Summary: Review Petitions (Sunni Ittehad Council/Reserved Seats Case), decided on 06 May 2025 with dissenting Note by Justice Ayesha Malik. ---- Majority Judgment (Amin-ud-Din Khan, J. – For Seven Judges) (a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Arts. 17(2), 51, 106, 184(3), 187, 188 & 225–––Election Commission of Pakistan–––Reserved seats for women and non-Muslims–––Nature, purpose and constitutional scheme–––Interpretation–––Scope of review jurisdiction. Held, that reserved seats under Arts. 51 and 106 are an integral component of representative democracy, meant to ensure inclusiveness of marginalized groups; however, their allocation remains party-based and contingent on valid participation through submission of party lists before elections. The Sunni Ittehad Council (SIC) had not submitted valid lists within statutory time; nevertheless, the earlier judgment (2024 PLD SC ___) incorrectly excluded the claim of seats solely because PTI candidates joined SIC post-poll. Such exclusion distorted proportional representation and denied voters’ constitutional right to representation. Court, exercising review jurisdiction under Art.188, revisited manifest error in interpreting Articles 51 & 106 and restored the legal position settled by the Peshawar High Court. (b) Election Act, 2017 (XXXIII of 2017) ----Ss. 60, 66, 104, 209 & Fourth Schedule–––Party lists for reserved seats–––Submission and substitution–––Consequences of omission–––ECP’s jurisdiction. Under s.104(1), party lists must be filed before the Commission within prescribed period; however, law does not bar consideration of subsequent lawful affiliation where a political party retains electoral identity through its symbol or allied group. ECP’s decision to treat SIC as ineligible was beyond jurisdiction and contrary to the spirit of participatory democracy. Held, that ECP’s action violated Articles 17(2) and 218(3) of the Constitution; hence, Peshawar High Court rightly set aside the Commission’s order. (c) Constitutional Jurisdiction & Review under Art. 188 ----Maintainability of review–––Grounds–––Error apparent on face of record–––Scope of “complete justice” under Art. 187. Held, that earlier three-member majority judgment committed an error apparent on face of record by granting relief to an entity (PTI) not party before the Court and by substituting statutory scheme with judicial innovation. Such exercise exceeded jurisdiction under Art.184(3). In review, the Court may correct its own constitutional error to uphold supremacy of Constitution; principle of functus officio does not bar review to correct manifest illegality. Jurisdiction under Art.188 read with Order XXVI, r.6 of Supreme Court Rules permits reconsideration of constitutional misinterpretation. (d) Principles of Interpretation –– Mandatory Timeframes and Jurisdictional Bars Held, that statutory requirements for filing party lists are directory in so far as they ensure procedural order, not substantive disenfranchisement. Technical lapses cannot defeat constitutional rights of representation. ECP’s insistence on procedural rigidity without constitutional foundation amounted to mal-exercise of authority. (e) Separation of Powers –– Election Disputes –– Art. 225 Held, that Art.225 restricts election disputes to election tribunals; however, questions of constitutional interpretation relating to representational rights fall within the Supreme Court’s review jurisdiction. The 2024 judgment exceeded the limits of “complete justice” under Art.187 by re-distributing seats contrary to electoral law; hence, liable to recall. (f) Fundamental Rights –– Freedom of Association & Political Representation ----Art.17(2)–––Right to form or be member of political party–––Proportional representation through reserved seats as extension of fundamental right–––Denial of representation unconstitutional. Held, that exclusion of voters represented by PTI-backed independents from allocation of reserved seats offended Art.17(2). Fundamental right to political participation cannot be curtailed by administrative interpretation or judicial construction inconsistent with the text and spirit of Constitution. (g) Precedents Relied Upon • Workers’ Party Pakistan v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2012 SC 681 • Muhammad Saeed v. ECP PLD 2023 SC 70 • Benazir Bhutto v. Federation PLD 1988 SC 416 • Lahore High Court judgment in E.T.R. No.01/05 etc., restored Disposition (Majority): Review Petitions Allowed –– Impugned Judgment dated 13.03.2024 set aside –– Peshawar High Court judgment restored –– Orders of ECP annulled –– Reserved seats allocated to Sunni Ittehad Council as per law. Dissenting Note (Ayesha A. Malik, J.) (h) Constitution of Pakistan ----Arts. 187, 188 & 184(3)–––Scope of review jurisdiction–––Distinction between appeal and review–––Finality of Supreme Court judgments. Held, that review is not a rehearing of the case; its scope is confined to correcting an error apparent on the face of the record. The petitioners failed to identify any such error. The review petitions sought re-appraisal of factual and legal conclusions already determined; therefore, were misconceived and incompetent. (i) Art. 187 –– “Complete Justice” –– Limits of power The power of “complete justice” cannot be used to subvert finality of judicial decisions or to alter outcomes reached after full hearing. The majority, by reopening concluded findings, exceeded the permissible scope of Art.188 and Order XXVI of the Supreme Court Rules. (j) Constitutional Discipline –– Finality of Judgments Reiterated, that finality of judgments is a constitutional imperative ensuring legal certainty and public confidence. Allowing review as a second appeal undermines judicial stability and erodes institutional credibility. (k) Result Held, that review petitions ought to have been dismissed; original judgment of 13.03.2024 contained no patent error; majority’s decision amounts to re-hearing rather than review. Disposition (Dissent): Review Petitions Dismissed. Final Outcome: By Majority (7 to 2): Review petitions allowed; judgment of 13 March 2024 recalled; Peshawar High Court judgment restored; dissenting note by Ayesha A. Malik, J.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Arts. 212(1)–(3), 10A & 37; Service Tribunals Act, 1973 ----S. 4(1) & (2)---Service matters—Maintainability of writ against order of de-novo inquiry—Scope of Art. 212 vis-à-vis S.4, STA---Held, that an order directing de-novo inquiry is not a “final order” affecting terms and conditions within the contemplation of S.4, STA; no statutory appeal/remedy lies before the Federal Service Tribunal against such interlocutory direction—Where no adequate/expeditious remedy exists, a writ petition before the High Court is maintainable to examine legality of the de-novo order on limited, jurisdictional grounds (e.g., mala fides, coram non judice, abuse of process, violation of law/rules), without embarking upon disputed facts—High Court erred in declining to decide the vires of the de-novo order merely due to perceived precedential conflict; matter remanded to decide the writ on merits within time. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Yar Buttar v. BOG, OPF (1999 SCMR 819) • Fida Hussain v. Chief Secretary KP (2023 SCMR 1109). (b) Civil Servants (Appeal) Rules, 1977 ----r. 2(a), r. 4; E&D Rules, 1973 ----r. 5(iv), r. 6-A (repealed); Civil Servants (Efficiency & Discipline) Rules, 2020 ----rr. 11, 16---Appellate structure and competence—Whether appeal lies to President against de-novo inquiry ordered after “exoneration” by Authorized Officer—Held, that r.4 of the 1977 Rules confines appeal to orders altering conditions of service or imposing/affecting penalties; a direction for de-novo inquiry is not such an order and is therefore not appealable to the President—Authorized Officer assesses proof of charge and makes recommendations; Authority may, in revisional space provided by E&D regime, order de-novo inquiry for recorded reasons, but such order remains interlocutory and open to judicial review on the limited grounds noted above. Cited Cases: • Federation v. Shafqat-ur-Rehman Ranjha (2021 SCMR 153) (distinguished). (c) Interpretation—Precedent—Conflicting co-ordinate Bench decisions—Per incuriam and sub-silentio---Where two three-Member Benches conflict, earlier view binds unless a larger Bench holds otherwise; a later judgment rendered without noticing the earlier binding dictum is per incuriam and does not carry precedential weight—Accordingly, Muhammad Yar Buttar (1999 SCMR 819) prevails over Shafqat-ur-Rehman Ranjha (2021 SCMR 153) to the extent the latter suggests an appeal to the President against a de-novo inquiry order—Courts should refer conflicts to larger Benches to preserve stare decisis and judicial discipline. Cited Authorities: • Salmond, Jurisprudence (on sub-silentio/per incuriam) • Don Basco High School v. A.D., EOBI (PLD 1989 SC 128) (ejusdem generis/“including”). (d) Constitutional and administrative law—Right to fair trial/due process—Art. 10A—Ordering de-novo inquiry—Standards for interference---Competent authority is not bound by inquiry recommendations, yet any de-novo direction must be supported by reasons and conform to the governing rules; High Court may quash such order where shown, on the face of the record, to be without jurisdiction, mala fide, coram non judice, abusive of process or in derogation of due process. Cited Cases: • Khalid Mehmood Wattoo v. Govt. of Punjab (1998 SCMR 2280) • Peer Muhammad v. Govt. of Balochistan (2007 SCMR 54) • Syed Arshad Ali v. PTCL (2008 SCMR 314). Disposition: Petitions converted into civil appeals and disposed of with declarations: (i) order of de-novo inquiry is not a final order under S.4, STA; writ is maintainable on limited grounds—impugned view on maintainability set aside; case remanded to Islamabad High Court to decide W.P. No. 2755/2023 on merits within three months; (ii) Service Appeal No. 32(K)CS/2025 regarding minor penalty to remain pending; if the de-novo order falls, its superstructure collapses (maxim sublato fundamento cadit opus); if upheld, the FST shall decide the appeal on its own merits.

Summary: (a) West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 ---- Ss. 10(4), 10(5) & 10(6) --- Punjab Family Courts (Amendment) Act, 2015 --- Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 ---- S. 7 --- Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939 ---- S. 2 --- Dower --- Khula --- Dissolution of Marriage --- Maintainability --- Through this judgment, we propose to decide C.P.L.A. Nos.2555 and 2556 of 2022 since they entail common features with same contesting parties --- Record shows that Adeel Akhter ("respondent") and Wajiha Rasheed ("petitioner") got married on 05.04.2001 --- Rukhsati did not take place until 28.06.2004 --- As per contents of Nikahnama, dower was fixed at Rs.10,00,000/- on demand in addition to Plot No.6, Sector-D, Ghazikot Township, Mansehra ("Plot No.6") --- Couple lived in United Kingdom for about three years after which petitioner returned to Pakistan --- After respondent's father, Muhammad Akhter sold Plot No.6 to one Riaz Ahmed, petitioner, on 20.12.2010, filed suit for declaration, permanent injunction and possession ("Suit No.216/FC of 2010") before family court against respondent as well as Muhammad Akhter and Riaz Ahmed praying inter alia for declaration to effect that she is owner of Plot No.6 on basis of entries in Nikahnama dated 05.08.2001 --- Petitioner had impleaded Riaz Ahmed as defendant in suit as he had purchased Plot No.6 from petitioner's father-in-law through Transfer Deed No.1194 dated 30.04.2004 --- This suit was decreed vide judgment and decree dated 18.10.2011 --- By this time, marriage between petitioner and respondent was intact --- Respondent's appeal against family court's said judgment and decree dated 18.10.2011, was dismissed vide judgment and decree dated 09.06.2012 --- Respondent filed writ petition No.548-A/2012 before high court against said concurrent judgments and decrees --- At this juncture, we deem it appropriate to make reference to suit for dissolution of marriage, recovery of maintenance allowance, dower and dowry articles ("Family Suit No.45 of 2012") filed by petitioner on 01.02.2012 before family court against respondent and his father --- On 09.10.2012, petitioner made statement before family court that there was no chance of reconciliation between parties; that on account of hatred and aversion that she had developed for respondent, she does not want to live with him; that she has not been paid her dower; and that she has no intention of relinquishing her dower --- After recording petitioner's statement, family court, vide order dated 08.11.2012 dissolved marriage and proceeded to frame issues --- One of issues framed was whether petitioner was entitled to recover dower amounting to Rs.10,00,000/- from respondent --- It appears that issue whether she was entitled to Plot No.6 as dower was not framed as by time issues were framed, she had already obtained decree with respect to said plot in her favour in Suit No.216/FC of 2010 --- As petitioner had alleged cruelty at hands of respondent, and had not relinquished her dower, family court proceeded further with trial --- Trial culminated in judgment and decree dated 06.11.2014 whereby petitioner was held entitled to recovery of dowry articles or their alternative depreciated value of Rs.200,000/- as well as to maintenance allowance of Rs.20,000/- per month for three-month Iddat period --- Family court turned down petitioner's claim for recovery of gold ornaments --- Her claim for recovery of dower was also turned down as she had not been able to prove cruelty or brutality at hands of respondent --- Petitioner's appeal against family court's said judgment and decree was dismissed by appellate court vide judgment and decree dated 01.03.2016 --- Petitioner preferred writ petition No.1007/2016 before high court against said concurrent judgments and decrees --- High court decided writ petition No.548-A/2012 titled "Adeel Akhter etc. Vs. Wajiha Rasheed etc." (reference to which has been made in paragraph-4 above) and writ petition No.1007/2016 titled "Wajiha Rasheed