction of the trial court. "(a) Mere adjournments on the part of learned counsel appearing on behalf of the accused cannot be counted as an act or omission on the part of the accused to delay the conclusion of the trial, unless the same are sought without any sufficient cause on crucial hearings. Thus, mathematical counting of all the dates of adjournments sought on behalf of the accused is not sufficient to deprive the accused of his right to bail. (b) The statutory period for the conclusion of the trial begins from the date of the detention of the accused and not from the date when the charge is framed and trial commenced. The object of recognition of a right to be released on bail on statutory grounds, subject to meeting the conditions described under the third and fourth provisos of section 497(1) of the Cr.P.C., is to ensure that criminal trials are not unnecessarily delayed and that the prosecution is not enabled to prolong the incarceration or hardship of an accused awaiting trial. (c) Speedy and fair trial is a fundamental right of every accused person as envisaged under Article 10-A of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. Whereas admittedly the trial in the case is in progress, there is no hope of its completion in the near future; thus, keeping the petitioner behind bars for an indefinite period will serve no useful purpose.

Summary: (a) Maintainability of Constitutional Petition – Departmental Appeal & Alternative Remedies Where a disciplinary order is challenged on the ground of violation of due process and statutory safeguards, constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 is maintainable, even without exhausting departmental remedies under Section 16 of the PEEDA Act, 2006. The High Court held that when the impugned action is patently illegal and violates Articles 4 and 10A of the Constitution, relegating the petitioner to alternate remedies is not justified. → Dr. Akhtar Hassan Khan v. Federation of Pakistan (2012 SCMR 455); Bashir Ahmad v. LDA (2020 SCMR 471) (b) PEEDA Act 2006 – Applicability to Contract Employees – Due Process Required Under Clause 8 of the Contract Policy, 2004, PEEDA applies to contract employees. Even then, safeguards such as due process and fair hearing must be ensured before imposing major penalties. Summary removal without inquiry, especially when the absence from duty is attributed to abduction and enforced disappearance, violates the principles of natural justice. (c) Show Cause Notice & Findings Beyond Allegations The disciplinary authority is required to strictly confine itself to the allegations stated in the Show Cause Notice. Any punitive findings based on matters not disclosed in the SCN—such as suspicions regarding family members or extraneous assumptions—render the order void ab initio. → Sanaullah Sani v. Secretary Education (2024 SCMR 80); Faisal Ali v. DPO Gujrat (2025 SCMR 92) (d) Departmental Inquiry – Mandatory in Cases of Disputed Willful Absence Where allegations of willful absence are contested and supported by plausible documentary material (e.g., FIR of abduction, orders by the Commission on Enforced Disappearances), a regular inquiry becomes mandatory. Dispensation with inquiry in such a case is arbitrary and a denial of fair trial rights under Article 10A. → Ghulam Muhammad Khan v. PM of Pakistan (1996 SCMR 802); SSP v. Shahid Nazir (2022 SCMR 327) (e) Disproportionate Penalty – Removal from Service The major penalty of removal from service must be proportional to the established misconduct. In the absence of inquiry and failure to prove willful misconduct, imposing removal from service is excessive and unlawful. The punishment must align with the degree of culpability. → NBP v. Roz-ud-Din (2025 SCMR 160); Secretary Food Dept v. Javed Iqbal (2006 SCMR 1120) (f) Rule of Law and Public Trust – Article 4 & 10A Constitution Article 4 guarantees the right to be treated in accordance with law. Public functionaries are under a constitutional duty to act fairly and in good faith. Orders that are arbitrary, fanciful, or punitive without basis undermine institutional credibility and public trust in governance. → Brig. Muhammad Bashir v. Abdul Karim (PLD 2004 SC 271); Farheen Rashid Case (2011 SCMR 1) ---Disposition: Petition allowed. Impugned removal order dated 27.11.2019 set aside. The petitioner shall be deemed to be in continued service and his case shall be reconsidered afresh by the Board in accordance with the law and observations of the Court.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----S. 115—Revisional jurisdiction—Scope—Concurrent findings of fact—Registered sale deed—Improper reversal by High Court—Non-speaking order—EffectAppellants filed suit for possession and mesne profits on the strength of a registered sale deed dated 05.03.1989. Trial Court decreed the suit, holding appellants as owners and respondent in illegal possession. First Appellate Court affirmed findings. However, Revisional Court, while exercising jurisdiction under S. 115 CPC, reversed concurrent findings without providing cogent reasons or identifying jurisdictional errors. Supreme Court held that Revisional Courts cannot act as another appellate forum and must refrain from reassessing evidence unless findings are perverse or contrary to law. Reversal without reasoning, and without addressing binding nature