Summary: (a) Federal Excise Act, 2005 (FEA, 2005) **---S. 3 & S. 7---Sales Tax Act, 1990---Issuance of consolidated show-cause notice under distinct fiscal statutes---Jurisdictional defect---Illegality---Scope---**Petitioners challenged show-cause notices (SCNs) issued under both FEA, 2005 and Sales Tax Act, 1990 through a single, combined instrument---Held, FEA, 2005 and STA, 1990 are separate, independent fiscal statutes with distinct procedural frameworks governing assessment, adjudication, and appeal---Issuance of a consolidated SCN under both Acts is unlawful, without jurisdiction, and contrary to legislative intent---Tax proceedings must be conducted under the distinct authority of each statute---Conflation of two separate taxing statutes into a single SCN vitiates due process and renders the notice void ab initio. Cited Cases: • Commissioner Inland Revenue v. Rose Food Industries 2023 SCMR 2070 • Cement Company Ltd. v. CIR (Appeals-II), Karachi 2018 PTD 388 • CIR v. Allied Stainless Steel Industries 2022 PTD 1930 • PLD 1964 SC 113 (Muhammad Younus v. CBR) (b) Constitution of Pakistan **---Arts. 4, 10-A & 199---Show-cause notice---Maintainability of constitutional petition---Exception to bar---Scope---**Petitioners challenged SCNs on grounds of being ultra vires, jurisdictionally defective, and issued without statutory authority---Held, although ordinarily writ petitions are not entertained against SCNs, an exception exists where the notice is patently without jurisdiction or issued in violation of law---Court can exercise constitutional jurisdiction to prevent abuse of power and denial of fair trial---Where SCN is issued without authority under relevant law or combines distinct statutory regimes, such illegality justifies intervention under Art. 199. Cited Cases: • Pakistan Oilfields Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan 2020 PTD 110 (IHC) • Gatron Industries Ltd. v. Government of Pakistan 1999 SCMR 1072 • Chairman NAB v. Nasar Ullah PLD 2022 SC 497 • Federation of Pakistan v. E-Movers (Pvt.) Ltd. 2022 SCMR 1021 (c) Tax Law & Procedure **---Due process---Specificity of charge---Requirement of fair adjudication---Scope---**Held, SCNs must contain precise allegations, specific statutory references, and must not rely on vague or inconclusive secondary data---Issuance of SCN must be backed by jurisdiction, law, and procedural propriety---Any action without adherence to statutory framework violates due process and cannot be sustained in law---Combined SCN, based on inconclusive data and arbitrary authority, denied petitioners the right to a fair opportunity of defence. Cited Cases: • Commissioner Inland Revenue v. Millat Tractors Ltd. 2024 SCMR 700 • Federation of Pakistan v. M/s Hashwani Hotels Ltd. PLD 1990 SC 68 • M/s Mirpurkhas Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Govt. of Sindh 1993 SCMR 920 (d) Fiscal Statutes Interpretation **---Strict construction---No room for intendment---Scope---**Held, fiscal laws must be interpreted strictly; no tax can be imposed or collected unless clearly authorized by statute---No implied authority exists to issue consolidated SCNs across different taxing regimes unless expressly provided---Any departure from explicit procedure vitiates the legality of the entire proceedings. Cited Cases: • Govt. of West Pakistan v. M/s Jabees Ltd. PLD 1991 SC 870 • CIT v. Mst. Khatija Begum PLD 1965 SC 472 (e) Administrative Law **---Ultra vires action---Public authority acting beyond conferred powers---Scope---**Held, a statutory authority cannot act outside the limits prescribed by law---Any attempt to combine powers not authorized by statute renders such action void---The department retains liberty to issue fresh notices under respective laws but must adhere to procedural safeguards. Disposition: Writ Petition No.2399/2016 and connected petitions allowed; consolidated SCNs declared unlawful, without jurisdiction, and void ab initio. Connected Cases (Annex-A): • W.P. No. 2400/2016 • W.P. No. 2565/2016 • W.P. No. 2571/2016 • W.P. No. 909/2017 • W.P. No. 50/2021

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan: ----Art. 199 Maintainability of writ petition against civil court decree—Availability of adequate alternative remedy—Scope—Petitioner assailed judgment and decree dated 28.09.2022 along with certain interlocutory orders passed by the civil court in a suit for declaration and partition—Held, where a specific and effective remedy is available under law (such as an appeal under S. 96, C.P.C.), invocation of constitutional jurisdiction under Art. 199 is not maintainable—Constitutional jurisdiction is not a substitute for appellate remedy nor can it be invoked to circumvent the statutory forum—Courts must exercise restraint and decline to interfere where alternate remedy has not been exhausted—Petitioner failed to avail the appellate remedy and directly approached the High Court without justification—Petition dismissed accordingly. Cited Case: Government of Punjab v. Abdur Rehman 2022 SCMR 25 (b) Constitution of Pakistan: ----Art. 199 Writ jurisdiction—Scope and limits—Reappraisal of facts—Held, the High Court cannot act as a court of appeal while exercising writ jurisdiction—Constitutional jurisdiction is not meant to reassess factual findings or reappreciate evidence—Jurisdiction under Art. 199 is limited to cases where illegality, lack of jurisdiction, or violation of fundamental rights is apparent—A writ petition cannot be used as a cloak of appeal to challenge findings of fact recorded by a trial court. Cited Case: Veerappa Pillai v. Raman & Raman Ltd. AIR 1952 SC 192 (c) Civil Procedure Code, 1908: **----S. 96—Right of Appeal—Mandatory nature—Held, where judgment is delivered by a civil court of original jurisdiction, the proper recourse lies in filing a first appeal under S. 96, C.P.C.