Summary: Review Petitions (Sunni Ittehad Council/Reserved Seats Case), decided on 06 May 2025 with dissenting Note by Justice Ayesha Malik. ---- Majority Judgment (Amin-ud-Din Khan, J. – For Seven Judges) (a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Arts. 17(2), 51, 106, 184(3), 187, 188 & 225–––Election Commission of Pakistan–––Reserved seats for women and non-Muslims–––Nature, purpose and constitutional scheme–––Interpretation–––Scope of review jurisdiction. Held, that reserved seats under Arts. 51 and 106 are an integral component of representative democracy, meant to ensure inclusiveness of marginalized groups; however, their allocation remains party-based and contingent on valid participation through submission of party lists before elections. The Sunni Ittehad Council (SIC) had not submitted valid lists within statutory time; nevertheless, the earlier judgment (2024 PLD SC ___) incorrectly excluded the claim of seats solely because PTI candidates joined SIC post-poll. Such exclusion distorted proportional representation and denied voters’ constitutional right to representation. Court, exercising review jurisdiction under Art.188, revisited manifest error in interpreting Articles 51 & 106 and restored the legal position settled by the Peshawar High Court. (b) Election Act, 2017 (XXXIII of 2017) ----Ss. 60, 66, 104, 209 & Fourth Schedule–––Party lists for reserved seats–––Submission and substitution–––Consequences of omission–––ECP’s jurisdiction. Under s.104(1), party lists must be filed before the Commission within prescribed period; however, law does not bar consideration of subsequent lawful affiliation where a political party retains electoral identity through its symbol or allied group. ECP’s decision to treat SIC as ineligible was beyond jurisdiction and contrary to the spirit of participatory democracy. Held, that ECP’s action violated Articles 17(2) and 218(3) of the Constitution; hence, Peshawar High Court rightly set aside the Commission’s order. (c) Constitutional Jurisdiction & Review under Art. 188 ----Maintainability of review–––Grounds–––Error apparent on face of record–––Scope of “complete justice” under Art. 187. Held, that earlier three-member majority judgment committed an error apparent on face of record by granting relief to an entity (PTI) not party before the Court and by substituting statutory scheme with judicial innovation. Such exercise exceeded jurisdiction under Art.184(3). In review, the Court may correct its own constitutional error to uphold supremacy of Constitution; principle of functus officio does not bar review to correct manifest illegality. Jurisdiction under Art.188 read with Order XXVI, r.6 of Supreme Court Rules permits reconsideration of constitutional misinterpretation. (d) Principles of Interpretation –– Mandatory Timeframes and Jurisdictional Bars Held, that statutory requirements for filing party lists are directory in so far as they ensure procedural order, not substantive disenfranchisement. Technical lapses cannot defeat constitutional rights of representation. ECP’s insistence on procedural rigidity without constitutional foundation amounted to mal-exercise of authority. (e) Separation of Powers –– Election Disputes –– Art. 225 Held, that Art.225 restricts election disputes to election tribunals; however, questions of constitutional interpretation relating to representational rights fall within the Supreme Court’s review jurisdiction. The 2024 judgment exceeded the limits of “complete justice” under Art.187 by re-distributing seats contrary to electoral law; hence, liable to recall. (f) Fundamental Rights –– Freedom of Association & Political Representation ----Art.17(2)–––Right to form or be member of political party–––Proportional representation through reserved seats as extension of fundamental right–––Denial of representation unconstitutional. Held, that exclusion of voters represented by PTI-backed independents from allocation of reserved seats offended Art.17(2). Fundamental right to political participation cannot be curtailed by administrative interpretation or judicial construction inconsistent with the text and spirit of Constitution. (g) Precedents Relied Upon • Workers’ Party Pakistan v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2012 SC 681 • Muhammad Saeed v. ECP PLD 2023 SC 70 • Benazir Bhutto v. Federation PLD 1988 SC 416 • Lahore High Court judgment in E.T.R. No.01/05 etc., restored Disposition (Majority): Review Petitions Allowed –– Impugned Judgment dated 13.03.2024 set aside –– Peshawar High Court judgment restored –– Orders of ECP annulled –– Reserved seats allocated to Sunni Ittehad Council as per law. Dissenting Note (Ayesha A. Malik, J.) (h) Constitution of Pakistan ----Arts. 187, 188 & 184(3)–––Scope of review jurisdiction–––Distinction between appeal and review–––Finality of Supreme Court judgments. Held, that review is not a rehearing of the case; its scope is confined to correcting an error apparent on the face of the record. The petitioners failed to identify any such error. The review petitions sought re-appraisal of factual and legal conclusions already determined; therefore, were misconceived and incompetent. (i) Art. 187 –– “Complete Justice” –– Limits of power The power of “complete justice” cannot be used to subvert finality of judicial decisions or to alter outcomes reached after full hearing. The majority, by reopening concluded findings, exceeded the permissible scope of Art.188 and Order XXVI of the Supreme Court Rules. (j) Constitutional Discipline –– Finality of Judgments Reiterated, that finality of judgments is a constitutional imperative ensuring legal certainty and public confidence. Allowing review as a second appeal undermines judicial stability and erodes institutional credibility. (k) Result Held, that review petitions ought to have been dismissed; original judgment of 13.03.2024 contained no patent error; majority’s decision amounts to re-hearing rather than review. Disposition (Dissent): Review Petitions Dismissed. Final Outcome: By Majority (7 to 2): Review petitions allowed; judgment of 13 March 2024 recalled; Peshawar High Court judgment restored; dissenting note by Ayesha A. Malik, J.