of registered deed or prior litigation, amounted to a serious legal error. Impugned judgment of High Court set aside—Findings of Trial and Appellate Courts restored.Cited Cases:• District Council Sialkot v. Nazir Ahmed Khan 2001 SCMR 1641• Lahore Development Authority v. Sharifan Bibi 2010 SCMR 742(b) Evidence Act (I of 1872)----S. 91 & S. 92—Registered sale deed—Presumption of validity—Challenge to title—Burden of proof—Failure to prove consideration—EffectRespondent alleged he had paid consideration to the father of appellants, claiming joint ownership of suit property. Supreme Court held that once a registered sale deed stands in favour of appellants, presumption of ownership arises, and burden lies on the challenger to rebut it through cogent evidence. Respondent failed to produce any proof of alleged payments or joint ownership and did not seek specific performance or refund. Courts below rightly disregarded vague oral assertions. Revisional Court's failure to address these evidentiary gaps rendered its interference unwarranted and contrary to settled law.(c) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)—S. 42—Declaratory relief—Challenge to registered instrument—Delay and failure to obtain relief—ConsequencesRespondent challenged appellants' title in a separate suit for cancellation of registered deed, which was dismissed by Trial Court and upheld by Appellate Court. Supreme Court noted that belated claims seeking cancellation without concurrent pursuit of specific relief or refund have no legal sanctity. Failure to challenge ownership through appropriate legal remedies bars collateral assertions in defence. Courts must give due weight to registered title documents when unassailed or unsuccessfully challenged—Revisional Court erred in undermining conclusive effect of prior judgments.(d) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----S. 9—Jurisdiction of civil court—Possession suit—Nature and maintainability—Mischaracterization by High Court—EffectAppellants' suit was for possession and mesne profits, duly based on title acquired through registered sale deed. Supreme Court disapproved High Court's characterization of such suit as one for “administration,” noting it had no basis in pleadings or relief sought. Misreading of record by Revisional Court led to misapplication of law and unwarranted interference with valid decrees. Such jurisdictional error warranted correction under constitutional appellate jurisdiction.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----Ss. 100 & 101—Second Appeal—Scope and jurisdiction—Concurrent findings—Substitution of equitable discretion by High Court—ImpermissibilitySecond Appeal under Section 100 CPC lies only on limited grounds, including decision contrary to law or containing substantial procedural defects affecting the merits of the case. The Supreme Court reiterated that High Court, in exercise of Second Appellate jurisdiction, cannot substitute its own view merely on equitable considerations, particularly when the First Appellate Court had reversed the Trial Court's decree by applying discretion judiciously and in accordance with law. In the instant case, the High Court interfered with the First Appellate Court's findings without establishing any substantial question of law, thereby exceeding the permissible scope under Sections 100 and 101 CPC. Supreme Court held that such interference amounted to sitting as a Court of First Appeal—Impugned order of High Court set aside—Judgment of First Appellate Court restored.Cited Cases:• District Council Sialkot v. Nazir Ahmed Khan 2001 SCMR 1641• Mir Abdullah v. Muhammad Ali 1977 SCMR 280(b) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)—S. 12—Specific performance of contract—Discretionary relief—Readiness and willingness—Delay in deposit of consideration—Effect—Doctrine of equityRelief of specific performance is discretionary and dependent upon consistent readiness and willingness of the plaintiff to perform contractual obligations. In the present case, the plaintiff/respondent failed to deposit balance consideration during prolonged litigation spanning seven years, and only upon the trial court's directive was such payment ordered. Supreme Court held that failure to deposit consideration during pendency showed lack of bona fides and disentitled the respondent from equitable relief. Additionally, the Court noted that market value of plots had appreciated considerably during the intervening years, which, coupled with retention of unpaid amount by plaintiff, militated against the grant of specific performance. Trial Court’s adjustment of consideration for three out of four plots, excluding one deceased defendant, was deemed speculative and unsupported by record—First Appellate Court rightly exercised discretion in refusing specific performance.(c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----S. 96—First Appeal—Findings on facts—Sanctity and weight—When immune from interferenceFindings of fact by the First Appellate Court, when based on proper appraisal of evidence and supported by record, are not liable to be disturbed in Second Appeal under Section 100 CPC. Supreme Court observed that while the High Court may disagree with the findings, it cannot replace its own view unless the findings are perverse, contrary to law, or cause miscarriage of justice. In the absence of such circumstances, appellate findings must prevail even if divergent from those of the trial Court. High Court’s action of substituting its view amounted to reappreciation of facts, beyond the lawful scope of Section 100 CPC—Principle of finality in litigation reaffirmed.