—Failure to avail this remedy renders a constitutional petition incompetent—Doctrine of exhaustion of remedies bars a petitioner from bypassing the appellate forum to directly invoke constitutional jurisdiction. (d) Constitution of Pakistan: **----Art. 199—Doctrine of Laches—Delay in filing petition—Held, writ petition filed after unreasonable and unexplained delay is liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches—Equity aids the vigilant, not those who sleep on their rights—Court may decline relief where a petitioner has remained passive and allowed time to elapse without pursuing available remedies—Such delay amounts to acquiescence—Petitioner’s writ petition was delayed and no reasonable excuse was offered—Relief denied on this ground. Reference: Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol. 14, 3rd Ed., Monographs 1181–1182. ----Disposition: Writ petition found to be misconceived and barred by the doctrine of laches—Petitioner failed to avail adequate alternate remedy of appeal under Section 96, C.P.C.—Constitutional petition dismissed in limine. "Respondent of a suit for recovery of separate possession through partition of suit house, recovery of mesne profit along with permanent and mandatory injunction challenges orders and seeks remanding back to Learned Trial Court for decision afresh."

Summary: (a) Family Law – Dissolution of Marriage, Dower & Maintenance: ––Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 35; West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964; Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, S. 5; Nikahnama (Marriage Contract)–– Family dispute involving dissolution of marriage, claim for recovery of gold ornaments, immovable property as dower, maintenance of wife and minor children, and dowry articles––Petitioner/husband denied allegations and sought restitution of conjugal rights––Trial court partially decreed suit, allowing maintenance for wife and children, recovery of dowry articles, but rejected claim of immovable property and gold ornaments as dower––Appellate court reversed trial court to extent of immovable property, holding that Rs.5000/- and 05 tola gold ornaments had been paid in lieu of dower––High Court, however, restored trial court’s findings, holding that columns 13 to 16 of the nikahnama must be read holistically to determine intention of parties regarding dower––Court emphasized that immovable property mentioned therein was not alternate but part of the dower––Court relied upon PLD 2016 SC 613 (Ms. Yasmeen Bibi v. Muhammad Ghazanfar Khan), 2022 MLD 416, and 2024 SCMR 1078 (Muhammad Yousaf v. Huma Saeed) to affirm that dower may include cash, ornaments, and immovable property where evidenced in nikahnama and no rebuttal is furnished––Doctrine of contra proferentem applied due to socio-cultural realities where wife typically does not negotiate nikah terms––Court observed that burden lies on husband to disprove intention of dower where ambiguity exists. (b) Maintenance of Minor Children: ––Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 35; West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964–– Respondent/wife sought Rs.10,000/- per month for each minor child with 10% annual increase––Trial court fixed Rs.2500/- per child; appellate court enhanced to Rs.3000/- with Rs.250/- annual increase––High Court found these amounts inadequate given inflation, petitioner’s admitted monthly income of Rs.23,000/-, and educational expenses of school-going minors––Court enhanced monthly maintenance to Rs.5000/- per minor with 10% annual increase till their marriages––Father directed to separately pay school fee directly to school, subject to any discount available due to mother’s employment––Court placed emphasis on Quranic injunctions (Surah Al-Baqarah 2:233) and socio-economic needs of children including health, food, clothing, and education to ensure fair upbringing. (c) Admissibility of Nikahnama & Interpretation of Its Terms: ––Nikahnama Columns 13–16; Evidence Act (1872), S. 91–– Non-examination of nikah khwan not fatal to claim where nikahnama produced and admitted without objection––Petitioner failed to produce any rebuttal or evidence disproving wife’s claim––Court reiterated that nikahnama is a civil contract, and all its clauses, especially those pertaining to dower, must be interpreted in light of parties’ intent and prevailing jurisprudence––Headings in nikahnama are not conclusive; literal and holistic interpretation required as held in 2024 SCMR 1078––In case of ambiguity, benefit to be given to wife unless husband proves that wife was fully informed and participated in negotiation of terms. (d) Delay and Non-Prosecution of Writ Petition: ––Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. IX, R. 9–– Writ petition remained pending for years due to repeated absence of petitioner and withdrawal of counsel––Despite restoration with cost, petitioner continued to