Summary: (a) Constitutional law – Writ jurisdiction – Maintainability – Premature or speculative petitions – Constitution of Azad Jammu and Kashmir, 1974, Arts. 4, 18 & 25 – A writ petition founded on mere apprehension or speculative harm, without demonstration of an existing or concluded executive action causing legal injury, is not maintainable – The mere constitution of a committee for regularization of ad-hoc or contractual employees does not, in itself, infringe any fundamental or statutory right. (b) Administrative law – Executive discretion – Formation of committees – Scope of judicial review – Administrative authorities may constitute committees to evaluate matters within their domain – Judicial intervention arises only when such action results in contravention of law, arbitrariness, or violation of constitutional or statutory safeguards – Courts must refrain from interfering with preparatory or internal administrative processes not yet culminating in enforceable decisions. (c) Constitutional law – Writ of prohibition – Preventive jurisdiction – Though preventive in nature, the writ cannot be invoked on the basis of abstract or hypothetical injury – It lies only where a judicial, quasi-judicial, or statutory body is imminently assuming jurisdiction not vested in it or acting contrary to law – Speculative challenges to anticipated actions do not warrant constitutional intervention. (d) Separation of powers – Judicial restraint – Premature interference with administrative deliberations undermines executive autonomy and the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers – Courts must exercise writ jurisdiction to redress concrete violations, not potential or contingent grievances. (e) Precedents followed – Umar Shehzad v. Azad Government (2023 SCR 879); Bashir Ahmed Badini v. Hon’ble Chairman (2022 SCMR 448; 2022 PLC (C.S.) 610) – Relief under writ jurisdiction lies only where there is a demonstrable violation of law or a manifest breach of a legal or fundamental right causing tangible harm. Disposition: – Appeal dismissed. – High Court judgment dated 13.12.2024 upheld. – No order as to costs.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Arts. 184(3), 185(3), 186, 191A, & 26th Constitutional Amendment Jurisdiction of Constitutional Bench---Interpretation and effect of Article 191A of the Constitution, introduced through the 26th Constitutional Amendment, 2024---Scope and authority of Constitutional Bench vis-à-vis Regular Bench---Petitioners challenged the vires of sub-section (2) of Section 221-A of the Customs Act, 1969, inserted via Finance Act, 2018---Petitions initially entertained by Regular Bench, which proceeded to examine its jurisdiction despite existence of Article 191A---Held, that the jurisdiction for cases involving interpretation of constitutional provisions, including vires of legislation, exclusively vested in the Constitutional Bench under Article 191A---Any proceedings taken or orders passed by the Regular Bench in such matters deemed coram non judice and void ab initio---Supreme Court, through its Constitutional Bench, recalled all orders passed by the Regular Bench in these matters. Cited Cases: Sabir Shah v. Shad Muhammad Khan PLD 1995 SC 66 Fazlul Quader Chowdhry v. Abdul Haque PLD 1963 SC 486 Marbury v. Madison (5 US 137 [1803]) Justice Qazi Faez Isa v. President of Pakistan PLD 2022 SC 119 Mustafa Impex, Karachi v. Government of Pakistan PLD 2016 SC 808 Premier Systems (Pvt) Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan 2018 PTD 861 (b) Constitutional Interpretation--- ----Principles of interpretation of constitutional amendments---Doctrine of purposive interpretation---Progressive and dynamic approach in interpreting constitutional provisions emphasized---Court observed that interpretation must be harmonious and align with legislative intent while avoiding judicial overreach---Doctrine of “sublato fundamento cadit opus” applied, holding that if foundational jurisdiction is absent, any superstructure built upon it collapses. Cited Cases: Hamza Rasheed Khan v. Election Appellate Tribunal PLD 2024 SC 1028 MQM v. Pakistan PLD 2022 SC 439 Pakistan Tobacco Company v. Government of NWFP PLD 2002 SC 460 LDA v. Imrana Tiwana 2015 SCMR 1739 (c) Judicial Overreach--- ----Separation of powers---Judicial activism versus judicial restraint---Held, that judiciary must operate within the limits of its constitutional jurisdiction and cannot assume legislative functions or expand its authority by judicial orders---Any deviation from this principle amounts to judicial overreach, shaking the foundation of constitutional democracy. Cited Cases: Mian Irfan Bashir v. Deputy Commissioner (DC), Lahore PLD 2021 SC 571 Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab (2014) 3 SCC 92 Badshah Begum v. Additional Commissioner 2003 SCMR 629 (d) Administration of Justice--- ----Due diligence in case management and jurisdictional determination---Registrar of Supreme Court directed to implement administrative safeguards to prevent jurisdictional errors in case fixation---Recommendations made for IT-based Case Management System with alerts and verification mechanisms to ensure correct allocation of cases to appropriate benches. ----- Disposition: Orders dated 13.01.2025 and 16.01.2025 passed by Regular Bench declared void; all related proceedings nullified.