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (a) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – O.VII R.11 – Punjab Irrigation, Drainage and Rivers Act, 2023, S.189 – Rejection of plaint – Scope – Suit for declaration challenging orders passed by Canal Authorities under the repealed Canal and Drainage Act, 1873 – Maintainability – Held, orders were challenged on grounds of mala fide, conspiracy, and violation of natural justice – Jurisdiction of Civil Court not ousted retrospectively by 2023 Act when proceedings originated under 1873 Act – Trial Court erred in rejecting plaint under O.VII R.11 without framing issues or allowing evidence – Civil Court can examine legality of actions where allegations of excess or lack of jurisdiction, mala fides, or violation of law are raised.(b) Punjab Irrigation, Drainage and Rivers Act, 2023 – S.189 – Ouster of Civil Court’s jurisdiction – Interpretation – Held, ouster clauses must be construed strictly – Section 189 does not retrospectively bar jurisdiction of Civil Court in matters where rights accrued under repealed law (Canal and Drainage Act, 1873) – Unless clear legislative intent exists to bar jurisdiction over pending or accrued matters, Civil Courts retain authority to adjudicate civil disputes.(c) General Clauses Act, 1956 (Punjab) – S.4 – Effect of repeal – Scope – Repeal of statute does not affect rights accrued, liabilities incurred, or legal proceedings commenced under repealed statute – Suit instituted in respect of rights or grievances arising under repealed law can proceed as if repeal had not occurred – Application of maxim: Nova Constitutio Futuris Formam Imponere Debet, Non Praeteritis.(d) Specific Relief – Judicial review – Actions of Canal Authorities challenged on grounds of lack of hearing, ex-parte decision, and malafide exercise of power – Held, where statutory authorities act beyond jurisdiction or violate natural justice, ouster clause does not apply – Civil Court has jurisdiction to determine legality and validity of such acts.(e) Civil Procedure – O.VII R.11 – Premature rejection of plaint – Principle – Held, rejection of plaint without inquiry into facts and framing of issues is not sustainable – Trial Court must allow parties to produce evidence on jurisdictional and legal questions before rejecting suit – Reference made to Abbasia Cooperative Bank v. Hakeem Hafiz Muhammad Ghous (PLD 1997 SC 03).Disposition:Civil Revision allowed. Orders of the Trial and Appellate Courts rejecting the plaint set aside. Suit restored and remanded to Trial Court to frame issues regarding jurisdiction and legality of Canal Authorities’ actions, and decide the matter after recording evidence.Cited Cases:Abbasia Cooperative Bank v. Hakeem Hafiz Muhammad Ghous (PLD 1997 SC 03)Muhammad Saif Ullah v. LDA (PLD 2021 Lahore 168)Ch. Zafar Hussain v. Border Area Committee (2012 MLD 1538)Mr. Muhammad Jamil Asghar v. Improvement Trust, Rawalpindi (PLD 1965 SC 698)Province of Punjab v. Haji Yaqoob Khan (2007 SCMR 554)Cited Legislation & Provisions:Punjab Irrigation, Drainage and Rivers Act, 2023, Ss. 189, 205Canal and Drainage Act, 1873, Ss. 67, 68Punjab General Clauses Act, 1956, S.4Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, O.VII R.11, S.9

Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 324, 396 & 149---Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance (VI of 1979), S. 17(4)---Qatl-i-amd, murder with dacoity, unlawful assembly, haraabah---Appreciation of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Withholding source of information regarding names and identities of accused---Scope---Accused were charged that they made firing upon the complainant party; the brother of complainant was hit and died during the dacoity---Complainant claimed that about two/four days prior thereto the main occurrence, he and his two brothers had the opportunity to see accused “GS” along with four unknowns---One of brothers of complainant was the deceased, his other brother had not been produced to state in Court about that fact, therefore, complainant became the sole person of that first episode to describe and prove as to the reconnaissance by the said accused and the exposure of their names and identity to him---Admittedly, all the four unknowns were strangers to complainant but he nominated them in the occurrence relying upon his queries from other persons of the town and claimed having knowledge about their identity by name---Complainant was bound to prove source of his knowledge of revealing the names and identity of said unknown accused but he did not opt to disclose even when asked in cross-examination, therefore, withholding his such knowledge gave rise to the mystery, making his statement regarding their nominations in the FIR as inadmissible in evidence to be culminated as hearsay---Role of Investigating Officer was to collect the evidence, he had not uttered single word about the first episode nor collected any evidence as to how the names of the unknowns were exposed to the first informer, hence nomination of the said unknown