remain absent, leading court to proceed ex parte––Court stressed importance of expeditious justice and discouraged delays by litigants. ----Disposition: Writ Petition No. 1923-P of 2020 dismissed; connected Writ Petition No. 4049-P of 2020 partially allowed––Decree regarding petitioner’s share in ancestral house as dower restored––Maintenance for minors enhanced to Rs.5000/- per month with 10% annual increase––Petitioner directed to pay school fee directly and deposit Rs.10,000/- cost imposed earlier. ----Cited Cases: • Ms. Yasmeen Bibi v. Muhammad Ghazanfar Khan, PLD 2016 SC 613 • Muhammad Qayyum Anjum v. ADJ Muzaffargarh, 2022 MLD 416 • Muhammad Yousuf v. Huma Saeed and Others, 2024 SCMR 1078 • Muhammad Maroof v. Mst. Mariam Farooq, W.P. No. 50/2024, LHC Rawalpindi Bench • Saddam Hussain v. Bibi Habiba, W.P. No. 606-B/2023 "Constitution Petition: Held: The Principle--- that column No. 13 to 16 in the nikahnama need to be holistically interpreted--- is further elaborated in the given facts and circumstances of the case. A doubt in the nikahnama as regards dower, is to be resolved in favour of wife, given our socio-culture norms that a bride is not meaningfully and demonstrable consulted at the time of nikah while dower is fixed and its mood of payment, proposed."

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 497(1), third & fourth provisos – Bail – Statutory Delay ––Bail in non-bailable offence––Delay in conclusion of trial––Scope and limitations under third and fourth provisos to S. 497(1), Cr.P.C––Petitioner accused of murdering his wife and concealing her body for nearly 18 days in a wooden box––Application for post-arrest bail filed on the ground of statutory delay––Held, third proviso to S. 497(1) Cr.P.C mandates release on bail where trial has not concluded within statutory time limits, provided the delay is not attributable to the accused––In present case, delay of more than two years established as not being attributable to petitioner––However, benefit of third proviso is subject to exclusionary conditions in fourth proviso––Court examined whether petitioner could be categorized as a “hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal”––Nature and gravity of offence, role of accused, and subsequent conduct relevant factors––Petitioner neither reported wife’s disappearance nor foul smell from decomposed body for 18 days––Admitted before I.O. to have murdered his wife on allegations of immoral character––Court held that such conduct reflects dangerous disposition and therefore falls within fourth proviso––Petitioner thus disentitled to benefit of third proviso despite statutory delay. (b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302, 311, 120-B, 34 – Honour Killing – Legal Status ––Murder of wife allegedly on pretext of “honour”––Accused admitted to killing wife due to suspicion of character––Dead body concealed in wooden box––Held, no person can take law into their own hands under the guise of honour––Such killings are treated as qatl-i-amd simpliciter––Reliance placed on PLD 2001 SC 96 (Muhammad Akram v. The State) where Supreme Court held that honour killings are neither justified by law nor by religion and are violative of fundamental rights––Accused cannot escape criminal liability merely on basis of alleged moral lapses of victim––Bail rightly refused in light of gravity of offence and conduct of accused. Disposition: Bail application dismissed––Petitioner found ineligible for statutory bail under third proviso to S. 497(1), Cr.P.C due to bar of fourth proviso. ----Cited Case: • Muhammad Akram v. The State, PLD 2001 SC 96 "1. In order to get a right of bail under the third proviso to section 497 (1) Cr.P.C, an accused person has not only to prove that his trial could not be concluded within the statutory period but he has also to prove that the delay in the conclusion of the trial is neither attributable to him nor to any person acting on his behalf besides he has also to prove that his case is not hit by the conditions precedent for attracting the fourth proviso to section 497 (1) Cr.P.C. 2. Under the established criminal jurisprudence, the third and fourth provisos to section 497 (1) Cr.P.C could not co-exist. If the fourth proviso does attract to the case of an accused person, then he will not be entitled for the benefit of the third proviso. In order to determine the applicability or otherwise of the fourth proviso to section 497 (1) Cr.P.C to the case of an accused person, the Court has to see that as to whether firstly that if he is a previously convicted offender for an offence punishable with death or life imprisonment; secondly that if he, in the opinion of the Court, is a hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal; and thirdlythat if he has been an accused of an act of terrorism punishable with death or imprisonment for life. 3. In forming an opinion by the Court of law that as to whether an accused person is a hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal, it amongst the other factors, could consider the nature of offence, the role attributed to the accused, the manner in which the offence was committed and the conduct of the accused. 4. Under the established criminal jurisprudence, any person is neither legally or religiously have a right to take the law into his own hands nor to take the life of anybody in the name of family honour."