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan: ----Arts. 191A, 175, 184(3), & salient features of the Constitution---Independence of judiciary and separation of powers---Challenge to the constitutionality of Article 191A added through the 26th Constitutional Amendment---Maintainability---Petitioners objected to the jurisdiction of the regular bench of the Supreme Court to hear cases involving the constitutionality of subsection (2) of Section 221-A of the Customs Act, 1969, based on Article 191A---Respondents argued that Article 191A infringes upon the independence of the judiciary and the separation of powers, key constitutional principles protected as salient features of the Constitution---Held, a constitutionally invalid amendment cannot override a valid conferment of jurisdiction on the regular bench---The objection regarding jurisdiction and the constitutional validity of Article 191A must be addressed before proceeding further in the matter. (b) Jurisdiction---Power to decide own jurisdiction: ----Principle of Kompetenz-Kompetenz---Scope---Respondents contended that the regular bench of the Supreme Court, being the forum in question, has the authority to determine the validity of its jurisdiction, including constitutional challenges to amendments impacting such jurisdiction---Cited principles from Sabir Shah v. Shad Muhammad Khan (PLD 1995 SC 66), Fazlul Quader Chowdhry v. Abdul Haque (PLD 1963 SC 486), and Marbury v. Madison (5 US 137 [1803]) to support the bench's competence to decide on its own jurisdiction. ----Cited Cases: • Sabir Shah v. Shad Muhammad Khan (PLD 1995 SC 66) • Fazlul Quader Chowdhry v. Abdul Haque (PLD 1963 SC 486) • Marbury v. Madison (5 US 137 [1803]) ----Disposition: Hearing adjourned to 16.01.2025 to allow parties to prepare and assist the Court on the objections regarding jurisdiction and the constitutional validity of Article 191A.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan: ----Arts. 63A, 184(3), 186 & 188—Disqualification on grounds of defection—Judicial review—Scope of presidential reference—Validity of Supreme Court's earlier decision—Review petition challenging the Supreme Court’s majority decision in PLD 2022 SC 488 and PLD 2023 SC 42—Held, Art. 63A provides a detailed, self-executory procedure for disqualification on grounds of defection, granting exclusive jurisdiction to the Party Head, Election Commission, and Supreme Court (in appellate jurisdiction)—Supreme Court’s earlier ruling had incorrectly nullified valid votes cast in defiance of party directives, overstepped judicial authority by disregarding the Party Head's discretion, bypassing the Election Commission’s jurisdiction, and abolishing the right of appeal to the Supreme Court itself—Court held that interpretation should be based strictly on constitutional text, and no judicial legislation or personal morality-based rulings should substitute constitutional mandates. (b) Constitutional Interpretation: ----Scope of judicial review—Doctrine of "casus omissus"—Judicial restraint—Held, Art. 63A does not require interpretation as it is a clear, precise, and self-executory provision—Judges in the majority of the earlier decision had engaged in judicial overreach by inserting additional restrictions not provided in the constitutional text, effectively amending the Constitution through judicial ruling—Established principle reaffirmed that courts must not legislate from the bench or "read into" constitutional provisions what is not explicitly stated—Courts cannot override parliamentary intent or assume legislative powers—Doctrine of casus omissus applied, holding that courts must adhere to textual interpretation and avoid inserting unwritten consequences into constitutional provisions. (c) Article 186—Presidential Reference—Scope & Limitations: ----Advisory jurisdiction—Opinion vs. Binding Judgment—Held, under Art. 186, the President of Pakistan may seek an advisory opinion from the Supreme Court on questions of law of public importance—However, such an opinion does not have binding effect, unlike decisions made under Art. 184(3) (original jurisdiction)—Court observed that the Presidential Reference had been politically