in the FIR remained a mystery and inadmissible in evidence--- Moreover, it was in evidence that FIR had been registered prior to the claimed arrest of the accused persons---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. (b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 324, 396 & 149---Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance (VI of 1979), S. 17(4)---Qatl-i-amd, murder with dacoity, unlawful assembly, haraabah---Appreciation of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Defective investigation---Accused were charged that they made firing upon the complainant party, the brother of complainant was hit and died during dacoity---In this case, the claim of prosecution regarding arrest of four accused persons after a police encounter was important and had to be proved before the Court---Investigating Officer had not prepared any sketch of the said place of encounter---Although cross firing had been claimed by Investigating Officer, an act of firing upon the police party could not be considered as a minor offence, which otherwise was punishable under S.353, P.P.C and even under S.7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, if it was covered under S.6 (m) (n) of the Act ibid, and as per Rule 25.13 of the Police Rules 1934, yet operative plan of the scene was required to be prepared for explanation of the scene but the same had not been prepared for highlighting the said venue---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. (c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 324, 396 & 149---Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance (VI of 1979), S. 17(4)---Qatl-i-amd, murder with dacoity, unlawful assembly, haraabah---Appreciation of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Credibility of the recovery witnesses doubtful---Accused were charged that they made firing upon the complainant party; the brother of complainant was hit and died during dacoity---Investigating Officer and SHO claimed the arrest of the accused from place of encounter, whereafter along with the contingent of the police the accused allegedly got recovered unlicensed pistols with empty magazine, cash amount, one gold chain, one wrist watch, two mobile phones from their personal search---Investigating Officer also claimed sealing the said recovered articles in presence of two witnesses, and prepared the recovery memos attested by them and then shifted the accused persons to the Police Station and registered the FIRs and handed over the said arrested accused to the Investigating Officer for investigation along with the total case property---Time of police encounter as stated by Investigating Officer was 10:40 a.m. to 11:20 a.m. and he also claimed the presence of recovery witness there, who signed the recovery memos at the place---Said recovery witness had been cross-examined on this point and stated that the police encounter continued from 11:00 a.m. to 11:15 a.m.---Identification of dead-body was made before the Medical Officer at the commencement of the post-mortem examination---Time as 10:30 a.m. was documented and proved by the Medical Officer---Time of identification of the dead-body and that of SHO joining from the place of occurrence for proceeding to the pursuit was concurrent, thus, the recovery witness was bound to explain his presence concurrently at two places otherwise manipulations on part of the police would be the result---Other recovery witness was also the marginal witness of Mashirnama of dead body and the memo. of possession of last worn clothes of the deceased---Said witness signed the said recovery memo, but it suffered with the same situation as that of other recovery witness---Simultaneously said witness claimed to be a member of the police raiding party and also a signatory to the recovery memos at the place of arrest of the culprits---One could not be deemed present simultaneously at two places apart, and if one claimed so and was proved in evidence to be present at two places, the onus shifted to such claimant---Therefore, it became clear that there existed manipulations and fabrications especially on part of the police---Hence, it could be inferred that either there was no police encounter or thatwitness was not present there---Hence, the credibility of the testimony of the said witnesses became doubtful and not believable---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. (d) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 324, 396 & 149---Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance (VI of 1979), S. 17(4)---Qatl-i-amd, murder with dacoity, unlawful assembly, haraabah---Appreciation of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Safe custody of all the case property and transmission of the said articles to the Ballistic Expert not proved---Accused were charged that they made firing upon the complainant party, the brother of complainant was hit and died during dacoity---Investigating Officer collected four crime empties from the place of main occurrence besides the blood on the same date---Said witness was cross-examined by the defence; during the cross-examination he accepted it as correct that he did not make marking over the weapons in order to identify that which one was recovered from which accused and accepted it correct that at present he was not able to segregate