Vs. Additional District Judge, etc." vide two separate judgments dated 17.03.2022 --- In its judgment passed in writ petition No.1007/2016, high court did not interfere with concurrent judgments and decrees of family court and appellate court passed in Family Suit No.45 of 2012 --- As regards writ petition No.548-A/2012, high court allowed same by holding that since marriage had been dissolved on basis of khula, petitioner would not be entitled to recovery of dower --- In holding so, high court had taken cognizance of development subsequent to judgment and decree passed in Suit No.216/FC of 2010 i.e. judgment and decree passed by family court in Family Suit No.45 of 2012 --- In fact, high court reproduced operative part of family court's order dated 08.11.2012 whereby marriage between petitioner and respondent, was dissolved --- High court did not give benefit of amendments made in section 10(5) and (6) of West-Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 through Punjab Family Courts (Amendment) Act, 2015 whereby in case of dissolution of marriage through khula, wife is to surrender up to 50% of her deferred dower or up to 25% of her admitted prompt dower to husband, whereas in case of decree for dissolution of marriage, family court is to direct husband to pay whole or part of outstanding deferred dower to wife --- High court took view, and correctly so, that since decree for dissolution of marriage pre-dates enactment of Punjab Family Courts (Amendment) Act, 2015, it could not be given retrospective effect --- Learned counsel for petitioner's submissions centered around petitioner's entitlement to her dower --- She asserted that concurrent judgments and decrees of family court and appellate court in Suit No.216/FC of 2010 entitling petitioner to Plot No.6 on basis of entries in Nikahnama could not have been interfered with by high court simply because in subsequent suit (Family Suit No.45 of 2012) for dissolution of marriage etc., petitioner had not been able to prove cruelty at hands of respondent --- Furthermore, it was submitted that even if petitioner was required to return dower, it should have been only to extent as provided in section 10(5) and (6) of West-Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 as amended by Punjab Family Courts (Amendment) Act, 2015 --- We have heard learned counsel for petitioner and perused record with her able assistance --- Although order dated 08.11.2012 (passed in Family Suit No.45 of 2012), whereby family court dissolved marriage between petitioner and respondent makes no mention of "khula", it does explicitly state that "marriage between parties is hereby dissolved under proviso [to] section 10 of Family Courts Act, 1964" --- Proviso to section 10(4) of said Act provides that in suit for dissolution of marriage, if reconciliation fails, family court shall pass decree for dissolution of marriage forthwith and "also restore to husband haq mahr received by wife" in consideration of marriage at time of marriage --- Through order dated 08.11.2012, marriage between petitioner and respondent was dissolved, but no order was passed as to return of dower --- This is because petitioner had alleged cruelty at hands of respondent, and she had to prove same in her evidence --- Family court and appellate court, after appraisal of evidence came to conclusion that petitioner had not been able to prove cruelty at hands of respondent in any form and therefore, she was liable to return dower --- Since petitioner had obtained decree for Plot No.6 (which was part of her dower), from another court in earlier suit (Suit No.216/FC of 2010), high court was well within its rights to allow respondent's writ petition and disentitle petitioner to such dower --- Petitioner's claim to Plot No.6 was based on entries in Nikahnama --- She had filed Suit No.216/FC of 2010 for declaration as to ownership of Plot No.6 on 20.12.2010 --- This suit was decreed on 18.10.2011 --- It is after this decree that petitioner, on 01.02.2012 had filed Family Suit No.45 of 2012 for dissolution of marriage and recovery of dower etc --- After order dated 08.11.2012 for dissolution of marriage, petitioner's entitlement to dower was dependent on whether she was compelled to leave her matrimonial abode or she had done so on her own volition for reasons not attributable to respondent --- Since family court, in its judgment and decree dated 06.11.2014 passed in Family Suit No.45 of 2012 had clearly held that she had not been able to prove cruelty at hands of respondent in any manner, therefore, her claim to ownership of Plot No.6 (which was part of her dower) even though based on earlier judgment and decree dated 18.10.2011 passed in earlier Suit No.216/FC of 2010 would cease --- Family court's finding that petitioner has to restore Haq Mahr/dower to respondent has been given due recognition by high court by setting aside concurrent judgments and decrees whereby Plot No.6 was declared to be petitioner's property on basis of entries in Nikahnama --- We tend to agree with findings of family court that it would have been different matter had petitioner been able to prove cruelty or brutality at hands of respondent --- In such eventuality, petitioner would have been entitled to retain her dower and there would have been no reason for high court to interfere with judgment and decree dated 06.11.2014 passed by family court in Family Suit No.45 of 2012 --- Dissolution of marriage under judgment and decree dated 06.11.2014 passed in Family Suit No.45 of 2012 not entitling petitioner to retain or obtain Haq Mahr was crucial development subsequent to filing of Suit No.216/FC of 2010 and had profound bearing on decree that petitioner had got regarding Plot No.6 prior to dissolution of her marriage --- It is well settled that courts can look into subsequent events at time of deciding cases --- Reference in this regard may be made to law laid down in cases of Mst. Amina Begum Vs. Mehar Ghulam Dastgir (PLD 1978 SC 220), Muhammadi Vs. Ghulam Nabi (2007 SCMR 761), Khushi Muhammad Vs. Abdul Ghafoor (2006 SCMR 839) and Evacuee Trust Property Board Vs. Sakina Bibi (2007 SCMR 262) --- With passing of decree dated 06.11.2014 in Family Suit No.45 of 2012 (which has been upheld by appellate court and high court), decree dated 18.10.2011 that was given in petitioner's favour in Suit No.216/FC of 2010 had become obsolete or unserviceable --- In case of Muhammad Arif Vs. Saima Noreen (2015 SCMR 804), it was held that where family court had reached conclusion that no cruelty could be proved by wife, it could not grant decree for dissolution of marriage on basis of cruelty under Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939 --- Furthermore, it was held that only logical conclusion was that marriage should have been dissolved on basis of khula in which event wife would have to forgo dower amount --- Since we do not find any legal infirmity in impugned judgments dated 17.03.2022 passed by high court in writ petitions No. 548-A/2012 and 1007/2016, leave to appeal is declined and petitions are dismissed --- Petitions were dismissed accordingly.