Summary: Bail granted---(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 497 – Bail – Fresh Ground – Principle of Consistency: ––Post-arrest bail––Fresh ground––Principle of consistency––Petitioner charged under Ss. 302, 324, 337A, 337D, 147, 148, 149 PPC and S.15 of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Arms Act, 2013 in FIR involving death and injuries resulting from a violent altercation––Earlier bail petition dismissed by High Court––Co-accused subsequently granted bail by Supreme Court (Criminal Petition No.1186/2024) on ground that case involved a cross-version––Petitioner’s role found identical to that of co-accused––Held, principle of consistency is a valid and independent fresh ground for bail when not available at time of earlier dismissal––High Court noted that Supreme Court’s finding regarding cross-version and grant of bail to co-accused was a material subsequent development––Also observed that co-accused Behrobar was granted bail by High Court on same basis after the Apex Court’s ruling––In circumstances, petitioner entitled to bail on rule of consistency––Reliance placed on Abid v. The State, 2016 SCMR 907, where Supreme Court held that similarly placed co-accused must be treated equally in bail matters. (b) Criminal Law – Cross-Version and Equal Treatment: ––Equal treatment in cases involving cross-versions––Where role of petitioner and co-accused is identical and case is accepted by superior court as cross-version, all similarly situated accused are entitled to equal treatment in bail––Denying bail to one would amount to discrimination in law enforcement and undermine consistency in judicial reasoning––Principle reaffirmed by both Apex Court and High Court––Benefit of Apex Court’s interpretation extended to petitioner as a fresh ground. ----Disposition: Bail petition allowed––Petitioner admitted to bail on furnishing surety bonds of Rs.100,000/- with two sureties in like amount. Cited Case: • Abid v. The State and others, 2016 SCMR 907 "Where the High Court has not favorably considered the case of two or more accused persons on a common ground and out of them, one has approached to the Apex Court against the order of the High Court and the Apex Court has favorably considered that ground in favor of such an accused then the co-accused, who has not approached to the Apex Court, could file a subsequent bail application before the competent Court on the fresh ground, which has accrued to such an accused person after passing of the judgment by the Apex Court. 2. A fresh ground for a subsequent bail application is to be considered that ground which was not available to the accused person at the time of filing of an earlier bail application rather available to him after the filing/ decision of the earlier bail application. 3. Any ground, available to an accused person at the time of filing of an earlier bail application but when the same has not been taken/ agitated in the earlier bail application then such ground could not be considered as a fresh ground."