the weapon recovered from accused---Said witness further deposed that he was unable to identify those empties recovered by him---Investigating Officer admitted that presently he could not identify the pistol recovered from accused and stated that at present it was not identifiable---Said witness stated that he did not remember at present that from the date of recovery till receipt of the weapons by the Ballistic Expert, where the case property was kept or retained---Said witness did not remember the name of the officials throughwhom the case property was transmitted to the Ballistic Expert---Said witness stated it correct that he could not say that which weapon was recovered from whom, whereas he accepted it correct that report of the Forensic Division contained the date of receipt of the weapons as 09.12.2010---Later on a Fire Arm Expert was summoned by the Court, he also clarified that the correct date of receipt of case property with the Ballistic Expert was 09.12.2010, meaning thereby that from the date of recovery that was 02.11.2010, the empties and the recovered pistols remained at some unknown place---Statement of Investigating Officerrevealed that the official who transmitted the case property remained unknown and was not a witness in this case---Police Official who kept the case property in the police station was also not a witness, therefore, the prosecution failed to prove on record the safe custody of all the case property vis-a-vis the transmission of the concerned articles to the Ballistic Expert---Place of arrest of the accused persons became doubtful and the claim of recoveries from the accused persons stood not proved and became inconsequential---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. (e) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 324, 396 & 149---Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance (VI of 1979), S. 17(4)---Qatl-i-amd, murder with dacoity, unlawful assembly, haraabah---Appreciation of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Ocular account not proved---Accused were charged that they made firing upon the complainant party; the brother of complainant was hit and died during dacoity---Ocular account was advanced by complainant and recovery witnesses, who deposed the story of main occurrence---Worth of testimony of recovery witnesses showed that they were not the witnesses of the previous occurrence and also they were not the witnesses ofexposures of names of the unknown accused persons to complainant---Complainant himself failed to prove that fact of the exposure of names and identity of the said unknown culprits, therefore, the specific attribution of snatching of the articles during the occurrence of dacoity without holding of any identification parade and not be believed---Similarly the specific attribution of fire shots could not be believed for the same reason---Therefore, statements of said witnesses in that regard before the Court could not be considered of any worth---Beside that said witnesses were part of the manipulations carried out by the police--- Complainant had assigned specific role to each of the five accused with names for snatching of cash, mobile phones, wrist watch and gold chain---Complainant admitted that he and the eye-witnesses did not become injured and even did not receive any scratch nor any sign of bullet was highlighted inside the shop on any place or object---Only four crime empties were recovered---Defence denied the presence of all the witnesses at the place of occurrence---Complainant categorically stated that after fall of deceased, the other accused persons who were also armed with pistols also made straight fire shots towards them with intention to kill but they fell down and their fire shots missed; this statement did not fit in the scenario so depicted of indiscriminate firing---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. (f) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 324, 396 & 149---Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance (VI of 1979), S. 17(4)---Qatl-i-amd, murder with dacoity, unlawful assembly, haraabah---Appreciation of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Justification for the presence of eye-witnesses at the time and place of occurrence not proved---Chance witnesses, evidence of---Accused were charged that they made firing upon the complainant party; the brother of complainant was hit and died during dacoity---Alleged eye0-witnesses were residents of a village located at six/seven kilometers from the place of occurrence, therefore, they might be considered as chance witnesses unless their presence at the scene of occurrence could be substantiated through any corroborative piece of evidence---Reasons for the presence of said witnesses as advanced by them was receiving of sale cash which otherwise remained an oral assertion as they did not provide any receipt of sale/purchase nor the Investigating Officer opted to collect any such evidence---Said witnesses had been contradicted qua their presence at the place of stated encounter and arrest with their presence at the hospital at the relevant times inter-se---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. Wazeer Hussain Khoso for Appellants. Khadim Hussain Khuharo, Additional Prosecutor General, Sindh for the State. Date of hearing: 13th February, 2025.

