Summary: Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)--- ----Ss. 9, 10 & 22---Suit for recovery of finance---Leave to appear and defend the suit, dismissal of---Substantial question of law, absence of--Suit filed by bank was decreed in its favour and against appellants / defendants---Validity---Application for leave to defend the suit was filed by appellants / defendants, reiterating the facts and disputing each and every assertion of bank, without raising any substantial question of law and facts with an aim to obfuscate claim of bank---Appellants / defendants attempted to make figures of amount outstanding against them as disputed, without presenting validly any evidence to rebut same---Such efforts of appellants / defendants were to make facts of the case unintelligent without offering any convincing alternate for a consideration---Appellants / defendants tried to dispute report of chartered accountant appointed with their consent by claiming unsuccessfully that the chartered accountant was biased in favor of bank, without pinpointing that his report was based on extraneous consideration or was an outcome of misunderstanding of facts---Division Bench of High Court declined to interfere in judgment and decree passed by Judge in Chambers of High Court as appellants / defendants failed to establish any material error in entries reflected in statement of accounts filed by bank nor could cite any excuse warranting their escape from fulfilling their obligation under agreements signed by them with the bank---Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances. 2014 SCMR 1048 and 2017 CLD 342 ref. Muhammad Arif for Appellant. Khalid Mehmood Siddiqui for Respondent along with Ms. Rabia Mehak, Law Officer of Respondent Bank.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----O.XXXVII, Rr. 1, 2---Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881), S. 28---Summary suit for recovery on the basis of dishonored cheques filed by the respondent against the CEO of the appellant company---Application for leave to defend by the CEO was dismissed on account of admissions and as a result the appellant company filed the appeal before the High Court---Appellant company took a plea that suit was filed against CEO instead of the company---The central moot point for determination by the High Court was whether a company, as a separate legal entity, could be held liable for a dishonored cheque issued in its name when the suit was filed against the CEO rather than the company itself---Specifically, the issue was whether the CEO, acting as an agent for the company, could be personally liable in such a suit or whether the company must be made a party to the suit, considering that the company was a distinct legal entity, and the CEO's actions were carried out in his capacity as the company's representative---Whether the failure to name the appellant company as a party to the suit, and instead filing the suit against the CEO, renders the suit fatal or defective---The appellant company sought to separate itself from its CEO at the appellate stage, claiming the CEO's actions were not representative of the company, despite previously accepting his role as the company's representative---Validity---It is settled law that company is a separate juristic entity from its employees and its employees / directors cannot be held responsible for the contractual obligations incurred by a company (with certain exceptions of personal guarantee, fraud etc. which are irrelevant for the instant purposes), but each case must be viewed on its own merits and circumstances---The summary suit was filed in the name of CEO but a perusal of the title page in the summary suit showed that the appellant company being named as the address for the CEO---The normal format would be to name the company first, being served through its CEO, but in the present case the respondent / plaintiff appeared to have done the opposite---Further perusal of the contents of the plaint revealed that the CEO and the appellant company, in essence, appeared to be one and the same---The CEO also never denied the liability being claimed by the respondent and answered the allegations as if he was the appellant company---The CEO was also instrumental in all proceedings throughout, including signing the agreement between parties, signing cheques, as well as putting up defence on the appellant's side---Perusal of leave