motivated, filed at a time when the then Prime Minister faced a vote of no-confidence, and lacked legal merit—Noted that the reference contained pre-determined conclusions rather than neutral legal questions, thereby compromising the neutrality required for constitutional references—Held, that the earlier Court had erred in treating the reference and constitutional petition together, as they arose under separate jurisdictions and required independent adjudication. (d) Separation of Powers & Judicial Overreach: ----Judiciary's role vis-à-vis Legislature & Executive—Encroachment on legislative and political matters—Court held that the earlier majority decision had encroached upon legislative powers by unilaterally expanding the consequences of defection beyond those stipulated in the Constitution—Judges had rewritten Art. 63A by effectively preventing votes from being counted and imposing an automatic disqualification, even though the Constitution clearly outlines a procedural mechanism involving the Party Head, Election Commission, and Supreme Court in appellate jurisdiction—Reaffirmed principles of separation of powers, cautioning against judicial intervention in legislative and political domains, especially where the Constitution explicitly assigns decision-making powers to other institutions. (e) Vote of No-Confidence & Political Consequences: ----Arts. 54(3), 58(1), 95—Unlawful dissolution of National Assembly—Court intervention—Judicial protection of parliamentary processes—Held, the vote of no-confidence against the then Prime Minister was a constitutional process under Art. 95, and interference by state institutions (Speaker of National Assembly and President) violated fundamental democratic principles—Court reiterated that once a vote of no-confidence is initiated, the Prime Minister cannot advise the dissolution of the National Assembly as per Art. 58(1)—Noted that the Supreme Court had earlier correctly intervened to prevent unconstitutional dissolution of the Assembly, ensuring that MNAs could exercise their right to vote in accordance with democratic norms. (f) Voting Rights of Parliamentarians: ----Nullification of votes—Violation of Art. 63A & Parliamentary Democracy—Earlier decision had ruled that votes cast in defiance of party directives should not be counted—Court held that this was unconstitutional, as the Constitution does not prevent a member from voting—The prescribed consequence of voting against party policy is post facto disciplinary action by the Party Head, subject to adjudication by the Election Commission and appeal to the Supreme Court—Votes cast in the National Assembly must always be counted to maintain the integrity of parliamentary democracy—Court emphasized that automatic vote nullification or immediate disqualification without following due process would destroy democratic accountability and concentrate power in party leaders, violating fundamental principles of representative governance. (g) Global Perspective on Defection Laws: ----Comparative constitutional analysis—No automatic disqualification in global jurisdictions—Court examined global practices on defection and found that no country imposes automatic disqualification for voting against party directives—Noted that in India, defection proceedings are governed by the Tenth Schedule and involve a due process mechanism similar to Art. 63A—Reviewed case law from Papua New Guinea, where its Supreme Court struck down automatic disqualification as unconstitutional for violating parliamentary privileges and free speech—Court held that Pakistan's defection provisions should be applied in line with global constitutional norms, avoiding judicially imposed punishments that are not explicitly provided in the Constitution. (h) Review Jurisdiction & Reversal of Earlier Judgment: ----Art. 188—Scope of Supreme Court’s review power—Review petition filed under Art. 188 of the Constitution, arguing that the earlier majority decision had misconstrued Art. 63A, ignored established case law, and violated the separation of powers—Held, a review petition can be granted where there is a mistake or error apparent on the face of the record—Court found that the earlier decision had incorrectly bypassed constitutional procedures and infringed upon parliamentary rights—Earlier judgment was set aside, and the legal framework under Art. 63A was restored as per its original constitutional intent. ----Disposition: Review petition unanimously allowed—Majority judgment of 17 May 2022 (PLD 2022 SC 488) and detailed judgment (PLD 2023 SC 42) set aside—Original constitutional interpretation of Art. 63A reinstated—Votes cast by MNAs to be counted—Defection proceedings must follow due process as per Art. 63A—Separation of powers and parliamentary democracy reaffirmed.