Summary: (a) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----S.5, Sched.---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.I, R.10(2)---Suit for recovery of maintenance allowance of minor children---Inability of father to pay maintenance---Paternal grandfather of minors, responsibility of---Scope---Where father is incapable of maintaining the minor children then such responsibility extends to the grandfather---Welfare of minor was of paramount importance in such matters---The petitioner (wife) filed a writ petition challenging the judgment passed by District Court which had allowed appeals filed by respondent No. 3 (paternal grandfather) and respondent No.4 (father) and set aside the family court’s order impleading the paternal grandfather as a defendant in a suit for recovery of maintenance for the petitioner’s two minor daughters---Respondent No. 4 (father) claimed financial incapacity, leading the petitioner to seek impleadment of Respondent No. 3 (paternal grandfather), a wealthy businessman with properties in multiple countries---Family court allowed this application, but the appellate court reversed the family court’s decision---Pivotal question for consideration by the High Court was as to “Whether the paternal grandfather could be impleaded as a necessary party in the suit for recovery of maintenance allowance when the father was financially incapable and the grandfather possessed sufficient means?”---Held: Documentary evidence submitted by the petitioner regarding financial status of respondent No.3 showed that he possessed substantial wealth, including multiple properties and businesses in different countries---His financial standing remained undisputed, making it apparent that he had the means to contribute to the maintenance of his grandchildren---High Court acknowledged the hardships faced by respondent No.4 (father), however, it was crucial to consider that the minor children’s right to maintenance should not be compromised due to the father’s financial incapacity---The law, in such instances, allowed for the financial responsibility to be extended to the grandfather---Where father was unable to provide the maintenance, the grandfather must step in---Therefore, respondent No.3 being the grandfather of the minors was a necessary party in the maintenance proceedings---If respondent No.3 (paternal grandfather) was made a defendant in the case concerning the maintenance of the minors, no prejudice would be caused to him, instead, a fair opportunity could be afforded to him to establish his financial capacity and whether he was capable of maintaining the minor children and rebut the stance taken by the petitioner through cogent and reliable evidence before the family court---Furthermore, if a decree of maintenance was passed against respondent No.4 (father) and he failed to pay the maintenance, then it might have been necessary to ultimately implead respondent No.3 (paternal grandfather) as a party and file a fresh suit for maintenance, which might have resulted in unnecessary complications and delays, ultimately causing hardship to the minors---Impugned judgment of the appellate court was set-aside and order of family court impleading respondent No.3 (paternal grandfather) as a party in the suit was upheld---Present Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances. Bashir Ahmad v. Additional District Judge, Hafizabad and others PLD 2024 SC 67 rel. (b) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----S.5, Sched.---Maintenance of minor children---Incapability of father to pay maintenance---Grandfather, obligation of---Scope---In Islamic jurisprudence, as well as Pakistan’s family laws, responsibility of maintaining minor children primarily rests on the father---However, in certain circumstances where the father is incapable of fulfilling this duty due to financial constraints, the responsibility extends to the grandfather---Paternal grandfather, being in a position of financial stability, cannot absolve himself of the responsibility to ensure the welfare of his grandchildren. Bashir Ahmad v. Additional District Judge, Hafizabad and others PLD 2024 SC 67 rel. (c) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----S.5, Sched.---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.I, R.10(2)---Suit for recovery of maintenance allowance of minor children---Responsibility of grandfather to maintain minor children---Impleadment of grandfather in the suit---Scope---It is not necessary to separately adjudicate upon the father’s incapacity before impleading the grandfather, in order to avoid creating an unnecessary procedural hurdle and prolonged litigation. (d) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----S.5, Sched.---Legal technicalities---In family suits involving children the Courts should facilitate justice rather than hinder it through excessive technicalities as well-being of minor children is of utmost importance---Legal procedures should serve as instruments to achieve justice rather than obstruct it---Wherever there is a procedural convenience, subject to the command of the statute, it must be resolved in favor of the women and children. Arif Fareed v. Bibi Sara 2023 SCMR 413 rel. (e) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----S.5, Sched.