Summary: ''Procedure for summoning individuals as court witnesses; the Court's role while exercising its powers under Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure; the purpose of criminal trials and the rationale behind the incorporation of Sections 94, 244, 265-F, and 540 of the Cr.P.C, as well as Article 161 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Ordinance (QSO) and Rule 2 of Chapter 1-E, Volume III of the Rules and Orders of the Lahore High Court.'' ----- (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ----Ss. 244 & 540---Magisterial trial---Scope of prosecution evidence---Mandatory nature of Section 244, Cr.P.C.---Court must record all evidence presented in support of prosecution and defence---Use of the word “shall” indicates mandatory character of provision---Trial Court obligated to admit material prosecution witness omitted from police challan, where evidence essential for fair decision---Held, Court's role in criminal trials is inquisitorial; it must actively seek truth to secure ends of justice. Cited Cases: • The Collector of Sales Tax v. Super Asia Mohammad Din and Sons 2017 SCMR 1427 • Hakam Deen v. The State PLD 2006 SC (AJ&K) 43 (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ----S. 540---Calling additional witness---Belated application---Effect---Court has discretion and duty to summon witness if their testimony is essential for just adjudication, irrespective of timing---Even if a witness was not cited in the challan or their statement under S. 161 was omitted, Court must allow testimony if relevant to determining truth---No application is required; Trial Court may act suo motu---Delay or omission by investigating agency cannot preclude the Court from exercising this power. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Azam v. Muhammad Iqbal PLD 1984 SC 95 • Abdul Latif Aassi v. The State 1999 MLD 1069 • The State v. Muhammad Yaqoob 2001 SCMR 308 • Chairman NAB v. Muhammad Usman PLD 2018 SC 28 • Sajid Mehmood v. The State 2022 SCMR 1882 (c) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 ----Art. 161---Power of Court---Inquisitorial nature of trial---Court empowered to question any party or witness at any time to discover relevant facts---Objective is to ascertain truth and not merely decide based on prosecution-defence contest---Court must ensure justice is not compromised due to omission or error by parties. (d) Code of Criminal Procedure (V of 1898) ----S. 561-A---Inherent powers---Scope---Setting aside revisional order---Trial Court permitted a prosecution eyewitness (named in FIR but omitted in challan) to testify under S. 540 Cr.P.C.---Revisional court erroneously set aside this order without properly interpreting law on additional evidence---Held, impugned revisional order was legally flawed and based on misapplication of law---Restoration of Trial Court’s order necessary to secure ends of justice. **(e) Criminal trial---Role of Court---Duty to secure justice---Inquisitorial role of magistrate in criminal proceedings requires active effort to clarify ambiguities, remove obscurities, and ensure that both innocence and guilt are determined accurately---Trial Court must remain vigilant and proactive, especially in admitting material evidence vital to fair adjudication. Cited Cases: • Khuda Bux v. The State 2024 PCr.LJ 2014 (Sindh) • Zaheer Ahmed v. Judge, Special Court PLD 2023 Lahore 528 • Ch. Muhammad Anwar v. Judge Accountability Court 2021 MLD 648 Disposition: Petition under S. 561-A, Cr.P.C. allowed; impugned revisional order set aside; Trial Court’s order restoring petitioner’s right to testify as prosecution witness reinstated; Trial Court directed to conclude trial within two months.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 – Article 4 – Control of discretionary power – Termination during probation – Scope and legality: Petitioner, a BPS-21 Professor, was terminated through Notification dated 27.12.2018 with effect from 20.12.2018—Challenge was made to legality of termination on grounds of violation of due process, retrospective effect, lack of hearing, and mala fides—Petitioner argued that the Notification was issued by an incompetent authority and in violation of principles of good governance—Held, petitioner was appointed on probation for one year vide appointment letter dated 22.12.2017, which specifically provided that his services could be terminated without notice or assigning reasons during probation—Syndicate, being the competent authority under Shaheed Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto Medical University Act, 2013, approved termination in its 12th meeting on 20.12.2018—Notification issued thereafter did not suffer from illegality—Principles of natural justice such as audi alteram partem do not apply to simpliciter termination of a probationer unless mala fides are established, which were absent in the present case. ----Cited Cases: Muhammad Iqbal Khan Niazi v. Lahore High Court, 2003 PLC (CS) 282 M. Munir v. Government of Punjab, NLR 1998 Service 124 Muhammad Hussain Naqshabandi v. Government of Punjab, 2004 SCMR 44 Muhammad Nadeem Ahmed v. Azhra Feroz Bakhat, PLD 1968 SC 37 Shahzada Shahpur Tan v. Auditor General of Pakistan, PLD 1984 SC 430 (b) Service Law – Probation – Nature of employment – Termination – No vested right to continue: –––Probationary appointment is by nature temporary and conditional—Termination simpliciter during such period cannot be questioned unless shown to be mala fide—University acted within terms of appointment and under proper legal authority—Petitioner's plea that notification had retrospective effect was held meritless since decision was taken by the Syndicate on 20.12.2018 and notified shortly after. (c) University governance – SZABMU Act, 2013 – Role of Syndicate – Competence to terminate services: –––As per Section 25 of the SZABMU Act, the Syndicate has exclusive authority to make appointments and determine terms of service for posts in BPS-19 and above—Petitioner was in BPS-21; therefore, Syndicate was legally competent to terminate his services—Notification issued following Syndicate's decision held valid and intra vires. (d) Service Law – Non-issuance of NOC – Allegation of mala fides – Justification: –––Petitioner’s claim that denial of No Objection Certificate (NOC) for alternate employment was mala fide—Court held that ongoing disciplinary inquiry and petitioner's alleged misconduct including disappearance of personal file were sufficient justification for refusal of NOC.