to defend filed by CEO on behalf of the appellant company unequivocally showed that he was acting on behalf of the appellant company---Prayer clause of leave to defend also showed that CEO accepted liability on behalf of the appellant company---Such actions of the CEO appeared to have been endorsed by the appellant company as throughout the memo of appeal before the High Court the appellant company referred to the leave to defend application (filed by the CEO) as the appellant company's own---It was an imperative aspect of the matter that given such acknowledgment and endorsement by the appellant company regarding the acts of the CEO i.e. filing leave to defend by CEO on behalf of the company, and owning the same as if the same was filed by the company itself, at a later stage when final order had also been passed, backtracked by attempting to create a juristic person separation between the appellant company and its CEO---Moreover, such plea was only taken by the appellant company in appeal and not before the trial court---Such belated argument being submitted by the appellant company in itself was self-defeating inasmuch as on one hand the appellant company was claiming relief based on the separation from its CEO and on the other hand it was claiming enforcement of the same leave to defend application filed by their CEO---The appellant company attempted to thwart judicial proceedings by raising an issue of 'legal entity vs. company employee' at such a belated stage---The appellant company could not blow both hot and cold i.e. accept the CEO as the appellant's representative when it suited them and then deny his authority when it did not---High Court also made emphasis on S. 28 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 which provided that anagent acting on behalf of another by signing a cheque could also be held liable---In the pleading of the instant case the CEO acted on behalf of the appellant company and same was never denied by the appellant company---In view of the above the High Court rejected such contention of the appellant company as being without merit---Appeal was dismissed. Sh. Muhd Irfan v. Sitara Commission Shop and others 2005 SCMR 800 rel. Habib Bank Ltd. v. T & N Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. 2016 CLD 1782 ref. (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----O.XIV, R.1(6), O.XV, R.1, O.XII, R.12 & O.XXXVII Rr. 1, 2---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 31---Judgment on admission---Admission in pleadings abolishing the need for further proof---Facts admitted need not be proved---Scope---Piercing the veil of incorporation---The appellant company and its CEO allegedly admitted owing the respondent Rs.57,000,000/- in their pleadings---Leave to defend application was dismissed on admission of liability---The Trial Court passed the impugned order based on the admission, raising the question of whether this admission was sufficient to support the decision---The Trial Court merely on the admission passed the impugned order---Validity---Where there is an admission in a pleading (such as written statement) there is no requirement for further proof---Leave to defend application could be dismissed where liability was admitted by CEO of the company---The appellant company at later stage could not disclaim its CEO from acting on its behalf considering the appellant company had repeatedly accepted / endorsed the CEO as its representative---The appellant company was estopped by its own conduct from claiming a juristic separative between itself and its CEO at such a belated stage---A piercing of the veil of incorporation would no doubt show the CEO and the appellant company to be one and the same i.e. CEO being the only person with whom the respondent had interacted---The signing of the agreement, cheques and all correspondence by the appellant company with the respondent were conducted through its CEO---The appellant company failed to show any illegality with the impugned order which was rendered entirely on admissions made by both the appellant company and its CEO through pleadings made under oath---The new plea of separating the CEO and the appellant company was also only taken at the appellate stage and was never raised earlier during trial proceedings---The CEO by purporting to substitute himself into the appellate proceedings had shown proximity with the appellant company---Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances. President v. Justice Shaukat Ali PLD 1971 SC 585 rel. Shaikh Javed Mir for Appellant. Muhammad Khalid Hayat for Respondent. Date of hearing: 25th February, 2025.