---Family suits involving children---Impact of family litigation on minor children---Welfare of minor children, importance of---Scope---Family litigation directly or indirectly causes long term effects on the emotional health of parties especially the children who become a silent victim of differences and disputes between contesting adults---Therefore, when a child comes to interact with the judicial system, the response of courts must be facilitative, cooperative and backed by child-right driven approach---The object of Family Courts Act, 1964 is to shorten the agony of litigant parties and to prove them justice as early as possible---Technicalities and trappings of normal practice and procedure are not suitable to the cases where very young children are the party. Arif Fareed v. Bibi Sara 2023 SCMR 413 rel. (f) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----S.5, Sched.---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.10-A---Suit for recovery of maintenance allowance of minor children---Incapability of father to pay maintenance---Grandfather, obligation of---Prerequisites---The obligation of a grandfather to maintain his grandchild is dependent upon two conditions (i) the father of the child must be a poor person who has no financial resources to maintain that child, and (ii) the grandfather of the child must be a person who is financially in easy circumstances---In case either of these conditions is not fulfilled, the grandfather is not under any obligation to maintain his grandchild---A child who claims his maintenance from his grandfather has to prove these two conditions, and the grandfather must be provided with an opportunity to defend the claim made against him by rebutting the existence of either of these two facts---This is the requirement of the fundamental right guaranteed by Art.10A of the Constitution which mandates that for the determination of his civil rights and obligations, a person shall be entitled to a fair trial and due process. Bashir Ahmad v. Additional District Judge, Hafizabad and others PLD 2024 SC 67 rel. (g) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----S.5, Sched.---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.I, R.10(2)---Suit for recovery of maintenance allowance of minor children---Decree for maintenance passed against father---Father’s incapability to satisfy the decree---Execution of decree against paternal grandfather---Grandfather not being a party in the suit---Effect---Whether a decree passed against a father can be executed against grandfather?---Impleadment of grandfather in the suit---Scope---A decree for maintenance passed against a father of a child cannot be executed against the grandfather, and the child has to institute a suit for maintenance against his grandfather, in case there is no property of his father---The reason being that the grandfather was neither a party to the suit instituted by his grandchild against his father nor was any decree passed against him---A decree that was not passed against the grandfather cannot be executed against him or his property---If a decree of maintenance is passed against father and he fails to pay the maintenance, then it will be necessary to ultimately implead paternal grandfather as a party and file a fresh suit for maintenance, which would result in unnecessary complications and delays, ultimately causing hardship to the minors---In such circumstances, the paternal grandfather can be impleaded as a defendant in the suit being a necessary and proper party. (h) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----S.14(3)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.I, R.10(2)---Appeal against interim orders---Appeal against order deciding application for impleading a necessary and proper party---Legality and scope---Where application filed under O.I, R.10 of C.P.C. for the impleadment of a party was adjudicated upon by the Family Court and the nature of the order passed thereon was of a final character, the same was appealable under the law---An order allowing or rejecting an impleadment application conclusively determines the right of a party to participate in the proceedings. (i) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----O.I, R.10---Necessary and proper party, impleadment of---Scope---If during the course of proceedings, a Court finds that the presence of any person is necessary for the final adjudication of the matter, then, in the interest of justice and based on the facts available, such a person should be arrayed as a respondent or defendant---Such a party is deemed proper and necessary for the just and expeditious resolution of the case in totality. Raja Muhammad Aleem Khan Abbasi and Malik Akhtar Abbas for Appellant. Shaharyar Nawaz Malik for Respondent No. 3. Khurram Masood Kiyani for Respondent No. 4. Date of hearing: 6th March, 2025.

Summary: Does the non-deposit of the balance sale consideration, in compliance with a Court order prescribing penal consequences, invariably warrant the dismissal of the suit as a general rule? If so, what legal criteria and parameters must be kept in sight by the Court before passing such an order?