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan: ----Art. 199---Maintainability of constitutional petition---Scope---Interlocutory order passed by Rent Controller---Petitioner challenged the dismissal of application under O.XII, R.6, C.P.C. seeking judgment on admission in pending eviction proceedings---Held, that the impugned order was not final and did not cause any tangible or irreparable injury to petitioner---Constitutional jurisdiction under Art.199 may only be invoked where no adequate alternate remedy is available and there exists a grave, imminent or substantial threat to personal or property rights---Challenge to an interlocutory, procedural order without finality or decisive consequence held not maintainable under constitutional jurisdiction. ----Cited Cases: • Muhammad Saeed v. Mst. Sirat Fatima, PLD 1978 Lah. 1459 • Mohammad Tariq v. Safdar Hussain, 2016 MLD 67 Lah. (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908): ----O.XII, R.6---Judgment on admissions---Nature of admission---Admission must be clear, unambiguous, categorical and made in the pleadings---Held, that admission made by attorney of respondents during cross-examination does not fall within scope of O.XII, R.6, C.P.C.---Such oral statement in evidence, in absence of any formal admission in pleadings, cannot be treated as binding admission for purposes of judgment on admission---Application rightly dismissed by Rent Controller. ----Cited Case: • Divisional Superintendent Postal Services Faisalabad v. Khalid Mehmood, 2023 SCMR 354 (c) Islamabad Rent Restriction Ordinance, 2001: ----S. 17---Eviction petition---Application of CPC---Scope---CPC provisions not applicable to rent proceedings stricto sensu---However, Rent Controllers may adopt equitable principles consistent with CPC where appropriate---Application under O.XII, R.6, C.P.C., not maintainable in eviction proceedings absent a formal and categorical admission in pleadings. ----Cited Cases: • Ayub Khan v. Fazal Haq, PLD 1976 SC 422 • Bambina Ltd. v. Selmor Intl. Ltd., PLD 1983 SC 155 ----Disposition: Writ petition dismissed in limine---Impugned order found legal, non-final, and incapable of causing prejudice to petitioner.

Summary: 1. In order to get a right of bail under the third proviso to section 497 (1) Cr.P.C an accused person has not only to prove that his trial could not be concluded within the statutory period but he has also to prove that the delay in the conclusion of the trial is neither attributable to him nor to any person acting on his behalf besides he has also to prove that his case is not hit by the conditions precedent for attracting the fourth proviso to section 497 (1) Cr.P.C. 2. Under the established criminal jurisprudence the third and fourth provisos to section 497 (1) Cr.P.C could not co-exist. If the fourth proviso does attract to the case of an accused person then he will not be entitled for the benefit of the third proviso. In order to determine the applicability or otherwise of the fourth proviso to section 497 (1) Cr.P.C to the case of an accused person the Court has to see that as to whether firstly that if he is a previously convicted offender for an offence punishable with death or life imprisonment; secondly that if he in the opinion of the Court is a hardened desperate or dangerous criminal; and thirdlythat if he has been an accused of an act of terrorism punishable with death or imprisonment for life. 3. In forming an opinion by the Court of law that as to whether an accused person is a hardened desperate or dangerous criminal it amongst the other factors could consider the nature of offence the role attributed to the accused the manner in which the offence was committed and the conduct of the accused. 4. Under the established criminal jurisprudence any person is neither legally or religiously have a right to take the law into his own hands nor to take the life of anybody in the name of family honour.

Summary: Where the High Court has not favorably considered the case of two or more accused persons on a common ground and out of them one has approached to the Apex Court against the order of the High Court and the Apex Court has favorably considered that ground in favor of such an accused then the co-accused who has not approached to the Apex Court could file a subsequent bail application before the competent Court on the fresh ground which has accrued to such an accused person after passing of the judgment by the Apex Court. 2. A fresh ground for a subsequent bail application is to be considered that ground which was not available to the accused person at the time of filing of an earlier bail application rather available to him after the filing/ decision of the earlier bail application. 3. Any ground available to an accused person at the time of filing of an earlier bail application but when the same has not been taken/ agitated in the earlier bail application then such ground could not be considered as a fresh ground.