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan — Art. 199 — Jurisdiction of High Court — Scope of judicial review — Family matters — Limitation of interference in concurrent findings of fact. High Court reiterated that its jurisdiction under Art. 199 is limited to correcting jurisdictional errors, misreading or non-reading of evidence, or findings based on no evidence. Constitutional jurisdiction cannot be invoked to reappraise facts or substitute concurrent findings of the Family and appellate courts. Interference is permissible only when findings are arbitrary, perverse, or in violation of law. In the present case, both the Family Court and appellate court had rendered concurrent findings supported by evidence, hence no interference was warranted. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Yousaf v. Mst. Farhat Zahra 2021 SCMR 1390 • Asadullah v. Mst. Rukhsana Bibi 2022 SCMR 1791 • Mst. Ghulam Fatima v. Mst. Iqbal Begum PLD 2019 SC 456 (b) West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 — S. 5 — Dissolution of marriage on ground of cruelty — Pronouncement of talaq — Independent grounds. Petitioner-husband contended that dissolution of marriage by the Family Court was redundant since talaq had already been pronounced. The Court held that pronouncement of talaq does not preclude a separate judicial finding where cruelty is independently proved. The Family Court rightly decreed dissolution on grounds of cruelty after evaluating evidence. The appellate court, having affirmed the decree, committed no illegality. Such decrees are consistent with the Family Courts (Amendment) Act, 2015, which empowers courts to adjudicate independent grounds for dissolution. (c) Family Law — Maintenance allowance — Obligation of husband — Idat period — Neglect proved. Negligence of the petitioner in maintaining his wife and minors was established. Under Islamic law and S. 9 of the Family Courts Act, husband is bound to provide maintenance during iddat period and for minors according to his financial capacity. The decreed maintenance of Rs. 10,000 per month for respondent-wife during iddat and Rs. 3,000 per month for each minor with 10% annual increase was found to be reasonable and within law. (d) Custody of minors — Welfare of child — Paramount consideration — Second marriage of father as relevant factor. Court held that in custody disputes, welfare of the minors is the primary consideration overriding legal or parental claims. Evidence established that the father contracted a second marriage and failed to attend proceedings or pursue custody, indicating lack of active concern. The mother, being the natural guardian and primary caregiver, was held better suited to ensure the minors’ emotional and physical wellbeing. No legal infirmity was found in the appellate court’s decision maintaining custody with the mother. Cited Cases: • Mst. Farzana v. Qamar Zaman 2020 SCMR 1689 • Muhammad Arshad v. Mst. Asma Bibi PLD 2021 Lahore 1022 (e) Dower and dowry articles — Recovery — Burden of proof. Respondent-wife claimed gold ornaments (09 tolas) and dowry articles. Trial Court decreed recovery of dowry articles and 04 tolas of gold; appellate court reversed decree for 04 tolas on finding that such ornaments were neither prepared nor delivered at the time of marriage as per Nikahnama. High Court upheld the finding, holding that burden lay on the claimant to prove possession or non-delivery through credible evidence, which was not discharged. Remaining decreed articles were found routine household items, not extravagant, and thus properly awarded. (f) Custody and visitation rights — Emotional and human dimension. Court observed that custody matters are unique and cannot be treated like ordinary civil disputes. Adjudication must balance the welfare of minors with natural parental affection. A mother’s right to care for her children cannot be denied absent compelling reasons. Such matters require a humane and contextual approach rather than strict technical application of legal provisions. (g) Family Law — Appellate findings — Concurrent decisions — No jurisdictional error or misreading shown. Both Family Court and appellate court appreciated evidence