Summary: (a) Sales Tax Act, 1990 ---- S. 47 --- Reference Jurisdiction --- Question of Law --- Limitation --- Maintainability --- Primary question that came for consideration before High Court in referred Sale Tax Reference (STR No.14 of 2008) was whether adjudication vide Order-in-Original involved was hopelessly time barred and this prime fact which is also paramount question of law has been taken care of/adjudicated upon by foras below --- Follow up question which was decided was whether such question, if not raised in lower fora, could be raised and argued before High Court in reference jurisdiction --- Impugned judgment concluded above question in terms of its paragraph 15, whereby it was held that no doubt Court (reference jurisdiction) exercises special jurisdiction under section 47 of Sales Tax Act, 1990 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") however that jurisdiction merely extends to decide question of law, which arises out of order and not otherwise --- Court, in its order restricted itself not to go into any question of law raised for first time before it --- In paragraph 16 of impugned judgment, it concluded that "reference applications do not give rise to question of law to arise from orders of appellate tribunal and thus references were dismissed" --- Court held that reason that prevailed with High Court was of special jurisdiction being exercised under section 47 of Act which, according to judgment could only be extended to question of law that arises out of order --- Court held that perhaps view in impugned order was that it is restricted to question "raised" before lower fora and "decided" and that new question of law (even if arises out of order) cannot be framed and that in terms of paragraph 16 (referred above) reference application devoid of such order --- Court held that in its understanding this concept/principle was completely alien, as order gives rise to question and not reference application --- Court held that as to scope of reference jurisdiction under relevant statute, matter came up for consideration with reference to Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 --- Court held that there was no cavil to proposition that scope of reference is now extended to extent of appeal, which is continuation of main lis and in consequence thereof such principles, considering statutory frame of reference jurisdiction are also attracted --- Court held that in terms paragraphs 49 and 50 of Messrs Squibb Pakistan Pvt. Ltd Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax (2017 SCMR 1006), this Court has held that independent interpretation of section 133 of Ordinance, 2001, as it stands today, on plain language of law, liberated from burden or benefit of earlier judgments, would make position very clear --- Court held that subsection (1) confers right on any person or Commissioner aggrieved by final order of Appellate Tribunal to file application before High Court along with statement of case stating any questions of law arising out of Tribunal's order --- Court held that there is direct right to approach High Court in similar manner as in appeals, revisions, reviews etc --- Court held that order being challenged is final order but challenge is limited to questions of law only --- Court held that statement must set out facts, Tribunal's determination and questions of law which arise out of its order in terms of subsection (3) --- Court held that questions of law which may be referred are only those which "arise" out of order of Tribunal --- Court held that on plain language of law, this would include any question which can be made out from order of Tribunal --- Court held that there is nothing in scheme of section to impute any extraordinary limitations on type of questions which may be posed --- Court held that facts as stated in Tribunal's order have to be taken as recorded and any question which can be made out from those facts may be raised in application under section 133 ibid, regardless of whether it was previously urged or not --- Court held that there is absolutely no reason for confining questions which may be referred to only those which were argued before Tribunal on hypothesis that this is advisory jurisdiction as that is not what language of law contemplates --- Court held that law, as it stands, allows all questions "arising" out of order to be referred and not just questions "argued" or "raised" before Tribunal --- Court held that section 133 ibid clearly states that upon hearing case, High Court is obligated to decide question of law raised by reference and pass judgment thereon and Tribunal's order automatically stands modified by order of High Court --- Court held that this is extremely significant aspect as it is essence of appellate order that it per se modifies order of lower forum, or, in other words, merges into it --- Court held that this particular aspect of section 133 ibid was introduced for first time by way of 2005 amendment and was not present in section 66 of Act, 1922 during brief period between 1971 and 1974 when law was similar to present one --- Court held that it is therefore clear beyond any doubt that remedy under section 133 ibid is appellate in nature and must be construed and applied as such --- Court held that language of law must be given effect to, rather than unnecessarily restricting scope of jurisdiction on basis of judgments from era when law and circumstances were completely different --- Court held that civilized world, including our own country, has been moving towards greater rights for citizens over last century to extent that privilege of fair trial has now become constitutional right --- Court held that in these circumstances, it is not appropriate to restrict scope of legal remedy available to citizens on basis of old decision, especially when language of law is clearly pointing in opposite direction --- Court held that question of limitation is always considered as integral part of main lis and can never be isolated, be it special/appellate or regular plenary jurisdiction etc --- Court held that limitation ought to have been decided as it is always betrothed with litigation --- Court held that it is attached with litigation in such way that it becomes court's duty to look into it as priority, on its own --- Court held that matter of treating reference as appeal came for consideration in another case of Messrs Rafeh Limited which to large extent reiterated principles laid down in case of Squibb Pakistan Pvt. Ltd --- Court held that it is not case of respondents that orders in all cases, were not passed beyond period mandated under law --- Court held that only contention was that question of limitation was never raised in lower fora hence cannot be agitated in reference jurisdiction, which question was set at rest in light of aforesaid judgments of Squibb Pakistan Pvt. Ltd. and Messrs Rafeh Limited --- Court held that it is thus not only those questions which have been pleaded and raised before lower fora which could be agitated in reference jurisdiction but would also include those which arise out of order of Tribunal --- Court held that order of Tribunal talks about passing of order-in-original and thus its validity, in terms of timeframe as contoured by relevant statute is to be adjudged and should have been adjudged, which indeed arises out of order --- Court held that there is thus nothing in referred provision of reference jurisdiction to prevent appellants from raising such question of law which can be made out and seen from contents of order, impugned in reference jurisdiction --- Court held that conclusion of paragraph 49 of Squibb case judgment has overriding effect and that is law, as it stands which allows all questions "arising" out of order to be referred and not just questions "argued" or "raised" before Tribunal --- Court held that thus, learned High Court erred in special jurisdiction under section 47 (which is pari materia to section 133 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001) by not allowing appellants to raise questions of law that could be seen flowing and arising out of order --- Court held that therefore, instant bunch of civil appeals are allowed and impugned judgment/orders are set aside --- Appeals were allowed accordingly.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1908) ---- Ss. 22-A, 173, 190 & 195 --- Pakistan Penal Code (XLV of 1860) ---- S. 182 --- False Information --- Registration of FIR --- Justice of Peace --- Maintainability --- Instant Petition for Leave to Appeal was filed against order dated 29.5.2025, passed by Single Judge, High Court of Sindh, Karachi, in Cr. Misc. Application No.655/2024, whereby Cr. Misc. Application, filed against order dated 13.5.2024, passed by Vth Additional Sessions Judge, Karachi (South) has been dismissed --- Briefly, facts were that on 18.11.2005 one Mansoor Ali lodged FIR bearing No.410/2005 at Boat Basin Police Station, Karachi, for offences under Sections 506-B, 504, and 34 PPC against petitioner and his father (now deceased) in which they were tried and convicted by Trial Court which was set-aside in appeal and they were acquitted of charge by learned Appellate Court --- Per petitioner, FIR was false and vexatious and during trial proposed accused Muzzamil Ali Sheikha and Mustansar Ali Sheikha (respondents Nos.5 & 6) have recorded false statements against him and his father and based on their evidence they were convicted but learned Appellate Court has acquitted them in appeal --- Petitioner in first instance approached local police for taking action against proposed accused (respondents Nos.5 & 6) under Section 182, PPC and having failed to receive response has invoked jurisdiction under Section 22-A, CrPC --- Learned Ex-Officio Justice of Peace after hearing parties' respective counsel and going through report of police declined to issue direction to SHO to lodge FIR of petitioner against respondents Nos.5 & 6 and dismissed application under Section 22-A, CrPC whereafter, petitioner filed Cr. Misc. Application No.655/2024 before