Summary: Issues: 1) Separation of Powers: Does the delegation of judicial powers to the executive officers of the ICT Administration violate Article 175(3) of the Constitution, which mandates the separation of the judiciary from the executive? ------ 2) Judicial Independence: Can judicial powers be exercised by executive officers who are not under the supervisory jurisdiction of the judiciary, as required by Article 203 of the Constitution? Implementation of Reforms: Has the delay in issuing the notification for the enforcement of the judicial separation under the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Ordinances of 2001 been unconstitutional? ------ Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Islamabad High Court ruled in favor of the petitioner, declaring the exercise of judicial powers by the executive magistrates within the ICT as unconstitutional. ------ Separation of Powers and Judicial Independence: The court held that the provisions of the Constitution are clear in mandating the separation of the judiciary from the executive. Any continued exercise of judicial powers by executive officers violates the Constitution, particularly Articles 175(3), 202, and 203, which require an independent judiciary. The exercise of judicial functions by ICT Administration officers was deemed unconstitutional. ------ Delay in Implementation: The court noted that the Federal Government had failed to issue the necessary notification to enforce the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Ordinances of 2001, which were designed to separate the judiciary from the executive. The delay of over 23 years in issuing this notification was found to be unconstitutional. ------ Prospective Effect: The court’s ruling operates prospectively, meaning that it does not affect past judgments or decisions already made by executive magistrates under the de facto doctrine, but prevents them from issuing future judgments or orders in criminal trials until the necessary judicial reforms are enforced. The court directed the Federal Government to issue the notification for the enforcement of the 1st Amendment Ordinance without further delay and restrained executive magistrates from passing final orders in criminal cases pending before them. ------ Citations/Precedents: Government of Sindh v. Sharaf Faridi (PLD 1994 SC 105) Confirmed that executive magistrates cannot exercise judicial powers in violation of the principle of separation of powers. ------ Mehram Ali v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1998 SC 1445) Reiterated that the separation of the judiciary from the executive is a constitutional mandate. ------ Government of Balochistan v. Azizullah Memon (PLD 1993 SC 341) Held that the period for separation of the judiciary from the executive expired in 1987, and any delay beyond that is unconstitutional. ------ Sheikh Riaz-ul-Haq v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2013 SC 501) Distinguished judicial power from administrative functions, emphasizing that judicial powers must be exercised by courts subject to judicial principles. ------ Malik Toti Khan v. District Magistrate (PLD 1957 Quetta 1) The court emphasized that inconvenience to the administration cannot override constitutional provisions regarding judicial independence.