correctly. Petitioner failed to identify any legal or procedural irregularity. Findings were based on credible testimony and documentary record. High Court concurred with lower fora that the judgments were legally sound and supported by evidence. (h) Constitutional Petition — Maintainability — Misuse to challenge appreciation of evidence. A constitutional petition cannot be used as a substitute for appeal or revision in family matters. Petitioners attempted to re-argue factual issues already settled by two competent courts. Such use of Art. 199 is impermissible; the High Court’s role is confined to ensuring legality, not reassessing factual determinations. Disposition: Both Writ Petition No. 149-D/2023 and connected W.P. No. 92-D/2024 were dismissed, being devoid of merit. Findings of the Family Court and appellate court were affirmed as legally sound and free from misreading, non-reading, or jurisdictional error. Held: Decree of dissolution of marriage on ground of cruelty, maintenance during iddat, custody of minors with mother, and partial recovery of dowry articles upheld. Both writ petitions dismissed.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) — Consecutive vs. concurrent sentences; statutory cap ----Ss. 35 & 397 Cr.P.C.; S. 71 PPC Petitioner was awarded 14 years’ R.I. under S. 302 PPC r/w S. 11 FCR and 14 years’ R.I. under S. 365-A PPC r/w S. 11 FCR in a single trial under the erstwhile FCR. Although the trial forum did not use the word “consecutive,” directing a total of 28 years’ imprisonment indicated consecutive running. Under S. 35 Cr.P.C., multiple sentences awarded at one trial run consecutively unless ordered to run concurrently; however, the aggregate cannot exceed 14 years. Sentences that exceed this statutory ceiling are to be modified to run concurrently. Courts also have discretion under S. 397 Cr.P.C. to order sentences (even from different trials) to run concurrently or consecutively, a discretion to be exercised judicially on the facts. (b) Constitutional jurisdiction & inherent powers — High Court’s competence to convert sentences ----Art. 199, Constitution of Pakistan; S. 561-A Cr.P.C. Even though not sitting as a trial/appellate/revisional court, the High Court, in exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction (Art. 199) and inherent powers (S. 561-A Cr.P.C.), may intervene to prevent abuse of process and secure the ends of justice, including directing that sentences run concurrently where the circumstances and settled law so warrant. Maintainability affirmed. (c) Frontier Crimes Regulation (1901) — Applicability of Cr.P.C.; execution of sentences ----Ss. 11, 12 & 13 FCR; Ch. XXVIII Cr.P.C. Under S. 13 FCR, sentences passed under S. 12 are executed per Ch. XXVIII Cr.P.C., thereby attracting the Cr.P.C. framework on concurrent/consecutive running and related sentencing incidents. Where the aggregate exceeds the S. 35 cap, modification to concurrent running is required to conform with law. (d) Remission and pre-trial custody credit — Mandatory application ----S. 382-B Cr.P.C. (as amended: “shall”); relevant prison rules on remission The court must take into consideration detention already undergone, and extend the benefit of S. 382-B mandatorily when awarding sentence(s). Remissions are to be allowed in accordance with the applicable rules and law, pari passu other prisoners. Cited Cases: • Shah Hussain v. The State PLD 2009 SC 460 • Ishfaq Ahmad v. The State 2017 SCMR 307 • Mst. Zubaida v. Falak Sher 2007 SCMR 548 • Muhammad Sharif v. The State 2014 SCMR 668 • Faiz Ahmad v. Shafiq-ur-Rehman 2013 SCMR 583 • Sajjad Ikram v. Sikandar Hayat 2016 SCMR 467 • Mst. Shahista Bibi v. Superintendent, Central Jail Mach PLD 2015 SC 15 • Ghulam Haider v. The State 1984 SCMR 887 • Khan Zaman v. The State 1987 SCMR 1382; Juma Khan v. The State 1986 SCMR 1573; Muhammad Ittafaq v. The State 1986 SCMR 1627 • Altaf Hussain v. The State 1987 PCr.LJ 2169 (Peshawar) • Bashir v. The State PLD 1991 SC 1145 • Rahib Ali v. The State 2018 SCMR 418 • Zaid Shah alias Jogi v. The State 2020 SCMR 497 • Ali Fauzan v. The State 2013 PCr.LJ 652 • Hafeez Bibi v. The State PLD 2021 Lahore 392 Disposition: Writ petition allowed. Sentences of 14 years’ R.I. under S. 302 PPC and 14 years’ R.I. under S. 365-A PPC (each r/w S. 11 FCR) ordered to run concurrently; benefit of S. 382-B Cr.P.C. directed; remissions to be granted per relevant rules and law.