Sindh High Court, Karachi, which too, vide impugned order, was dismissed --- Learned counsel for petitioner argued that both Courts below were not justified to decline relief sought by petitioner against accused persons who falsely implicated petitioner in aforesaid FIR, however, after trial, petitioner and his father (now deceased) were acquitted from charge --- According to learned counsel, petitioner and his father were made to face criminal proceedings, which were based on mala fide and resulted in malicious prosecution, which caused damage and injury to their reputation --- Learned counsel further argued that it was duty of concerned Station House Officer ("SHO") to initiate proceedings under Section 182, PPC against respondents Nos.5 & 6 for having recorded their false statements with intention to cause injury to petitioner and his father, so that accused persons would have been convicted under Section 182, PPC for recording false statements --- Respondents argued that in view of proceedings before judicial forums, wherein, no such directions were issued to I.O or SHO for initiation of criminal proceedings under Section 182, PPC, therefore, petitioner cannot compel I.O or SHO to initiate such proceedings --- Court held that grievance expressed by petitioner before this Court is against refusal of concerned SHO to initiate proceedings under Section 182, PPC against two accused persons namely Muzzamil Ali Sheikha and Mustansar Ali Sheikha who according to petitioner gave false evidence before Trial Court resulting in conviction of petitioner and his father (now deceased) in FIR bearing No. 410/2005 at Boat Basin, PS Karachi for offences under Sections 506-B, 504 and 34, PPC vide judgment dated 03.03.2008 by court of VIIth Civil Judge and Judicial Magistrate Karachi (South) --- Court held that order of Trial Court was assailed by accused persons namely Abid Hussain and Ali Adnan Sheikha (petitioner in instant case) in Criminal Appeal No. 05/2008 in court of VTH Additional District and Session Judge Karachi (South) who vide judgment dated 23.05.2009 set aside judgment of Trial Court and acquitted petitioners with further directions to cancel bail bonds and discharge sureties --- Court held that it is pertinent to mention that petitioner appears to have not assailed aforesaid judgment passed by Appellant Court as nothing has been placed on record to this effect --- Court held that however, petitioners after lapse of 15 years from date of aforesaid judgment approached police authorities to initiate proceedings against Respondent Nos. 5 & 6 who according to petitioner recorded false evidence before Trial Court --- Court held that on refusal by police to exceed to request of petitioner, petitioner approached Ex Officio Justice of Peace i.e. VTH Additional District and Session Judge Karachi (South) by filing application under Section 22-A, CrPC for issuance of direction to concerned SHO to initiate proceedings under Section 182, PPC against aforesaid respondents, however, such application was dismissed after hearing parties in detail vide judgment dated 13.05.2024 --- Court held that petitioner feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied filed Criminal Misc. Application No. 655/2024 under Section 561, CrPC before High Court of Sindh, Karachi who after hearing parties and having examined entire facts and relevant law in detail has been pleased to dismiss same --- Court held that though learned Single Judge in aforesaid paras has correctly interpreted relevant provisions of law which do not require any interference by this Court however, in order to further elaborate scope of relevant provisions of law attracted in instant case i.e. Sections 173, 190 and 195, CrPC and Section 182, PPC we may examine same in detail --- Court held that Section 173, CrPC mandates that every investigation pursuant to FIR shall be completed within 14 days however, if investigation is not completed within period of 14 days, officer In Charge of police station shall within 3 days of expiration of such period forward to Magistrate through public prosecutor, an interim report in form prescribed by provincial government --- Court held that I.O after completing investigation as per Rule 24.7 of Police Rules, 1934 can recommend disposal of FIR in Class "A" if case is true but accused is untraceable, or in Class "B" if information given to police is maliciously false, or in Class "C", if matter is non-cognizable or for civil suit or case was filed owing to mistake of fact --- Court held that once such report is submitted before concerned Magistrate of First Class or any other Magistrate specially empowered by provincial government on recommendation of High Court, such Magistrate has power to either accept same or take cognizance of offence reported or to direct I.O to reinvestigate matter and submit fresh report within prescribed period --- Court held that however, Magistrate has no authority to direct I.O for disposal of FIR under A, B or C class as referred to herein above --- Court held that in case I.O after completion of investigation forms opinion that information laid before police by complainant is false, he can recommend disposal of FIR in "B" Class (maliciously false) after recording reasons and submit same before concerned Magistrate, who after perusal of same can accept such recommendation and dispose of FIR in "B" class or issue directions for disposal of case in any other class and can take cognizance of matter and proceed further in accordance with law --- Court held that however, said Magistrate has no authority to issue directions to initiate proceedings under Section 182, PPC against complainant in view of bar laid under Section 195, CrPC which provides that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under Sections 172 to 187 of Pakistan Penal Code, except on complaint in writing of public servant concerned, or of some other public servant to whom he is subordinate --- Court held that it may be clarified that in case of registration of FIR information is laid before SHO of concerned police station, then only said SHO is competent to initiate proceedings under Section 182, PPC in case of false information in appropriate cases, whereas, if such SHO is not available or prevented by sufficient cause to initiate proceedings under Section 182, PPC then such proceedings can be initiated by superior police officer --- Court held that having examined aforesaid provisions of law we may now explain scope of Section 182, PPC which provides that if complaint is laid before any public servant giving any information which he/she knows or believes to be false with intention to cause or likely to cause, such public servant, to do or omit anything which such public servant ought not to do or omit if true state of facts were known by him, or to use lawful power of such public servant to injury or annoyance of such person then such person shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for term which may extend to six months or with fine too which may extend to three thousand rupees or with both --- Court held that it may be observed here that incase information laid before public servant with Bonafide belief and knowledge of it being true, same cannot be termed as false unless it is proved in accordance with law through judicial proceedings --- Court held that such information can be termed as 'not proved' and not 'false' and, therefore, same cannot attract penal provision of Section 182, PPC --- Court held that suffice is to state that provision of Section 182, PPC can only be initiated by public servant before whom false information was laid, which resulted in initiation of criminal proceedings and found to be false through judicial process, whereas, such penal provisions cannot be invoked in cases where complainant could not prove allegations by producing sufficient evidence or material in support of such allegation before judicial forum --- Court held that to sum up above discussion in view of hereinabove provisions of law it has emerged that no court can take cognizance of any offence punishable under Section 182, PPC for having given false information to public servant in order to cause him to use his lawful power, except on written complaint of concerned public servant or his higher authority --- Court held that in case in hand it has transpired that neither I.O formed opinion that information given by complainant is false nor submitted report under Section 173, CrPC before concerned Magistrate for disposal of case in "B" Class, instead report was submitted for disposal of case in "C" Class however, Magistrate took cognizance of matter and convicted accused persons nominated therein through judicial process --- Court held that such judgment of Trial Court was assailed before appellate forum who acquitted accused persons in view of contradiction in judgment of Trial Court --- Court held that however, there was no finding of Appellate Court to effect that information laid before police by complainant was false --- Court held that since there was no opinion of I.O and finding by any judicial forum holding information laid before police by complainant as false, therefore, provisions of Section 182, PPC are otherwise not attracted in instant case --- Court held that any other interpretation to hereinabove provisions of law would result in multiplying criminal litigation out of same criminal proceedings and would open floodgate of filing frivolous proceedings in every criminal case where complainant could not succeed due to any other reason i.e. jurisdictional defect, limitation, insufficient evidence, or benefit of doubt etc --- Court held that in view of hereinabove facts and circumstances of case, we do not find any substance in instant Criminal Petition for Leave to Appeal whereas, learned Single Judge of Sindh High Court, Karachi has ably dealt with all factual and legal issues as per spirit of law, therefore, impugned judgment does not suffer from any factual error or legal infirmity --- Petition was dismissed accordingly.

Summary: Bail granted --- (a) Pakistan Penal Code (XLV of 1860) ---- Ss. 324, 337A(i), 337A(ii), 337F(ii), 148 & 149 --- Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1908) ---- S. 497 --- Bail Before Arrest --- Pre-Arrest Bail --- Maintainability --- Instant petition has been filed by Muhammad Irshad and Ali Raza (petitioners) against impugned order dated 23.04.2025, in Crl. Misc. No.14086-B of 2025, passed by Lahore High Court, Lahore with prayer to set-aside said order and grant pre-arrest bail to petitioners in case FIR No.160/2025, dated 28.01.2025, offences under Sections 324/337A(iii)/337A(ii)/337F(ii)/148/149 PPC, registered at police station Zafarwal, District Narowal --- Arguments heard --- Record perused --- It is evident from perusal of order dated 23.06.2025, of this Court that instant petition has already been partially dismissed to extent of Muhammad Sajid (Muhammad Sajid Iqbal) petitioner No.1, on account of his arrest --- Insofar as case of Muhammad Irshad and Ali Raza (petitioner Nos.2 & 3, respectively), is concerned, we have noted that as per contents of FIR, Muhammad Irshad (petitioner No.2), was assigned role of inflicting wooden 'bala' on forehead of Younas PW, whereas Ali Raza petitioner No.3, has been assigned role of inflicting hatchet blow on back side of head of Sufiyan PW --- Injuries attributed to both petitioners were declared by concerned Medical Officer to be punishable under section 337A (ii) PPC --- During investigation, it was concluded by Investigating Officer that Muhammad Irshad (petitioner No.2), was merely present at spot and he did not cause any injury on any member of complainant party --- Said findings of Investigating Officer have made prosecution case as one of further inquiry entitling Muhammad Irshad (petitioner No.2), to relief of pre-arrest bail as observed in judgments reported as 'Ehsan Ullah v. The State" (2012 SCMR 70) and 'Muhammad Ishaq v. The State and others' (2012 SCMR 1137) --- So far as Ali Raza (petitioner No.3), is concerned, we have noted that in medico legal report of Sufiyan PW, Medical Officer has mentioned injury on his head as skin deep --- Section 337A(ii) PPC, is attracted when bone under injury is exposed but it is evident from perusal of medico legal report of Sufiyan PW that no such finding regarding exposing bone of head of Sufiyan PW was mentioned in report rather it was categorically mentioned that injury on head of Sufiyan PW was skin deep, hence offence under section 337A(i) PPC, which is bailable offence, is attracted instead of section 337A(ii) PPC, to extent of abovementioned injury entitling Ali Raza (petitioner No.3), to grant of pre-arrest bail --- Reference in this context may be made to judgment reported as "Muhammad Qasim and another v. The State and others" (PLD 2014 Lahore 555) --- We have also noted that sixteen (16) named and 4/5 unknown accused persons total 20/21 accused persons have been implicated in this case by complainant, therefore, possibility of malafide involvement of petitioners in this case by complainant while using wider-net cannot be ruled out at this stage --- In light of above discussion, this petition is converted into appeal and same is partly allowed --- Consequently, impugned order is set-aside to extent of Muhammad Irshad and Ali Raza (petitioner Nos.2 & 3, respectively) --- Ad-interim pre-arrest bail already granted to Muhammad Irshad and Ali Raza (petitioner Nos.2 & 3, respectively), vide order dated 23.06.2025, is hereby confirmed subject to their furnishing of fresh bail bonds in sum of Rs. 50,000/- (rupees fifty thousand only) each with one surety each in like amount to satisfaction of learned Trial Court --- Petition was allowed accordingly.

Summary: Bail granted --- (a) Pakistan Penal Code (XLV of 1860) ---- Ss. 302, 324, 337A(i), 337A(ii), 337F(ii), 148 & 149 --- Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1908) ---- S. 497 --- Bail After Arrest --- Post-Arrest Bail --- Maintainability --- This Criminal Petition for Leave to Appeal is filed by Binyameen against impugned order dated 28.08.2025 passed by learned Peshawar High Court, Peshawar, whereby his application for post-arrest bail was dismissed --- Petitioner is facing trial in case FIR No. 123 dated 15.03.2025 under Sections 302, 324, 337A(i), 337A(ii), 337F(ii), 148 & 149 PPC registered at police station Mardan City, District Mardan --- Arguments heard --- Record perused --- As per contents of FIR, occurrence took place on 15.03.2025 at about 8.00 p.m in area of Mardan City where petitioner along with other co-accused persons allegedly committed murder of deceased and caused injuries to complainant party --- Petitioner was arrested on 20.03.2025 and since then he is in judicial custody --- Learned counsel for petitioner argued that petitioner is innocent and has been falsely implicated in this case --- He further argued that there are material contradictions in prosecution evidence and case against petitioner is based on weak evidence --- He also submitted that petitioner is not named in FIR and his name surfaced during investigation --- Learned counsel further argued that petitioner has been in custody for more than five months and trial is not likely to conclude in near future --- He also submitted that petitioner is not a flight risk and will not tamper with prosecution evidence --- Learned Additional Advocate General, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa opposed bail application and argued that petitioner is involved in heinous offence of murder --- He further argued that there is sufficient evidence against petitioner to connect him with commission of offence --- He also submitted that if released on bail, petitioner may abscond or tamper with prosecution evidence --- After perusal of record and hearing arguments, we find that petitioner is facing trial for serious offences including murder --- However, we have noted that petitioner has been in custody for more than five months and there is no likelihood of early conclusion of trial --- We have also noted that petitioner is not named in FIR and his name surfaced during investigation --- There are also some contradictions in prosecution evidence which need to be tested during trial --- In view of above facts and circumstances, we are of opinion that petitioner deserves relief of post-arrest bail --- Accordingly, this petition is converted into appeal and allowed --- Impugned order is set aside --- Petitioner is granted post-arrest bail subject to his furnishing bail bonds in sum of Rs.200,000/- with two sureties in like amount to satisfaction of learned Trial Court --- Petitioner shall also appear before Trial Court on each date of hearing and shall not leave jurisdiction of Trial Court without prior permission --- Petition was allowed accordingly.

Summary: (a) Customs Act, 1969 ---- Ss. 179(3) & 179(4)---- Adjudication proceedings—Limitation for passing order-in-original—Mandatory nature of time frame—Effect of delay—Show cause notice issued on 05.12.2014 under S. 179(3), Customs Act, 1969—Adjudicating officer was legally bound to pass the order-in-original within 120 days, with a maximum 30-day extension under second proviso to S. 179(3), making 150 days in total—Order-in-original dated either 19.05.2015 (title page) or 04.06.2015 (signature page), both falling outside the prescribed time frame—Extension under S. 179(4) allegedly granted on 20.05.2015, was also beyond limitation—Held, entire adjudication proceedings rendered time-barred—Provisions of S. 179(3) and 179(4) are mandatory and non-compliance vitiates proceedings. (b) Limitation—Mandatory statutory timelines—Interpretation by Supreme Court ---- Time-bound adjudication under fiscal statutes—Non-compliance results in nullity—Supreme Court reaffirmed that adjudication timelines under Customs Act, 1969 are mandatory—Cited and affirmed larger bench ruling in Messrs Wak Limited v. Collector Central Excise and Sales Tax (2025 SCMR 1280), which upheld earlier precedent in Collector of Sales Tax, Gujranwala v. Super Asia Mohammad Din (2017 SCMR 1427)—Provisions mandating time-limited adjudication must be strictly followed—Late extensions or post-facto regularizations cannot cure jurisdictional defect. (c) Fiscal Law—Adjudication under show cause notices—Invalidity due to lapse of limitation --- Adjudication orders passed beyond statutory time—Invalidity and consequences—Where adjudicating officer fails to conclude proceedings within prescribed time under S. 179(3) Customs Act, and extension (if any) is granted after expiry, the resulting adjudication order is without lawful authority—Proceedings under show cause notice abate—Held, order-in-original passed beyond limitation period was unlawful and proceedings void. (d) Disposition Petition converted into appeal and allowed—Impugned order of Lahore High Court set aside—Order-in-original held to be time-barred and proceedings under show cause notice declared invalid—Stay application (CMA No. 5968/2025) disposed of accordingly. Cited Cases: Collector of Sales Tax, Gujranwala v. Super Asia Mohammad Din, 2017 SCMR 1427 Wak Limited v. Collector Central Excise and Sales Tax, 2018 SCMR 1474 Messrs Wak Limited Multan Road, Lahore v. Collector Central Excise and Sales Tax, 2025 SCMR 1280

Summary: Acquittal --- (a) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Control of Narcotics Substance Act, 2019 ---- S. 9-D --- Pakistan Penal Code (XLV of 1860) ---- Ss. 324, 337A(i), 337A(ii), 337F(ii), 148 & 149 --- Narcotic Substance --- Life Imprisonment --- Maintainability --- This Criminal Petition for Leave to Appeal filed under Article 185(3) of Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, is directed against judgment dated 16.11.2023 of Peshawar High Court, Peshawar ("the High Court"), whereby appeal filed by petitioner was dismissed and his conviction and sentence of rigorous imprisonment for life with fine of Rs. 600,000/- recorded by trial Court in Crime No. 230 dated 31.08.2021, registered under Section 9-D KP CNSA, 2019 at police station IDS, Swabi, were maintained --- Prosecution's case, as set forth in Crime report, is that on 31.08.2021, complainant alongwith other police contingents (NET squad), laid nakabandi at crime scene --- In meanwhile, Datsun bearing registration No. DR-3588, coming from Mangal Chai, loaded with crushed stones, arrived, was intercepted --- Driver of vehicle, namely Irshad (present petitioner), was deboarded --- Upon his personal search, no incriminating article was recovered; however, search of Datsun led to recovery of white sacks of sugar, wherefrom 20 chunks of opium wrapped in yellow insulation tape and three packets of chars pukhta were recovered, which, upon weighment, came out to be 24885 grams of opium and 3013 grams of chars --- Test samples were separated from each piece (tikya), as such, remaining case property was packed and sealed into different parcels --- Case property was shifted to police station, and so accused alongwith vehicle --- Test samples were sent to office of Chemical Examiner, and positive report in this respect was received --- Accused-petitioner disclosed that recovered narcotics is ownership of Arshad, son of Momin; consequently, he was also booked in Crime report --- On completion of investigation, challan was submitted --- To substantiate charge, prosecution examined as many as five witnesses --- Accused was examined under Section 342 Cr. PC, however, he did not produce evidence in defence --- At conclusion of trial, accused-petitioner was adjudged guilty of offence by trial Court, convicted, and sentenced vide judgment dated 30.07.2022, as under: Under Section 9-D, KP CNSA, 2019, to rigorous imprisonment for life with fine of Rs. 600,000/- (Six Hundred Thousand only) --- In case of failure to pay fine, he was directed to further undergo SI for six months --- Benefit of Section 382-B Cr.PC was also extended to him --- His co-accused, namely Arshad Zaman, was acquitted of charge through same judgment --- Accused-petitioner challenged his conviction and sentence before High Court through Cr.A No. 787-P of 2022, which was dismissed vide impugned judgment dated 16.11.2023 --- Aggrieved thereof, he has filed instant petition --- It was argued by learned ASC for accused-petitioner that prosecution has miserably failed to establish guilt of accused-petitioner beyond ray of doubt as prosecution's evidence is pregnant with contradictions and discrepancies --- He next maintained that accused-petitioner is innocent and has falsely been implicated in alleged crime --- He added that during trial, neither Register No.19 nor Register No. 21 was produced in original; vehicle, wherefrom alleged contraband was recovered, was neither produced nor exhibited; and samples of narcotic were not examined separately by Chemical Examiner --- On basis of above deficiencies in prosecution evidence, learned ASC submitted that accused-petitioner deserves outright acquittal --- As against this, learned Additional Advocate General, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, submitted that prosecution has succeeded in proving case against accused-petitioner beyond any shadow of doubt --- According to him, there is no inconsistency in prosecution's case --- He next submitted that prosecution has proved safe transmission of case property to police station and onward transmission to FSL through PW-3 --- Heard both sides and record perused --- It is well-recognized principle of criminal jurisprudence arising out of maxim "communi observantia non est recedendum" that when law prescribes specific procedure, it must be followed accordingly; any deviation renders act questionable --- In this context, reference may be made to case of Noman Mansoor --- This Principle is applied more stringently in cases arising out of special enactments like "Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Control of Narcotics Substance Act, 2019", which prescribes severe punishment to accused, therefore, it requires concrete and strong evidence to bring home guilt of accused --- Reference may be made to cases of Ahmed Ali, Muhammad Hashim, and Ameer Zeb --- It is alleged by prosecution that on relevant day and time, complainant, Akbar Ali, Inspector (PW-1) alongwith other police contingents, had laid nakabandi at Bagla Road near Bagla Kandawo, 45/46 KMs away from police station --- According to prosecution, recovery of contraband was witnessed by Fawad Khan, SHO police station, IDS (PW-2) and Gohar Khan, SI (given up) as is reflected from recovery/seizure memo (Ex.PW1/1), but neither seizing officer nor investigating officer (PW-4) bothered to place on record daily diary report to show that seizing officer alongwith other police officials had made departure from police station to spot for nakabandi to prove their presence on spot --- Whenever police official makes departure from police station, he is essentially bound to record reasons of his departure from police station, as contemplated by Rules 22.48 and 22.49 of Police Rules, 1934 --- Failure of prosecution to produce in Court daily diary of police station showing departure of police party to spot would lead to inference that police party did not leave police station and all proceedings were carried out in police station --- Fair play demands that it should have been tendered in evidence to prove fact that seizing officer alongwith other police officials, left police station to spot --- Perusal of statements of seizing officer and marginal witness of recovery memo, namely Fawad Khan, SHO (PW-2) reflect that seizing officer deposed that he stopped vehicle and searched its driver, nothing incriminating article was recovered from him, however, search of vehicle led to recovery of opium and chars --- Likewise, PW-2 stated that complainant took into possession chars and opium --- He failed to mention that at relevant time and day, accused-petitioner was driving vehicle in question, wherefrom contraband was recovered --- He did not even bother to mention registration number of vehicle or place of recovery --- Neither seizing officer nor any official of police took pain to make videography of recovery proceedings to establish that recovery of contraband was made from vehicle driven by accused-petitioner, nor photographs for complete coverage of crime scene were taken as contemplated by Rule 25.14 of Police Rules, 1934 --- Moreso, PW-2 did not disclose presence of other police officials, including second marginal witness of recovery memo on spot --- Murasila (Ex.P A/1), as per prosecution's story, was taken by Ahmad Ali, MHC, but he was not produced --- Fazal Amin, MHC, was examined as PW-3, according to him, case property was handed over to him by seizing officer, however, seizing officer did not utter even single word in this respect --- Furthermore, extracts of Registers No. 19 and 21 were tendered in evidence as Ex.PW3/1 and Ex.PW3/2, when we examined extract of Register No. 19, it appears to be on plain paper; therefore, its exhibition was rightly objected to by defence counsel --- We noticed another serious flaw in prosecution's case regarding forensic examination process --- FSL report Ex.PK/1 reflects that collective analysis of twenty parcels of opium and three parcels of chars was given --- Neither these samples were tested separately nor individual report of each sample prepared, which is violative of principles laid down in Ameer Zeb's case (supra) --- In our view, collective forensic report not only reduces credibility of chemical examination but also raises serious doubts regarding representative nature of samples sent for chemical analysis --- We also noticed that recovered substance was sealed with monogram reading as "MN", unrelated to any officer or witness involved in case, fact admitted by PW-2 and left unexplained by prosecution --- Finding serious procedural violations, absence of credible forensic evidence, and dents in prosecution's case, we conclude that prosecution has not been able to prove its case against accused-petitioner beyond shadow of doubt --- Accordingly, this petition is converted into appeal and allowed --- Impugned judgments passed by Courts below are set aside, and appellant is acquitted of charges --- He be set at liberty, if not required to be detained in any other case --- These are detailed reasons for our short order of even date --- Petition was allowed accordingly.

Summary: Illegal disposition requirements ---- (a) Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 —- Ss. 3, 4 & 5 — Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, Ss. 435 & 439 — Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 10-A Maintainability of complaint — Concurrent civil litigation — Jurisdiction of trial court — Scope of inquiry under the 2005 Act — Remedial purpose — Complaint under Ss. 3 & 4 of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 was dismissed by trial court without trial, solely on grounds that (i) petitioner and respondent were co-owners in un-partitioned land, and (ii) civil litigation was pending — High Court upheld dismissal relying on judgments in Habib Ullah v. Abdul Manan (2012 SCMR 1533) and Bashir Ahmed v. ASJ Faisalabad (PLD 2010 SC 661) — Held, both precedents had been declared "not good law" by Gulshan Bibi v. Muhammad Sadiq (PLD 2016 SC 769) — Dismissal of complaint solely due to pending civil litigation or co-ownership status is contrary to established law — Sessions court is duty-bound to determine from available material whether unlawful dispossession occurred, even in presence of parallel civil proceedings — Complaint under 2005 Act is maintainable unless trial court determines that it is being misused to convert a civil dispute into criminal liability — Dual-track nature of civil and criminal liabilities underlies the Act’s independent remedial character. Cited Cases: • Gulshan Bibi v. Muhammad Sadiq (PLD 2016 SC 769) • Muhammad Naseem v. Fareeda Gul (2016 SCMR 1931) • Abdul Majeed v. The State (2017 SCMR 390) • Criminal Petitions No. 66-K & 67-K of 2024 (2024 SCP 243) Disposition: Petition converted into appeal and allowed; matter remanded to trial court for determination in accordance with 2005 Act. (b) Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 —- S. 5(1), Second Proviso Scope of inquiry — Role of trial court — Failure to investigate key factual questions — Effect — Trial court failed to investigate core factual issue of actual possession prior to alleged dispossession, despite calling for police report — Inquiry report submitted under order dated 19.12.2020 was deficient and failed to address possession status of complainant prior to occurrence — Held, trial court should have invoked second proviso to S. 5(1) and directed further inquiry — Instead, it erroneously dismissed the complaint without trial — Jurisdictional error committed by trial court by not determining whether alleged illegal dispossession actually occurred. Judicial Direction: On remand, trial court must conduct inquiry in accordance with 2005 Act and determine (i) if petitioner was dispossessed, and (ii) effect of delay, if any, in filing complaint. (c) Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 —- S. 3 — Scope and elements — Applicability test Conditions for application — Legal test from Mumtaz Hussain case reaffirmed — Four elements required for S. 3 offence: Property must be immovable; Complainant must be lawful owner or in lawful possession; Accused must have unlawfully entered the property; Such entry must be with intent to dispossess — Held, trial and High Court failed to properly apply this test — No findings rendered as to actual possession prior to occurrence — Summary dismissal without factual determination was unlawful. Cited Case: • Mumtaz Hussain v. Dr. Nasir Khan (2010 SCMR 1254) (d) Criminal Jurisdiction — Civil proceedings pending — Concurrent remedy — No bar on maintainability Dual-track proceedings — Civil litigation does not preclude prosecution under 2005 Act — Held, pendency of civil litigation regarding same immovable property does not nullify jurisdiction of criminal court under the 2005 Act — Criminal liability must be adjudicated on its own merits and cannot be defeated by citing pending civil suits — A person cannot take law into own hands, dispossess lawful occupier, and avoid criminal prosecution merely due to co-existing civil claims. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Naseem v. Fareeda Gul (2016 SCMR 1931) • Abdul Majeed v. The State (2017 SCMR 390) • Criminal Petitions No. 66-K & 67-K of 2024 (2024 SCP 243) Final Disposition: Leave to appeal granted. Petition converted to appeal and allowed. Judgments of High Court and trial court set aside. Matter remanded to trial court to proceed under 2005 Act, assess legality of alleged dispossession, and determine effect of delay in filing complaint.