Summary: Detailed judgement of order 2024 SCP 13 ---- Issue:Whether PTI's failure to conduct intra-party elections as per the Elections Act, 2017, and ECP's directives renders it ineligible to obtain an election symbol.Holding:The Supreme Court held that PTI?s failure to conduct intra-party elections makes it ineligible for an election symbol under the Elections Act, 2017.Reasoning:Intra-Party Elections:The Court emphasized the significance of intra-party elections for democratic functioning within political parties, as mandated by the Elections Act, 2017.Role of ECP:The ECP is constitutionally entrusted with ensuring democratic practices in political parties, including enforcing intra-party elections.PTI?s Non-Compliance:PTI?s disregard for ECP's repeated directives for intra-party elections was seen as a violation of democratic principles and the Elections Act.Jurisdiction and Authority of ECP:The Supreme Court recognized the ECP?s authority to enforce election laws and its jurisdiction over political parties? internal democratic processes.Legal Precedents and Principles:The Court referred to previous decisions and legal principles emphasizing the importance of internal democracy in political parties, including cases from other jurisdictions that highlight the significance of primary elections.Validity of the Elections Act:The Court upheld the provisions of the Elections Act, 2017, as a valid legal framework governing political parties? internal elections.Disposition:The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the PHC?s judgment, and upheld the ECP?s decision that declared PTI ineligible to obtain an election symbol due to its failure to conduct intra-party elections.Key Citations and Precedents Referenced:The Elections Act, 2017Workers? Party Pakistan v Federation of Pakistan, PLD 2012 Supreme Court 681Benazir Bhutto v Federation of Pakistan, PLD 1989 Supreme Court 66Salahuddin Tirmizi v Election Commission of Pakistan, PLD 2008 Supreme Court 735Muhammad Hanif Abbasi v Imran Khan Niazi, PLD 2018 Supreme Court 189Relevant U.S. Supreme Court decisions emphasizing the importance of primaries in the democratic process.

Summary: Ss. 2 & 3—Criminal Law Amendment (Special Court) Act, 1976 (XVII of 1976), S. 4—Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 6 & 199—Trial for high treason—Judgment of Special Court—Territorial jurisdiction of Lahore High Court—Scope The respondent, a former Chief of Army Staff, was convicted and sentenced to death by the Special Court. The Lahore High Court, through its impugned judgment, allowed a writ petition filed before it and set aside the judgment of the Special Court. The High Court, among other findings, held that initiating proceedings against the respondent for high treason was ultra vires, unlawful, coram non judice, and beyond the constitutional mandate. -------- Legality—The primary grievance raised and the relief sought in the respondent’s writ petition related to acts and proceedings conducted by the Special Court in Islamabad. Under Article 199(1)(a)(ii) of the Constitution, only the Islamabad High Court had territorial jurisdiction over such matters. The Lahore High Court assumed jurisdiction not vested in it, violating the constitutional framework. Despite Supreme Court directives to continue the trial, the Lahore High Court exercised writ jurisdiction under Article 199 to set aside the proceedings of the Special Court, including its final judgment. Lahore High Court Bar Association v. General (Retd.) Pervez Musharraf 2019 SCMR 1029 ref. The acts and proceedings undertaken by the Special Court in Islamabad could only be challenged before the Islamabad High Court. The respondent, instead of pursuing his grievance before the appropriate forum, filed a petition in the Lahore High Court, which entertained the matter without jurisdiction. Government of Pakistan v. Special Court PLD 2020 Isl. 82 ref. --------Art. 199—Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. II, R. 2—Territorial jurisdiction of a High Court—Scope The primary object of the petition, i.e., the main grievance and ultimate relief sought, determines the territorial jurisdiction of the High Courts. If the relief pertains to an act or proceeding within the jurisdiction of a particular High Court, no other High Court can assume jurisdiction. Splitting claims and seeking relief from multiple High Courts regarding the same cause of action is prohibited under Order II, Rule 2, C.P.C. Relief regarding federal actions and acts pursuant to such actions must be sought in one petition and adjudicated by the High Court having territorial jurisdiction over both. --------Sandalbar Enterprises v. Central Board of Revenue PLD 1997 SC 334; Amin Textile Mills v. Federation of Pakistan 1998 SCMR 2389; Sethi and Sethi v. Federation of Pakistan 2012 PTD 1869 and Province of Punjab v. Shehzad Anjum 2024 SCMR 766 ref. --------High Treason (Punishment) Act, 1973 (LXVIII of 1973), S. 2—Criminal Law Amendment (Special Court) Act, 1976 (XVII of 1976), S. 12(3)—Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 6 & 199—Trial for high treason—Maintainability of writ petition—Availability of alternate remedy The High Court’s writ jurisdiction cannot be invoked where an adequate, alternate remedy exists under the law. Section 12(3) of the Criminal Law Amendment (Special Court) Act, 1976, provides an appeal mechanism to the Supreme Court against a Special Court’s judgment. The respondent bypassed this remedy and sought relief under writ jurisdiction, which is impermissible under the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies. A party must utilize the remedies provided under the relevant law before invoking writ jurisdiction. --------Imran Khattak v. Sofia Waqar Khattak 2014 SCMR 122; Tariq Transport Company v. Sarghodha-Bhera Bus Service PLD 1958 SC (Pak.) 437; Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax/Wealth Tax v. Punjab Beverage Company 2008 SCMR 308 ref. --------S. 9—Trial in absentia—Lahore High Court declared Section 9 ultra vires the Constitution—Legality Section 9 of the Criminal Law Amendment (Special Court) Act, 1976, allows the trial of an accused in absentia under specific circumstances, such as willful absence or behavior impeding justice. The Lahore High Court declared Section 9 unconstitutional, stating that trials in absentia are impermissible. However, the respondent was not "aggrieved" under Article 199(1)(a) or (c) of the Constitution and had not challenged the entire provision of Section 9. The High Court’s declaration lacked reasoning and was legally unjustified. --------Lahore High Court Bar Association v. General (Retd.) Pervez Musharraf 2019 SCMR 1029 ref. --------S. 3—Constitution and reconstitution of Special Court—Applicability of Mustafa Impex judgment The Lahore High Court invalidated the Federal Government’s actions, including the filing of a complaint and constitution of the Special Court, relying on the Mustafa Impex judgment (PLD 2016 SC 808). However, the principle in Mustafa Impex is not retroactive and applies only from the date of its pronouncement. The constitution and reconstitution of the Special Court predated this judgment and complied with the legal framework. Actions taken after Mustafa Impex also adhered to its principles. Thus, the High Court’s findings were contrary to the law. --------PMDC v. Muhammad Fahad Malik, 2018 SCMR 1956 ref.----- The case pertains to the legality of the Lahore High Court's decision that annulled proceedings and conviction of General (Retd.) Pervez Musharraf by a Special Court for high treason under Article 6 of the Constitution. The Lahore High Court's judgment was challenged on grounds of lack of territorial jurisdiction and its misapplication of the law, especially with respect to precedents set by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court had jurisdiction and acted within the bounds of constitutional and legal principles. ------- Issues: ------- 1) Did the Lahore High Court have territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition against the acts and proceedings of the Islamabad-based Special Court? ------- 2) Was the exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 199 justified in the presence of an alternate adequate remedy of appeal? ------- 3) Did the Lahore High Court violate precedents and directions of the Supreme Court in setting aside the Special Court's proceedings? ------- 4) Was the Lahore High Court correct in declaring Section 9 of the Special Court Act ultra vires the Constitution? ------- 5) Did the High Court exceed its jurisdiction by deciding on the merits of the high treason charges? ------- Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: Lack of Jurisdiction: The Supreme Court held that the Lahore High Court lacked territorial jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution. The acts and proceedings of the Special Court, located in Islamabad, fell exclusively within the territorial jurisdiction of the Islamabad High Court. ------- Alternate Remedy: The High Court’s exercise of writ jurisdiction was unwarranted as the respondent had an adequate remedy of appeal under Section 12(3) of the Special Court Act, which was ultimately availed. ------- Violation of Precedents: The Supreme Court noted the Lahore High Court’s disregard for binding precedents, including prior Supreme Court judgments, undermined judicial propriety. ------- Section 9 of the Special Court Act: The declaration of the entire Section 9 as ultra vires was unwarranted and lacked justification. The Supreme Court reaffirmed its earlier decision in Lahore High Court Bar Association validating trials in absentia under certain conditions. ------- Merits of the Case: The Lahore High Court improperly delved into the substantive issue of whether General Musharraf committed high treason, usurping the jurisdiction of the Special Court and appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. ------- Outcome: The Supreme Court set aside the Lahore High Court’s judgment, holding it unconstitutional and without jurisdiction. The petitions were converted into appeals and allowed. ------- Citations/Precedents: Sindh High Court Bar Association v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2009 SC 879): Declared the Proclamation of Emergency Order, PCO, and Oath Order of 2007 unconstitutional. Nadeem Ahmed v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2010 SC 1165): Reaffirmed the invalidity of actions taken under the PCO. Moulvi Iqbal Haider v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2013 SC 507): Directed inquiry and trial under Article 6 for high treason. Abdul Hameed Dogar v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2016 SC 607): Limited the Special Court’s authority to associate suspects. Lahore High Court Bar Association v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2019 SC 645): Validated trial in absentia under Section 9 of the Special Court Act. Mustafa Impex v. Government of Pakistan (PLD 2016 SC 808): Mandated Federal Cabinet approval for actions by the Prime Minister. PMDC v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2018 SC 189): Limited retrospective application of Mustafa Impex. Sandalbar Enterprises (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Central Board of Revenue (1997 SCMR 1131): Defined territorial jurisdiction of High Courts. Amin Textile Mills Ltd. v. Central Board of Revenue (1992 SCMR 1652): Emphasized dominant relief determining territorial jurisdiction. Sethi and Sethi v. Collector of Customs (1985 CLC 324): Addressed relief-seeking in territorial jurisdiction. Articles 189 and 190 of the Constitution: Establish binding authority of Supreme Court judgments on all judicial and executive authorities.