Summary: "Adjournments on the part of learned counsel appearing on behalf of the accused cannot be counted as an act or omission on the part of the accused to delay the conclusion of the trial" --- Bail granted --- (a) Criminal Procedure—Statutory bail on delay ----Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, S. 497(1) third proviso; Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, Ss. 302/34 Accused arrested on 27.12.2022; trial not concluded beyond two years—Held, right to bail on statutory ground accrues as of right once the stipulated period expires and trial remains unconcluded, unless delay is attributable to the accused—Computation runs from date of detention in the case, not from framing of charge. Cited Cases: • PLD 2022 SC 112 (Nadeem Samson v. The State) • 2024 SCMR 28 (Muhammad Usman v. The State) (b) Delay attributable to accused—Effect of defence adjournments ----Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, S. 497(1) third proviso Mere adjournments sought by defence counsel do not per se defeat the statutory right; only adjournments without sufficient cause on crucial hearings, or a patterned design to delay, count against the accused—Record showed major delays due to non-availability of prosecution witnesses; even excluding limited defence-caused delay, custody still exceeded two years. Cited Case: • 2022 SCMR 1 (Shakeel Shah v. The State) (c) Exceptions to statutory bail—“Hardened, desperate or dangerous” etc. ----Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, S. 497(1) sixth proviso To invoke the sixth proviso, court must form an opinion on material that the accused is a previously convicted, hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal, or involved in terrorism—No such material produced; exception inapplicable. Cited Case: • PLD 1990 SC 934 (Moundar v. The State) (d) Constitutional guarantee—Speedy and fair trial ----Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 10-A Prolonged incarceration without reasonable prospect of early conclusion offends the right to fair and expeditious trial; continued custody serves no useful purpose where statutory period has elapsed and prosecution delays predominate. (e) Additional references ----Practice and procedure—Calculation and approach to delay Courts must assess cumulative impact on progress of trial rather than mathematical exclusion of every date sought by defence; attendance of witnesses and readiness for evidence are central considerations. Cited Cases: • 2024 YLR 2029 • 2015 P.Cr.L.J 259 • 2018 P.Cr.L.J 140 (g) Disposition — Bail allowed on statutory ground; petitioner admitted to bail upon furnishing bonds of Rs. 200,000 with two sureties each in the like amount to the satisfaction of Illaqa/Duty Judicial Magistrate, who shall ensure sureties are local, reliable and men of means.

Summary: "Section 382-B CrPC applies where civil offences are tried by military Court through deeming clauses, but not to offences exclusively triable by military Courts." ---- (a) Pakistan Army Act, 1952 — Special law prevails; applicability of S. 382-B, Cr.P.C. to convictions by courts-martial ----S. 59, S. 136 PAA; S. 1 & S. 382-B Cr.P.C.; Pakistan Army Rules, 1954, R. 53(1) Trials and sentences under the Army Act are governed by that special law and its Rules; the Code of Criminal Procedure does not apply proprio vigore to such proceedings (S. 1 Cr.P.C.). Under S. 136 PAA, imprisonment commences from the date the original proceedings are signed. While R. 53(1) requires the court-martial and confirming authority to consider, inter alia, the length of time the accused has been in arrest or confinement when determining sentence, S. 382-B Cr.P.C. is not directly applicable to Army Act convictions. On the facts, the record showed that the benefit analogous to pre-sentence custody was already factored in at sentencing; no further credit was due under S. 382-B Cr.P.C. (b) Constitutional jurisdiction — Art. 199(3) & (5) vis-à-vis military matters; scope of review where relief sought is S. 382-B credit ----Art. 199(3), (5), Constitution of Pakistan Objection was taken that High Court jurisdiction was barred; however, the petitions were examined and decided on the controlling legal framework (special law vs general law) and on the record showing custody already accounted for. In petitions seeking only the extension of S. 382-B to Army Act sentences, absent legal entitlement under the Code and in view of the special regime under the Army Act/Rules, no writ could issue. (c) Commencement and computation of sentence under Army Act — Mandatory rule ----S. 136 PAA; Pakistan Army Rules, 1954, R. 53(1) Sentence of imprisonment under the Army Act “shall” be reckoned from the date the original proceedings are signed by the court-martial president (or by the court in summary court-martial). Pre-trial custody is considered at the sentencing stage per R. 53(1), not subsequently via S. 382-B Cr.P.C. (d) Distinction from “civil offence” trials drawn into Army jurisdiction; inapplicability here ----S. 2(1)(d)(ii) & S. 59(4) PAA; Official Secrets Act, 1923, S. 3 (context) Where a civilian is tried by court-martial for a civil offence ordinarily triable by a Magistrate, some courts have allowed S. 382-B by analogy to avoid discriminatory treatment. That line (e.g., Manthar alias Manoo) is inapplicable where the convictions arise squarely under substantive Army Act offences and procedure. (e) Prior orders of coordinate benches extending S. 382-B to Army convicts — Not followed ----W.P. No. 2593-P/2023 (Maqbool Badshah) & W.P. No. 2976-P/2024 (Shahid Ali) (PHC) With respect, those orders were not followed; the present bench holds the special law (Army Act/Rules) governs commencement and credit, and the record already reflects consideration of custody under R. 53(1). Cited Cases: • Azhar Iqbal v. State & others 2014 PCr.LJ 1387 (Lahore) • Nobi Dar v. Registrar Court of Appeals, JAG Dept., GHQ & others PLD 2009 Quetta 271 (leave declined) • Manthar alias Manoo v. Federation of Pakistan, Cr. Misc. Appl. No. D-107/2014 (Sindh High Court) • Shah Hussain v. The State PLD 2009 SC 460 • W.P. No. 352/2015 (PHC, 30-04-2015) (jurisdictional objection noted) • Maqbool Badshah v. Federation of Pakistan etc., W.P. No. 2593-P/2023 (PHC) • Shahid Ali v. Federation of Pakistan etc., W.P. No. 2976-P/2024 (PHC) Disposition: Petitions dismissed. Court-martial sentences governed by the Army Act/Rules; S. 382-B Cr.P.C. not directly applicable. Record shows pre-sentence custody already considered under R. 53(1); no further relief warranted.

Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860): ----S. 302(b)--- Qatl-e-amd—Benefit of doubt—Conviction based on initial plea of guilt coupled with prosecution evidence—Delay of over 22 hours in lodging FIR remained unexplained—Principal role of causing fatal head injury attributed to co-accused who was acquitted and whose acquittal attained finality—Allegation against appellant limited to causing simple injury to female witness—Ocular account found unreliable due to material contradictions, dishonest improvements, and lack of corroboration—Held, plea of guilt under S. 265-E, Cr.P.C. could not be relied upon in isolation once full trial was conducted under S. 265-F, Cr.P.C.—Prosecution failed to prove charge beyond reasonable doubt—Conviction and death sentence set aside—Accused acquitted. (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898): ----Ss. 265-E & 265-F--- Plea of guilt—Discretion of trial court—Scope—Where accused pleads guilty but the trial court proceeds with full trial and records prosecution evidence, conviction cannot subsequently be based solely on earlier plea of guilt—Such plea loses its independent evidentiary value—Held, capital sentence based on plea of guilt, despite subsequent trial proceedings, was unlawful—Conviction set aside—Principles discussed in Muhammad Ismail v. The State (2017 SCMR 713) and Khalid Mehmood v. The State (2024 PCrLJ 1212) followed. (c) Evidence Act (I of 1872): ----Ocular evidence—Improvements—Effect--- Credibility of eyewitnesses—Complainant and one female eyewitness made material omissions and dishonest improvements on vital aspects of occurrence—Injured witness Allah Mafi not produced for cross-examination—Held, evidence of prosecution witnesses not confidence-inspiring and liable to be discarded—No independent witness supported prosecution version—Accused entitled to benefit of doubt. (d) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984: ----Art. 129(g)--- Withholding of best evidence—Adverse inference—Eye-witness given up after examination-in-chief and not produced for cross-examination—Held, adverse inference drawn that such witness would not have supported prosecution—Further weakens already untrustworthy ocular account. (e) Medical Jurisprudence: ----Medical evidence—Nature and delay--- Medical examination of injured witness conducted four days after occurrence—Simple contusion observed—Delay casts serious doubt on prosecution version—Held, medical evidence not helpful to prosecution in absence of trustworthy direct evidence—Accused acquitted. (f) Criminal trial: ----Recovery—Sota--- Recovery of alleged weapon (club) after 38 days from accused’s house—Not sent for forensic analysis—Held, item was a household object; recovery inconsequential—Recovery inadmissible where ocular account is disbelieved. (g) Delay in FIR: ----Impact--- Unexplained delay of over 22 hours in lodging FIR—Held, such delay casts serious doubt on prosecution version—Presumption arises that occurrence may have been manipulated or fabricated—Delay fatal to prosecution—Reliance placed on Asia Bibi v. The State PLD 2019 SC 64. (h) Benefit of doubt: ----Principles--- Established rule—Single circumstance creating doubt sufficient for acquittal—Where entire prosecution case found doubtful due to contradictions, delay, improvements, and lack of corroboration, benefit of doubt must be extended—Held, case replete with doubtful circumstances—Accused acquitted—Sikandar Ali alias Bhola v. The State 2025 SCMR 552 relied. ----Cited Cases: • Mst. Asia Bibi v. The State PLD 2019 SC 64 • Muhammad Ismail v. The State 2017 SCMR 713 • Khalid Mehmood v. The State 2024 PCrLJ 1212 • Muhammad Rafique v. The State PLJ 2011 SC 191 • Amin Ali v. The State 2011 SCMR 323 • Sardar Bibi v. Munir Ahmed 2017 SCMR 344 • Zafer v. The State 2018 SCMR 326 • Sikandar Ali alias Bhola v. The State 2025 SCMR 552