Summary: Background:This case involves multiple civil appeals (Nos. 26-K to 38-K of 2021) against a common judgment dated 08.04.2021 by the Sindh High Court, Karachi, which dismissed various constitutional petitions related to the regularization of services. The appellants, initially appointed on a contract basis as Deputy District Attorneys and other positions, sought regularization under the Sindh (Regularization of Adhoc and Contract Employees) Act, 2013. Despite fulfilling the criteria and being in service, their regularization was not processed, prompting them to approach the High Court. The High Court, while dismissing their petitions, also declared the 2013 Act ultra vires (beyond the powers) without the appellants challenging the Act?s validity.----Issues:Whether the appellants, being contractual employees, were entitled to regularization under the Sindh (Regularization of Adhoc and Contract Employees) Act, 2013.Whether the Sindh High Court could declare the 2013 Act ultra vires without it being directly challenged and in the absence of any aggrieved parties challenging its validity.------Holding/Reasoning:The Supreme Court found that the Sindh High Court had overreached its jurisdiction by declaring the 2013 Act ultra vires when the appellants had not challenged the Act's validity. The Supreme Court emphasized that the High Court does not possess suo motu jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution similar to the Supreme Court's under Article 184(3). The judgment by the High Court affected the rights of numerous employees already regularized or under consideration for regularization without giving them an opportunity to be heard, violating Article 10-A of the Constitution, which guarantees the right to a fair trial and due process.The Supreme Court held that the High Court should have confined its decision to whether the appellants were entitled to regularization under the 2013 Act, rather than delving into the validity of the Act itself. The Supreme Court underscored the principle that courts should aim to uphold laws rather than striking them down, ensuring not to overstep their jurisdictional bounds.-----Citations/Precedents:Dr. Imran Khattak v. Ms. Sofia Waqar Khattak, establishing limits on judicial jurisdiction.Jahanzaib Malik v. Balochistan Public Procurement Regulatory Authority, on the High Court's lack of suo motu jurisdiction.Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif and others v. Muhammad Habib Wahab Al-Khairi and others, regarding the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution.Raja Muhammad Nadeem v. The State and another, Mian Irfan Bashir v. The Deputy Commissioner, Lahore and others, and M/s Sadiq Poultry (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, all reinforcing the High Court's lack of suo motu jurisdiction and the principle of judicial restraint.

Summary: Issue: The petitioners challenged the validity of the insertion of Section 5 TE through the Finance Act, 2022, to the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. This section deemed that for the tax year 2022 and onwards, a resident person would be considered to have derived income equal to 5% of the fair market value of their capital assets situated in Pakistan, chargeable to tax at 20% under Division-VIII C of Part-I of the Ordinance. This specifically targeted immovable property owned by resident persons.---Arguments: The petitioners argued that this deeming clause to tax the fair market value of immovable property as income was not permissible, citing precedents from the Apex Court in the case of Messrs Elahi Cotton Mills and the Indian Supreme Court in the case of Harbhajan Singh Dhillon. They contended that taxing the capital value of an asset, particularly targeting immovable property alone, was beyond the competence of Parliament.---Decision: The court held that:In light of Entry No. 50 of the Fourth Schedule to the Constitution, Parliament did not have the jurisdiction to impose income tax on immovable property.However, Parliament did have the jurisdiction to tax the capital value of assets per Entry No. 47 of the Fourth Schedule to the Constitution.The court did not agree with the reasoning of the Sindh High Court, which upheld the impugned legislation, nor did it find the curative judgment of the Lahore High Court, which suggested reading down the impugned legislation, appropriate.---Outcome: The court declared the challenged section concerning the taxation of the fair market value of immovable property as income beyond the Parliament's jurisdiction.