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Art. 199, Art. 13(a)---Writ jurisdiction---Multiple FIRs on similar allegations---Abetment through social media---Doctrine of sameness---Petitioner, a political leader, was implicated in multiple FIRs registered across different police stations in Lahore in the aftermath of countrywide unrest following the arrest of a political leader on 09.05.2023---Allegation against petitioner was incitement through social media posts---Petitioner contended that the various FIRs stemmed from a continuous sequence of events arising out of the same cause, and therefore violated the rule enunciated in Mst. Sughran Bibi v. The State (PLD 2018 SC 595) and the doctrine of sameness---Held, the doctrine of sameness does not apply where alleged offences occurred at different times and places, involved distinct acts of violence and accused persons, and were not part of the same transaction---Only where proximity in time, place, and continuity of action exists can joinder of trials be considered---General consolidation of all FIRs unjustified in present facts. Cited Cases: • Mst. Sughran Bibi v. The State PLD 2018 SC 595 • Shahid Ali v. The State and others PLJ 2024 Peshawar (Note) 222 • Mst. Sanam Javed v. Special Judge Anti-Terrorism Court, Gujranwala and others 2025 PCr.LJ 148 • Md. Mosaddar Hoque and Md. Abdul Rouf v. The State PLD 1958 SC (Pak) 131 • S.M.K. Alvi v. The Crown PLD 1953 FC 189 • Shahadat Khan v. Home Secretary, West Pakistan PLD 1969 SC 158 • Khan Mohammad v. The State 1971 PCr.LJ 762 • Choragudi Yenkatadri v. Emperor ILR 33 Mad. 522 • Babulul Chuukhani v. King-Emperor 65 I.A. 158 (b) Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 ----Ss. 154, 177, 179, 180, 233, 239---Multiple FIRs---Trial jurisdiction---Abetment---Same transaction---Scope---Petitioner claimed all FIRs related to one act of abetment and sought their transfer to District Faisalabad where a related trial was pending---Held, section 180 Cr.P.C. allows concurrent jurisdiction either at the place of abetment or where the abetted offence was committed---However, it does not support consolidation of multiple distinct offences across districts committed by different individuals, even if allegedly instigated by the same act---Section 239 Cr.P.C. permits joinder only if offences were committed in the course of the same transaction---Factual distinctiveness of each FIR, including time, location, and participants, precludes their joint trial---Petitioner’s reliance on section 180 Cr.P.C. and the “same transaction” doctrine was misplaced in view of settled judicial interpretation. (c) Interpretation of "same transaction" under Cr.P.C. ----Ss. 233, 234, 235, 236, 239---Joint trial---Same offence v. different offences---Judicial tests---Scope---Held, “same transaction” must reflect proximity of time and place, continuity of action, and community of purpose---Factors such as causal connection, participation of same accused, and interdependent events are relevant but not sufficient unless community of design and factual nexus is established---Courts have consistently held that each case must be examined on its own merits to determine whether joinder is permissible---Generalized reliance on political context or common cause is insufficient to justify consolidation. Disposition: Petition dismissed. However, competent trial court may consider limited joinder under section 239 Cr.P.C. in cases where factual record shows proximity in time, place, and continuity of events.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending